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

JOHN ELOF BOODIN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

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1939

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By JOHN ELOF BOODIN

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Published September, 1939.

TO

JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS

SANE AND SYMPATHETIC
INTERPRETER
OF
HUMAN RELATIONS.

FOREWORD

In the crisis through which we are passing there is developing a new interest in social philosophy. But our efforts at present are fragmentary and there is great need of systematic synthesis. To attempt an empirical synthesis in our present milieu is a stupendous undertaking. The field of social philosophy overlaps several basic sciences—biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, history. I have tried to take account of these sciences in this work. Since society is part of the evolution of nature it has cosmic implications which can be only suggested in a work like this.

Two conceptions which have recently been emphasized in philosophy and social theory, namely creative synthesis or emergence and wholism[1] or gestaltism have been basic in the writing of this book from the first published essay in 1913.[2] These concepts are now so well known that they do not require explanation. Creative synthesis (epigenesis, emergence) means that new characters, not present in the constituent factors or conditions, appear as a result of the interaction. Wholism means that individuals or events can be understood only as figuring in a whole or gestalt. It is important to bear in mind that this whole must have reference to time as well as to space. Social relations illustrate both emergence and wholism. The two concepts, however, do not always go together. Casual social relations may influence human beings, but they do not constitute a whole or group.

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1. Called *Holism* by J. C. Smuts in his important work of that title, 1925.
2. These concepts were basic in *Time and Reality*, 1904; *Truth and Reality*, 1911; *A Realistic Universe*, 1916, 1931; *Cosmic Evolution*, 1925; *Three Interpretations of the Universe*, 1934; *God*, 1934.

I have used the expression, social mind, for the synthesis of individual minds into wholes, with new properties. Just as the chemist speaks of the synthesis of material atoms into molecules as matter, so we may speak of the synthesis of particular minds into new unities as mind. In such a treatment of the subject, we stear clear, on the one hand, of the fallacy of individualism which emphasizes the parts and neglects the whole-form, and, on the other hand, of the fallacy of transcendentalism which recognizes the whole-form but abstracts from the component parts. It is high time for us to recognize that in the realm of social relations, as well as in the realm of physical relations, there is an order of emergent wholes, with their characteristic properties, with which we must deal, if we would be successful in social relations. It is certain that we cannot know a human being in isolation. We can know it only as it enters into various creative syntheses. The great problem of today—a problem as old as human history—is to try to understand the conditions of these human syntheses, in order that we may guide them towards harmonious behavior, as the chemist by understanding physical syntheses is able to avert catastrophes and to guide them into useful channels. The pressing need of the future is not so much the advance in inorganic chemistry or even organic chemistry, as it is the advance in social chemistry. The neglected field is social relations. Unless we can meet the urgent problems in this field, our advance in other fields will be in vain. The chief purpose of striving to understand society is that we may create a better society.

This book has been a long time in the making, and in the meantime a great deal of the material has appeared in provisional form in various periodicals to which I wish to express my appreciation for their courtesy in allowing me to make use of the published articles. Since these articles have come out during a period of over twenty-five years, considerable rewriting and supplementation have been neces-

sary, but the main themes have persisted while new themes have been added to fill out the growing scheme. Chapter IV, The Existence of Social Minds, which gives the central conception of the book, was the first essay to take form. It was read as my presidential address at the Easter meeting of the Western Philosophical Association in 1913, and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1913. It has been most often referred to and the most often misunderstood of the published papers. With the dying, by degrees, of the old *laissez faire* individualism and the birth of a conception of wholism in the social sciences, this essay and this book may now have "the advantage of the fitness of the time," to use the language of Shakespeare. Other chapters which have had preliminary publication in the same journal are: Chapter VIII, 1914, under the title, Cognition and Social Interpretation; Chapter VII, 1915, under the title, Value and Social Interpretation; Chapter VI, Social Systems, 1918; and Chapter V, The Law of Social Participation, 1921. Two essays had preliminary publication in the *International Journal of Ethics*, namely, Chapter XV, Social Immortality, 1915, and Chapter XI, the Unit of Civilization, 1920. Chapter XII, Education in Society, first appeared in *School and Society*, 1918. Part of a paper entitled, Education for Democracy, in the same journal, 1918, has been incorporated into the same chapter. Chapter III, under the title, Group Participation as the Sociological Principle par Excellence, appeared as a study in the University of California Press, 1933. Chapter I, the Biological Basis of Society came out in the *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 1936, and Chapter XIV, The Idea of Progress—An Interpretation, appeared in part in the same journal in 1939. I have given these references for the sake of students who may wish to make comparisons. In fairness to the author these essays should be judged by their present form. There are, I think, no radical disagreements, but during twenty-five years there has been development of the au-

thor's thought. Of this the revisions and the new chapters will give evidence. Perhaps I may hope that this work is a pioneer work and prophetic of greater things by other workers in the future. Since I believe that the tendency of the time is in my favor, I look for greater understanding and influence of my work.

I have not tried to give a bibliography of the books and articles bearing upon the topics which are treated in this work. Such a bibliography, if comprehensive, would itself make a large book. I have referred to authors whom I found useful, in stating my own view, at the time of writing. But I have tried to use the direct evidence of human experience, rather than other thinkers' analyses. This book on Social Philosophy may be regarded as a culmination of a series of systematic works on philosophy. It will be out by September 14, 1939, as a celebration of my seventieth birthday. I hope now to start anew. Life begins at seventy, that is, from wherever we are in time.

I am grateful to my colleagues, Professors Kate Gordon, Franklin Fearing and Donald C. Williams for reading the entire manuscript and for the suggestions that they have given me. But, of course, they are not responsible, in any way, for the views expressed in this book. I want also to express my appreciation to Professor Glenn James for reading the proof and to Miss Lois E. Miller for her faithful assistance in putting the book through the press.

The University Club of Los Angeles
California, U. S. A.

Postscript

Since this book went to press, a momentous war has broken out in Europe. The great democracies, the British Empire and France, after having been pressed to the limit, have rebounded to new life and are showing their old-time

energy and resolution in their fight against Hitler's Nazi Germany. A new chapter in the world's history is being written. What type of control is going to dominate the human race? No lover of democracy can be indifferent to the outcome of this conflict.

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CHAPTER I

THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

When we try to grasp the significance of the life of man, we must immerse ourselves in the stream of time. We must consider life as history, if we are to understand its meaning. This we are prone to forget. When we try to rationalize life, we seize upon the flotsam of ideas which are carried by the stream, but we neglect to take account of the stream itself. The ideas are of significance only as they help to indicate the direction of the stream of life as it issues from the depths of the dark caverns of the past, is lighted up by our consciousness for a moment, and then disappears in the enveloping shadows of the future. We fasten our attention upon such stereotypes as reflex, instinct, habit, custom. These are but the thickening of the stream of life for a time. What we must do first of all is to plunge into the stream of life itself, if the floating bits of our analysis are to reveal anything about the meaning of life. Life has meaning only as it carries forward its past and transforms it into the pattern of the future. All the while it is the creative wholeness of the future which makes significant the passage of events.

The division of labor which has resulted in distinct compartments in modern science has had its disadvantages as well as its advantages. It has conduced to efficiency of research in the complexity of modern science, but it has also been a curse in that it has tended to make the investigator blind to the relation of his field of research to other fields of knowledge. It has made it well-nigh impossible to view nature as a whole. Here the Greeks had the advantage. Aristotle could view nature as an organic whole with its soul and could view life as the striving for form in nature and society as the striving for form in human relations. "Man is a political animal."

We must endeavor to discover the integral view of

nature in the variety and complexity of our perspectives. We too must start with nature as a whole, with its own genius and its own control which guides the development of the parts. Immanent in nature, through all its ceaseless change, there is the cosmic urge for creativeness. Nature is not just a collection of randomly reacting things. Change in nature is measured and rythmic. The quantum of radiation is a universal constant. Radiation is concreted in the womb of nature into electrons, positive and negative, which are the same the world over.[1] The electrons are synthesized in nature into some ninety-two atomic patterns which are repeated the world over, as the conditions of temperature and pressure permit. The atoms, in turn, are built into compounds with beautiful mathematical patterns. Life emerges in nature as such a structure, rather simple in elements but marvelously complex in architecture. It is evident that nature manifests guidance and architecture even at the lowest levels, those of electrons, atoms and molecules. And this architectural control has reference to time as well as to space. It is forward-looking. There is a nisus in nature toward increasing complexity which shows itself throughout a series of levels in the organic realm as well as in what we call the inorganic. Convenient though the distinction is between inorganic and organic, when we view nature serially, there are signs that we are returning to the Greek view that even what we regard as physical nature is in some sense organic. It is no longer looked upon as dead and inert, but as manifesting infinite sensitiveness, selectiveness and architectural constructiveness. We may say that there is a law of rectigradation—of forward-looking constructiveness—throughout the levels of nature, inorganic, organic and social. There is a fitness of the geological environment for the emergence of life which cannot be accounted for as a mere chance ensemble. And if this is true for the simplest emergence of life, it is even

1. To be exact we should have to add protons, neutrons, neutrinos, etc., as building bricks. But the argument is not affected.

more evident that there must be a forward-looking fitness for the vastly more complicated adjustments which are involved in mental life.

It is certain that we cannot conceive causation in nature in merely mechanical terms. Nature is not merely the juxtaposition or collision of ready-made blocks. You can't squeeze blood out of a turnip. We must learn to take the point of view of *natura naturans,* creative nature, and not merely that of *natura naturata,* the ossified results of the past. Evolution means creation. There is more in the result than in what we abstract as the causal conditions. We must learn to look at nature as genius. The new pattern, the new wholeness, is a creative synthesis. The operation of genius is manifest throughout nature from the atom to human society. Social creativeness is vastly more the manifestation of the immanent genius in nature than the synthesis of atoms and molecules. In creativeness the paradox holds that things are more than they are. In this creative process there is the urge for repetition and there is the urge for novelty. The genius of nature like the child wants the game repeated again and again, but it also wants thrills and surprises. So it seems that in order to enter into rapport with nature, we must recover the innocence of the child.

There is manifest, I believe, a continuity of cosmic control and genius throughout nature. There is a cosmic architecture which manifests itself in the emergent patterns of life as well as in the patterns of matter. The cosmic urge in life strives for its maintenance as does all structure, but it also strives for richer life. At an early stage life branched into the two great divisions of plant and animal, with a symbiotic relation of complementariness, plant life being peculiarly adapted for the storage of energy while animal life is adapted to use up energy in motion. In a large way animal life is parasitic upon plant life, since the latter alone can convert the energies of inorganic nature into compounds that animals can use as food. But animal life

in turn plays a part in the economy of plant life in various ways. Plant and animal life in turn radiated, at a remote time, into phyla of great diversity and increasing complexity. The whole of organic evolution is part of the cosmic urge for creativeness and indicated in the genius of nature as truly as are the patterns of atoms, molecules and crystals. With the advance in nature come greater degrees of freedom and greater degrees of individual responsiveness to the milieu of nature. The responsiveness becomes more variable and more selective. But with the urge for more varied initiative there is also in nature the innate tendency to laziness or conservatism. Looking at nature in the large, this characteristic may seem the more evident. It is a law of nature that many are called but few are chosen.

Evolution throughout its series of levels is a whole-making process—from the atom to human society. An atom is a whole, a gestalt. It has characteristics of its own which are not those of its constituent elements. Just as an atom is a whole and not a mere collection of electrons, and as a molecule is a whole and not a mere collection of atoms, and as a cell is a whole and not a mere collection of chemical elements, and as a multicellular organism is a whole and not a mere collection of cells, so the psychological group is a whole and not a mere collection of individuals. But it must not be forgotten that they are different types of wholes. There is no sense in trying to reduce one type of whole to another—the molecular gestalt to the constituent atoms, the cellular gestalt to its chemical elements, the multicellular gestalt to its constituent cells, the group gestalt to the individual members. Within each type of gestalt there is indeed the individual character and movement of the constituent parts—the electrons in the atom, the atoms in the molecules, the molecules in the cell, the cells in the multicellular organism, the individuals in the psychological group; but there is also the character and movement of the whole without which we cannot under-

stand the behavior of the parts. The parts are different because they figure in the particular gestalt.

Society is as truly a pattern of life organization as is a multicellular organism, but it is a different type of pattern. Just as at the level of the multicellular organism a single cell cannot realize its life destiny by itself but must realize it in its organic group, so at the level of human society a single individual cannot realize his life destiny, except in a social group. The biological approach shows the absurdity of attempting to study human society as a collection of individuals. The human individuals are evolved through a long process of creative adaptation and selection for a common life as truly as are the cells in the multicellular organism. They are destined by their evolution to work in symbiosis in order to realize their life genius, however great their degrees of freedom in so doing. Man doth not live unto himself or die unto himself. He is part of a community of life which stretches backward and forward into the gestalt of life history as a whole.

The forward-looking creative activity of nature is as evident in the more advanced stages of life, those of human society, as in physical nature and in the more primitive forms of organic nature. The creation of a pattern of a political state is as truly a manifestation of the genius of nature as the pattern of an atom or of an organism. If the pattern of a possible atom is indicated in the creative advance of nature, so is the structure of a viable social group. When man reaches a certain development, he is able, to a small extent, to share consciously and deliberately in the creativeness of nature. But this development is also part of the genius of nature and it must work in accordance with nature—the properties and laws of nature—to be fruitful. "It is not generally recognized," says Gregory, "that the human mind is, on the whole, such a successful device of Nature because it embodies to a high degree the anticipatory qualities which are essential to all

life."[2] It is part of the genius of nature to experiment, to strive, not only to anticipate the future, in the uniform course of nature, but to create the future through new forms of synthesis. Thus the genius of nature works throughout and only becomes more conscious and therefore more economical in the life of man. The Promethean fire is an emergent in man from the genius that is in nature and which in man becomes, to a degree, conscious of itself—though still working largely by instinctive feeling—so as to experiment ideally as well as organically. Man's invention of artificial tools is as much a manifestation of the genius of nature and its urge for life as is the invention of organic tools. And so the invention of patterns of marriage, of clan and of tribal control, is the expression of the genius of the stream of life of which man is a part.

When we maintain that a psychological group is a whole, a gestalt, not reducible to its parts, we do not mean that the gestalt is transcendent in the sense that it exists apart from the living community of members. If the members must be understood as functioning within the gestalt, so must the gestalt be understood as functioning through the members. To separate the gestalt from the members and view it as a self-subsistent entity would indeed be vicious formalism. The gestalt of a psychological group no more exists apart from its members than the gestalt of the molecule H^2O exists apart from its atoms. For dramatic purposes we may think of the gestalt as a tendency or genius in nature, informing the material of nature with a characteristic pattern under certain conditions, whether in the synthesis of water or of a human group. But we know the gestalt only as it creatively emerges in nature under the conditions. We must recognize it as a fact. Because human individuals can function and be identified in different groups, successively or simultaneously, we are inclined to regard them as self-subsisting and independent

2. William K. Gregory, "Basic Patents in Nature," *Science*, Vol. 78, p. 566.

of any group. But in fact individuals can be known only as functioning in some group. And they function differently because of the gestalt of the group. Apart from group relations they are mere abstractions. Of course, individuals may lapse from a more complex type of group to a simpler type of group. A human individual may lapse from spiritual associations with his kind to organic relations with nature as in sleep and to mere physical relations as in death.

In the last analysis all evolution is cosmic evolution, for everything—atom, cell, society—evolves in the matrix of nature. Our sharp demarcations of matter, organism, society, are limitations introduced by our mind. They are unknown to nature. The biologist should start with cosmic evolution, for life is part of the cosmos—evolved in the womb of the cosmos. If we view the cosmos mechanically, evolution is a riddle indeed. But if we view it as creative nature, working by a trial and error process to establish viable patterns, evolution ceases to be anomalous and contradictory. Gregory's conception of biological evolution as the invention of a cumulative series of patents, comparable to those exhibited in a human patent office,[3] may seem anthropomorphic, but the implication, I think, is sound, namely, that nature, including life, can only be understood as creative genius.

If biological evolution must be understood as part of cosmic evolution, social evolution must be understood as part of biological evolution—the experimental effort to realize the urge for life and a more complex life. It is only by an artificial division of labor that the biologist neglects the cosmic background and the sociologist the biological background. Nature shows its genius as truly in social synthesis as in organic synthesis and in inorganic synthesis. They are all part of the matrix of nature. This synthetic activity of nature, we have seen, has reference to

3. "Basic Patents in Evolution," *Scientific American*, 1930, pp. 112, 113; 200-202; 286-288.

time as well as to space. It is not merely a whole-forming activity, but a whole-forming activity in which wholes are built prospectively with reference to more comprehensive wholes, as far as the conditions of nature and the inertia of the energies of nature permit. There seems to be a certain indeterminacy throughout the levels of nature from the electron to human individuals. The "willingness" of the parts counts.

The constructive forward urge works largely in the silent womb of nature. At best we see it only in retrospect. The impetus must come somehow from the larger matrix of nature of which life is a part. In Einstein's language the space-time of nature is directional, though, owing to the plurality and indeterminism of the individual energies of nature, the direction in the making must present irregularities—blind alleys, recessions, as well as forward movement. It is in retrospect, when the unsuccessful trials have been eliminated, that the creativeness of nature in organic evolution, as in the psychological evolution which we see in retrospect in the patent office, presents a graduated series of steps. When we say that the environment furnishes the stimulus of the synthetic activity of nature in the individual, we must not conceive the environment in merely mechanical terms, but as the organic wholeness of which the individual is a responsive part. We cannot account for the advance in nature merely in terms of the Lamarckian conception of use or effort, though functioning is certainly characteristic of nature and in some sense must be part of its advance. But the use of habit structure could only reinforce habit, it could not account for the emergence of memory. And the use of routine memory could not account for constructive thought, with its analysis and synthesis. To say that the advance in nature takes place because of mutations is merely a statement of a fact, namely, that there must have been change in the germ plasm for the gain to be handed on in the life stream of generations, but it does not explain the direction

of change. Such direction becomes intelligible only through the progressive adaptation of life to its environment. To say that such fitness is due to a pre-established harmony is mere obscurantism. This is the impasse to which a mechanist like Thomas Hunt Morgan is brought.

That social evolution is part of biological evolution and that the study of the phenomena of the social group is part of the broader study of life phenomena is now being recognized by the anthropologists. "It is the functioning of the living human group," says Wissler, "that produces community life. This is why the biological basis to group life is important. Throughout our studies it is well to bear in mind that whatever social phenomena we are investigating in the abstract form exist only in the living group."[4] It is from the point of view of the urge to life, its maintenance and furtherance that we must study savage customs and institutions, as Marett has admirably pointed out: "The savage stands by his custom as a whole, in obedience to a pretty clear notion that it enables him to live; and after all he lives not because he obeys an order to that effect, but because he enjoys living."[5] It is in the light of the desire for life that we must interpret religious practices as well as the practices that more obviously have to do with the maintenance of life, such as the economic practices. "Approaching as we do the history of religion from the side of anthropology, which is ultimately the side of biology, we are bound to interpret man's religious activity as a manifestation of the will to live. Now even from the limited standpoint of biology, which takes life as a datum-fact that can be explored to some extent even though both its whence and whither are left out of account, there is an immense potency or pregnancy inherent in the will to live, seeing that it is essentially a will to sur-

4. Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, 1929, p. 56.
5. R. R. Marett, *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*, (1932) page 154.

vive, to live racially."[6] Though biology, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, does not consider human society as part of biological evolution, society is, nevertheless, as much part of the will to live as the more primitive functions which biology has chosen to investigate. The functions of communication and social cooperation are as much part of the will to live as the organic cooperation of cells in the organism. We may say with J. Arthur Thomson that "Man at his best discovers the secret motion of things and uses his knowledge to bend Nature to his purposes. He seeks after the True, the Beautiful and the Good. He sends his tendrils to the stars!"[7] But after all these ideal activities, too, are vital activities and have for their end the furtherance of life.

The genius of life has been engaged through the ages in creating more adequate patterns of life-environment as well as in creating patterns for its life in physical nature. Life has tried a large variety of experiments to create a community of life. At an early stage colonies were formed, mere aggregates at first but sometimes moving as a unity and sometimes having a common alimentary canal. The adherence of the cells in the cell division, so as to form a multicellular organism with differentiation of structure and function for the maintenance of a common life, was a momentous step in evolution. Then came the association of anatomically discontinuous organisms having freedom of movement in space and in time. These organisms were bound together more and more by psychological ties and not merely by the organic ties of the colony and the multicellular organism. In the insects we see the culmination after long ages of experimentation, of which we know nothing, of one type of social group, with a genuine corporate life, with division of labor, forming an integrated whole which is more than the sum of its components. As we see this type of group, it is largely stereotyped, though with some

6. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
7. *What Is Man?* 1924, p. 36.

adaptation to circumstances. We have here a subordination of the individual to the life of the whole as strict as that within a multicellular organism. That the insect community exists for the maintenance and continuity of life seems obvious.

Among vertebrates we have looser types of association. We have herd groups with their instinctive conventions for combination in attack and defense, and sometimes with considerable division of labor as in the case of the beaver. With the apes we have more permanent family groups with a larger range of communicative signs and a more evident tradition, socially handed down. We cannot go into detail, but it is evident that life has experimented with group patterns to satisfy the need for the maintenance and the handing on of life. It has been said that non-social animals show as much intelligence and as much capacity for survival as the social animals. It is true that the predatory animals are equipped for survival or they could not have survived. They have agility, strength and cunning. But to compare their intelligence with the architectural genius of the great builders—the predatory wasp with the honey bee or the tiger with the beaver—is like comparing the intelligence of the robber in human society with the builders of the Gothic cathedrals or the skyscrapers. Finally in their lack of sociality, they miss one important enrichment of life without which we, as human, would not regard life worth living: the satisfaction of comradeship.

I have tried to indicate that the social group is part of biological experimentation to realize a community of life—working first by physical and chemical adherence, then by instinctive association of individuals in various types of patterns. In human association the urge for life is manifested in a new type of wholeness, a spiritual gestalt of common plan or purpose in which the members of the group share consciously to a certain degree. But human society can be understood only as rooted in the biological evolution of the race. The brain as well as the hand must be regarded

as the result of a progressive series of inventions for the realization of life. Human history itself presents a long series of experimentation. The earliest human grouping must have been as instinctive as that of the anthropoids. With the evolving of abstract intelligence in man and the possibility of descriptive communication, a radical change in man's adjustment to his environment—human and non-human—becomes possible. We have the beginnings of civilization. With the prolongation of the plastic period in man between birth and maturity—the prolongation of infancy and the further telescoping of a period of adolescence between infancy and maturity—the learning process is given far greater range than in life below man.

Nature is achieving in human life a new whole-form in which time has a vastly greater significance than in life below man. The whole-form of man includes not merely the organic cycle of maturing in the physical and organic environment but it includes also the spiritual maturing in a spiritual enviroment. The social group relations are as much part of the realization of the life of man as are the physical and organic environment. We have looked upon society too abstractly as though it were an artificial addition to man's biological evolution. It is in fact part of his biological evolution. The gestalt of the life of man requires the social relations for its completion. The social group is an invention by the life urge as truly as is the stomach. That life becomes to a certain degree consciously inventive does not make it less of life. Brain and intelligence are evolved in the service of life. They are manifestations of the urge for life and for fuller life. They are part of the whole-pattern of life at a certain stage of evolution.

It has been said that thought is talk, and it is true that communication is essential to the development of abstract intelligence. Mind must develop in a milieu of mind. But to say that thought *is* communication is to substitute a consequent function for the rationale of the process.

Talk which is not mere talk is an instrument of thought. Thinking is a whole-function which involves the evolution of a certain cerebral structure, of certain vocal mechanisms, of manipulatory mechanisms. Anaxagoras thought that the hand of man makes the mind of man superior to that of other animals. Thinking also involves the affective organization of man—his emotional life. For effective intellectual functioning requires the harmonious flow of the emotions. In short it includes the whole man and the whole man includes the community of man. For thought is expression. If we regard communication in the abstract it becomes indeed as much of a miracle as transubstantiation, as Dewey says. But human communication is not just language. It is rooted in the biological urge for expression which in turn is rooted in the very mutuality of life. The lyric song of the frogs which millions of years ago disturbed the stillness of the night was, as it is now, the expression of the mating drive—that life might go on. The evolution of brain structure and vocal mechanisms for more specific expression was a further development of this urge for mutuality. Men do not need one another because they have vocal organs, but they have vocal organs because they need one another. They can only complete their life gestalt in mutuality with their kind.

While the life of the insect (as we now find it) is apparently organically complete, so that the cycle of its gestalt is indicated in its biological heredity, human life starts with a gestalt which, if viewed without reference to time, is largely a blank. Its specialization of instincts and capacities lies in the future: in its interactions with its milieu and more specifically with its social milieu. Moreover, the life of man must experiment consciously to discover new group patterns to satisfy the demands of life in its growing complexity. The group pattern of man is not prescribed by biological heredity as the group patterns of life, below man, now seem to be. But the viable pattern of harmonious living together in the psychological group

is not arbitrary but as truly indicated in its conditions of realization as the viable pattern of a molecule in the inorganic conditions of nature. There is no doubt a difference in the texture of the biological life of man, but this difference can become known only in the creative interactions of the individual with his milieu, and only then if the milieu is adequate in its opportunity for responsiveness. The urge in man for social creativeness is a manifestation of the urge of life for the maintenance of life and for richer life.

While we speak of man as a rational animal, his reason, his creative intelligence works to the urge of feelings which are deeper than ratiocination and which are the vitality of the stream of life. The satisfaction of even our most abstract thought comes from this deeper vital urge. There has been a tendency to emphasize too much the abstract verbal type of intelligence as though this were the chief thing in the evolution of man. And we are paying dearly for this over-emphasis. Our advance in science and technology has far outstripped our moral evolution for harmonious cooperation on the big scale that our advance in science has made imperative. For the evolution of new patterns of society and the mutuality of realization of its members, there must also evolve higher capacities for imaginative sympathy, love and appreciation; and there must be the adequate stimulation of these capacities in a sound system of education. Mere intellectual education will not suffice to produce unity of endeavor on the part of the human race. Medieval culture, no doubt, tended to overemphasize the mystical side of human nature. But without the mystical sense of unity, in an enterprise of living which far outstrips our intellectual power of analysis, intellectual achievement may prove futile and even mischievous. Intellectual progress must itself be fed by and find its justification in a deeper realization of life as a whole.

If sociology approaches the study of human behavior from the point of view of the living group, it can get

rid of the abstractionism which has largely vitiated its work in the past. J. Arthur Thomson suggests that the work of the sociologist is cut out like coordinates in geometry: "Organism, Function, Environment; Folk, Work, Place; Famille, Travail, Lieu."[8] But this is too artificial. We must start with Folk as a group. Work is for the most part the effort of maintaining the life of the group. And what sort of Place is required depends upon what sort of group it is. If it is a hunting group it requires considerable territory; if it is an agricultural group it requires less territory but a different kind; if it is a manufacturing group it does not require so much territory but it needs to be favored by resources for creating power. There is no use in discussing Folk, Work, Place in the abstract. If we start with the living group we shall not be likely to fall into the formalistic error of regarding the customs and institutions as the substance of the group, for we shall realize that the group does not live to maintain customs and institutions but that it invents and uses these to maintain its life and will change them rather than jeopardize its life. Nor shall we yield to the particularistic tendency which attempts to explain the life of the group by means of instincts, desires, imitation, suggestion, etc., but we shall explain the manifestation of these in terms of the life of the group and its maintenance. In one sense sociology is prior to psychology, for at any rate the higher psychological functions, which place man above the brutes, can be actualized only in group relations. For it is as the result of the social urge that life invents language as a tool for expression, and language makes possible the storing up of the vital experience of the group as tradition, and this in turn makes possible cumulative invention and culture. Tradition, however, must not be taken as an abstraction. It is of no significance except as it is transmuted in the vital thought of the group.

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8. *Op. cit.*, 135.

The living group with its history must be our frame of reference, if we would understand its conditions. In a pregnant condensation, Marett tells us that "culture depends on social organization; social organization on numbers; numbers on food; and food on invention."[9] But these factors must not be taken abstractly as links in a one-way causal chain, as Marett has pointed out. In fact they reciprocally determine one another and they must be understood in the light of the vital urge of the group. It is the character of the living group which expresses itself in organization. The group is not just a function of the organization. It may change the organization. It may express itself differently in the same organization. While numbers are a significant factor in organization, it is also true that what numbers are required depends upon the organization and the complexity of the culture. The simple life of the Eskimos does not require the numbers of more complex cultures. Invention is important. It may radically change the possible supply of food and the possible numbers and it may change the organization, but it can be understood only as growing out of the cumulative experience of the group and its striving to live and to live better.

On the psychological level of life, the individual has a new kind of sensitiveness to his kind. He is not only organically sensitive but psychologically sensitive. As on the level of physiological evolution, the response of the organism is first protopathic—the organism responding in a vague, general way—and later, with the building up of a central adjustor system, becomes epicritic, that is, definite and quantitative as well as generally qualitative, so on the social level the responsiveness is at first vague and undifferentiated but with the development of an adjustor system, a psychological structure of habits and ideas, the responses to the individuals in its milieu and to their

9. R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, 1912, p. 155.

characteristics become more specific and definite. The mechanism of the community of life in the multicellular organism, which makes it function as a whole in the realization of the life of the organism, is obscure. But we know now that living tissue radiates, and its wave length has been measured. It must, therefore, be a community somehow of vital radiation as well as chemical exchange from part to part. The community of individuals on the psychological level must be conceived in different terms. It is a spiritual community and not merely an organic community. But here too there must be radiation from individual to individual. We know that the brain radiates; and the brain, endowed with mind, must have its own characteristic radiation. The radiation at this level must be conceived in terms of psychical energy, instead of physical energy.

The psychological field establishes its own continuum. It has its own psychic chemistry, with a new fusion of individual systems of energy into psychological wholes which have their own characteristics. We know that a man manifests different characteristics and reacts differently in different group situations as truly as an atom behaves differently in different molecular groups. If the physicist must postulate a gravitational field and an electromagnetic field in order to understand the community of nature at the level at which he studies it, so the sociologist must postulate a psychical field to understand the community of nature at the level at which he studies it. When viewed as such a psychical field of energy, the Mana, the mysterious power of the group, becomes easier to understand. The approach of the sociologist has been either too particularistic or too formalistic. He has either centered his attention on the human atoms or on the abstract forms of society. He has neglected the dynamic field of human relations within which individuals live and move and have their being. The sociologist must learn from the physicist and, instead of centering his attention upon verbal abstrac-

tions, must deal with energy systems, with their field relations, but he should not forget that these are energy systems and field relations of another level and have their own characteristics and laws, which cannot be reduced to those of inorganic physics and chemistry. Nevertheless, psychical energy is as truly part of nature as molecular energy or electrical energy. It has its own inertia which must be overcome, its own laws of spreading, its own law of conservation. Here we have the remarkable phenomenon that while physical energy is spent in being used, psychical energy increases with use.

When I say that the social group is in fact a part of biological evolution, I must not be understood as advocating biological organicism. I am not reducing the psychological group to the multicellular organism. It is a new level of life with a new pattern of organization which must be understood on its own level. The mutualness in human society is not the same as that on the lower levels of life. It takes on new characteristic forms of exchange, though it still exemplifies the law of mutual aid. We cannot use the principles which have been found convenient in the study of the single cell nor of the multicellular relation to explain social behavior. We must discover the laws appropriate to its own level. This Marx and Engels clearly saw, owing to their Hegelian training. The social group is a unique type and must be studied in its wholeness in its environment. But it is a living group and part of the urge of life for expression.

It is evident now that we must study human life from the point of view of the group with its tradition. Human life is actualized in society, as Aristotle might say. If social life manifests greater degrees of freedom than nature below it, it also manifests greater degrees of dependence. Degrees of freedom and degrees of dependence go together. An electron can be split from an atom and an atom from a molecule and yet exist. An amoeba can split into two amoebae, each with an independent life. But a

cell of a multicellular organism cannot long continue to exist as a living cell when separated from its matrix and cannot function properly except in its own type of milieu. A human individual cannot survive after birth without parental care and it cannot function and be understood except in society. If, after it attains sufficient growth to care for itself, it is separated from society, like Robinson Crusoe, it still carries society with it, with its habits and tradition, though it talks to itself. Because some experimenters have thought that they have found that children work no better when they work together competitively in the same room upon the same problem, than when they work apart,[10] it has stupidly been argued that social interaction is not important for thought. But Robert Frost has a truer insight.

> "Men work together," I told him from the heart,
> "Whether they work together or apart."[11]

The social stimulation need not be immediate. I may be more stimulated by Plato and Aristotle than by those about me. But is not the conversing with them and reacting to them through their recorded mind as truly social stimulation of mind upon mind as though they were physically present? And is not the consciousness of working upon a common enterprise, within a common heritage of tradition, itself a form of social interstimulation, whether we work together or apart?

It has been said that self-preservation is the first law of life. If we use self-preservation to include race preservation, this statement has its profound truth. But if we look upon the life process as a whole, we must qualify this statement by saying that life aims not merely at self-maintenance but at fuller life. The story of life is a story of experimentation which has reference to time. In evolution before man we cannot say that this experimentation was

10. Later experiments seem to have disproved this assertion.
11. Robert Frost, *The Tuft of Flowers*.

a conscious aim on the part of the participants, though we know nothing of the psychological experimentation which led to the architecture of the beehive nor do we know how it is maintained. We call the process instinct or intuition, but this is a mere confession of ignorance. It means merely that the process is not deliberate in the sense that man's activity with his use of abstract concepts, embodied in language, is deliberate. We may, however, suppose that creativeness in evolution below man is a response to feeling or racial impulse, the import of which the individual could not know, though working as he did must have given him satisfaction. When we reach experimentation on the level of man, with his verbalizing ability, creativeness becomes in a measure deliberate. In his group interactions, man was led to formulate plans to a certain degree, though his feeling for the fitness of things was probably more important with early man than his imperfect verbalizing. The emphasis on the level of primitive man, as with the animals below him, must have been on life-maintenance. This at any rate is said to be the emphasis in the case of savage societies which anthropologists study. But we must not forget that a long period of social experimentation has preceded the stage at which we find savage man. This experimentation has involved discovery, technological and ceremonial, within the group, and also borrowing, competitively or amicably, from other groups. The motive, in any case, has been not merely the maintenance of life but the furtherance of life. We are apt to look upon primitive groups, as upon animal groups, as static. But this may be due in either case to a short view. After a workable adjustment, within a definite environment, has been attained, there is no doubt a strong conservative tendency on the part of primitive man, as of civilized man, to let well enough alone. It takes profound disturbance of the equilibrium of society, before man is willing to readjust fundamental mores.

We boast of living in a scientific age and in many enter-

prises we are no doubt deliberately inventive. But when it comes to the fundamental movement of life of which we are a part, we are satisfied usually to blunder along. Even with the most thoughtful planning we should realize that we know but little of the cosmic movement of history of which we are a part. And our planning and efforts often have the opposite results from those at which we consciously aim. Hobbes wrote the *Leviathan* in defense of the divine right of kings but in effect it was a document of revolution. This does not mean that we should not plan, but that we should take the experimental attitude and be ready to readjust our plans, realizing that we see but a little way and that we are in the grip of a process which is mightier than we. Our human sympathies and our instinctive intuitions are often better guides in the complexities of life than mere rationalistic formulae. But our concrete intuitions need to be eked out by careful thinking and experimentation in order to be effective. We should at all times have a sincere and passionate devotion to the Good, with tolerance and open-mindedness as to the means of realizing it.

With the consciousness that we are but part of the great march of life, with but a vague intimation of its whence and whither, we must, if we value the gift of life and its opportunity as we have received it, contemplate with awe and gratitude the vast procession of life from its beginnings, with the trials and sacrifices which the experimentation has involved that have brought us where we now stand. And we must feel a particular gratitude to the procession of humanity which, working largely in the dark, prepared the way for us. The gestalt of future man is still in the creative womb of nature. We may help consciously in a measure by proper laws of eugenics, by proper stimulation of energies that are ours, but we cannot know what we are to become. The life urge, which has been the dynamic factor in evolution hitherto, is still at work to create new whole-patterns in the matrix of nature, with new com-

prehensiveness and with new quality, preparing in its own secret wisdom for the higher man. By virtue of this creative urge "we are more than we are and we know more than we know," yet not we but the immanent genius which works in us. In our germ plasm and in the vital impulse of which this is the vehicle is the urge toward a new future. Inspired by "that divine unrest, that old stinging trouble of humanity that makes all high achievement and all miserable failure, the same that spreads wings with Icarus, the same that sent Columbus into the desolate Atlantic,"[12] in devotion to the genius of life and the spirit of history, let us go forward to do our part.

12. Robert Louis Stevenson, *Will o' the Mill* from *The Manse*.

CHAPTER II

THE GROUP

We must start with life if we are to understand society, for society is an expression of life. And life must be understood as part of nature. We must get rid of the idea that life is an accident in the universe. We live in a life-producing and life-nurturing world. The world is alive in us. To live is to share in the ineffable mystery of existence which can be real only to the living. Life transmutes everything into itself. It is only by living reality that we can hope to comprehend reality. Our sense of reality is more than inference, it is more even than faith or instinct. It is more intimate than these, for these are consequent functions and have their basis in the mutuality of living, for the world lives in us as well as we in it. It is because we live nature that nature is real to us. Nature in us is human nature; and when human nature awakes it tries to comprehend nature—not as an outsider but as in nature and of nature. Everything in nature exists in mutuality, in reciprocity. Nothing lives unto itself or dies unto itself. The group is fundamental in nature. Everything exists in energy systems with reciprocal relations to other energy systems. Life is only a specific type of mutuality and reciprocity in nature. We cannot account for the origin of life. When we trace it back to what we are accustomed to consider as its simplest forms, the bacteria, it is already vastly complex. All we can say is that it is characteristic of nature to create life and more complex life in an orderly way. The order itself is the mystery of cosmic genius.

What is certain is that living is an original and ineffable experience. And living includes the specific milieu of nature which sustains life. To part of this milieu, life responds as having the character of life, and to this living part, life shows various degrees of antagonism, tolerance and attraction. This is evident even on the bacterial level. Some

bacteria carry on a deadly war against other bacteria; to others they are indifferent; again they are attracted to others with varying degrees of intensity. This attraction gives rise to colonies and sometimes to elaborate symbiosis, one species carrying out part of a chemical process while another species completes the process. The economy of life, plant and animal, is deeply dependent upon such symbiosis, though we are generally more interested in the struggle for survival. What is of especial importance to us is that even at the level of bacteria, which in complexity of adjustment rival the higher organisms, we find not only the immediate recognition of life by life, but we find elaborate social relationships.

Organic Groups

The survey of life from the bacteria up through the various grades of life should show us the absurdity of our exclusive verbalizing of social relations. These relations are grounded in life itself as shown in the various degrees of antagonism, tolerance and attraction throughout the scale of life. Does the bacterion argue from analogy that there are other bacteria? The absurdity of such rationalizing becomes evident at once, when we start with social relations on the level of bacteria. It has been the custom to start the study of social relations with language. But language is a limited and consequent function. It does not make us social, but because we are social we need to express ourselves. The urge to live in mutuality creates language mechanisms to make our sociality more effective. Words may be the symbols of social relations, they are not the substance. When we take note of the fact that social relations of various degrees of complexity exist in the living world where no abstract language exists, it should make us realize that social relations are more fundamental than language. The basis of social relations in such life as bacteria is obscure, but here we must have recourse to concepts of chemical, electrical and radiant energies. And

the same, we may be sure, is true on the level of life where verbalizing plays so conspicuous a part. Language presupposes the reality of social relations. When we take a broad view of the community of life, we shall not take seriously the arguments of philosophers about the ego projecting the alter-ego or about the alter projecting itself upon the ego, so as to concrete an ego. Language no doubt plays a large part in our concepts of ego and alter. But the milieu out of which such distinctions arise is prior to our verbalizing. While the bacterion has no verbal concepts of ego and alter, it strives to maintain its life and it adjusts itself to its alter in a great variety of ways. With us, too, the alter is first a living relationship before it becomes a verbal "eject." The translating of our world into verbal concepts presupposes the living consciousness of the world. The reality of first-hand living precedes verbalizing and must be the milieu within which verbalizing moves. The community of life is founded upon subtler and more intimate relations than verbalizing.

The fundamental fact of life is the will to live. The will-to-live manifests itself as an individual will and as a racial will in the whole evolution of life. The individual does not come into existence when it verbalizes about itself. Its reality is far deeper. Its hunger is its own hunger and is not confused with the hunger of any other organism. It responds differentially to the living environment—cooperatively, defensively or aggressively. Conceptual activity is a late flowering in a very limited part of life and presupposes the primary relations of life. Life strives first of all to maintain itself, and maintenance includes the racial will as well as the individual will. The urge for food and the urge for propagation are the most primitive urges of life. To satisfy the animal's urge for food other life must be killed. "How different in kind is another group of needs with its corresponding activities! The mate, no less imperatively needed than food by all highly developed animal organisms, must be as fully alive as the

needy individual itself."[1] Life is not only egocentric but other-centric from the outset. Otherwise it could not exist. But while the urge for propagation works for life as a whole, this urge by itself does not produce the continuous social relations which make a group possible. The urge for parental care of the offspring is required to telescope individuals into a group for a period and issues, in the course of evolution, into the permanent family bond.

Besides the racial attraction, there manifests itself another type of attraction which in its most general form is the attraction of kind or species. This attraction is evidenced throughout the scale of life in various degrees from bacteria to man, though in man it is complicated by other motives. It leads to colonies of indefinite size. The feeling for kind is a different urge from propagation, though it no doubt furthers propagation. The feeling for kind is a sympathy which transcends the smaller divisions of family and community. As the feeling for humanity, it is, when coupled with imagination, a factor in the integration of man into a comprehensive unity which is still in the future. At a high level of evolution, the feeling for kind becomes a spiritual feeling—the kinship of mind.

A different and limited type of sociality manifests itself in the band, as we find it among the higher mammals. This type of social attraction, within the species, requires a limited number and involves a peculiar type of familiarity. It is defeated by unlimited gregariousness. It leads to certain patterns of group behavior which are favorable on the whole to the security and maintenance of the individual. It brings a peculiar type of satisfaction to those on the inside and animosity to those on the outside. We may say that biological evolution gives evidence of three basic types of social grouping—the colony, based upon attraction of kind or species; the family, based upon the nurture and

1. *The Natural History of our Conduct*, W. E. Ritter, and E. W. Bailey, 1927, p. 73.

protection of the young with more or less reciprocal service at the highest level between parents and between parents and offspring; and the band with its limitation of comradeship and its strong sense of familiarity.

It is obviously impossible to survey social relations in the whole range of animal life. The limitation of space would make such a survey impossible; and the evidence is available for only a small part of animal life. We shall select two types of social experimentation below man—one type has reached its full maturity in the higher insects,[2] the other type is illustrated in a late stage of evolution among man's nearest kin, the non-human primates. The insects have some twenty-five million years the start of us. We are ignorant of the social planning which led to the results of the insects' experimentation. We say that they live by instinct and intuition, but such words merely cover up our ignorance. Moreover, the mental processes which were prominent in the period of creative adaptation may be largely submerged now, except in so far as some adaptation is always required in a variant environment. We know little of the psychological processes of contemporary insects. The keenness of their sense perception so much surpasses ours as to be a mystery. The sense of smell evidently plays a very large part in their adjustments. To those that work in the light, sight is very important. Their hearing must be very keen, and some insects have invented wireless telegraphy, carrying their own antennae. Touch seems to play a large part in their social relations. They may have senses of which we are ignorant. That the insects manifest discrimination and memory is evident from their behavior. The invention and continuation of the patterns of their behavior, sometimes very complicated, is beyond our comprehension. There are patterns of

2. For a summary (which I have found useful) of the evidence, see the chapter by O. E. Platch, "Insect Societies," pp. 83-141 in *A Handbook of Social Psychology,* 1935, ed., Carl Murchison, with its bibliography. See also the important work by R. M. Wheeler, *Social Life Among Insects,* 1923.

peaceful productiveness and there are patterns of war. Some soldiers of the higher termites can squirt a toxic gas from a syringe-like gland in the frontal head, thus anticipating by many million years the gas warfare of man!

The fundamental unity of the social life of the higher insects is the reproductive unity. But this serves all the purposes of maintenance. Individual life is subordinated to the life of the race. To find a thorough-going system of communism, we have to go to the higher insects—the social bees, the ants, and the termites. Unlike the sophisticated supervision by supermen in Aldous Huxley's *A Brave New World*—which is always liable to disruption from the discontent of the small number of intelligent directors—the insect system of communism is guided by the racial wisdom of the workers. Through a science of eugenics of their own the higher insects have ensured the continuity and success of their social scheme. The workers determine the classes of the community by diet. There seems to be no difference in the eggs. The difference of queen, workers and males is due to the chemical difference in the food which is given to the offspring.

Let us use as an illustration the most familiar of the social insects—the honey bee. A beehive consists of queen, workers and drones. The workers, the proletariat, regulate the diet and, therefore, the status within the hive. That an egg develops into a queen is due entirely to the feeding. Only one queen is permitted in a beehive. By a selection of their own, the workers kill off the other candidates at a certain stage. The queen, for all the delicacies it gets and the attention, in the way of retinue and petting, is a mere egg-laying machine, unable to take care of herself. She has lost the apparatus for collecting pollen as well as the pharyngeal glands. The males exist only for fecundating the queen, and the queen of the bees, as also of the other higher insects, is fecundated only once. She has a way of storing the spermatozoa for all her egg-laying. The males are unable to gather food for themselves. After the hy-

meneal flight, when the successful male perishes in the conjugual union, the other males are taken care of until winter approaches. Then they are chased out by the workers and starve or freeze to death. The workers are the efficient factor of the community. By some subtle chemistry of diet, known only to workers, the queen is specialized for reproduction and the workers for virgin motherhood. "Their's not to reason why," though there is considerable room for intelligence and adaptation. The conditions in the wild vary and the architecture must vary. While man interposes his management in the life of the bee, yet the bee is never domesticated. It is merely that the adaptation varies with the environment. The secret of the marvelous engineering skill of the bees we do not understand, but it is doubtless the result of long ages of experimentation. It is certain that the intelligence is concentrated in the female workers. The queen, while larger in size, has a smaller brain. The males are hopelessly stupid.

The workers, in spite of their control of the community, are entirely subservient to it. It is the community and its continuity that count. The worker's life may be divided into three periods. During the first two or three days she is busy, cleaning and preparing the brood cells from which she and other workers have emerged and assists in keeping the brood warm. Around the third day she becomes a nurse, feeding and taking care of the older larvae. After the sixth day, when her pharyngeal glands begin to function, she devotes herself chiefly to the younger larvae who need the pharyngeal secretion for their growth. After she is ten days old, she enters upon a second period for another ten days, during which she has a variety of duties, such as storing the nectar in cells, helping the young to emerge from their cocoons and finally being entrusted to guard the entrance. She probably makes a trial flight out into the world during this period under the guidance of an older sister. With the third period of about ten days,

her work is outside the hive, foraging for honey and bringing it back to the hive—until she dies. During the foraging season, scouts are sent out and report back upon their finds of nectar by executing a dance. A busy life is that of this virgin sisterhood whose whole drive and satisfaction are ministering to their community and by a wisdom all their own preparing for the future, thus ensuring the continuity of life.

The continuity of the bee community is maintained not only by the maintenance of one community but by establishing new communities. There is a limitation to the growth of a community. The egg laying potentiality of the queen is enormous and there comes a time when it is necessary to send out a new community. Just how the bees measure the size of the community and prepare for the future we do not understand. But the workers in their wisdom prepare new queens and new males for the multiplication of the community. When the time comes for migration scouts are sent out and report back. When the hive divides, it is the old queen and her retinue who take the lead in establishing a new home.

While the ants do not live in such close relation to man as the bees and therefore do not appeal to our imagination as the bees do, from a sociological point of view they present a greater variety of experimentation. All the species of ants are social, while only few of the species of bees are social. They present a great range of organization. At the bottom of the scale we find such types as *Ponerinae,* with small colonies of only few dozens of monomorphic workers which are often fertile and differ little from the queen, who therefore does not receive extraordinary attention. At the top of the scale we find a polymorphic hierarchical organization of great complexity. We find the same three types of individuals as in the beehive—queen, worker, male. But the ants are not dependent on one queen and therefore do not eliminate the males. Instead, they manage to find a use for them, even if it

be only to use their big heads to block the opening to the nest. The workers know how to tickle them so as to give entrance. A community of the higher ants reaches enormous numbers. But, as in the case of the bees, the individual is entirely subordinated to the maintenance and continuity of the life of the community. The difference in the classes is due, as in the bees, to the diet which the workers furnish to the offspring. But in the higher ants we find a stratification of the workers into a hierarchy of classes with differentiation of labor. The Harvester ant, so graphically described by W. M. Wheeler, is a black ant of moderate size and is common in the deserts of Arizona and Mojave. It may very well serve as an illustration of the life of the higher ants. Wheeler found long files of workers busy in the late afternoon, carrying seeds to the nests, husking them, storing the kernels and throwing out the chaff. It seems they use soldier workers with their big heads and powerful mandibles as official seed crushers.

From my own observation, they (or their cousins) show wonderful teamwork. A party of us had a picnic lunch on a bare rocky slope in the Sequoia National Forest. We inadvertently left crumbs and small pieces of crackers on the ground. Soon we found a large number of ants, from a community seven or eight yards away, busy collecting the remains. Some slivers of crackers were too large for an individual ant to carry and required the cooperation of several ants. But this was not done in a haphazard way. Engineers surveyed the object in question and decided on the feasibility of moving it. One little piece of cheese, after being examined, was left undisturbed as being unmanageable. The route presented great obstacles in the way of layers of pine needles and twigs. One sliver of cracker, the size of the nail of my index-finger, was the particular object of interest of myself and the ants. It required a number of ants to move it. Moreover, owing to the obstacles of the terrain, it was necessary to shift it into various positions, sometimes under, sometimes over,

sometimes vertically around obstacles. There was remarkable insight in finding the line of least resistance. At every considerable obstacle careful examination was made of the relation of the booty to the environment. Mere haphazard energy would never have gotten such a large object, through such a forest of hindrances. At times, it was necessary to stop in order to drive off large marauding ants, which also was done by team-work. Some little ants had great fun riding on top of the object to be transported, without any resentment apparently on the part of the workers. After some three hours the engineering feat had been accomplished and the piece of cracker was received intact by workers at the nest, with its intricate galleries, storerooms and tunnels. Like the bees, the ants show marvelous foresight in providing for the future and from early times have been exhibited as a model to human sluggards. It seems that the Harvester ants, at the approach of winter, kill the infirm and the aged to safeguard their dense life in the colony.

We cannot go into detail about the various organizations of higher ants. The Legionary ants of the tropics are notable for their military organization and for making a clean sweep of the country which they traverse. There are the Fungus-growing ants with their carefully tended fungus gardens. There are the Honey-dew ants, some of whom, instead of getting the honeydew directly, domesticate other insects such as plant lice, mealybugs, scale-insects and leaf-hoppers for the purpose. Plant lice seem particularly desirable domestic animals. By stroking such insects with their antennae, the ants make them yield up their honey-dew. In return these domesticated insects are well fed and protected. The Honey-dew ants may also use their own kind as "repletes" for storing the honey-dew. There is, however, a darker side to the picture. There are Slave-making species of ants. The *Formica Sanguinea* organize slave raids in a very systematic manner. They first send out scouts and when the report is favorable they

attack in force and carry off the larvae, which the defenders have not succeeded in carrying away, to their own nests where they are brought up to serve the nest. It should be said that the slave raiders do not destroy the robbed unless they should offer resistance, which they probably see is futile. After watching the robbery, they return to their empty nests. The Amazon ants have become entirely dependent upon slaves and are unable to excavate for the brood or to forage for themselves. While the ant communities are closed communities and vigorously defended, yet the ants allow quite a variety of guests some of whom are so ungrateful as to feed upon the larvae of their hosts.

The great enemy of the ant is the termite, sometimes called a "white ant," but is not an ant at all. An ingenious kind of strategy is reported in the warfare of the ants with the termites. The ants are no match for the termites, but when the termites break into the ants' nest, the ant soldiers are set on the termites to protect the community. The termites eventually kill all the soldiers, but in the meantime the workers have plastered and sealed up the room, so that the termites cannot get out and therefore starve to death. The ants seem to have found a way of making war unprofitable.

While the termites are not ants, they have certain fundamental traits in common with the ants. There are the same three types—queens, workers, males—which are produced by diet. Like the ants, the queens and males of the termites are winged, but the queens, as with the ants, lose their wings after the hymeneal flight. Like the higher ants, the higher termites show a great range of polymorphism, namely, structural differences of workers and soldiers. Like the ants, some of the higher termites forage, store seeds or grow fungi. But they have a special inclination to wood diet which makes them so dangerous to home-builders.

While the termites resemble the ants in many respects, they also present radical differences. There is no larval or

pupal stage in the life of the termites. The nymphs as they come from the egg are put to work (in some species they seem to do all the work). The worker class is made up of both sexes. A nest is normally started by one pair—a king and a queen. In a community of higher termites there are, beside the king and queen, one or two types of workers and from one to three types of structurally different soldiers. The workers, of course, do the regular work of maintaining the colony. While the queen is fecundated only once and swells up into an enormous egg-laying machine, the king stays with the queen. If anything happens to the queen, the king is furnished with a harem of queens, the reserve queens not being so prolific as the first queen. If anything happens to the king, there are reserve kings. But as with the bees and the ants what counts is the community, its continuity and maintenance. And the community is a perpetual proletariat of workers.

Such is the outcome of social experimentation in the oldest true social type of community. Whether it indicates the ultimate trend of human evolution we cannot say. At any rate, the insects' solution of the social problem should be instructive to us. Social experimentation in human evolution is vastly accelerated, owing to the conceptual planning which is made possible by abstract language in later human evolution, but the problem is the same —the adaptation of the life of the individual to the life of the race. In spite of our boast of reason, we are very far from having solved that problem. Certainly man is imperfectly evolved for living together on a large scale. Perhaps we must wait for profound biological changes in human nature before the problem can be solved. Perhaps our intellect, or rather the intellect of a few, has advanced too rapidly. It has outstripped our emotional qualifications for living together. Science has placed too great power at the disposal of morons and monomaniacs. We have scarcely undertaken as yet the work of social planning. The radical communism of our neighbors, the insects, would

certainly be a scandal to our "patriotic" societies, if they had brains enough to see it. We must admire, too, the way the higher insects have solved the problem of sex. (I say the higher insects, because the common house fly impresses me as being quite lascivious.) The higher insects have liberated the great mass of workers from the disturbing influence of sex. The queen for a brief moment yields to lyric enchantment, but only once. The drones, to be sure, exist only for sex. But we have seen how the bees put the drones in their place. The ants and termites are wise in putting the males to work. Perhaps the higher insects pay too high a price for chastity. At any rate, the sex problem is one of the perplexing human problems.[3] What the biological destiny of man is we cannot know. But creative intelligence is part of that destiny if we can learn to use it. In the meantime, it would be well for us to heed the advice of the ancient wise man: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard!" The only way to get a satisfactory community is to work for it.

It is a big jump from the insects to the primates. But in social evolution, it may be regarded as a jump backward. The primates are very recent in geological time; and at any rate one type of primates is in a process of rapid social evolution. It may throw some light on man's background to cast a glance at the non-human primates[4] who have changed more slowly than man and therefore may be supposed to be more like pre-human man than is man today. The difficulty lies in obtaining trustworthy evidence about our relatives in their natural habitat. We shall limit our observations to Howling Monkeys, Baboons and Chimpanzees. While the amorphous herd type of aggregation is no doubt common among the lower primates,

3. The higher insects show that the sex instinct and the maternal instinct are two distinct instincts. The queens are differentiated for sex, the female workers for motherhood.
4. For a competent summary of the evidence on social life among infra-human primates, see especially the chapter on "Social Behavior in Infra-Human Primates," by R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes in *a Handbook of Social Psychology,* edited by Carl Murchison, pp. 973-1033.

we wish to use the species, mentioned above, to illustrate the two more definite types of social relations: the biological family and the band, because these types play important roles in human evolution. It is important to start with the group rather than with functions. As Yerkes says: "The primate social group is not describable in terms of a single function or utility. As a rule several ends are achieved by association: conspicuous among them are reproduction, nutrition, defense, aggression, shelter, exercise, and social facilitation. These are only a few of the biological needs or functions which appear from one point of view as determiners of group formation and cohesion, and, from another, as functions of the group. Their respective importance varies."[5] (This statement is relevant to the study of insects and man, as well as of infra-human primates.)

We shall now have occasion to note the difficulty in combining the two types of grouping—the family and the band. Among the infra-human primates, one dominates at the expense of the other. In the case of the howler monkey the band dominates. Carpenter's study of the howlers on Borro Colorado Island is the most complete survey we possess of the social life of the infra-human primates. Carpenter uses the anthropological term, "clan," to describe the howler group. The howler clan cannot be called a family though it provides for reproduction as well as other activities which are essential to the life of howlers. It is a closed group which repels members of other clans, though occasionally a "complemental" male is admitted. It may at times share the feeding grounds indifferently with other genera of mammals. But these have no more to do with the clan than the birds and trees. Within a restricted area, which the clan regards as its own, they migrate from place to place. The movement may be initiated by any adult, but generally it is a male. Within the

5. *Ibid.*, p. 979.

territorial area there is a definite order of progression: one or more males lead the procession; females carrying infants are put in the last quarter of the procession. The howlers seem to seek out routes to food, shelter and retreat and to retain the memory of such routes. They are strictly arboreal. As in the case of the other non-human primates, it is each for himself in the getting of food, though, of course, the young are nurtured by the mother until they can shift for themselves.

Within the clan, there are such functional sub-groups as female and nursing infant; female, infant and juveniles. There are groups for play, for defense, for directing and retrieving activities, and assemblages about oestrous and parturient females. There seems to be no struggle among males for females. The female gives the sign to the male whom she prefers and the others stand off. This absence of aggressive jealousy makes it possible for the band to function peaceably. The harmony of the clan is secured at the price of sexual promiscuity. The male takes the aggressive, protective and defensive role in the case of danger to the clan, but the battle seems to be vocal. The side that makes the loudest noise wins. Human nations try to win their victories in the same way and sometimes succeed, but there is always the danger of armed conflict. The clan population of howlers was found by Carpenter to vary from four to thirty-five. In general the howler clan is democratic, the females have about the same rights as males—in other words, to shift for themselves and their young. If the females in a clan are too few, males may wander off and seek admittance into another clan of howlers or they may attract females from another clan and start a new clan.

The baboons illustrate the conflict between family group and band. The baboons are primarily familial but they also have a strong band instinct. Since they are very jealous and pugnacious, they fight most of the time. They are like some humans who cannot live together yet cannot

live separately. The reproductive unit of the baboons is polygynous, consisting of the dominant male, his harem, the nursing infants and one or more semidependent juveniles. Dominance is a conspicuous characteristic of the baboon, while it is not of the howler. Not only is there the dominance by the overlord but there is a serial dominance all through the group. In the harem is a chief wife who does most of the petting of the overlord. The females are abject slaves of the overlord. Sometimes he deigns to notice the infants or juveniles but he takes no responsibility for their care (like some human husbands). There are deadly fights among the males over the females in which the female stands a good chance of being killed or maimed, so that often, when the fight is over, the object of the fight has been destroyed. The baboon band is apparently an aggregate of family groups. While the family group is relatively stable, the band varies greatly in numbers from a few to several score. Yet the band does have importance for all its variability. Its function is defensive, aggressive, nutritional. It uses the same shelter and feeding ground. Its habits show great regularity, so that you can predict just what time of day it will be found in the valley of prickly pears. The howlers and the baboons represent opposite social experiments. The howlers have been successful in the experiment of the clan because they have no sexual jealousy to divide them. The baboon has a strong sense of proprietorship in his females and their young, and, because of his extreme sexual jealousy, he is lacking in group solidarity.

The chimpanzee is generally recognized to be the nearest kin to man, both physiologically and psychologically. But while we know a great deal about the chimpanzees in captivity, our knowledge of them in their natural habitat is very deficient. The chimpanzee young are dependent on their mother for three years or more. Owing to the long period of infancy there is no doubt a stronger bond in the chimpanzee family than in that of the lower primates.

Whether the family is permanently stable we do not know. The chimpanzee mother shows great affection for her offspring during the period of dependency. She assists it to walk during the first three to five months. During the second half-year it rides on the back of its mother. She is continually grooming the child. She feeds, protects it and directs its training. All this we can observe in captivity. In its native habitat the chimpanzee lives in bands. According to Nissen who observed the chimpanzees in French Guinea, the bands varied from four to fourteen. Nissen noted the occurrence of more than one male as well as females in a group. He found the ratio of females to males to be 1.9 to 1. It is not clear what the intra-family relations are. Yerkes suspects that they may be polygamous, instead of monogamous or polygynous. Nor is it certain that the band is a familial unit. Nissen refuses to call the band a family, but Yerkes inclines to that view. Perhaps it is what the anthropologists call a group marriage. The group, at any rate—consisting of male or males, the mates, and their young—is real, whatever name we give it. "Apart from its reproductive function, we discover in the chimpanzee band a society, presumably closed, which is useful for both defense and aggression. The adult male or males of the social group frequently, if not commonly, guard, protect, and defend accompanying females, infants and juveniles. All reports tend to indicate that risks to the individual, whatever its sex, age or condition, are lessened by the nature of the social organization."[6] When, however, the chimpanzees select a camp site for the night, everyone makes its own bed, except the mother who makes a bed big enough for herself and dependents.

The deeply social nature of the chimpanzees has been expressed by Köhler. "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a chimpanzee kept in solitude is not a real chimpanzee at all. That certain special characteristic qualities of this

6. *Ibid.*, p. 993.

species of animal only appear when they are in a group, is simply because the behavior of his comrades constitutes for each individual the only adequate incentive for bringing about a great variety of essential forms of behavior. Furthermore, the observation of many pecularities of the chimpanzee will only be clearly *intelligible* when the behavior and counter-behavior of the individuals in the group are considered as a whole. . . The group connection of chimpanzees is a very real force, of sometimes astonishing degree. This can be clearly seen in any attempt to take one animal out of a group which is well-established as a group."[7] The separation gives rise to extreme fear in small animals and to rage in bigger animals. When kept in separation, the chimpanzee shows intense symptoms of nostalgia. When it rejoins the group there is great joy on the part of the separated one and evident welcome on the part of the group. The welcome is especially demonstrative when it is the oldest animal which has been taken and is returned. But the animals of the group soon forget the absent comrade. The distress must be perceived to be real. Even chimpanzees do not seem to have much power of reproductive imagination, without which a genuine psychological group is impossible. Out of sight, out of mind holds for the group, though not for the separated individual who pines away. There are marked degrees of friendship among chimpanzees. There is also evident leadership and dominance, though the chimpanzees are not especially pugnacious. Familiarity is an important part of the group bond. Strangeness means hostility, though they are known to get over the strangeness. There is a sense of property among chimpanzees. They have a fairly definite feeding district. They also show attachment to things with which they play.

We know a great deal of the mental life of the chimpanzee, thanks especially to Köhler. Köhler thinks that the

7. W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, 1927, p. 282. (trans., Ella Winter.)

vocal language of the chimpanzees, though of considerable variety, expresses urges, attitudes, emotions but is never descriptive. (Yerkes thinks it may sometimes be descriptive.) Köhler thinks the visual language is more important than the vocal. The mimetic expression of the chimpanzees has a large range and in general the range of emotional expressiveness is far greater than in human beings. Köhler confesses that the chimpanzees have ways of comprehension which escape him. "There are certain spells of 'pure excitement' about whose exact character I have formed no definite opinion, even after six years of study. But among themselves the animals understand perfectly 'what is the matter,' on almost every occasion—that is evident from the communal behavior." He rightly suspects the psychological theory of analogy as the basis of social recognition. Yerkes and Köhler have impressed us with the insight of which chimpanzees are capable. They are certainly capable of concrete analysis of whole and part, as shown in putting things together to reach a desired object, even if they do not make use of descriptive language. In fact they are uncannily human. Yet for all their learning capacity, it seems clear that, while they are certainly capable of genuine group life, the basis is biological rather than psychological. They cannot constitute a psychological community because that involves sharing common memories and they seem to live in the present. A psychological group must live also in the past and in the future. The chimpanzees take no thought of the morrow any more than of the past. In their tropical environment it has not been necessary that they should. They live in the present and each looks out for itself, except where the mother instinct is involved. Under the circumstances, the non-human primates could not dominate the world, as the insects and man have done. There is, to be sure, a great deal of mutual attention among the chimpanzees according to the degree of attraction. They are always picking each other over. It is generally sup-

posed that they are de-fleaing each other. We know that mutual de-lousing is a very amorous pastime between the sexes among the natives of Melanesia. It seems chimpanzees do furnish first aid to the wounded by licking them and petting them. But the mutual interest of the chimpanzees is always an immediate one. They have not learned to work for life as a whole, as the insects have learned and as man, perhaps, may learn.

In surveying social life below man, we have found three types of grouping: the colony, the band and the family. The latter two types we have found to be characteristic of the higher non-human primates. The problem of the primates is to harmonize the family and the band. The howler monkey has done so by practically eliminating the family. The baboons have families, aggregated into bands, but with perpetual conflict. The chimpanzees live in small bands which are probably family units with polygamous relations of the sexes. The human problem was to harmonize the band and the family without sacrificing the family. When the pre-human ancestors became terrestrial instead of arboreal in their mode of living, they greatly increased their dangers as well as their opportunities. Darwin suggests that man may have evolved from one of the weaker species of anthropoids rather than such strong ones as the gorilla. Hence, the great survival value of mutual aid. But the change in the conditions of living probably had more to do with it.

The climatic changes which forced man to abandon his arboreal life must also have revolutionized his diet. Man became a carnivorous animal and therefore became a hunter. Since he could not contend singly with the large and fierce animals of his environment, he was obliged to hunt in packs. We know from the paintings of the Cromagnon man that he hunted the Bison. The hunting pack meant discipline in cooperation. Man's strength lay in the pack. He must also provide protection in the way of shelter and covering. And he must provide proper weapons, es-

pecially to reach his prey at a distance. Man had entered upon a new era. And the new era emphasized the pack.

Owing to the prolongation of infancy in the human species, the family bond would have greater strength and permanency. There must also have been greater cooperation of the male in the maintenance and protection of the family. Man was also obliged by survival conditions, as well as by a strong social instinct, to live in bands. But man is a very jealous and pugnacious animal. His situation therefore must have been something like that of the baboon. We may suppose that the dominant male of humans, like the dominant male of the baboons, drove away the young males when they reached sexual maturity. These would then wander about and seek to enter other bands or to capture females by enticement or force from other family groups and start new groups. It is easy to see how marrying out by the males may have started. In the course of time the feeling must have grown up that the juvenile females should be mated to men outside. Female jealousy of the daughters probably played a part. We may suppose that exogamy was, in a rough manner (very rough), an accomplished fact when man started to think about it. We cannot, I think, suppose that mating out of the family was due to an instinct against incest. For among other primates, while the old male may drive the young males away, he does not drive the young females away.

The real history of man begins when he manifests creative intelligence. Man discovered the use of fire and how to make fire. But early man, unlike modern man, probably gave as much thought to social inventions as to physical inventions. The problem was pressing. The survival value of group cooperation was great under primitive conditions, in the struggle with human and animal enemies and with physical nature. Some wise men started to find formulae for living together. The problem of marriage was especially urgent for peaceful living together. We can understand now the great attention which was given

to marriage regulations in all primitive civilizations. But men don't think in vacuo. They think because they are confronted by a crisis, and primitive man had to be practical in order to survive. If primitive man did not invent exogamy, he was certainly called upon to invent rules for regulating it. The problem was to preserve the family and also to have the cooperation of a band of families. This problem could be worked out only by the wisdom of the larger group, the band. The marriage regulations were called forth by the problem of keeping families together in a clan and yet not having promiscuity. They aimed to harmonize two powerful instincts: sexual jealousy and the parental instinct.

The regulation of marrying out was a master stroke. It made it possible for parental affection to assert itself in retaining one member of the marriage relation within the family group, the other party to the marriage having a status as a visitor. But the party marrying out had the moral support of his or her clan. No regulations are watched over with such jealous care as the marriage customs. Whether exogamy was once universal in primitive life cannot, of course, be proved, but it is well-nigh universal among primitive peoples. Even where it does not now exist, it may have led to rules which have persisted even after the institution has disappeared. Among some of the Veddas, owing to their being so few and being obliged to live under one roof, the structure of exogamy has disappeared but the marriage relations are those which prevail in exogamous societies. Where groups become scattered owing to the necessity of forming new bands, which eventually separate from the old bands, and where the locality becomes the important factor in the grouping, the marriage customs may yet remain. At any rate close marriages such as between brothers and sisters, parents and children are universally prohibited, except in some instances of royalty where the king is obliged to marry a sister. This was the custom in Uganda in East Africa, in parts of Polynesia,

in ancient Peru, in ancient Egypt. We must not forget, however, that there has been considerable variety in the invention of marriage customs and also that marriage inventions, like other inventions, may spread.

Psychological Groups

It is when we deal with the human stage of living that we are concerned with social relations in the psychological sense of the consciousness of common interests. We pass from the "natural" group to the "artificial" group, meaning by the latter that, in some degree, creative intelligence enters into planning. We cannot, of course, separate man's intelligence from his biological nature. Intelligence is part of life, but it furnishes a new way of regulating life. The instinctive nature of man remains basic, but with intelligence it can see its drift; and because of memory, imagination and thought it is not bound to the present situation but can extend its perspectives to the past and the future. A true psychological group can arise only when the members share the memories of the past and the plans for the future. To make this possible, descriptive language must be developed, though at the primitive stage of man as with the chimpanzees, visual language may play a larger role than auditory. The development of language makes it possible for man not merely to communicate the tradition of the past but to share in developing plans for the future.

At the primitive stage, the group is of primary concern. Primitive man thinks in terms of "we" rather than "I." "Thus if the question be 'Who will help?' the Apache will reply 'I—amongst others,' 'I for one.' " Only under special circumstances or when he is recounting his personal exploits, will he say: "*Sheeda,* I by myself."[8] The development of language can easily be seen to be of momentous importance in social evolution. Primitive language is holophrastic or cinematographic, instead of analytical. This

8. Marett, *Ibid.,* p. 146. Read Marett's whole chapter on Language, Chap. V.

is due in part to the fact that visual communication plays a dominant role. At any rate the vocal expression reproduces the whole functional situation. "For instance, I-cut-the-bear's-leg-at-the-joint-with- a-flint-now corresponds fairly well with the total impression produced by the particular act."[9] Primitive language did not abstract the elements of the situation and use them independently, as an analytical language does. It used whole-expressions. Owing to this holophrastic character of language, the significance of the individual thing or person is inextricably bound up with its concrete group relations rather than with abstract ideals. While communication is of very great importance in the social relations of primitive man, language, whether words or ceremonies or emblems, is for him, as for us, merely the outward and visible sign of the spiritual reality of social relations, though the inward substance does need the external symbols to make the relations sacramental.

When we survey the facts of primitive society, we find two groupings which are universal: the family and the band or camp. "A survey of the data," says Lowie, "clearly shows that the family is omnipresent at every stage of culture, that at a higher level it is frequently coupled with a sib[10] organization, and that at a still higher level the sib disappears."[11] But when we speak of family, we must not think of the legally independent modern European family. The primitive family is inextricably intertwined with the larger social organization, in the way of restraints, responsibilities and privileges. This is true, whatever the social organization may be, but is especially apparent when the marriage pattern is that of clan exogamy.

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9. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

10. The British anthropologists use the term clan. American anthropologists have used clan for matrilineal organizations, gens and gentes for patrilineal and sib to include both. But the American usage is changing in favor of the British, clan being the generic term and matrilinear and patrilinear indicating species.

11. Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 1920, p. 147.

Under the exogamous form of marriage, it is necessary to distinguish between kinship and consanguinity. We think of marriage in terms of consanguinity or the relations of biological descent in various degrees—brothers and sisters, first cousins, second cousins, etc. Kinship, on the other hand, according to the clan system of counting lineage, is a sociological concept and includes only half the blood relations. Suppose that you are a member of the deer clan, then you must marry into another clan—the elk clan or the bear clan. When the organization is of the maternal type, then when a man from the elk clan marries a woman of the deer clan, the children are all counted as deer. The descent is matrilineal. They are not kin to the father's people. The custom may also be matrilocal, then the man upon being accepted and paying the purchase price lives with his wife's clan at least for a time. It may be added that the arrangements are made mostly by the woman's relatives. In the matter of purchase a man may get as good as he gives and then it really becomes an exchange of gifts. But marriage without purchase price is generally not regarded as respectable. Naturally the wife's relatives —usually the wife's oldest brother—have a great deal to say about the bringing up of the children. When the wife's relatives have complete legal control of the marriage relation, the institution is called matripotestal. Property like lineage descends on the mother's side. The converse of the picture holds when the paternal form of marriage is the custom. The permissible degree of kinship, as between marriage camps, varies from first cousins to third or even fourth cousins. The regulations are difficult for students of anthropology, but seem to cause no inconvenience to "savages." To have sexual relations, and still more to marry, within the forbidden degree is incest, and is punished with varying grades of severity, even with death. While it may seem that "savage" man, under such an arrangement, has only half as many relatives as "civilized" man, as a matter of fact, the kin through various de-

grees count with the savage. The whole clan is felt to be a kinship unity, though of course there are degrees.

Though the family is very much circumscribed, under such a system, the natural family group of mother, father and minor children is an intimate unit with real affection for the children and sometimes of the mates for each other. While divorce is generally easy, that is, for due cause (including incompatibility and cruelty) and with property arrangements, when there are children the married people generally stick together. We must agree that marriage was an invention of the first order. It is all the more remarkable when we consider that early man probably did not understand the causal connection between sexual relations and offspring. The higher animals have no such consciousness. Anthropologists tell us that today the natives of Melanesia and central Australia have no comprehension of the physiological causes of pregnancy. But they have strict rules governing the relations of the sexes, and they enforce strict responsibility for sociological parentage. Every child must have a sociological father.

We have seen that the family is a universal group in primitive life. We may add that it is still universal among human beings, and though the institution of marriage has changed greatly yet the general pattern remains. The effective nucleus still consists of parents and minor children; and the restrictions on intermarriage follow on the whole the ancient pattern, in that very close blood relationship is taboo. The most striking difference is that the group of parents and children has attained an independent legal status within the larger community. Not only the family but the members of the family—the husband, the wife, the children—have, in the modern community, attained a legal status. But the affectionate family of father, mother and young children has shown remarkable continuity and still remains fundamental in our social organization.

The other universal grouping in primitive civilization, the band or camp, has undergone more radical transforma-

tion. We have been obliged to say something about this grouping in order to understand family relations. Under the exogamous system, the family relations are merged into the camp relations. In general the camp is more fundamental in primitive life than the family. The primitive man thinks of social relations in terms of the camp. The camp is the community. It is the self-subsistent unit, not the family. "Viewing the primitive world as a whole," says Wissler, "we see man as a camp dweller. We think of our own society in somewhat different terms. To us, what we call the family seems the elementary social unit, but among primitive peoples the important social unit is the camp, or community. . . . Such a primitive community may be composed of several married pairs and their dependents, and in that sense it is a camp of cooperating families. Not every family in the camp participates equally in the round of life. . . . It is scarcely conceivable that each family could alone carry on all the social activities. . . . But such is possible in a cooperating group of families."[12] The important point is that in primitive life we must start with the community. There are instances when the family and the community coincide, as for example, with the Ifugaos, on the isle of Luzon of the Philippines, where the family, consisting of all the generations, with well-organized property rules, is the ultimate kinship and political unit. But that is an unusually simple situation.

The camp is primarily a food group. The quest for food is an ever urgent quest among primitive peoples. And it is easy to see that the conditions of obtaining food are bound to affect social organization. We have seen that marriage relations, on the exogamous pattern, require more than one camp. But we must not suppose that camps are constituted to fulfill a specific type of marriage. The exogamous relation presupposes the existence of friendly camps. The camp or band is no doubt grounded in the

12. Carl Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, p. 14.

biological nature of man. But the biological pattern is eked out by psychological contact which gives rise to common memories and the consciousness of common interests. Human beings felt and feel an intense sense of at-homeness in a limited group where everyone knows everyone else in an intimate way. In such a group human nature attains completion. In primitive life, such a group had important advantages in defense and aggression, as well as in food activities. Generally there were, in one neighborhood, several camps which understood one another and cooperated for certain purposes. Some food enterprises required the cooperation of several camps, as in the buffalo hunt on the North American prairies or the salmon fishing in the Pacific Northwest. Some ceremonial observances, such as the great initiation ceremonies in Australia at the time of adolescence, draw camps together over a considerable area. Some of the dramatic festivals of the American Indians required considerable numbers and drew from a number of camps and tribes.

The proximity of the camps who could understand one another naturally led to inter-camp or super-camp regulations and sometimes resulted in tribal government. With the North American Indian the tribe generally constituted the largest in-group for friendly cooperation and intermarriage. While marriage was exogamous as between clans, it was endogamous when you take the tribe as the unit. Such is the relation still where the ancient customs are maintained. The clans of the tribe were sometimes grouped into two sets, called phratries. These served certain ceremonial and sporting purposes. When such a division existed, exogamy applied to the relation of the two divisions as such. The American Indian started a new experiment in organization which, if it had not been cut short by the white man, would doubtless have had momentous consequences. The Iroquois took the lead in forming a democratic league of neighboring tribes, in short, in forming a nation, which was increasing in size and

in power with great strides and would probably have dominated the continent.

Primitive man was far more dependent upon the environment than we. There is a general tendency, according to Malthus, for population to exceed food supply. The checks have been war, pestilence, and famine. Malthus' generalization had relevance before the new era of scientific control. The food supply was precarious in primitive times and no doubt Malthus' checks operated to keep down population. There was considerable room for movement in some areas like the North American plains, as has been the case in modern times with the discovery of new continents. But, on the whole, the areas were claimed and movement meant war. Primitive man, however, was not entirely determined by geography. When pressed with hunger, he sometimes invented new means of coping with the environment. We are impressed with the progressive series of inventions by men of the Old Stone Age. The Cromagnon man seems to have been an accomplished fisherman as well as a hunter. In the Neolithic Age man discovered the domestication of cattle and the cultivation of cereals, thus making possible a denser population. Primitive civilizations present a great range in man's mastering of the environment, from the crooked stick and boomerang of the Australian to the complex iron civilization of central Africa. Hunger was a powerful motive with primitive man for trying something new whether by borrowing or by original invention. But utility was not the only motive. Sometimes he invented patterns to satisfy his esthetic feeling. Art in some form is universal in primitive life.

We are concerned now with social invention rather than material invention. Does the size of the population determine the group pattern? We must note that, with the same density of population, we find a great variety of group patterns. Numbers, then, cannot be the only factor. Differences of race and more important still, differences in history, including individual genius and varying histori-

cal circumstances, must be taken into account. It is true, however, that density of population is a factor in social organization. The social pattern which works in the sparsely settled arctic regions could not work in the densely populated regions of central Africa. But in neither case is the pattern the mere result of numbers. Social patterns are inventions. They are not the mere product of circumstances. We find different patterns within the same arctic regions and in the same region within central Africa. The social pattern of the Eskimos is different from that of their neighbors, the Chuckchis, of northeastern Siberia. The negroes of central Africa have a hierarchical organization with a monarch at the top. But within this general pattern there are wide differences. With the Ewe, the power of the king is nominal; with the Dahomi, he is a despot. Again, the Masais, in the same geographical region, but with a different history, have a democratic organization. The increase of population, beyond a certain point, made it necessary, for effective living together, to invent a new social pattern, but the pattern is not determined by mere numbers. Where there is a great area to spread in, as in the habitat of the American Indian, the pattern was preserved by groups dividing and separating, when the numbers had become too large for the pattern. The Iroquois, again, with a far look into the future invented a pattern for tribes to cooperate in a democratic way. We cannot say that this invention was the result merely of geography.

Communities and Associations

Human groups may be divided into communities and associations or interest groups.[13] Both types of groups are illustrated in primitive civilizations. It is here that we get the purest example of the primary community. "Any circle of people," says MacIver, "who live together,

13. See R. M. MacIver's authoritative work, *Society, Its Structure and Organization*, 1931. (New re-written ed., 1938.)

who belong together, so that they share, not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and complete enough to include their lives, is a community. . . . The mark of a community is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relationship *may* be found within it."[14] It must include the concept of area, but area is not enough: it must be "an area of common living." The area, however, is always an essential part of the primitive community, even though it be semi-nomadic. The community may be called an involuntary group because we are "born into communities." Under modern conditions we have considerable choice and facility in moving into new communities, but under more primitive conditions a man is born into a community for life. You are born into a camp (which may be part of a larger group) and your relations with your community are part of you. If you are banished from your community you are nobody. You have no status, you have no place to go except the wilderness. Under modern conditions, it is difficult to find a community which answers MacIver's definition. In the Middle Ages, according to Barker, "each village was practically self-sufficing; at the most it imported commodities like iron and salt; for the rest it drew on itself and on its own resources."[15] But there were taxes, military obligations, religious relations which made the village conscious of being part of a larger order. In the interior of China, there are villages as secluded as those of medieval Europe, but they are made aware at times of the demands of a larger world. It is true, however, that such a village has most of its interests in common and that practically all of a man's social relations are within the village; and those relations include the past with its far-flung traditions and ancestral spirits.

The rural neighborhood, in the highlands of southern

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 10.

15. Ernest Barker in *Unity of Western Civilization*, 1929, ed. F. S. Marvin, p. 92.

Sweden, where I was born and lived my childhood and early youth, came very near being self-sufficient. My family raised the grain on the farm, took it to the mill on the river nearby, brought back flour and made it into bread. We raised our own vegetables. Milk was furnished by our own cows and we made our own butter. We sheared our own sheep and spun the wool and wove it, then took it to the fuller on the river. The leather for shoes came from hides of our own cattle which we slaughtered at home. We then sent the hides to the tanner, a little farther away. When we needed clothes the tailor of the neighborhood came to our house with his apprentices and stayed until the large family was provided. When we needed shoes, the shoemaker and his apprentices likewise came and lived with us till they had finished. The village blacksmith provided us with the implements—plows,[16] harrows, scythes, axes which we needed for the farm. We had no modern machinery. We cut our own wood from our own forest of pine, birch and oak. We had a very considerable pine forest and sometimes sold a park of mature timber to the outside world. We carted it for the most part ourselves to the station six miles away and, since my older brother wanted me as a child with him on his trips, I saw the mysterious trains come from the unknown and go to the unknown. It was a great thrill to watch them but I did not ride on one until I went away to college at the age of sixteen. The groceries which we needed we bought from a neighbor's store. The public primary school was in the neighborhood and my father was one of the directors. But the grammar school was next to the church three miles away and I walked back and forth. My further preparation for college was by the kindhearted Pastor, C. D. Sjöfors and his wife (blessings on them!) who took me into their family.

We all went to church on Sunday and extended our acquaintance with the parish. The parish church was the

16. Both steel plows and wooden plows were used, the former for breaking the turf, the latter for stirring the soil.

center of the communal life as well as of religion. The parish affairs were disposed of at communal meetings which selected their own chairman. The pastor represented the state as well as the church. He baptized the infants, churched the mothers, confirmed the young (after they had finished the grammar school, and had received in addition instruction in the catechism from himself), gave the sacrament to those confirmed, visited the sick and buried the dead. He was the head of the schools. He represented culture and authority in a very kindly way. He and the teachers were elected by the voters of the parish, but with permanency of tenure.

While the parish was the corporate community, it was rather a secondary than a primary community, at least for me as a child. It stretched three miles in each direction from the church. Many of the people were comparatively strange to one another, though of course they were conscious of belonging together as a parish. The neighborhood was the intimate community. Since the same families had lived there for generations and intermarried, it was largely a kinship community. Nobody was very rich and no one was allowed to starve. At worst, the parish saw to that. There was no great distinction between rich and poor. At my home the family and servants ate at the same table and lived in the same house. The servants were really the most independent, as they were the most important members of the family. When the tailor and the shoemaker—each with his apprentices—came, they were members of the family. When the tailor had gone on a spree and had delirium tremens my brothers were sent to take care of him. When the miller or shoemaker was ill my family watched over them and sent them things to eat. Everybody who was ill or in need in the neighborhood was the concern of my father and mother. All the unfortunates were, in a large way, members of our family and could come and stay as long as they wished. Ours was an open house. My father was Father Elias to the whole neigh-

borhood. He loved all, rich or poor, but especially the poor. When they were in distress or sickness or dying, they wanted him and he did not fail them.

As a boy, I took part in everything around the farm, as I was able, but especially I remember bringing the cattle home at night and being a messenger boy to those in need. My family managed to send me to college for a couple of years, then my father died; and since we were a large family, I decided at the age of nearly eighteen to emigrate to America. I was uprooted from my community. However kind the new world has been and whatever my success within it, the loss of my own community has always haunted me. The change meant a change of language, a change of history and tradition. It was a complete cleavage with my world before eighteen. For some years while my mother was living and some of my family remained at the old home, I made a visit occasionally, but I was no longer part of the community. And now the community itself is gone. My kindred have died or moved away. The tailor, shoemaker and blacksmith have, for the most part, been crowded out by the factories. The new farmers have no past. They know nothing about the legends of the place —the hill within which a giant sits on his chest of gold and silver, the trolls who lived in the lake (now drained and cultivated) and who long ago did the harvesting for my ancestors annually, at night, for a bowl of porridge. Nor do they know about the many monuments still remaining of the Old Stone Age. You cannot have a community unless people are rooted in the remembrance of a common past.

The picture of the fate of my own childhood community is a picture of the fate of western civilization during that same period of fifty or sixty years. The primary community, with its love for the soil on which it lives, with its roots in the common memories of the past, with its intimate mutual understanding, has largely disappeared. At best it is a fringe on the larger secondary community—the

city, the state—with its indirect and impersonal relations. And in this larger community, associations, based upon abstract interest, have largely supplanted the concrete community, based upon history and the soil. The family in the western world is disintegrating and its functions are largely taken up by the fringes of the larger community—the street, the school, the playground. The home is chiefly a place to sleep. The family has lost its attachment for the soil, made sacred by the memory of a succession of ancestors, as it was in earlier days and as it is in China and to a considerable extent still in rural France. Even when the family lives on a farm, the farm is just a place of departure for other places. With the automobile and other means of rapid transportation, the rural neighborhood is being merged in the village, and the village, in turn, is becoming a suburb of the city. The rural church—the old social center— is being abandoned. The rural relations are becoming casual. The new organizations of farmers are regional and even national. The cooperative movement, in its early stage, gave new vitality to the local community, but has rapidly extended itself, until it, too, is becoming national. It is the economic interest that counts rather than the community, though some times the cooperative association, as in Sweden and Denmark, leads to the organization of local study clubs and other common cultural activities.

What impresses one about our western world is its restlessness. People feel that they must travel with terrific speed, beating up the dust, not caring where they are going, and that generally means going to hell. The insane asylums are overcrowded, anarchy is breaking out the world over. You cannot uproot a humanity, envolved, through long ages, for a community of the soil, without serious consequences. There is something lost, something people are seeking in their speed. They are like a wolf seeking his pack, and not knowing what they are seeking. We cannot return to the past. The angel of fate bars the way. But we must de-

centralize our civilization and try to re-establish the primary community, though it will be a new community.

The great drift of the industrial era has been to concentrate life and interests in the city to the disintegration of the smaller communities. But the city cannot be regarded as a true community, though it is a common area of living and it has a common organization. I do not mean merely that the city cannot be a primary community. Because of its size it is inevitable that human relations must be largely secondary and indirect. I mean that, on the whole, there is generally lacking, at any rate in the U. S. A., a sincere and intelligent civic interest. People know what is going on in the city mostly through their newspapers which emphasize the pathological side—the scandals, murders, suicides, and other pathological phenomena. Since the newspapers are run, generally, in the interest of the big advertisers, people get but a distorted view of the communal affairs of the city. Mostly, the general public is indifferent to the concerns of the city. They are concerned with their private business and ambitions; and let the bosses run the city for the "special interests" which pay them. Once in a while, because of some public-spirited leader, the people may be aroused and clean house. But public interest works only part of the time, while the selfish interests work all the while. The reason that the city fails to be a true community is that there is no permanent and vital interest which holds the people together. The city, in spite of its common organization, is a colony of quasi-communities and interest groups rather than itself a community group. There may be local pride, especially in size, but the general interest in the city is thin and intermittent. I am speaking, of course, of the American city.

The provincial "state," in the United States of America, is an even thinner community than the city. Its unity is mostly geographical. It has important concerns such as public education, roads, courts, institutions; and it certainly

needs public interest. Intermittently the people of a "state" are whipped up to political consciousness by political parties; and sometimes, as in California, aged retired farmers celebrate annual picnics for their "state." But on the whole there is very little community interest for the "state." It is left mostly to the politicians to take care of, with the result that "special interests" are better taken care of than the public interest. Except for public apathy, the multiple subdivisions of the "state," with the enormous number of political office holders and the consequent load of taxation, would not long be tolerated.

Of the secondary communities, the sovereign state has gained an ascendancy in the public consciouness over all the other secondary communities. Some political writers deny that the state is a community. They call it an association,[17] like a corporation. They say that the state is not all-inclusive of the life of the people within it, that it is the organization of merely one interest. But if complete inclusiveness of the life of a people were the test of a community, then there is no community today—not even in China, no, not even in the primitive camp. The state is the self-regulating and self-controlling organization of a people of a definite area. If the criterion of a community is "an area of common living," then certainly the state is a community. Moreover, all title to the possession of a limited area is vested in the state. Without the state there is no property in the legal sense. There is only the right of the stronger. The state alone possesses ultimate "eminent domain," even though by its own moral restriction it must give compensation. All other control of "domain" is vested in it.

A nation, on the other hand, is a sentimental unity, unless it is organized as a state. A nation must have the con-

17. The view that the state is an association is held by such outstanding interpreters as Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917; *Authority in the Modern State*, 1919; *A Grammar of Politics*, 1930; and by R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, 1926; *Society*, 1931.

sciousness of a common tradition and common ideals, but it does not necessarily have a common area or control that area. The Hebrews have been, through the ages, a nation, but since 70 A. D. they have not had an exclusive territory and therefore have not been a community, though there are local Hebrew communities. The Scotch are certainly a nation, with a strong sense of national tradition and a definite area, but as a nation they do not exercise exclusive control over that area. No doubt the national feeling is a strong bond of a state community, but Switzerland consists of three nationalities—German, French, Italian—yet within the area there is a strong sense of a common history, of common interests, and an efficient performance of the reciprocal services which make a community.

In social evolution any group which exercises ultimate control within a definite area is functionally a state. Theoretically, the state may control any function or interest which the people so organized regard as of concern to the whole people. What concerns are regarded of such general importance depends, of course, upon public opinion as articulated through the institution of government. That there are limits to the expediency of control is true in any community. That the state in recent years has become of increasing importance is due to the fact that, in the complexity of our civilization, new problems have arisen which cannot be solved by individual initiative or by special corporate interests. There is an ever larger number of problems where the people must act as a whole for the welfare of all. At the present time, we find a variety of experiments in this whole-control. We cannot go into those experiments here, but what stands out is the increasing consciousness of the state as the community of the whole people of an area; and in some forms of control such as communism and fascism the state has become *the* community to the effacement practically of local communities. Certainly, the state cannot be defined in terms of one func-

tion or interest. The *laissez faire* conception of the state emphasized police functions. But that is only one of many functions. The state is concerned with health, with education, with economic interests, with ecological interests, such as soil conservation and forestation. Government[18] is not the state but an institution created by the state; it is an instrument for organizing a great variety of interests.

In dealing with the community we have been obliged to refer to the other type of grouping—that based upon a particular interest, such as economic interest, social interest, religious interest. The grouping which is based upon a particular interest, MacIver calls an association. The interest grouping is not based upon "a common area of living," as is the community, though it may be confined to such an area, as is largely the case in primitive civilization. But an interest is an abstraction from the concrete milieu of life, and a grouping based upon interest tends to operate independently of geographical relations. In primitive life, there is a great variety of groupings, beside community grouping, though, as MacIver points out, such groupings are closely adherent to the kinship group. We find groupings based upon age in a progressive series, sometimes with special initiatory ceremonies for each stage, though the transition into manhood or womanhood is made especially impressive. Sometimes, as in the case of the Banks Islands of Melanesia, promotion from one age-group to another requires heavy fees. But that is not usually the case. Secret societies play a very large role in primitive life. Sometimes the age classes are in fact secret societies, as the mysteries are progressively revealed. In some civilizations (as on the Banks Islands), the secret societies are the controlling influence in the social organization. There are religious societies, such as the very important Tobacco

18. There has been a tendency in English jurisprudence, ever since Locke, to confuse government and state. This confusion is reflected in the conception of limited sovereignty.

Society of the Crow into which both men and women are admitted. This society has specifically to do with ceremonies to promote the growth of tobacco, but in its selectiveness and in its dignity it exercises important influence upon the whole social life. There are military societies, which are also social clubs, and in that respect resemble the American Legion, but unlike the Legion they do not exist primarily for promoting bonuses, but for the sake of the constant need of service to the group, the only reward being the praise by the group and an occasional scalp or other personal trophy.

There are dancing societies which sometimes play an important role in social relations. There are dramatic societies which may require considerable numbers, even a hundred or more, drawn from various camps and even tribes, in carrying out the great dramatic performances of such peoples as the American Indian. Such dramas have great educational significance as they communicate the tradition, including the religion and the moral codes, of the people. There are ceremonial societies which also may require considerable numbers and draw from wide areas. There are occupational societies or guilds such as the Cheyenne Women's Craft Guilds, "devoted to the higher reaches of the various feminine crafts, such as tent-cutting, quill embroidery, moccasin decoration, and rawhide painting. Entrance was granted only on payment of heavy fees, and altogether these organizations are plausibly likened by their discoverer to our trade unions. Here the necessity for gaining expert advice and recognition in a chosen field of endeavor has caused an exuberance of societies that puts to shame the dogma of woman's unsociability."[19] The blacksmiths, among the Masais, constitute a guild of highly skilled workers in iron, but, curiously, while they are the most essential part of Masai civilization, they are a despised class and prevented from intermarrying with other

19. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

classes. All these and many other social groupings are selective, with definite standards of membership, and exercise a powerful influence on social morale. Not to be accepted in the current societies means, of course, social isolation.

Besides functional groupings, there are groupings based upon rank. The rich and the poor are always with us and the distinction is important in primitive life, as well as in modern life. But it is a general rule in primitive life that no one must be allowed to starve. The Eskimos, who live from season to season, depending upon the seasonal hunting and fishing, have a nice custom of "borrowing." While they have plenty, the families give feasts to one another, especially during the long winter, but when a family runs short it "borrows" from those who have. There is no expectation of a return but during another season it may be another family which needs to borrow. The distinction between rich and poor does not exist in Eskimo civilization but it does in most primitive civilizations—in general where there is capital, whether cattle or lands or both.

But besides the stratification of property there is the stratification of blood, that is, the stratification of caste, which is quite widespread in primitive life. The American Indian stands out nobly for his democracy and his respect for humanity—man, woman and child. But even there we find exceptions. The Indians of the west coast of British Columbia had a stratified system of nobility, commoners, and slaves. But the social prominence consisted in "flattening" out the rival by giving great feasts and distributing gifts. Among such peoples as the Polynesians (including especially the Maoris of New Zealand) and the Bantus of Central Africa, the caste system is basic in social relations.[20] Sometimes caste is the result of occupation when an occupational class becomes a closed class. This has happened with the blacksmith guild of the Masais. India

20. See Paul Radin, *Social Anthropology*, 1932, 69 ff., 79 ff.

is, of course, the great illustration of occupational classes stiffening into castes and resisting even modern change. Marett thinks the real basis of the differentiation of classes and castes is economic, even in the case of the castes of India. With their economic advantage, it is easy for the favored to create a theory of superior blood. A class, in general, becomes a caste when, because of blood, it cannot intermarry with other classes. That of course means the monopoly of some privilege which is sanctified by the myth of blood.

We generally think of the life of the savage as being very simple. In fact, so far as the individual is concerned, it may be far more complex than ours. Lowie is impressed with the "mottled diversity" of primitive society. He gives an imaginary history of a man of the Mountain Crows eighty years ago. A woman of the Thicklodge sib marries a man of the Bad-leggings sib and gives birth to a boy. The father sends for a noted warrier of his own sib to give the boy a name. The warrior names the boy Strikes-three-men, after one of his own exploits. The boy grows up and enters a league of playmates, an imitation of the warrior societies and their activities. As the boy grows older he meets Albino-bull and forms with him a life-long friendship. Together the two friends go hunting, share each other's mistresses, and set out for war parties. Together they join the Fox society, a social club, but leave it for the rival Lumpwoods who offer greater inducements. They share as comrades in the society's feasts, dances, and songs. Strikes-three-men buys a wife and enters into a special relation with the wife's sib, though the old relations with his own sib remain. The two friends join a hunting band about the Yellowstone confluence and with this band they pay a visit to the friendly River Crow of the upper Missouri and join with them in a punitive expedition against a gang of Dakota raiders. Strikes-three-men wishes to join the religious Tobacco order and is sponsored by Four-bears of the Weasel chapter whom, hereafter, he

calls "father" and from whom he receives gifts. "Thus our Crow comes to be a member of some half-a-dozen well-defined groups. . . . Manifold as are his affiliations, they are hardly above the average in number and complexity. Under special circumstances a variety of others could be added. Through distinguished valor he may become a chief; the purchase of one medicine would establish a ceremonial tie between him and the seller; by buying another he would come to join still another definite organization, the Horse Dancers. On the whole, there is remarkably little collision of interests through this varied allegiance; and an extension of sentimental attachment takes place rather than a clash of emotions associated with diverse groups."[21]

Our modern civilization is impressive when you take it in the aggregate, but when you consider individual relations it is thin compared to what we call primitive civilization. This is true not only of social relations but of individual activities. The Eskimo[22] youth was master of his whole civilization—of its tools and its tradition. He could make his own houses admirably adapted to winter and summer. He could make the harness for his dogs. He could make his own fishing and hunting equipment. The harpoon is a marvel of ingenuity even to the sophisticated modern and so is the bow when you consider how the Eskimo utilized his material. The drill is another ingenious instrument which he used for working with bone and ivory as well as for making fire. Altogether the Eskimo attained a marvelous adjustment to his environment; and every generation must learn to master that adjustment. With all, the Eskimo added a touch of beauty to his work. He was an artist.

Compared to the Eskimo's education, our own education seems abstract and thin. Under pioneer conditions, when people lived on the land, our education was far more con-

21. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

22. See Alexander A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, 1922, pp. 34-52.

crete than it is now. To be sure, intellectually it consisted of the three R's, as the old song says:

> "Reading and writing and 'rithmetic
> Taught to the tune of the hick'ry stick."

But the three R's were combined with the work on the farm which gave an active acquaintance with nature—its seasons, its plants and animals, its soil and the productive processes of nature. Now most of the new generation have the three R's minus the farm; and the work of the farm has become largely mechanized. Carl Sandburg may sing:

> "The Plow and the hammer, the knife and
> the shovel, the planting hoe and the
> reaping sickle, everywhere these are
> the people's possession by right of use."

But he is singing of an age that is past. Our education is mostly words and a student who can cram his head full of books and lectures can get a Phi Beta Kappa and even a Ph. D. But is he cultured? To be cultured he must have a creative acquaintance with nature and man. He must gain mastery of the hand as well as the brain. The brain is an incomplete instrument without the trained hand.

While primitive associations are personal, intimate and closely bound up with the community, in modern associations the relations of the members tend to become impersonal and indirect, and the interest is divorced from the community. Modern associations are more deliberately formed than primitive associations. Some people take the lead in promoting some interest and set out to get members for an association. They may do this by bringing people together or by means of propaganda. The interest to which appeal is made, is, first of all, a like interest. Individual farmers want a better price for their dairy products, and so combine into a dairy association; laborers want better pay for their labor and greater security, and form a labor union; steel manufacturers want to establish a higher

price level for their products and form a cartel. A like interest may become a common interest. The laborer may be interested in better wages and greater security for his association, and even for other associations; and may be willing to run the risk of loss of wages and even the loss of employment for the sake of the group. It is not easy to draw the line between individual interest and common interest. A man may join a cultural association ostensibly for the promotion of a specific cultural interest, such as a scientific interest or an art interest; but the real motive may be the standing or publicity which such a membership makes possible. Men may read papers at scientific associations for the sake of enhancing their reputation or gaining promotion. Politicians may try to persuade us that their sole interest is the welfare of their country, but their real interest may be getting the social standing or financial reward of the office (though there are a few public spirited politicians). When they orate about saving the country, they generally mean saving their own party and the spoils of party victory. Whether a particular type of interest is individual or common depends upon the motive of the individual or the association. Individuals or associations may work together for a complementary interest, as in lobbying for a tariff schedule. One group may want a high tariff on cotton, another on steel products, etc.; and, by combining, all the groups may get what they want, though they want different things.

There is a great variety of interests which can be made the basis for promoting associations from stamp collections to financial corporations. There are social clubs for women or men or both sexes. They satisfy an enormous appetite for talk, as well as an alimentary appetite. They are the great market for "hot air" venders. They shout and sing together and whoop it up for something or other. They may sound like bedlam but they are harmless. Sometimes the primary interest buds into secondary interests. Budding of a primary interest into various secondary in-

terests is a characteristic of groups generally. Sometimes the primary interest grows so weak that it takes some secondary interest to keep the group together. A social club may bud into a considerable variety of interests, such as card games, sport interests, book reviews, and of course in the local group there is always gossip as an interest. A social club is no sooner started than it has an urge to give birth to other social clubs like itself. The ambition is to have a nation-wide network and federation of such clubs with provincial and national officers, thus ministering to the strong instinct of vanity in human beings. Success means to have a large circle of members (of course very respectable members) and a large number of clubs. What they do is of minor importance, yet no doubt they produce the satisfaction of sociability, though, of course, when the clubs are scattered over a large area, the inter-club relations become indirect and impersonal.

The evolution of social clubs serves to illustrate the evolution of interest groups generally. They usually start as local groups and then spread out into a net-work of groups with overhead organization which becomes more and more impersonal. But instead of an association starting as a local cell which multiplies into a number of cells, which become integrated into a large organization, an association may start as a regional or national association. Some cultural associations are national in their scope, though usually with regional branches. Here space (which includes expense) enters as a very important limitation in getting together, though, since the number is limited and the meetings shift from one region to another, and some can afford to go any distance and some get subsidies, there is a considerable acquaintance among those interested.

We cannot go into detail about associations and their classification. The extent to which likeness in interest results in large scale organization depends, of course, upon the chance of furthering that interest by combination. There are many like interests which remain individual

tastes. Interests which have been effective in producing large scale associations are such interests as political interests, with their organization into political parties and their extra-constitutional machinery; economic interests embodied in such associations as capitalistic corporations, labor unions and consumers' associations; cultural interests expressed in educational, scientific, religious, esthetic and other organizations. With large area and large numbers, the tendency is for associations to become impersonal and indirect in their relation to the members. That the drift of modern life has been toward the interest type of grouping is altogether too evident. It is also evident that the abstract grouping on the basis of interest has tended not only to intersect and overlay, but to obscure and sometimes to disintegrate the communal type of grouping. It is time for the community, which means ultimately the state, to assert and organize the interests of the common life of the people and to regulate and control, where need is, the interest associations for the common good.

Mysticism and Society

The unity of the group may take on mystical significance, and generally does so in times of stress. This is especially true when the group has a common symbol. In primitive life, the substitution of the symbol for the group is known as totemism. Goldenweiser defines totemism as "the tendency of definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols of emotional value." There is great variation in the significance of totemism.[23] The totem may be thought of as a mythical ancestor—usually an animal species, but it may be a plant species, or, rarely, an inanimate object. The important thing is that the totem emphasizes that the members of the group are of one blood. The totem is generally associated with a camp, though among some native tribes in Australia it is independent of the camp and originates because these people

23. See Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-145.

are ignorant of reproduction and attribute the origin of a new life to some outside spirit. "Among the Arunta the group associated with an animal or plant is not a sib since membership depends not on that of either parent but on the mother's belief that such and such a child is the reincarnation of a particular totemic spirit,"[24]—some object which the mother happens to see or hear when she feels the quickening of life within her. Some Australians also have sex totems and other totems. But generally the totem is associated with a camp. Where totemism takes the mystical character of "participation" in the totem, as in Australia, there naturally grow up elaborate ceremonies for participating by eating the totem and for multiplying the totem. The totem under such conditions may be taboo except for sacramental purposes. The Australian aborigines seem to have exhausted their originality in inventing elaborate mystical ceremonies, while otherwise their civilization is the very crudest. There are various degrees of totemic mysticism from that of Australian "participation" to the heraldic function of the totem among the American Indians. Even in the latter case, the symbol is of great importance to the sense of unity of a group and may at any time acquire a high degree of mystical meaning, as the flag does with us. Naturally since totemism emphasizes that the group is of one blood, it serves to reinforce exogamy, though there is exogamy where there is no totemism.

Totemism is a sociological system of beliefs and must not be confused with religion which has its own roots in human experience. Religion is universal in primitive civilizations; and it is impossible to understand the texture of those civilizations without taking into account their religious beliefs and practices. The bond of the primitive group is always a religious bond. You cannot separate the group of the soil from the gods of the soil. Religious experience

24. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

has its basis in the feeling of presence of a mysterious power or powers, which are believed to help man or to hurt him according to his ability or failure to establish proper rapport. Nature for primitive man is not a dead world. It is a living, ensouled world. Man may think of this living and life-promoting character of objects in nature as a separable soul like his own, or he may think of it as a mysterious power, mana, which resides in things. In the former case we have animism, in the latter case we have what Marett calls animatism. These two types of attitudes coexist in primitive life, and we do not know which is earlier. Animatism persists in fetichism and still lingers in "the lucky penny." Animism has developed into the great religions. Animatism is manifest in mechanical religion—the belief in the potency of things, words, ceremonies. This attitude we may call magic. Animism leads to spiritual relations with the supernatural, such as prayer and consecration. Magic has always been a part of religion and may be used for the good of the group. It is black magic or witchcraft which is, on the whole, anti-religious, because it is generally practiced for selfish and injurious motives.

What concerns us here is that religion is inextricably woven into the life of primitive man. It is believed to be an essential condition of prosperity. Not all the functions of primitive life have a religious character. There is the matter-of-fact realm, the purely technological side, such as the making and the use of hammer, knife, bow and arrow. Such things are within man's control. But there is the vast realm where man is dependent upon forces which he cannot control or comprehend. Religion becomes momentous in the crises of life—birth, death, war; and man feels that it enables him to meet such crises. But religion for primitive man is not just a specific set of beliefs and practices. It is bound up with all his customs. To break a custom brings bad luck—not just to the individual but to the whole group. It is just the collectivistic character

of primitive life which makes religion so dominant. Religion is "medicine." It brings luck to the group. It stabilizes and cements the group. But just because religion is "medicine" and is vitally important to group prosperity, there are crises when it becomes necessary to have a change in "medicine." An inspiration may come to some wise old men; or it may be a youth, as with the American Indians, who has a revelation; or a people may borrow "medicine" from their more successful neighbors.

While religion has its basis in a feeling of mystery, experience and thought enter into its development. The theology of primitive religion, which we call mythology, varies all the way from the dairy ritual of the Todas[25] of southern India to the elaborate system of the American Winnebagoes. Religion is never mere feeling; it is also interpretation. And it is also experimentation, because man must find the right "medicine" if he is to prosper. And primitive man's prosperity is conceived in terms of the group. It is certain that religion is a constant, pervasive and controlling influence in the life of primitive man. And it remained so in the great civilizations which developed out of primitive life. You cannot conceive Greek civilization without its gods. After the battle of Salamis, when the Athenians were invited by Xerxes' envoy to desert the Greek cause, they replied that they could not betray what "is of one blood and of one speech and has establishments of Gods in common, and sacrifices, and habits of life of similar mode." Unfortunately, even such bonds did not suffice to hold the Greeks together.

In a recent work,[26] Bergson has given us, in his own brilliant language, an impressive myth of social evolution in which mysticism plays a vital role. I call his interpretation a myth, not to minimize the truth that is in it, but because it does not seem to be founded upon an-

25. See Marett, *op. cit.*, p. 216 ff.
26. Henri Bergson, *Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* (Trans. R. A. Andra and C. Brereton, 1935.)

thropology and history but rather upon a general philosophy. Bergson divides societies into closed and open societies. Primitive societies illustrate the former type par excellence. He thinks that the outlines of the primary groups of family and clan are furnished by instinct, though in man, unlike the animal, they are completed through experience. But man developed intelligence; and intelligence, according to Bergson, is a selfish and disruptive force and would have led to the disintegration of society. This disintegration was prevented by religion. The residue of instinct which survives in intelligence gave birth to the mythmaking faculty. Instinct gave rise to a quasi-hallucinatory perception which blocked the march of the selfish intellect. Instinct works somnambulistically for the species; and through the creation of mythological religion it obliged the egoism of intelligence to recognize the claims of other egoisms. Religion may thus be regarded as a "defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence."[27] A "god"—not at first personified—arose to prohibit the violation of custom and to ensure the preservation of society. The mythmaking power of religion also works to protect man from the shock of death, through the belief in immortality. The apparently dead are still part of the community and they may be its most powerful part. It is dangerous to offend the ghosts. Religion, further, serves to overcome the indifference of nature by creating a world full of "intentions." Nature can be appealed to and, when properly appealed to, will work for man. Thus the mythmaking faculty made secure the closed society for which man is primarily made. Bergson wisely remarks that religion does not arise *from* fear but *against* fear.

So might things have always remained. But there is, according to Bergson, another force at work—the upsurge of the vital impulse—which will not allow creation to be arrested with the species or with its expression, the closed

27. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

society. There are two kinds of emotions: the emotions which are below intelligence and the emotions which are above intelligence. The love which gives rise to the closed society of family and community is of the former kind. The love of humanity is above intelligence. It is this love which animates the creators of the open society. "The true mystics simply open their souls to the oncoming wave"[28] of the vital impulse. The conduct of the mystic souls is not determined by social pressure and obligation which constitute morality at the level of the closed society. The morality of the mystics, on the contrary, is characterized by aspiration. The essence of the morality of aspiration is also biological but it is a fresh wave of the vital impulse. The mystic "embraces all humanity in one simple indivisible love." The love which consumes the mystic "is no longer simply the love of man for God, it is the love of God for all men," for the mystic's soul lives in union with God and shares God's love. What the mystic's love "wants to do, with God's help, is to complete the creation of the human species. . . . . Its direction is exactly that of the vital impetus."[29] It is in the mystics that the vital impulse breaks through the stiffening of life into species and societies. "It is the mystic souls who draw and will continue to draw civilized societies in their wake." The true mystics, according to Bergson, are not those who become passively submerged into divinity. They are rather those whose life in God breaks forth into enormous energy to transform the world. The true mystics share God's life of creation. The passive mystics are only half mystics. Bergson does not regard the oriental mystics as true mystics, nor Plotinus in the West, since their mysticism ended in absorption. In the true mystics, contemplation completes itself in action. Bergson finds true mysticism exemplified in Christian mystics, such as St. Paul and St. Bernard. But the wave of the vital impulse, of which the mystic is the evidence,

28. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

spends itself because of the resistance of matter and in turn settles down and gives rise to a new closed society at a higher level—until a new wave comes.

Bergson is no doubt right that the life stream is more than the crust of species or of social forms. There is in life a cosmic drive for creativeness which cannot be held down to fixed forms but which breaks through and creates new forms. But this creative drive in human history is not just emotion as opposed to intellect. It is creative intelligence which includes intuition and emotion. New and higher forms of social life did not come merely as waves of emotion and intuition. They required also hard thinking about the facts of life and dear-bought experience. Intuition requires method to be fruitful. The great prophets have been realists who have faced intelligently the actual conditions with which they must deal. The social forms which life has taken on have been the result of art as well as instinct, intelligence as well as intuition. New and higher forms are bought by experience and intelligent planning. They do not come merely as mystic waves of emotion.

It is not true that intelligence makes men selfish. Satisfying one's own craving is characteristic of animal life except where the maternal instinct steps in. Cooperative activity by the group and control for the group required serious thinking. It is through thinking that man discovers that he can be prosperous only by working with others. Cooperation and harmony are really good sense. There is the larger feeling for kind, but it is only when the affections become enlarged through experience and thought that the general feeling of kind becomes effective. The medieval doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man is an expressed ideal of this enlargement. Without thought, the emotions, instead of producing unity in our world, are often the divisive factor. Good sense would indicate that the nations of Europe should join into a united states of Europe, or still better join with the other

nations into a united states of mankind, with a pooling of their resources for the benefit of all, instead of wasting their substance in war and the preparation for war. If you say that the European nations are not actuated by the higher emotions, how can you tell the higher emotions except by their being more reasonable in their results?

Bergson has over-emphasized the role of the mystics. It was the rationalistic Stoics rather than St. Paul who established the conception of the unity of mankind—neither slave nor free, neither Greek nor barbarian. Since humanity is one, there can be one system of law for all human beings. And through the organizing genius of Rome the Stoics went a long way toward unifying mankind under one system of law. St. Paul himself was bred in the atmosphere of Stoicism and when he wanted to make an effective statement of God's universality he quoted the Stoic poet, Aratus: "In Him we live and move and have our being." But St. Paul recognized the unity of mankind only as they should become "one in Christ Jesus," which meant to him that they must be baptized and accept the doctrine which he preached. In the Epistle to the Galatians he pronounces a double anathema against those who preach any other doctrine. St. Bernard, admirable man that he was, recognized no unity except that of the Catholic Church with its doctrines and ceremonies. He is remembered now chiefly for his persecution of Abelard for whom he had a violent dislike, which took the form of doctrinal antagonism. No doubt the fundamental attitudes of the two men were different. But we certainly cannot commend the tolerance of St. Bernard. It is true that he would rather bring heretics from the error of their ways by persuasion than by force, but if they would not be persuaded, he thought it better that they should be burned than that they should contaminate others by their example.

We must turn from such dominating personalities as St. Paul and St. Bernard to such gentle natures as St. Francis to find Bergson's ideal of a mystic who embraces

all humanity in one simple indivisible love. Of all the Catholic mystics, St. Francis is the most like his Master. Meek though he is, his life is not occupied merely in contemplation, but goes out in benevolent and consuming service for all sorts and conditions of men. His "sisters" and "brothers" include not only man but the animals and the flowers, and even the sun and the wind and the rain. Of St. Francis it may be said that "the love which consumes him is no longer the love of man for God, it is the love of God for man."

The philosopher who has expressed most fully Bergson's ideal in modern times, though indeed a saint, stood outside the Christian church and was excommunicated by his own people, the Jews. Indeed, Bergson has paraphrased the very language of Spinoza, his fellow Jew. "The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity: in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. . . . . Hence it follows that God, insofar as God loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical . . . From this we clearly comprehend in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists; to wit, in an unchangeable and eternal love toward God, that is, in the love of God toward men."[30] But Spinoza is no mystic in Bergson's sense. Spinoza is rather a rationalist who holds that only clear and systematic thinking can free us from the bondage of the emotions and unify us with God and man. Spinoza's love of God is an intellectual love. It is the sublimation of the emotions by seeing things *sub specie aeternitatis,* under the form of eternity. For Spinoza thinking is more than discursive

30. *Ethics,* Pt. V, Prop. XXXVI (Bohn Library.)

logic. It becomes the vision of truth in its wholeness. And thinking is action, not merely contemplation. Like Plato's love of the Good, Spinoza's love of God is a passionate, though constructive, love which acts upon its insight. It transcends nationality, race and creed to embrace all man and nature in one universal love. If our love is to be effective in creating greater unities of cooperation and harmony, our emotions must be illumined by intelligent planning and our planning must in turn be suffused with affection for humanity from the nearest circle to the most remote. Emotion alone leads to fanaticism. Creative intelligence is the great universalizer of emotion.

CHAPTER III

THE GROUP AS THE BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

Introduction

It has been customary to explain social evolution and social groups in terms of certain factors or causes, such as geography, race, instinct, population, custom, etc. The thesis of this paper is a reversal of the ordinary method. It is, that, instead of trying to account for the group by certain factors, we must understand the factors in terms of the group—its cumulative tradition and creative life. The real causes or motives must be found in the life-history of the individual as woven into the net-work of social relations at a specific moment in the history of the group. We cannot say that this particular condition of the environment or this particular biological tendency effected such and such results, but we must take account of this condition or tendency as part of an organization of life-interests, with its social pressure, its system of beliefs, and scale of values. The particular factors must be regarded as the instruments, the conditions, and the raw material of social construction. The process, in other words, must be regarded, not as a mechanical but as a teleological process —the factors having meaning and efficiency only as they enter into the creative synthesis of group realization. We must take account of group participation, not as a mere effect, but as an independent variable, and for sociology, the most significant variable. Other factors may vary, yet group relations remain the same. On the other hand, group relations may vary while other factors remain the same.

The method here used may be called analytical—starting as it does with the reality of the living whole—as opposed to the synthetic method which tries to build up socie-

ty from external factors or causes. Without the internal bond of group life, with its cumulative experience and its forward striving, the so-called factors become mere bricks without mortar. Group genius, moreover, builds various structures out of the bricks of the external factors, though it must of course use the external energies. The real explanation of social evolution must be teleological—in terms of human needs as they become conscious and organized in the historic process.

The attempt to explain human conduct in terms of mechanical causes has found new favor of recent date. There is a feeling that sociology would be more scientific if it could eliminate human desires and human motives and express social relations purely in terms of physiological behavior. It may be of interest to know that this movement, like so many others, has its counterpart in ancient Greece. Perhaps no better refutation of it can be found than that by Plato in the *Phaedo.* In the person of Socrates Plato expresses his disappointment in reading the famous book by Anaxagoras, which may be taken as the embodiment of the scientific results of the time:

> I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have ligaments which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture, . . . forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence. . . . There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which the mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.[1]

1. Jowett's translation.

A theory which excludes the teleological motives of human nature and which is based solely upon physical factors or upon statistical averages may seem simpler and more scientific than a theory which takes account of such motives. But it lacks truth and reality; it does not really explain the conduct of men in society. In the last analysis society rests upon human nature; and we must understand human nature through its organization in group relations. In his virtues and his vices man is bound up with society; he does not live to himself. And group relations must be understood not merely as the presence to each other of individuals, but of individuals woven into a common web of traditions and institutions: group life must be recognized as being a cumulative life, a reconstruction of the factors, internal and external, that condition its existence, in terms of the mores already attained and of its forward-looking life. It is only when we consider the whole ensemble of internal and external conditions as organized into constructive group life that we can hope to understand the conduct of man.

The Group and Physico-geographical Factors

Those who have emphasized physical conditions as the determining factors of social evolution have been prone to regard the group as a mere passive result of these forces. They have failed to see that the group is a creative factor, selecting the physical forces that it uses and determining how it shall use them; it is not a mere resultant from them. We need only contrast the manner of life of non-social animals with that of social animals to see the difference in their relation to their respective physical environments. Non-social animals do little to change the environment: they accept its conditions. Social animals order the environment to meet their needs. Contrast in this connection the non-social wasps with the honey bees, or the solitary tiger with the beaver colony. In the long series of man's cumulative constructive efforts, from the crude

eoliths to the complex tools of today, man has been not merely passive effect but a creative cause, in molding and shaping his environment. For the human group the physical environment furnishes problems to be met in terms of its tradition and in terms of its needs. In the mastery of this environment under varying conditions lies a large part of the significance of social evolution. The Eskimos have not merely accepted the bleak environment of the north, but they have reconstructed it to meet their simple needs; and because they have mastered the environment, they have been able to survive.

This is not denying the importance of the physical conditions. These furnish the raw material and set the limitations of reconstruction. In the words of Franz Boas:

> It is not difficult to illustrate the important influence of geographical environment upon forms of inventions. The variety of habitations used by tribes of different areas offers an example of its influence. The snow house of the Eskimo, the bark wigwam of the Indian, the cave-dwellings of the tribes of the desert may serve as illustrations of the way in which protection against exposure is attained, in accordance with the available materials. [2]

This limitation, set by the environment, can be shown further in the more special inventions, such as the complex bow of the Eskimo, which is the way he met the problem of lack of elastic material for bow staves. We need not go into detail to show the effects of climate, fertility of soil, configuration of country, facility of communication, etc. They all have presented problems and set limitations in the reconstruction of the external conditions to meet the needs of man. But what is of supreme interest to the student of society are the ways in which different social groups have met these problems. The physical environment does not account for the making of houses or bows. These are constructive contributions by the group. While the environment set the conditions, the problems arose only because of human inventiveness and the cumulative group tradition.

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2. *The Mind of Primitive Man*, 1911, pp. 159, 160. (Rev. Ed., 1938.)

Nor have these problems been met in the same way even in the same environment. To quote Boas[3]: "The forms of culture of peoples living in the same kind of environment show often marked differences." This, as he points out, can be illustrated by the successive races which have inhabited the same area, as, for example, the European settlers contrasted with the Indians in America, and similarly in various historical periods of the European countries. "Even among primitive tribes, geographical environment alone does not by any means determine the type of culture. Proof of this fact may be found in the mode of life of the hunting and fishing Eskimo and the reindeer breeding Chugchee (Bogoras): the African pastoral Hottentot and the hunting Bushmen in their older, wider distribution (Schultze): the Negrito and the Malay of Southeastern Asia (Martin)." Boas points out rightly that "a more important element to be considered is the social status of each people, and it would seem that environment is important only in so far as it limits or favors the activities that belong to any particular group." We cannot of course ignore the effect of the environmental conditions in the development of particular customs and beliefs. The environmental conditions are problems which must be met, but the ways in which they are met must be understood primarily in terms of "cultural conditions which in themselves are due to historical causes." In other words, the special customs and beliefs must be understood as the cumulative experiment of creative intelligence, determined not only by the environment but by the tradition and inventiveness of the human mind. And it is because, and in so far as, this mind is social, that it possesses the instruments and the incentives to set and to meet problems. It matters not how far back you go in social evolution, you can never derive the creative reconstruction of the environment from the external factors.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 161 ff.

The creative group with its tradition and status, when it once appears, adds a new variable to cosmic evolution; and it is primarily in terms of this variable that human evolution must be understood.

The Group and Biological Factors

If we turn now to the biological factors, we find that these, no less than the physical factors, must be understood in terms of the group. Let us consider first the complex factor of race or inherited mental constitution. It has been the fashion in some quarters to state the ultimate explanation of civilization in terms of race. We quote Le Bon: "History in its main lines may be regarded as the mere statement of the results engendered by the psychological constitution of races. It is determined by this constitution, just as the respiratory organs of fish are determined by their aquatic life. In all the manifestations of a life of a people, we always find the unchangeable soul of the race weaving itself its own destiny."[4] The factor of race for Le Bon is a permanent factor in all the fluctuations of the life of a people and explains the supposed uniformity in a group's reaction, in spite of seemingly radical modifications. "A psychological species is formed, as is an anatomical species, of a very small number of irreducible, fundamental characteristics around which are grouped accessory characteristics which are modifiable and changeable."[5] Le Bon proceeds to illustrate his hypothesis by contrasting various peoples, particularly the Anglo-Saxon and Latin peoples. But if one reads his generalizations in the light of history, they seem far from convincing. When we start with a comparative study of the various groups and consider their different history and their different problems, the supposed race differences become more doubtful than Le Bon assumes. One cannot

4. LeBon, Gustave, *The Psychology of Peoples* (New York, Stechert, 1912, 1895.) pp. 129, 130.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

help feeling that the facts have been selected to suit an *a priori* definition.

In his study of the American Negro,[6] Park has made a genuine effort to give full weight to the historical factors. Park shows how the content of Negro religion in the U. S. A. must be understood by reference to the problems of the Negro—problems growing out of slavery and social isolation:

> The external cultural forms which he found here, like the memories of the individual, have furnished the materials in which the racial wish, that is, the Negro temperament, has clothed itself. The inner meaning, assumed as the result of their transference from the white man to the Negro, these have been the Negro's own. . . . This temperament, as I conceive it, consists in a few elementary but distinctive characteristics, determined by physical organization and transmitted biologically. These characteristics manifest themselves in a genial, sunny and social disposition, in an interest and attachment to external, physical things rather than to subjective states and objects of introspection; in a disposition for expression rather than enterprise and action.[7]

Recent comparative studies of primitive cultures have cast doubt upon the assumption that there is a particular constant complex of inheritable characters such as the race theory postulates. In her study of *Sex and Temperament* in three primitive societies in New Guinea, Margaret Mead has come to the conclusion that the complex of characters which have to do with sex and temperament can be accounted for by social conditioning. In the three cultures which she selected for investigation, the mountain-dwelling Arapesh, the river-dwelling Mundugumor, and the lake-dwelling Tchambuli, there can be no doubt that each culture presents a striking complex of characters. The Arapesh speaking peoples "unite in a common adventure that is primarily maternal, cherishing, and oriented away from

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6. Park, Robert E., "Education in its Relation to the Conflict and Fusion of Cultures, etc.," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 13, 1918, pp. 38-63.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 59. An interesting parallel as regards emotional buoyancy may be found in the case of the early Christians in the period of persecution. But this was evidently a compensatory reaction rather than racial, and changed when conditions became conventionalized.

the self towards the needs of the next generation."[8] There is peaceful cooperation instead of competition between the sexes, with no definite division of labor. Among the Mundugumor, on the other hand, there is continuous strife between the sexes. Life is highly competitive. The father is jealous of the sons, the mother of the daughters. There is no cooperation among households except for occasional feasts. The Tchambuli have an economy based upon the cooperation of women. The men and women live in separate houses. The men's life is occupied with ceremonies and dramatic performances. Economically they are subordinated to the women and accept their role. Once a culture exists it will produce, by education and social pressure, a certain uniformity of behavior within that culture. Within every culture there are variants who furnish problems. Once the culture is established, it is selective and perpetuates the type. That, of course, is especially true in primitive cultures. Conditions of life tend to emphasize one set of individual characteristics rather than another in a culture. Historical accident no doubt plays a part. Altogether it becomes difficult if not impossible to segregate constant hereditary cultural characters.

We can no longer assume that either temperament or intellectual capacity is uniform in a particular so-called race. The variations of temperament and of capacity are greater within the same race than between many individuals of different races. We have seen how plastic temperament is. Boas has come to the conclusion that we need assume no such complex so far as intellectual capacity is concerned: "We have found that the unproved assumption of the identity of cultural achievement and of mental ability is founded on an error of judgment; that the variations in cultural development can as well be explained by a consideration of the general course of historical events without recourse to the theory of material differences of

8. Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament*, 1935, p. 15.

mental faculty in different races."[9]

It has been suggested that a gradual transposition of two so strikingly different peoples as the English and the French, provided that the conditions for the assimilation of the unique tradition of each country were perfect, would leave each national type intact. The results of assimilation in the modern migration of peoples go a long way toward making such an hypothesis probable. One cannot help being struck by the fact that in a country like America, wherever the conditions for assimilation have been favorable, it is impossible to distinguish the second generation of European immigrants from the native type. Even the intonations of speech which seem so fundamental a part of a linguistic type disappear and must be regarded, therefore, as belonging to the social heritage rather than to the biological. It may be that the comparative failure of assimilation between some so-called races is due primarily to social prejudice, resulting in social islands within the population and stimulating by isolation and suggestion differences in reaction. Certainly there is no uniformity in race prejudice. Children do not possess it. Within the same people it is curiously specialized, the Negro being objectionable as a passenger in a pullman car but not as a porter. It varies in different nations of the same race, as between Europe and America for example. While we are most familiar with the prejudice of the white race against other races, we need only look to Asia for an equally strong prejudice against the white race; and in Asia, without any possible doubt, the prejudice is due to social causes. If you take again the assumptions as to certain moral characteristics, the prejudices, in respect of certain crimes held against the Negro, do not seem to be borne out by statistics. It would seem that race prejudice, whether on the intellectual or moral side, is primarily a matter of status. One thing is certain: if we are to identify race traits, in-

9. *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

tellectual or temperamental, it must be through the comparative study of groups; and the significance of such traits must be the emphasis and coloring which they give to group culture. We shall not find them by studying individuals in the abstract. But we must be careful not to assume such differences until we have exhausted the historical causes.

If now, instead of attending to heredity as a total organization or mental constitution, we pass to the hereditary organization of certain tendencies, we shall here, too, find that only by taking account of their functioning in social relations can we understand their significance for conduct. Some hereditary reactions are of a very general character and may be called tropisms. Among such reactions may be mentioned the sensitiveness to light and perhaps to special wave lengths, the effect of temperature upon human activity, the effect of pressure and bodily position, the sensitiveness to contact, the effect of electricity, the response to musical rhythm, etc. It is certain that we have not given sufficient attention to these general reactions. The restaurant manager knows the difficulty of getting people to sit in the middle of the room. They want to sit next to a wall. We know something of the effect of contact in the midst of a crowd—the fascination of it for many people and its effect upon suggestibility. The theatrical manager and the advertiser know the importance of light and movement for attracting the attention of the public. In the modern school room some attention is being paid to light, to posture, and the most favorable temperature. The industrial manager is studying the effect of musical rhythm, especially upon monotonous work. Experiments have also been made on the effects of electricity in connection with mental work.

Among these general tendencies, we must, perhaps, class imitation, in the pure sense of the unconscious repetition of movement in the environment, especially that of other people. In the primitive environment man evidently re-

peated movements in nature as is indicated by the onomatopoetic words in our language and by the gestures of primitive man. Perhaps we should also include sympathy or sympathetic induction—the tendency to share spontaneously the emotional state of other people, especially pain. Both of these tendencies play an important part in our social relations, even if that part has sometimes been exaggerated. It is hard to see how the learning process could be possible unless there were these hereditary organizations to repeat, on the one hand, the conduct of others, and, on the other hand, to feel spontaneously the emotions of others. But to understand these general tendencies as they actually operate in the development of the individual, we must understand them as functioning under group customs and group standards. We come for the most part to imitate the conduct that society approves, and our sympathies are determined largely by the community of interest which the group establishes. But the original tendencies still remain and may betray us into reactions, unguided by our group. Thus the southern aristocrat unconsciously imitated the Negro's enunciation. And we all respond to the sight of intense pain in others sympathetically, though not necessarily altruistically. Sympathy, if not combined with the altruistic instincts, may merely lead us to avoid the distress of the suffering individual.

We come now to the more specially organized inherited tendencies which we call instincts. There is a large and so far ill-defined range of these tendencies, with the definiteness of the nest building instinct at one end and such vague and general tendencies as the tendency to conformity at the other. We are told by William McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* that an instinct is an inherited organization to perceive, to feel, and to act on a certain range of stimuli in the environment. As to what tendencies are to be included under the head of instinct, there is no clear agreement among psychologists. McDoug-

all would limit the term instinct to such innate conative dispositions as we share with the higher animals. This does not allow for the development of any additional instincts in man's considerable history on the earth. It is reasonable to suppose that social selection has operated during this long period toward fitting individuals for group life. And since selection cannot create tendencies, we may suppose that nature or the vital impulse in man has put forth new characters to meet the new demands in accordance with what Osborn has called the law of rectigradation. At any rate McDougall's limitation seems arbitrary.

Titchener suggests a much wider range of human instincts:

> If we try to work out a rough list of human instincts, we find at the lower end of the scale a number of *definite modes of response to particular stimuli;* such things as coughing, sneezing, swallowing, smiling, threading our way in the street, beating time to music; or, in the baby, such things as sucking, clasping, biting, turning the head aside, standing, creeping, walking, crying, vocalizing. At the upper end of the scale, we find *gross general tendencies;* the tendency to take the world of perception as a world of real things in outside space; the empathic tendency to humanize and personalize our surroundings; the social tendency that makes us imitative and credulous; the tendency to classify everything in pairs, the tendency to try things out, which is always at war with the tendency to let things be.[10]

Between these extremes of the scale there would be those special instincts which are usually enumerated—hunger, fear, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, rivalry, self-abasement and self-assertion, the sex instinct, the parental instinct, the gregarious instinct, acquisition, construction, etc. Pillsbury[11] has suggested a classification of instincts into individual instincts, such as taking nourishment, fear, pugnacity, etc.; racial instincts, such as the parental and associated instincts; social instincts, such as bashfulness and sociability.

There has been in some quarters an almost superstitious regard for instincts. They have been dealt with as entities

10. Titchener, E. B., *A Beginner's Psychology*, 1915, p. 205.
11. Pillsbury, W. B., *Essentials of Psychology*, 1911, Chap. X.

capable of explaining the whole of human conduct. Indeed, all that would seem necessary is to refer conduct to some instinct—surely a strange revival of faculty psychology. McDougall finds the springs of human action in a few elementary instincts which we share with the higher animals:

> We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means. . . . These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will.[12]

In this reaction from intellectualism it has been the fashion to assign to thought a secondary role as a mere instrumental agency. The group as an organizing and determining factor has been largely ignored or treated as a mere effect. But what about the more complex patterns of life, such as the sentiments, organized thought, and character? Can we resolve these into simple animal impulses? This is to neglect the creative function of intelligence. It is impossible to atomize the organized dispositions into simple impulses. Even though these may figure as ingredients in the larger patterns, they are transformed in the process, sometimes beyond recognition. The sex instinct may figure in the sentiment of beauty, but this sentiment is certainly different from the blind animal impulse of reproduction.

We cannot understand human instinctive tendencies, and the more complex patterns into which they enter, except as they are woven into the texture of social relations. In some insects we seem to find a complete bio-

12. McDougall, William, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1921, p. 45.

logical pattern of behavior which realizes itself without experience furnishing any guidance, as in the Yucca Moth[13] which rolls up its eggs in a ball of Yucca pollen and deposits it in the ovary of a flower of the same species, thus providing nourishment for the eggs when they hatch and at the same time fertilizing the flower, then dies without seeing the result; but in the higher animals we have no such complete instincts. Heredity is here completed in the interaction of the organism with its environment. In man, who is socially nurtured, experience plays a large role; and it is difficult to determine what is contributed by biological inheritance or what is due to social inheritance—the accumulated experience of the group. At the beginning of the infant's life we find only a few general responses. We cannot say that these are absolutely native, in the sense of being independent of any environment, for the infant has had its prenatal history in which heredity and environment have interacted. All responses are acquired responses in the sense that they involve both the individual and its environment. It is arbitrary, therefore, to select the moment of birth as the dividing line between native responses and acquired responses. The behaviorist's selection of three or four responses in the early days of infancy as constituting the hereditary basis of conduct—everything later being due to "conditioning"—has neither embryological nor psychological justification. Why should we arbitrarily limit the biological factor to what has taken place before birth? The embryologist today recognizes with Aristotle that the life-history from conception to senescence and death must be regarded as a unit. Biological heredity asserts itself in the development after birth as well as before birth.

While heredity and environment cannot be separated in

13. In the relation of the Yucca Moth and the Yucca Flower we have a striking example of symbiosis, the two being entirely dependent upon each other for the continuity of life. This symbiosis, moreover, is limited to a species of each.

the cycle of individual life, yet we can watch new characters as they emerge in the integral relation. In the different epochs of biological development through childhood and adolescence, we should expect to find, and do find, distinctive traits of behavior and emotion, even when there are variations in the social environments. And there are subtle structural traits, characterizing maturity and senescence. The mistake in the past has been to attribute the whole pattern of the behavior at a certain stage of development to heredity, neglecting the fact that in human behavior the pattern is largely the result of the interaction of the individual with society. There are, no doubt, biological roots or radicles which figure as part of the developmental process. But the definite responses, with the implied attitudes and emotions, must be understood as socially conditioned, not just in general but as entering into the psychic chemistry of the particular social situation with its specific organization. The social organization is as integrally part of the response as is the biological radicle. If we use the word instinct to emphasize the biological aspect of the particular type of response, we must remember that the integral response itself is an emergent from heredity-in-the-social-situation.

We must consider behavior as the function of an evolving biological constitution creatively realizing itself in its milieu. The milieu is as truly a factor in the creative synthesis as the biological constitution. Either factor apart from the other is an ineffective abstraction. With human behavior the most important part of the milieu is the social milieu. It is in interaction within this milieu that a human organism forms dispositions, traits, and specific types of behavior. Since our purpose is to examine the function of the group in human behavior, we are not concerned with an abstract analysis of biological instincts. This is a futile procedure. What is usually meant by the word, instinct, in psychology and literature is not biological instinct, in the abstract, but specific types of behavior,

having to do with the maintenance of life, individually and racially, *in* the environment. Our interest is to show how the group organizes human biological nature. By this method we stand a better chance of finding what biological nature contributes to behavior than by making an artificial demarcation between nature and nurture.

Sociologists have emphasized the instincts for food, shelter, and sex as the prime determiners of human conduct. But it is not the bare satisfaction of hunger or mere shelter that men seek, but the satisfaction of these and other wants in accordance with a standard of living at a certain stage of social evolution and of group consciousness. Men have not been prone to follow the example of Diogenes of sleeping in a tub and lapping water like a dog. Those that have done so have done it under the pressure of some social ideal. Nor do decent people seek merely to gratify the sex impulse. They desire such relations between the sexes as are recognized and approved by society. It is because of this socialized attitude that continence and marriage relations are made possible, while in the most highly idealized relations between the sexes the reproductive instinct is obscured and sublimated in the complex organization of life interests. At every step our wants are woven into the patterns of society, and it becomes increasingly clear that man doth not live by bread alone, nor by any mere brute impulse. If, in the Middle Ages, men chose privation, a cold cell, and celibacy, it was not because the instincts for food, shelter, and sex were less strong than in other ages, but because the social ideal of the times so demanded it.

It is clear that in order to understand conduct as we find it in society, we must take account of social conditions and not merely abstract biological factors. Rivers, in discussing a special instinct, has shown in an illuminating way "that certain social processes have been strictly determined both in their general character and in their details, by social conditions, and that certain psychological processes

which have been believed to be the determining factors are wholly inadequate to explain how existing conditions have come into being." As an illustration he selects the blood feud. Westermarck regards the blood feud as "blood revenge," determined by an instinct of revenge. How inadequate this explanation is, Rivers shows by examples from primitive peoples:

> Melanesia provides abundant examples of the difficulty of explaining the response to social injury by means of revenge. A frequent cause of warfare throughout the region is adultery or rape. A community which has been thus injured makes war upon the offenders, and if this were all we knew, we might seem to have a definite example of the dependence of warfare upon the emotion of revenge. An inquiry into the manner of waging war, however, puts a different complexion on the matter. The people fight till one or more men have been killed on either side; in some islands it is necessary that an equal number shall have been killed on each side. As soon as it is seen that each side has lost a man or men the fight comes to an end automatically; there is no parleying or arrangment of terms. Some time after, the two opponent peoples exchange presents which are of equal value on the two sides. There is no question of the offenders giving a larger amount in compensation for the injury which was the primary cause of the quarrel. Moreover, in the island of Eddystone in the Solomons, the party which thus takes the initiative in the exchange is not that of the offenders but the order of giving depends on the drawing of the first blood in the fight. The side which kills first gives its gift first.[14]

Nothing could show more clearly that we cannot understand the conduct of man by referring it to some animal instinct. Rather must we understand the instincts through their functioning in group experience.

Pugnacity has been classified as a biological instinct. Yet while there can be no doubt about its biological basis, its pattern in human behavior is due mostly to society. Physical combat between individuals has become increasingly rare, whatever may be the consequences in the way of balked dispositions. Society frowns upon such fighting, and individual disputes—aside from verbal encounters—are usually settled by the legally constituted third party. It is between groups that fighting still persists as a per-

14. Rivers, W. H. R., "Sociology and Psychology," *The Sociological Review*, 9:5.

missible method. The fighting between economic groups does not, except sporadically and in isolated instances, degenerate into primitive encounters which presumably satisfy the fighting instinct, though in the recent break-up of society it has often taken on a more general and primitive character. It is between national groups that primitive fighting most markedly persists. But do nations fight to give vent to the suppressed fighting instinct? Many seem to think so and regard war as necessary to human nature. No doubt an earlier society felt the same way about individual and feudal encounters. But few men go to war from an instinct of homicide and no one would want such men as soldiers since they would be more dangerous to their own side than to the enemy. It is too simple an explanation to say that the soldier fights because of an instinct of pugnacity. It was not the instinct of pugnacity that sent the flower of British manhood to the enlistment office in the late war. They did not just wait for the release of the instinct at the word of their diplomats. It was necessary first to arouse their social consciousness —their respect and love for British tradition, the consciousness that a great wrong had been committed, the consciousness that Britain needed them, that humanity needed them. It was an appeal to their loyalty, to their sense of duty. Few men in any country went to war because as individuals they were keen for a fight; they went because of loyalty to a national cause and because of the social pressure to support that cause; no self-respecting man wanted to be called a slacker. But even after they had enlisted they were not soldiers. They must go through the discipline which converted this soft mob into an army machine, participating in the tradition of a military group. Under compulsory enlistment, many men who did not want to go to war became good soldiers through the enforced discipline.

Did the men want to fight? They were glad to tears when peace was declared. They all agreed that war is

beastly. They were kept in line, not by the fighting instinct, but by the military routine—most of them submitted to this routine through the consciousness that somehow their group demanded it, and a small number through the belief that the cause was worth the sacrifice. The bitterness was indulged in for the most part by the people at home. As a soldier put it: "There had to be a division of labor; we had to fight and the people at home had to feel bitter." Wars are the results of social pressure, motivated mostly by economic rivalry. Wars are manipulated by those in power. But when a war has started there is overwhelming demand for group loyalty and sacrifice. By means of propaganda, intense hatred is worked up against the other side. But nations change sides with remarkable agility, when their interests so demand. Those who insist that war is a necessity because of human instinct, forget the pressure of the interests that produce war. Of course the real motive is camouflaged by self-defense, or even the motive of humanity, in order to work a people up to the red heat of war. So far then from fighting being due to a persistent lust for individual combat, it is stimulated primarily by social motives. This is true even on the animal plane. Many animals fight only when their young are threatened, and then the most timid animals become ferocious.

Since national wars are social phenomena, arising from group sentiments, group rivalries and loyalties, and not from instinctive necessity, they can be socially cured. They are no more necessary than duels and feuds. Good sense and a greater appreciation of humanity must eventually substitute between national groups, as between individuals and between groups within the nation, the habit of referring disputes to a third party rather than to the arbitrament by force. It is true that war is a powerful solvent, but it is destructive, not constructive. Education and discussion are more dependable solvents. It is true that war stimulates loyalty and sacrifice, but it also

stimulates hate and selfishness. As for the military virtues which have been so highly prized, they seem to amount primarily to routine and obedience; they are not the democratic virtues. Nor need we look far for substitutes for war. It is easier to stimulate the herd emotion, to destroy blindly our adversary than it is to rouse us to the moral task of understanding him, of appreciating his point of view, of recognizing his claim when it is just, or at least being willing to have all claims settled under the law, of seeing the importance of differences as well as agreements, and of coming to grasp the community of life amid the differences, local and international. Men keen to fight collectively are often cowards in facing the problems of their own neighborhood. It will take all our moral courage to meet the social and economic problems that face us. And it should especially be our earnest endeavor to bring about such an understanding among nations as will make impossible such a gory sacrifice as the recent world war.

Is there an instinct of rivalry? It is certain at any rate that society furnishes the motive and determines the nature of competition. It determines, also, whether competition is worth while or not. Where social pressure is for uniformity of behavior, uniformity becomes the motive and standard. If the belief prevails that a certain ritual or magic must be carried out in a precise way in order to produce results, there is no rivalry of methods. Where society taboos certain activities or objects, there is only indifference or aversion to such objects. Society determines what things shall seem worth while; society sets the task and the goal of competition. In the Middle Ages energetic men competed in self-denial and privation; at other periods they have competed in self-indulgence and in the amassing of worldly goods. It is for social approval that men, for the most part, strive; therefore they strive for the values and the degrees of achievement which bring such approval. The forms of competition are determined by the social organization of the time and its peculiar em-

phasis.

Is much insight into repugnance, as it exists in society, to be gained by examining certain reactions to creeping and slimy things? Rather, must we not search for the causes of social repugnances and aversions in social customs and traditions? Our race repugnances, as we have previously tried to show, seem to have no uniformity, but to be due to social conflicts, motivated largely by a desire to maintain an esteemed social status. National aversions are of course even more obviously the result of historic causes. It is absurd to suppose, as people sometimes do in the stress of war, that there is something inherently base and repulsive about certain peoples whom in the past we valued as friends. A change in our conception of group interests works revolutionary changes in our appreciation of, or our aversion to, a group or a race. A striking illustration of this fact is the change of attitude between the British and French nations, for centuries bitter enemies. Personal relationships usually dispel the blindness which we mistake for an inherited aversion to the individuals of a race or a people. Our moral repugnances to individuals or groups are based upon social customs and beliefs, some of them relevant, others irrelevant. How irrelevant such repugnances may be can be illustrated by the aversion to witches a century or two ago and the aversion, still persisting in certain communities today, to the word socialism. Some aversions are of course based upon characteristics which militate against any moral living together. But even here it has been impossible to establish an hereditary criminal type.

Fear is generally recognized as a primitive instinct. Yet is much of human behavior to be explained by referring it to an instinct of fear? It is only as socially conditioned that fear has significance in human behavior. Do men run from fear? Sometimes they stick to their post and fight from fear—from fear of punishment and disgrace, from fear of the opinion of their friends, from fear of public

opinion. Fear, moreover, is not necessarily personally egoistic. It may be fear for the safety of the members of one's family, fear for one's country. It is then bound up in one disposition with the social responses. We do not get far in understanding the function of fear by examining the physiological reactions in certain animals. To determine just how great a part fear plays in social stability is an important problem. If social theorists like Hobbes based their philosophy of social control upon fear, it was because at that time fear was thought to be the most effective agency in social control. In a society resting upon force, and where conformity is the chief consideration, appeal will always be made to fear. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the appeal is to an *instinct* of fear. Rather the appeal is to certain consequences of conduct resulting from certain social sanctions—the legal sanction of punishments, the sanction of public opinion, the religious sanction with its rewards and punishments in the hereafter. The fear economy is largely giving way to an economy of interests, as man becomes conscious of the control of his own destiny. But it is a question whether some human natures are capable of entering into the spirit of community life. Will men generally ever be able to meet about the table of reason? The decay of the religious sanction the world over is regarded by many as a serious matter; it remains to be seen whether the discipline exercised so effectively at one time by the church can be made effective through other sanctions, such as the control by the guild. At any rate, education into the real meaning of society and into the real spirit of cooperation for the common good must take the place of force and fear as the cement of society, for the latter have not only proved futile in fact: they are a violation of the new moral consciousness of man.

If we now consider the so-called social instincts,[15] it must be clear that, while these have their biological roots,

15. See Wallas, Graham, *The Great Society*, 1915, pp. 139 ff.

the form and complexity which they take in human behavior must be understood from social relations. We cannot determine the social responses of man from the reactions of the higher animals. Sex is a basic biological urge but, in a human being, except as focalized and given pattern by social suggestion, it would remain a mere restlessness. The social significance of sex comes from its integration with the parental instinct into the social sentiment of love and forming the basis of the institution of the family and of other altruistic relations. There can be no doubt that the maternal response has a deep-seated basis in racial life. It is the common root of the altruistic responses. But in human beings, at any rate, we must also take account of the paternal response, the cooperation of the father with the mother in the care of the offspring during their long dependency and in preparing them for the requirements of a complex civilization. That the pattern of this cooperation, with its standard of living, is a social pattern does not require argument. Besides the parental responses, we must take account of the filial responses. These responses of offspring to parents and to one another are necessary for the telescoping of the members into a family. Though generally weaker than the maternal response, they are often strong enough to engender great sacrifices for the members of the family group. The filial responses, especially on the female side, may produce renunciation of individual interests for the care of aged or dependent parents and, less often, for other members of the family group. On the human level, the so-called social instincts are in reality emergents, involving not merely the biological roots of human nature but the creative synthesis of social situations in which human nature creates and is created. We cannot understand the human family and its reactions by taking it merely as an instinctive group. It must be understood as organized in response to conscious human needs, consecrated by social sacraments, held together by the pressure of social sanctions, and

realizing itself in terms of the current customs and ideals of the group. In no relationship has the religious sanction been more important than here nor its decay more serious. With no other relationship has society exerted itself more assiduously from the most primitive times to safeguard the bond of sentiment by social and legal sanctions.

Besides the responses which constitute the basis of the family, we must take account of the response of comradeship. There can be no doubt that man has an instinctive craving for sympathetic responsiveness. This response, which shows itself to the best advantage between members of the same sex—though realizing itself in a higher stage of civilization also between members of different sexes—is distinct from the sex response and the family responses: it does not relate to the procreation of the species. It expresses a strong need, however, in nature. No severer punishment is known to public opinion or to the law than social isolation. Human beings need the approval and communion of their fellows. A man lacking in this need is unfit for society. We sympathize with the saying, attributed to Democritus, that a man who does not have one good man and true for a friend does not deserve to live. This need reveals itself among all conditions of men—among social outcasts as well as among saints. It is not produced by imagination and active sympathy, though these heighten it. It shows itself among people of little capacity for active sympathy and it is unmistakably present among the higher animals. It is not identical with the gregarious response since it is selective and exclusive in its attachment. So far from being increased by the crowd, it is negatived and defeated by the presence of large numbers. In its manifestation on the conscious level, it shows itself in kinship of interest, though it often thrives on contrast and variety of interests. In its highest and most idealized form it becomes platonic love or friendship—the choicest gift in human life.

Another class of responses of great social significance comprises those that have to do with the group as distinct from the family—group loyalty, group conformity, group respect, and group sacrifice. There can be no doubt that the band has an instinctive basis in some animals, including man. We shall not enter into the question, which is earlier, the clan or the family. In the earliest stages of human life of which we have evidence, the clan generally figures as the unit of control, and marriage relations owe their force and sanction to the clan organization. Suffice it to point out here that the clan, as we know it, has a foundation of its own in human nature and in human interest. Since its origin, the clan has exercised rigorous selection in the direction of clan conformity and clan loyalty. It has made strong demands for the subordination of individual interests to those of the clan. Moreover, loyalty to the political group may mean sacrifice of the family as well as of the individual. Plato, in the *Republic*, would produce greater public loyalty by abolishing the family. He saw that family selfishness was often opposed to public spirit. But he later abandoned this part of his program. There can be no doubt that group loyalty has been one of the most potent factors in social evolution and that it remains so in the life of today. It shows itself in public spirit, the willingness to devote one's life to the common good. It shows itself in respect for public opinion and in the desire to have the approval of one's group.

We must of course understand this group of responses, as all others, in terms of social customs and sanctions. But there must have been qualifications in human nature for social cooperation and these qualifications must have been continually emphasized and enlarged by group selection, since group cooperation and solidarity have been important survival conditions. The process of selection is still going on, as our penal institutions and insane asylums testify. The organization of the group has been greatly modified and enlarged in the evolution of man—the greater

integration being in turn a survival condition. In modern times the nation, with its symbols and traditions, has become the chief object of group loyalty and has commanded sublime sacrifice. The causes which have stimulated this group loyalty through the ages must be sought, on the one hand, in an internal bond of tradition, of community of interest, and of common symbols, and, on the other hand, in the external antagonism between the in-group, one's own group, and the out-groups, the other groups. The external antagonism serves to enhance and consolidate the loyalty to the in-group. The tendency has been for the in-group to grow progressively larger. The problem today is to enlarge still further the consciousness of the in-group, through sympathetic understanding and cooperation with the out-groups, until humanity as a whole becomes organized into a community with a genuine sense of kinship. This loyalty, too, must be, as in the past, a loyalty to the future as well as to the present—the loyalty to the promise of a future humanity as Israel was loyal to the future Israel. At its best, it becomes a loyalty not merely to present customs, but to ideal standards and an ideal society, the city of God.

Is there an instinct of gregariousness? There is manifest a response to kind in many species of animals. This responsiveness varies a great deal not only as between species but in individuals of the same species, though here individual conditioning through experience plays a large role. The sociological importance of instinctive gregariousness has been very much exaggerated. Can we account for the aggregation of human beings in the modern city on the basis of an instinct of gregariousness? That seems to be the opinion of William McDougall. He compares the attraction of the city to that of the animal herd: "As in the case of the animals, the larger the aggregation the greater is its power of attraction."[16] He thinks that the breaking

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

of custom which in the past has held people in place has given the opportunity to the primitive instincts, especially the gregarious instinct, to determine men's choices. "Other causes have, of course, cooperated and have facilitated the aggregations of population; but without the instinctive basis they would probably have produced only slight effects of this kind."[17] But this seems too simple an explanation. Since the gregarious instinct is presumably a constant, it would seem that other factors must be mainly responsible for changes in the distribution of population.

Even in primitive life other factors seem to have been the important determinants. This is shown in an illuminating way by Edward Westermarck in the case of the Snake Indians. Prior to the introduction of the horse there seem to have been no other tribal arrangements than such as are now seen in the management of the salmon fishery. "The organization would be very imperfect, because the remainder of the year would be spent by them in families widely spread apart, to eke out the year's subsistence on the roots and limited game of their country." After the horse came into use the Boraks would form bands and a more permanent cooperation was established. "Here, I think, we have an excellent account of the origin of society, applicable not only to the Snakes, but in its main features to man in general." Westermarck draws the conclusion: "Thus it seems that the gregariousness and sociability of man sprang, in the main, from progressive intellectual and material civilization, whilst the tie that kept together husband and wife, parents and children was, if not the only, at least the principal factor of life in earliest man." In other words, the recognition of common interests and the discovery of the means to realize them are more important in bringing men together than the herd instinct which must, if operating by itself, be self-defeating, as is illustrated by the buffalo who aggregated in such numbers

17. *Ibid*, p. 297.

as to starve to death in spite of immense grazing lands.

If the instinct of gregariousness accounts for the growth of the great cities of western civilization, why did this growth coincide with the coming of modern invention, modern industry, and modern advertising? The loosening of the bonds of custom has been gradual and the result of many causes. It has been least effective in the rural districts; it has been greatly hastened by concentration of population and by improved means of communication. The loosening of custom has been an effect of the concentration of population rather than its cause. At most, instinctive gregariousness is only one of many factors in accounting for concentration of population, and since it is a constant it may be omitted.

There are many reasons for the appeal of the city. The growth of industrialism made the city a place of economic opportunity in an increasing population. The complexity of city life furnishes a greater range of vocations through its division of labor, and thus makes it possible to suit individual preferences. The variety of city life furnishes an outlet for a greater number of tendencies than the monotonous rural community can supply. The city furnishes greater personal freedom than the gossipy small community. It appeals to the craving for adventure and novelty in many human beings. It stimulates rivalry and gives specialized human nature, such as geniuses and criminals, a greater opportunity.[18] These and many other causes must be taken into account. It is in these social causes, rather than in biological, that we must seek the explanation of the modern city. And it is because the city is the product largely of sociological factors that we can hope to control it. By improved means of communication and a better industrial organization we may produce a different distribution of population or at least remedy some of the most

18. See Robert E. Park's article, "The City—Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 20:577 ff.

glaring evils of the present tendency while we retain its advantages. If the herd instinct were the basic factor, the situation would obviously be hopeless since the instinctive attraction is supposed to increase with the mass and therefore would eventually swamp us completely.

Do people strive for private property because of an instinct for property? The instinct for private property has been made much of in modern political and economic theory. Some recognition of property seems to be universal even in primitive societies, varying of course with the complexity of the society. But in primitive societies property was subordinated to the life of the group. For untold ages men lived together in the compact society of the kinship group, under restraints which emphasized the group as the unit, and which limited personal property to that which symbolized individual prowess and genius in the service of the group. As men today still work for wealth for the family, so they then worked for the clan. It is certain, at any rate, that the interest in property is largely socially conditioned. If society should emphasize that poverty is particularly meritorious, then men would, like the saints in the Middle Ages, vie in being poor. There are a great many gifted people today who feel absorbing satisfaction in pursuing ideal interests, such as truth and beauty and social service, in comparative poverty. The motive of private property has been greatly exaggerated in modern society to the injury alike of society and of the individual who makes acquisition of property his chief aim. Human beings want security. They have valued property as a means to security. But it no longer serves that function.

Is constructiveness an instinct? The manifestation of constructiveness varies a great deal as between individuals. But it is society, at any rate, which furnishes the incentive and the tools. Where society encourages inventiveness, we find a great increase of inventiveness and of rivalry in inventiveness. The evidence of inventiveness is in direct

proportion to social encouragement. In a society that discourages inventiveness, that insists upon things being as they are, and brings its sanction to bear to maintain them as such, there individuals reverence things as they are. Again, inventiveness at any stage must be understood with reference to the history of the group. Each inventor must utilize the available material, and his construction bears a direct relation to the advance in the particular field. It is the cumulative tradition which makes it possible for him to invent the next step in the process. While there may be, then, an original urge, in some individuals, to construct, it comes to expression in terms of the customs, the available tools, and the pressure of immediate needs, then and there, within the historic process of society. Even when it is esthetic construction, it grows out of the social milieu and aims at social satisfaction.

Society by and large gives shape and substance to the type molds of individuals and of their strivings. Do men differ instinctively in self-assertion and self-submission? At any rate, the atmosphere of society determines to a large extent whether men will strive to realize individual ambition or will efface themselves in group assertion. Individualism and socialism are attitudes traceable primarily to historic causes. The instinct for assertion may take the form of renunciation of personal pride and personal ambition, counting them "worse than nothing," in order that the cause of the nobler group may be furthered. In such energetic natures as St. Paul and St. Augustine the propelling interest is not the I but the Christian community, which lives in them and masters them. In the Middle Ages, when humility and self-denial were of the religious climate, it was the fashion for the strongest and finest natures to renounce self for the sake of the church. Again, the will-to-power may not be so much for personal power as for the power of the group with which an indomitable will identifies itself. Gregory VII sinks his masterful personality in the church and Bismarck's ambition, which amount-

ed to a religion with him also, found its fulfillment in a strong united Germany. On the other hand, such social responses as bashfulness and stage fright indicate nothing but an exaggerated self-consciousness, due to lack of social adjustment.

Instead, then, of treating instincts as faculties, we must bear in mind that they owe their pattern, so far as it is humanly significant, to the tissue of social relations into which they are woven by group education and by group sanctions. Only by taking into account their function in group life, not by their relations to animal life, can we understand the part they play. It is the social atmosphere which determines whether imitation is the proper thing and what are the things to imitate. It is society with its valuation and its pressure in the way of sanctions which makes self-sacrifice or self-assertion seem to the individual the thing worth striving for. The instinctive emotional impulses are thus woven into social sentiments in the process of group education; and it is as organized into the customs of society and into the objects of social activity that they become important motive powers in shaping the conduct of the individual. It is a false abstraction to attribute the motive power of conduct to biological instincts apart from their organization into sentiment and character under social stimuli. They are not independent drives in terms of which we can understand the energies and motives of men. The real drives are to be found, not just in biological human nature, but in this as organized by habit, imagination, and thought under the control of the social consciousness.

The Group and Psychological Factors

If we now turn to the psychological factors—the processes of experience through which the individual learns to adjust himself to his environment—we find here, too, that we must start from the group if we would understand the conduct of the individual. It is by studying the group—its initiation of the new generation, its processes of educa-

tion and its ceremonies, its customs and beliefs, its scale of values, its pressure—that we come to understand the habits and idea-complexes, conscious and unconscious, which determine the attitudes and the trend of attention in the members. On the level of automatic suggestion and assimilation, the pressure of the group silently and persistently enforces its etiquette and customs upon us and dictates the habits which are acceptable to it. Amiel has well said: "In the conduct of life, habits count for more than maxims because habit is a living maxim become flesh and instinct. To reform one's maxims is nothing; it is but to change the title of the book. To learn new habits is everything, for it is to reach the substance of life. Life is but a tissue of habits." Yet habit is not all of life, important though it is. A society relying entirely upon habit becomes stereotyped. When a social breakdown comes, habit is helpless. We must cultivate other capacities of mind as well, especially thoughtfulness.

Group suggestion with its pressure not only dictates our habits but also prescribes our perceptions and ideas—all the more effectively because the process is largely automatic. We perceive and remember a world of things and relations, because society is ever at our elbow pointing out and labeling the facts for us. Without such emphasis and labeling, perception and memory would remain in the inchoate state in which we find them in the animals below us. Society also furnishes us with a certain organization of our world, which we come to assume uncritically. It provides us with our yardsticks and clocks for measuring space and time. It dictates our conceptions of causes and effects—sometimes visionary, but nevertheless impressive. It gives us a ready-made world of classes of things and relations with their labels. It dictates to us its scale of values. It stands over us with the prestige of its might. It punishes and rewards in manifold and subtle ways, and makes us assimilate its organization until we feel and act spontaneously in the expected manner.

It is due to society's cleavages of emphasis that there are cleavages in our thought and evaluation—cleavages between mind and nature, cleavages of classification, which come to seem to us part of the facts themselves; cleavages between religion and science, setting the supernatural realm apart as another world with its consequent unreality; cleavages in sentiment, which make us see life in hard and fast social classes and strata, such as capital and labor, aristocracy and common people, saints and sinners. Society builds up islands of race and nationality, of religious denominations, of accepted beliefs and standards, which make us suggestible within the distinctions made, but make us resist the merging of distinctions.

A great deal has been written on the subject of suggestion. We may define suggestion in general, as Titchener does, in terms of stimuli-touching-off-a-determining-tendency. We may point out further that suggestion varies with expectancy and emotional instability. We may show with Sidis that abnormal suggestibility results from dissociation of tendencies or of systems of associations, and that suggestibility varies inversely with integration of tendencies. But all this does not explain either the origin or the significance of the various forms of suggestion. It does not show that it is the pressure of the group, with its organization and sanctions, which makes us like-minded in our responses; that it is dissociation in the thinking of the group, the lack of intelligent integration of its experience—leaving islands in its beliefs and so preventing the checks of common sense from operating—which accounts for the superstitions of witchcraft, the fanaticism of religious revivals, and the walls of class and nationalism. The physiological islands in the cerebral organization are but the effect and counterpart of the social islands, except in a few pathological cases which cannot take on the social habits. Again, it is the repetition of group stimuli which makes us automata.

The particular content of suggestion at any one time,

with its particular determining tendency—whether Ptolemaic or Copernican, whether witchcraft or the red peril or the yellow peril—is due largely to the group situation at the time, its degree of integration, and its peculiar emphasis. By means of social pressure and social repetition, the habits and idea-complexes are formed which condition so largely our subsequent selection and reaction. All the more because these idea-complexes sink largely into the subconscious do they escape our attention and require special analysis. But it is also because of this fact that they become so effective as pre-determining tendencies. We forget that they are the product of society, and they come to seem our very nature. As Le Bon so strikingly puts it: "Ideas can have no real action on the soul of peoples until, as the consequence of a very slow elaboration, they have descended from the mobile regions of thought to that stable and unconscious region of the sentiments in which the motives of our action are elaborated. They then become elements of character and may influence conduct. Character is formed in part of a stratification of unconscious ideas."[19] It is because ideas are indexes of social sentiment and social beliefs that they exercise such potency in our conduct. Ideas charged with feeling are dynamite. Such ideas were liberty, equality, fraternity in the French Revolution.

It is futile to try to account for suggestion and assimilation as processes operating merely from individual to individual. They take place, on the contrary, in accordance with group pressure, and they are limited by group organization. Tarde's law of imitation is stated as though humanity were a mass of individuals. Instead it is a mass of groups, with their varying solidarity and sanctions and their resistance to suggestion from other groups. This group solidarity constitutes the chief inertia to the spreading of mores and accounts for the slowness with which

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

Western civilization, and especially Western religion, have won acceptance in other parts of the world—the inertia being in direct proportion to the integration of the antagonistic mores and decreasing with the breakdown of these mores. The group character of suggestion also explains the seemingly contradictory characteristics which are emphasized by Le Bon in *The Crowd.* A crowd will be docile to ideas which harmonize with its organized tendencies and with the dominant impulse at the time. It will be equally dogmatic and intolerant of ideas or forms of conduct which conflict with the set of the crowd. It is in this way, as a matter of fact, that we all are tolerant or intolerant. It is easy for us to welcome and believe in ideas which fit in with our pre-established bias. It is difficult if not impossible for us to see the significance of ideas which conflict with that bias. The bias resulting from group history and the dominant interest at the time may be different in different epochs and peoples, but the psychology is the same. When ideas or forms of conduct conflict with what we really regard as vital to group welfare, the intolerance and resistance soon make themselves felt.

If society prescribes the content and range of perception and memory, it also shows the limitations of human nature which must be reckoned with in social reconstruction. Our sense of reality, in our social relations, is conditioned to a considerable extent upon our ability to remember the names and characteristics of people and to represent them vividly to ourselves. We are not fitted by nature to be citizens of the world. The human world which can have a first-hand reality for us is, after all, a very limited world. The larger context must be built up from this. Society must be so organized as to make face-to-face relations—the relations of actual personal contact, personal memory, and personal representation—the basis of our social structure. The larger integration of society must be built out of first-hand personal units if it is to succeed in fulfilling the needs

of human nature.[20]

If we pass now from the level of automatic suggestion and assimilation to the level of active reconstruction of life, we must again start with the group if we would understand the conduct of the individual. We have here to do with crises in experience, whether of the individual or the group, which habit cannot meet, but which require fresh experimentation. Here attention comes into prominence. Thomas has well said: "Attention is associated with habit on one hand and with crisis on the other."[21] But neither the aspect of habit nor the aspect of crisis can be understood without reference to the group which has produced both the habit and the crisis. As the same author remarks: "Obviously the ability to meet crises depends on the degree of mental preparation. The Negro, for instance, had not been properly prepared for freedom."[22]

We must not forget that the spiritual climate, the tools, and the content of reconstruction, are expressions of the social group in the epoch of which we are a part. It is this group situation which ideal construction must illuminate, direct, and make significant. It can do so only by expressing itself in terms of the matrix and fundamental spirit of the group. This is true in all forms of ideal construction. Ideal construction must be ideal reconstruction—the fulfillment of the law and the prophets. In intellectual reconstruction we, first of all, assume certain categories which have become the stock of thought—the uniformity of nature, the law of conservation of energy, Newton's law of gravitation, the concept of geographical democracy, etc. Only when a new crisis arises in our thinking, because of radical scientific discoveries or because of tragic failure in our social adjustments, do we question the accepted categories. In the second place, we are dependent upon

20. See Chapter X.
21. Thomas, William I., "Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 17:732.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 736.

the epoch of group evolution in which we live for the possibilities of achievement, even in the highest flights of genius. We must work with the instruments furnished by the contemporary social group before we can devise better instruments. Genius must address itself to problems as they have grown out of the experience of his group. If Newton had come at the crisis when Anaximander came, would his guesses have been more fruitful? There can be no doubt, at any rate, that the possibility of achievement which distinguishes these two geniuses bears a close relation to the difference in their group context. Finally, the direction which intellectual reconstruction takes is determined to a large extent by the spiritual climate, and this reconstruction is fruitful, for the time being at least, only when it expresses, in articulate form, this climate. The spiritual climate determined the theological interest of the Middle Ages, as contrasted with the humanistic and secular interest of the Renaissance. If Newton had come a few centuries earlier he might have been a Thomas Aquinas, addressing himself to the creation of a theological system instead of a science of mechanics. (Even as it was he was too fond of theology and had to be kept to his scientific work by his friends.)

It has been shown by Franz Boas and others that the difference between the thinking of primitive man and of civilized man arises chiefly, if not altogether, from the tradition in which each participates. As Boas puts it: "It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling all our actions since the time of our birth."[23] Primitive man and civilized man alike accept without question certain presuppositions; these presuppositions determine the convincingness of the argument. It is when the presuppositions have become different, and because the

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

presuppositions of primitive man are no longer convincing to us, that we are apt to discredit the reasoning powers of primitive man. But

> when we recognize that neither among civilized men nor among primitive men the average individual carries to completion the attempt at causal explanation of phenomena, but carries it only so far as to amalgamate it with other previously known facts, we recognize that the result of the whole process depends entirely upon the character of the traditional material. . . . It would be vain to try to understand the development of modern science without an intelligent understanding of modern philosophy; it would be vain to try to understand the history of medieval science without a knowledge of medieval theology; and so it is vain to try to understand primitive science without an intelligent knowledge of primitive mythology. "Mythology," "theology," and "philosophy" are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the phenomena of nature.[24]

We may say that it is these influences which determine what seems reasonable to us. We may be less hide-bound in our obedience to associations of custom and may pursue a larger range of experimentation than primitive man; but these things, too, are true because of the atmosphere in which we live rather than because of any peculiarity in the construction of our minds as contrasted with that of primitive man.

The most crying need of the time, as of every time, is greater thoughtfulness. While we must recognize in general the dependence of thought upon communication, this does not mean that mere talk is thought. In our complex civilization we have come to be more and more dependent upon the written word—newspapers, magazines, books, for the most part calculated to produce conviction by suggestion rather than to produce thought. We have neglected the importance of oral discussion for the stimulation of thought. Yet it is only by first hand and intelligently organized discussion of the issues of the day, whether within the

24. *Ibid.*, p. 204. Contrast this point of view with with that of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl: *Primitive Mentality, How Natives Think, The "Soul" of the Primitive.* Lévy-Bruhl makes a qualitative distinction between the primitive mind and the European mind. See Chap. V.

government or outside the government, whether among students or teachers, that we can hope to achieve that clearness and organization of thought which shall make it possible for us to grasp the trend of the time and to give it proper expression. Whenever there have been such periods of free, open-minded discussion under wise and stimulating leaders, history has moved forward with seven-league steps.

In esthetic reconstruction, as in intellectual, we are limited by the canons of taste and the traditions of the epoch in which we work. In this epoch we must find our material and our interest. We must interpret the dominant spirit of the time if our art is to be significant. The history of art shows clearly that the conceptions and standards of art are matters of development. They are different in Babylonia from what they are in Ancient Greece, different in Greece from what we find in the Middle Ages, different in the Renaissance from what they are today, different in the Orient from what they are in the Occident. In each epoch, art has influenced and made significant the lives of men, because it has expressed the fundamental yearnings of that period or people in terms of the unique tradition. If art in the Middle Ages took a religious form—the form of liturgy and Gothic cathedrals—it was because the religious interest was the dominant interest of the day. If art today is secular and sublimates the common striving of men for life expression, it is because the dominant note with us is that of democracy and humanity. In fascistic nations, with their totalitarian will to power, art and literature are obliged to follow the lead of the controlling regime.

Again in volitional reconstruction, the motives and content are furnished by social relations. The emphasis, whether individualistic or socialistic, the motives which impel men to action, the forms in which men strive to embody their activity—all these grow out of the social matrix of which we are a part. The direction, the spirit, whether self-renunciation or self-expression, whether quality

or quantity, whether aristocracy or democracy, are the outgrowth of the genius and spirit of the age under these particular circumstances and at this particular stage of development. I am stating a tendency, not an ideal. We must learn to realize that the blind worship of a form of organization or of the tradition of the fathers is not going to get us anywhere. With due regard for the experiments of the past, we must be ready and courageous to carry forward the process of experimentation by creating such institutions of control as shall best organize the complex interests of the time, with the least sacrifice of relevant interests in the process. And only a control which gives voice to the variety of interests and heeds their claims can hope so to organize these interests that they will produce a livable harmony. At best, we must all learn restraint for the common good, since only by limitation can there be cooperation and only by cooperation can there be a life worth living.

No doubt individual genius contributes much in all these various fields of creativeness toward clearness and distinctness of the ideas and motives which underlie the striving of the group. But genius must work with the instruments available, it must interpret the content of life of its epoch, it must remake the tradition of which it is a part, if it would speak to its age and direct that age. It is not true that the individual is a *mere* intersection point of the social planes at a moment of time. He is not a mere zero, a mere passive result of forces. He is a manifestation of the creative impulse which has produced species and organs in the past, and which is reaching out for new adjustments to the universe. But the individual cannot be understood as an isolated fact. He is telescoped by instinct and education into historic social patterns; only by identifying himself with the historic social order and by interpreting this order can he make his life and the life of the group of which he is a part significant.

One thing is certain: we cannot understand the conduct of men and the possibilities of organization unless we study

the capacities of men in the matrix of social relations. We must, as we have already seen, take account of the limitations of human nature with respect to memory, imagination, and interest, if we would organize society into suitable interest groups and neighborhood groups. As Höffding has truly remarked: "The ethically right must be sociologically possible." Besides such normal limitations in human nature, we must face the fact that a considerable proportion of the population is mentally subnormal and constitutes a special problem of education and control, not to say of eugenics. At the other end of the scale are the especially gifted individuals; and these should be furnished adequate opportunities and incentives for excellence. For all grades of intelligence a great deal more attention needs to be paid to the cultivating of imagination and thoughtfulness. Such cultivation is important not only for art and science, but equally so for the practical relations of men. Long ago Socrates laid down the principle that "virtue is knowledge"; and a modern psychologist, William James, tells us that "thinking is the moral act." A great deal of the maladjustment in social life is due to sheer stupidity; and certainly a great deal of this stupidity is curable if taken in time. The effectiveness of our sympathy and altruism is dependent largely upon our being able to make imaginatively real to ourselves the feelings and attitudes of other people—in short, their humanity. Revolutions in social conditions have been wrought by men who were able to make the more fortunate half of humanity realize how the less fortunate half lives.

But we must cultivate this finer life of human beings, the life of creative intelligence, not merely because it is an instrument to living but because it makes life genuinely worth while. We must get over the idea that thought is a mere abstraction, a mere instrument in the service of instinct. Thought is activity. It has its own organic basis as truly as the instincts. It does indeed require the routine of memory in order to do its work. But it is not just com-

plex mechanical association; for it analyzes the routine of experience. Constructive activity has its own restlessness and furnishes its own peculiar type of satisfaction. It has its own values—values of consistency, values of harmony—which are not mere satisfactions of instinctive curiosity. It is because intelligence is an activity that it is mighty to control and to organize the impulses of human nature. What is needed in the present crisis, and in every crisis, is not chaotic and wilful impressionism, but some stubborn thinking. When people are willing to examine their class prejudices and their group hatreds in a critical and thoughtful way, a long step has been taken toward a new order. A psychoanalysis which shall expose our unconscious prejudices and introduce good sense into our social relations would indeed be valuable.

The Group and Sociological Factors

We can no more understand the sociological factors than we can the physical, biological, and psychological factors unless we take them as part of the living matrix of group life. We must see the futility, for example, of trying to derive society, with its organization and division of labor, from such abstract factors as the density and volume of population.[25] In the first place, such a factor as density of population is itself effect as well as cause. The numbers and the density which are possible within a given area vary with the stage of civilization. Thus more people can live within a given area in the agricultural stage than in the nomad stage, and more in the industrial stage than in the agricultural, because of man's growing mastery of tools and

25. While Émile Durkheim does not ignore the group aspect, he seems to lay chief stress on the factors of density and volume of population. *De la division du travail social,* livre II. Cf. F. H. Giddings, *A Theory of Social Causation,* Macmillan, 1904. I do not deny that variation in density of population may be a factor in social change. Great increase in density of population calls for more complex social and political organization if the group is to live successfully, but mere density does not produce organization and, of course, the group may fail for want of proper organization, and often does fail.

of organization. Again, the same density may produce vastly different results in respect of group organization and division of labor, in different stages of civilization and in populations with different characteristics. We must then regard society as the creative factor, and population as the material of social construction. To understand social change, we must take account of the group's will to live, with its cumulative tradition and genius. Mere numbers will lead only to confusion and starvation as has so often happened to the animal herd. Mere numbers never lead to organization or to division of labor. Differentiation of interests and functions must be in the service of group life and must be guided by social intelligence. Only thus can invention and experimentation take place. There must, further, be custom, to conserve the results of the past and to restrain the peoples' impulses so that they are willing to specialize in the service of the group. There must be, finally, the recognition of certain permanent and vital interests. Else there will be no organization of institutions.

We cannot understand social relations without taking account of the indifference of space, or the area over which population is spread. Face-to-face relations yield a result which no mediated relations can give. This is shown in the phenomena of the crowd and in the choicer relations of friendship. But the area which conditions personal relations, has come, to a large extent, under social control. Modern invention, if it has not annihilated space, has at any rate done a great deal toward overcoming its indifference; and vastly more scattered as well as larger numbers can cooperate today in common enterprises than could have cooperated a few generations ago. Again, the larger unit, the public, makes its own contribution. It may neutralize the crowd effects of the smaller unit and so tend toward social sanity. There is the obligation to wait upon the reaction of the larger group or of coordinate groups; and this in itself tends toward sanity. Contrast the revolution accomplished over-night by a city crowd

with the present slower reaction of a nation.

Tradition has been rightly emphasized as one of the most important factors of social life. We cannot understand the individual significance of the group without knowledge of its history. With all our differences as members of a nation, we yet revere a common tradition. A common language and literature help us to realize our kinship. Then there are the outstanding historical events and personalities. As American citizens we have a certain common political heritage. The Declaration of Independence has been made for all of us. Washington and Lincoln belong to all of us. They represent the victorious tendencies in our history. Our faith in democracy, in a free religion, free citizenship, trial by our peers, the Australian ballot, the Monroe Doctrine, give us a common body of axioms. The whole is symbolized by a name and a flag—emblems of our loyalty. Every people must be understood from its roots in the past. The tradition of a people is a sacred heritage for which it is willing to sacrifice to the utmost. Tradition accounts alike for the loyalty of a group and the strong antagonism between groups. Furthermore, a group which is loyal to its past is better prepared to meet the present and the future. The Anglo-Saxon race has shown a peculiar respect for its tradition. It has never let go of the past until it has found new ground to stand on; and even then it has reverenced the past, though that past has become only a relic. Lord Charnwood says of the English Church: "The reformed English Church attached itself with reverence to the real authority of a Christian tradition, undefined and unformulated and incapable of any decisive exposition, but none the less living for that, a slowly-growing, continuously modified thing, operative in the hearts and minds of endless succeeding generations."[26] And E. A. Baker says of the English language: "Faithful to the past, it revels in the present, yet seems to be always

26. "The Church of England and the Present Day," *The Living Age*, 304:149.

beckoning to the future."[27]

But while tradition is important, it must be borne in mind, and it cannot be impressed too often, that tradition is not an end in itself, that tradition must not be the master of society, but its handmaid. In other words, a tradition to be significant and valuable and worthy of loyalty must be a living tradition. It must be the expression of the moral energy of the group. The group must always contain its constructive element as well as its conservative element. History is a graveyard of traditions which remain as signposts of the past but are no part of the living present. The history of the Norsemen is of interest to us as part of our past, but it does not control our life now. The tradition of the Fiji Islanders is of importance, no doubt, to them, but it is largely a matter of curiosity to us. A tradition must express the needs and genius of a people; and traditions must ever be reconstructed or discarded as these needs demand. In a progressive society, tradition must be regarded as an instrument, not as an end. Else a group is condemned to stagnation. Tradition is effective and valuable only so long as it is suffused with the creative spirit of the group. Tradition is indeed the storehouse of the wisdom of the past; but while we recognize its reality and value, we must not worship it. We must develop the critical spirit. We must have the prophets of the future, not merely the priests of the past. We must have the faith which can create new social patterns, as our forebears had faith to create the institutions that we have. We must be willing to take the risk of experimentation in ever larger relations, even as they took the risk. We cannot test the value of a new organzation of humanity by examining it in the abstract any more than we can tell whether marriage is a succcess by being cynical onlookers. We must try it and learn by the consequences.

Social conflicts, as well as social unities, must be under-

27. "English Language in War Time," Ernest A. Baker, *The Living Age*, 302:24.

stood in terms of the group, its development, its differentiation of interests. National conflicts, class conflicts, religious conflicts, sex conflicts, race conflicts—all must be understood in terms of the evolution of group mores. It is only in terms of group habits, group ideals and standards of living that we can understand the conflict of interests, whether within a group or between groups. We cannot say, for example, that the conflict of labor and capital is merely the result of an unequal distribution of wealth, merely a conflict between the haves and the have-nots, since for ages wealth was even more unequally distributed than it is now, without any conscious conflict existing. Rich and poor alike accepted religiously their lot. It is not because things are worse, but rather because the standard of the masses is higher, that there is a present consciousness of conflict. To account for this conflict would indeed be a long and complex story. We should have to consider the influence of Christianity, the reorganization of Europe in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the weakening of old sanctions, political emancipation, modern industry with its differentiation of labor and its centralization of labor, the unionization of labor and of capital, the greater intelligence of labor, the impersonalism of modern industry, etc. All are causes which have their root in group development and differentiation. It is no answer to the demands of labor to say that labor is well off today because it is better off than in the past. The struggle is precisely for an improved standard of living, with all that it implies.

If we try to understand the meaning of social control, we must bear in mind, and history gives us abundant illustrations of the fact, that such control cannot be exercised merely through external customs and restraints, but must be a moral control growing out of the living tissue of beliefs and ideals of those controlled.[28] To say that human beings

28. Émile Durkheim, at least in his earlier works, has emphasized society as "external restraint" and as "independent of its individual manifestations." See *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 19. In his *Elementary*

have been influenced and controlled by mythologies, illusions, etc., is to commit the psychologist's fallacy—the fallacy of reading the spectator's attitude into the processes which he investigates.[29] People have never been influenced by what they regarded as mythology or as illusion. What is actually mythology or illusion is a relative matter. For Le Bon, the Christian religion is a vast illusion, but it certainly is not an illusion for the millions who are guided by it. Religion, poetry, science, art, institutions exercise control over human beings only so long as they are part of their living conviction. A restraint, which rests upon mere force and which has no sanction in the convictions of a people, can never persist for long. The only restraint which is genuine and has promise of permanence is moral restraint. Restraint must grow out of the will of the group; it must be recognized by the group as being for its welfare.

It is futile to try to understand the actual control of a people by the study of its form of government or the letter of its constitution. In the first place, the form is meaningless and ineffective except as it expresses a common consensus, rooted in the history and the living convictions of the people concerned. Thus governments may have been democracies in form but, owing to lack of an organized public opinion, they have often been despotisms in fact. And again, governments may have been despotic in form but, by virtue of the pressure of public opinion, they may have been democracies in fact. Governments may be much the same in form, for example, those of Great Britain and France, yet in fact they may exercise a very different type of control. The causes for this difference must be sought first of all in the differing historical

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Forms of Religious Life he has tried to correct the impression of his earlier language by putting the chief stress on "moral authority," but his emphasis is still on the collective aspects.

29. This external point of view occurs in Gustave Le Bon's brilliant study, *The Crowd*, 1922, 1896, and to a certain extent in Edward A. Ross' suggestive work on *Social Control*, 1920.

development of the two peoples. In England national unification was a legal unification through the king's courts and the establishment of the common law, while in France the strong feudal lords were able to defy the king and to maintain their own courts.[30] When the national unity of France was finally established it was the administrative unity of the national overlord, and this unity was external to the well defined provincial units. Perhaps genius of race figures, too; but only after we have exhausted the historical causes should we take refuge in the obscure factor of race.

The absolutistic theories of the nineteenth century have failed because they predicated an absolute individual. This they did even where they also assumed, as in Hegelianism, an absolute society, because this absolute society rested primarily upon the assumption of absolute individuals. This assumption made self-realization seem an adequate theory of the moral life, since if the individual only realizes his own insight he must realize society and the universe. But the practical outcome of such an individualism is seen in the *laissez faire* conception of society, which has anarchism for its ultimate ideal. For if the individual is absolute, society can be at best a means to an end—a temporary scaffolding until the process of individual education is complete.[31] In the economic field, individualism naturally based its theory upon competition between individuals and upon marginal utility. The group with its striving for status was ignored. It is partly through new historical insight, partly through evolution of a new group consciousness that such theories have become antiquated. Economists have been compelled to recognize that the

30. For a clear, concise statement see A. Lawrence Lowell's *Greater European Governments*, 1925. For a more comprehensive treatment see the same author's *Public Opinion and Popular Government*. See also Harold J. Laski's *The Problem of Sovereignty* and *Authority in the Modern State*.

31. It is interesting that the Marxist philosophy of Russia looks forward to a condition when external restraint will be unnecessary; in other words to voluntary cooperation as sufficient.

competition is not between abstract individuals but between individuals with a group consciousness. Says Taussig: "A standard of living so tenaciously held as to affect natural increase may be a force in the background, fixing a sort of supply price, and in the end affecting relative wages more fundamentally than marginal efficiency."[32] With the organization of both labor and capital, the competition has become a competition between conscious groups, and the demand for a certain status or standard of living has become consciously the chief factor in the competition.

For the individual absolutism of the nineteenth century we have substituted relativism. We cannot take the individual as an abstract entitity if we would understand human conduct. We must take him as figuring in the historic stream of development—woven into group mores and group standards, themselves constantly shifting in the development of the race. The group has reality for those born into it and woven into its life tissue. The group preexists and makes demands upon them—makes its demands indeed, before they are in a position to remake it. It commands loyalty, it establishes obligations. On the automatic level it uses the individuals with their sense organs, their instincts, their capacities, as instruments to do its bidding. Even when man emancipates himself by rising to the constructive level of life, he must draw his lifeblood from the group; he is still part of its tissue of tradition. He must understand this tradition in order to interpret and to remold it. He can only re-create the group by identifying himself with it. In attempting to graft the new insight upon the old tree of life, we must understand the character of the old. The principal requirement is that the reconstruction shall be thoroughgoing, lest we patch a new cloth upon an old garment, pour new wine into old bottles, and thus prevent the experiment from being fully tried.

But if life in the concrete is relative to its setting, are there not at least absolute ideals which we can use as pat-

32. Taussig, F. W., *Principles of Economics*, 1921, 2:158.

terns? So we are apt to think. Every age is likely to assume that its ideals are absolute. Only in retrospect do we come to see their relativity. For ideals, too, are the florescence of the life process. They cast their light into the darkness of the future for but a little way ahead. Their significance arises from the social process out of which they grow. They are the expression no doubt of the law of the life process and of the cosmos. But we are obliged to discover this law, and for us its significance varies with our evolutionary setting. Our ideals are not absolute because we believe in them absolutely: they are the trend of life rising obscurely into the consciousness of thought and always requiring re-definition in the history of life. Different ages have emphasized different ideals, and it is best for us not to be over-confident that our ideals are infallible because they are ours.[33] The Greeks emphasized measure, symmetry, self-control. They created in their day a matchless world of beauty. But their ideals proved inadequate to meet the problems of a new crisis. The Romans emphasized law and institutions, and they built a wonderful structure; but their world went to pieces and they could not put it together again. The Middle Ages emphasized other-worldliness and renunciation, and held the world spellbound for a while. But the urge for the expansive life—for self-expression, for nationalism—fascinated men, and the Renaissance, with its pagan music, won them back to the riotous desires of this world. The ideals of wealth and power have been fixed for a time into custom. They have appropriated the religious sanctions; they have enslaved men in false illusions. But now they are breaking and society faces dissolution again. Perhaps in the time of crisis and conflicting claims we may learn that self-control has its place in life as well as self-expression, and that only by limiting our desires can we become masters

33. The relativity of ideals has been beautifully set forth in G. T. W. Patrick's paper, "Our Centrifugal Society," *Natural History*, 19:292-300 (reprinted as University of Iowa Extension *Bulletin*, No. 50.)

of the world. Perhaps we shall find that in renunciation for a larger cause, in creativeness for the group and for humanity, lies the way to happiness, rather than in the frenzy of getting and spending. We do well if we can express the consolidated insight of an age, but we must not suppose that our insight is final. The true prophet must look forward, must divine the future, to discover the ideal which shall solve our new problems.

For the time being the world seems to have gone to pieces. While the catastrophe came as a thief in the night, there were causes long at work which undermined the crust of custom. The welter of impressionism in literature and art that preceeded the welter of social madness and anarchy was no accident but rather a symptom that the old crust of sanity was near the breaking. It was the sensitiveness of the barometer of individual genius to imminent changes in the cosmic weather. But we shall not achieve a new sanity by rioting in subjective feelings. We need the master artist of creative thought who, viewing events from the perspective of history and making use of the wisdom and instruments of the ages, shall build out of the wreckage of the past a nobler civilization. Above all, it is not merely an individual destiny which we must build, but a cooperative destiny, a new bond of adventurous endeavor, in which the individual and the nation shall live and create in union with other individuals and nations, in and for the whole, at this particular crisis of life. We do not understand the seasons of the cosmic weather and its subtle influence on the integrations of matter and life. Nor have we any faculty of intuition which can follow the subtle rhythms of cosmic life in its history. We can apprehend these if at all only in so far as they are revealed in the social climate and in the rhythms of social reconstruction. But we must work in faith with the instruments and insight which are available, building for a future which stretches beyond the present and whose meaning we must discover if life is to come to its fulfillment.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL MINDS[1]

Types of Theories

In looking backward at the social theories of the past, it seems to me that for the most part they assume the subcranial or solipsistic conception of mind. Let us glance briefly at some of these theories. It is easy to place the old abstract individualism, with its practical egoism. For Hobbes the individual is himself and himself alone. Society is but an artificial addition, extraneous to human nature. While Hobbes regards the artificial addition as an indispensable means to peace and happiness, modern anarchism regards society as at best a necessary evil. For Herbert Spencer it is a temporary police supervision, until human nature shall have embodied within itself the necessary social instincts for unconstrained living together; for Nietzsche, it is but a philistine conspiracy on the part of the weak and cowardly to suppress the strong and fit.

The absorbing biological interest of the last generation could not help making itself felt in social theory. Society is fundamentally an organism, so the biological school tells us. The analogies between the organism and society have been worked out into sometimes fantastic detail: The organism is the union of soul and body, we are told. Though an organism is a whole, it has parts animated in their own way and playing into the whole. The organism is developed from within outward in life history. If we transfer these analogies to the state, we find that here too we have the union of soul and body, the body being the constitution with its articulate provisions. In the state, too, we have members, the officials and the offices with

1. Presidential address to the Western Philosophical Association delivered at Northwestern University, March 21, 1913, and since revised, but in substance the same.

their varied functions, forming a coherent internal organization and acting as a unit in external relations. The state like the organism grows, though, since popular passion and strong individual interest may deflect the course, it may not grow quite so regularly as the organism. Such in brief is the picture by J. K. Bluntschli in his *The Theory of the State.*[2] On the ethical side, Leslie Stephen in his *Science of Ethics* emphasizes that "the individual is moralized through his identification with the social organism;" and that "the conditions, therefore, of the security of morality are the conditions of the persistence of society."

But after all the social organism is merely a metaphor, a vague analogy. Even if we should go so far on the biological side as to credit each cell of the complex organism with a mind of its own, still we should be entirely ignorant of the psychological relations of these cells; and our ignorance furnishes a poor explanation of the intimate relations which come within our experience in society. The unity of society is not an organic but a psychological unity. It is a unity of value and not a mere unity of external continuity. In order to arrive at any intimate understanding of social relations we must use psychological and not merely biological tools.

More profound in its insight is the attitude of speculative idealism. Here at least we have a recognition that the unity of society must be psychological; and it must be more than the unity of each individual mind. This is as true in our theoretical relations as in our practical. In order to have any common understanding according to absolute idealism, a supra-individual unity must somehow be immanent in the finite centers. It is this which makes us overlap and makes us imply more than we seem. In the words of Emerson: "Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. In all conversation between two

2. See especially pp. 16 ff. The analogy of the state to the organism had been worked out in great detail by John of Salisbury (who died in 1180) in his *Polycraticus.*

persons tacit reference is made as to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common nature is not social; it is impersonal; it is God."[3] How intimate this unity is to our own individuality is also emphasized by Emerson: "Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person who in his integrity worships God becomes God; yet forever and forever, the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable." This intimacy of life enables the finite person to say: "Behold I am born into the great, the universal mind. I the imperfect adore my own Perfect. I am somehow receptive of the great soul." Of this union the world itself is the "perennial miracle which the soul worketh." On the basis of such intimacy with the absolute, T. H. Green likewise merges the finite self into the universal self.[4]

The difficulty with the above theory of social relations is of course its abstractness. The unity of each and all of the personal selves with the absolute is so intimate that social finite relations disappear altogether in this abstract background. An entity, however, which in this abstract way explains all unity does not make us any wiser as regards the various types of concrete unity with which we are concerned in our practical social relations. There is a great difference between social mind as an abstract, permanent idea and social mind as an existing living unity, as warm and real as individual mind. To show that the individual and society mutually imply each other or that we are socially minded is a different thing from showing that social minds exist.

Hegel has come nearer than anyone else of the speculative idealists to recognizing the reality of the various types of social mind. For Hegel, indeed, the ethical life means precisely the adjustment to social institutions. Man is not a stranger in an artificially super-imposed society. Social

3. From *The Oversoul.*
4. *Prolegomena to Ethics.*

institutions are the concrete embodiments of his own deeper will. In Hegel's own words: "The various social forces are not something foreign to the subject. His spirit bears witness to them as to his own being. In them he feels that he is himself, and in them, too, he lives as in an element indistinguishable from himself. This relation is more direct and intuitive than even faith and trust."[5] And again: "Spirit has actuality, and the accidents or modes of this actuality are individuals. Hence as to the ethical there are only two possible views. Either we start from the substantive social system, or we proceed automatically and work up from a basis of individuality. This latter method, because it leads to mere juxtaposition, is void of spirit, since mind or spirit is not something individual, but the unity of the individual and the universal."[6]

When Hegel, however, tries to make clear what he means by this spiritual unity, his bias for the abstract and formal vitiates his treatment. Thus in discussing the types of social unity he places the family lowest, as the unity of feeling; the civic community he defines as "an association of members or independent individuals in a formal universality. Such an association is occasioned by needs, and is preserved by the law." But the final type of unity is "the substantive universal, and the public life dedicated to the maintenance of the universal. This is the state constitution."[7] Thus Hegel's abstract method loses the social mind in the mere external form and expression of society. To be sure he tells us: "The state is the divine will as a present spirit which unfolds itself in the actual shape of an organized world."[8] But the state remains a juristic abstraction to the end.[9] Mind for Hegel is finally vested

5. *The Philosophy of Right*, par. 147.
6. *Ibid.*, par. 156.
7. Par. 157. Cf. Medieval realism and its conception of the church. The church is conceived as having a reality over and above individuals. It does not depend upon individuals. It is not a specific and creative relation of individuals.
8. *Ibid.*, par. 270.
9. The same is true for Emile Durkheim. Society exercises "an external

in the absolute self-consciousness; and persons and institutions alike must be understood as expressions of this self-consciousness. The new discovery of history is "the unity of the divine and the human;" and this unity comes to a focus in each self-conscious personality. Institutions are but the expression of this substantive self-consciousness. As he puts it: "In the state, self-consciousness finds the organic development of its real substantive knowing and will; in religion it finds, in the form of ideal essence, the feeling and the vision of this truth; and in science it finds the free conceived knowledge of this truth, seeing it to be one and the same in all its mutually completing manifestations, namely, the state, nature, and the ideal world."[10] But these are after all only manifestations of self-consciousness. Philosophy is the ultimate realization of spirit, and Hegel in spite of all his efforts to take the social point of view ends, as a result of his abstract method, in being a rational individualist. The difficulty with idealistic theories in general, in spite of the fruitfulness of their empirical intuitions, is that they have been so anxious to arrive at the Absolute that they have slighted the concrete problems of continuity. The Absolute becomes an immense solipsist, with no alter.

Recent theories of society may perhaps be characterized, in contrast with abstract individualism, on the one hand, and abstract universalism on the other, as functional theories. As against abstract individualism they emphasize the qualifications in human nature for social relations. As against abstract universalism, they emphasize that mind is essentially individual and deny the reality of a supra-individual mind. In the words of Giddings: "The social mind is a concrete thing. It is more than any individual mind and dominates every individual will. Yet it exists only in individual minds, and we have no knowledge

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constraint." It is "independent of its individual manifestations" *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique,* end of Chap. 1, 1895. *(The Rules of Sociological Method,* 1938, trans., S. Solovay, J. Mueller.)

10. Hegel, *op. cit.,* par. 360.

of any consciousness but that of individuals. The social consciousness, then, is nothing more than the feeling or the thought that appears at the same moment in all individuals, or that is propagated from one to another through the assembly or the community. The social mind is the phenomenon of many individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment and perhaps act in concert."[11] In the same spirit we are told by Ward: "There are none so simple as literally to personify society and conceive it endowed with wants and passions. By the improvement of society they only mean such modifications in its constitution and structure as will in their opinion result in ameliorating the conditions of its individual members."[12] In spite of this, society "should imagine itself an individual, with all the interests of an individual; and becoming fully conscious of these interests, it should pursue them with the same indomitable will with which the individual pursues his interest."[13] Still we are dealing with an aggregate of individuals, even if such individuals should base their actions upon "the science of sociology." As Spencer puts it: "By social laws are meant the principles of human action in collectivity." But for Spencer this collectivity is an external relation of individuals. Society, as such, has no reality.

We may distinguish three types of this functional theory of society. One type of theory starts from the division of labor, as the complement of the varieties of human needs. This type has been stated in an immortal way by Plato in *The Republic*.[14] Plato recognizes here the variety of capaci-

11. Franklin H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, 1896, p. 134.
12. Lester F. Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 1893, pp. 99 and 100.
13. *Ibid*, p. 324.
14. In recent times this theory has been developed in great detail by Émile Durkheim in *De la Division du Travail Social*. While Durkheim uses the division of labor as the variable of which the various phenomena of social development are functions, he in turn makes the division of labor dependent upon increase in the density of population.

ties of human nature, as well as the variety of its complex needs. Society must be so organized, and education must be so specialized, as to make it possible for each human unit to fill its specific function, to do what it can do best in the economy of the whole. For Plato and Aristotle alike the conception of society is instrumental. Its purpose is the education of the individual in virtue, the attainment of the highest possible measure of insight into the meaning of life . This is even more strikingly brought out in Plato than in Aristotle, for with Plato the doctrine of immortality plays an essential part in the redemptive scheme of life.

Another type of theory has its basis in individualistic psychology. Its problem is: What are the individual processes or qualifications by means of which we come to share in a common social life? The classical statement of this type of approach goes back to Adam Smith: "How selfish, soever, man may be supposed to be, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when either we see it, or are made to conceive it in a lively manner."[15] His conception of mind, however, remains strictly individual: "As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation." We put ourselves in the other man's place in our imagination, and thus share with him what he must feel. We also learn to regulate our own conduct by what we represent to ourselves as his attitude toward us. This representative theory of social relations has been formulated more recently by William James: "A man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in the sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity

15. *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments,* 1869, Part 1, Chap. 1.

to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably by our kind."[16] In turn, we react upon our representation of how we are noticed.

Other writers of this psychological school have emphasized imitation, as the process by means of which social unity is brought about. Says Tarde: "Society may therefore be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who without actual imitation are alike in their possession of common traits which are ancient copies of the same model."[17] He even goes so far as to say: "What is society? I have answered: society is imitation."[18] In the same spirit, Baldwin suggests that the social self may be likened roughly to a composite photograph: "The variety of personalities about him each impressing him with some one or more peculiarities, exaggerations, deficiencies, inconsistencies or law observing regularities, gradually leave upon him a certain common impression, which, while getting application to all personalities as such, yet has to have supplementing in the case of any particular individual. . . . He 'ejects' it into all the fellows of his social group. It becomes then a *general alter*, a sort of speaking social companion."[19] Josiah Royce, carrying out the same method with his own idealistic background, came to regard nature itself as the system of our social agreements, and thus only a more comprehensive social unity.

Still a third type of functional theory takes its start from our practical social situation. It assumes at the outset that all our consciousness is, as a matter of fact, social. This has been strikingly expressed by A. W. Moore, a member of the Dewey school. In his own words: " 'My' consciousness is a function of a social process, in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor. . . . 'My' thinking and

16. *The Principles of Psychology*, 1890, I, pp. 293, 294.
17. Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation* (trans. E. C. Parsons, 1903), p. 68.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
19. James Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 292 f.

feeling may be as truly a function of 'your' brain or mind as of my own. My thinking of sending for you as a physician to treat my headache is as truly a function of your medically trained brain as of my own aching one."[20] Moore thinks rightly of this "private consciousness" not only as born of, but as growing up in and therefore continuing all the while vitally and organically related to, its matrix. Not only in its origin but in its continual development and operation it must always be a function of the whole social situation of which it is born. It is never to be regarded as *wholly* or *merely* the function of an individual mind or soul or of a single organism or brain. It is always a readjustment within a social situation.

The theory thus stated does not try to define the nature of the social situation, neither does it discriminate between situations where the motive is individual and where the social aspects, such as language, science, etc., are strictly instrumental, and the situations where the motive is consciously social. In so far as we use the concept, social, to characterize all our experience we have obviously failed to give the differentia between what we may term the individual consciousness, on the one hand, and the group consciousness on the other. Moreover, the word "function" is ambiguous. Are my thinking and the physician's thinking in regard to my headache, identical states of consciousness? Or do they merely figure with reference to a common problem? Evidently the latter is all that can be meant in this case. It still remains, therefore, to explain the nature of that social context in which both our minds figure. Does this amount to a common social unity, including both minds and having an existence of its own, or are we simply two numerically distinct minds thinking of the same object?

The value of the above psychological type of treatment lies in emphasizing the fact, that there must be cer-

20. *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 1910, p. 275.

tain qualifications on the part of the individuals, taken as abstractions, in order for social communion to take place. Such qualifications are partly instinctive and partly intellectual. On the *instinctive* side, we must distinguish certain specific instincts, such as the gregarious instinct, the band instinct and the parental instinct, from the more general innate tendencies, such as imitation and sympathy. Without such native qualifications social life would of course be an impossibility. Lacking those we should have merely artificial restrictions superimposed upon atomic units. We should have no genuine social life. These innate tendencies are further complicated and enhanced by the *intellectual* processes which are grafted upon them. These intellectual qualifications may be broadly stated as imagination and suggestion. By means of imagination we can imitate, and sympathize with, not only the immediate perceptual situations but the secondary inner situations of the other person's experience. A similar experience suggests to us similar trains of ideas and similar types of conduct. But these qualifications, whether instinctive or intellectual, are mere abstractions or potentialities, looked at from the individual point of view. Their function is to *canalize* or to make definite the intersubjective continuities, as do the terminal instruments in wireless telegraphy. They are no more social than oxygen and hydrogen, when taken separately, are water. Our *knowledge* of social mind may depend upon imitation and suggestion, it may involve inferences of the most complicated kind; it certainly presupposes language for any definiteness of mutual understanding. But this does not prove that the existence of a social mind consists of those cognitive processes, any more than that the existence of a chemical compound depends upon our methods of studying it. The existence of a new reality in each case must be ascertained through the pragmatic attitude which we must take toward the specific type of unity.

What I wish to show is that there is a genuine social

unity, distinguishable from what we call the unity of individual experience, and if not more real, at least more inclusive than this. The latter may be considered from this point of view as a group of constant traits which we identify in a variety of social situations. What we have in reality is dynamic situations. Some of these situations we come to recognize as physical, that is, as having no recognizable significance or value of their own; others again we come to acknowledge as social with their own psychological unity. In each case we are able to follow the individual factors within the varying dynamic situations by virtue of certain relatively constant traits which we can identify in the situations, such as the ions in chemical compounds, the Mendelian units in the biological generations, and the personal traits which constitute the individual's unique marks of identification in the various social unities.

Intersubjective Continuities[21]

If instead of starting our study of social relations with the verbal level of mature human behavior, we had started with such primitive levels of social relations as those of the bacteria and the protozoa, we should not have landed in the solipsistic impasse of present social theory. We should have seen that there is a radiation of life from the simplest level to the highest and that life responds, in a specific way, to a specific quality of life. Among bacteria we find various degrees of attraction and hostility between species. The attraction, moreover, is not merely between individuals but is also mass attraction, leading to the formation of colonies. Where there is propagation by conjugation, as there is sometimes in protozoa, the selection is always within a species. There is a reciprocal response to a species quality of life. Whether the conjugation leads to the absorption of one protozoön by another so that the

21. T. Lipps' doctrine of *Einfühlung* (empathy) and W. McDougall's "sympathetic induction" seem to point in the same direction. Of course, the medieval mystical doctrine of intussusception implies direct intersubjective experience.

two literally become one flesh (the most complete conjugal union) or the conjugation, as generally is the case, takes place by the communication of the chromosome substance, there can be no doubt of the immediate response to a specific quality of life. There can be no question of inference by analogy. In trying to understand communication on higher levels where life has the capacity of memory, imagination and verbal expression, we must not forget the fundamental fact that we are still dealing with the interaction of life with life and that this interaction is immediate and direct. Man, since there has been human intercourse, has responded to the mental quality of the human life situations as directly and immediately as he has responded to a physical quality in his physical relations. The meaning of the situation in either case is the result of a long process of trial and error which in turn could never have advanced very far except for social communication. What I want to impress is that social communication is basically an interaction of life with life which is a cosmic fact. The communication of life with life, however, varies with the different levels of life.

Instead of starting with the postulate of isolated minds, as psychology has done in the past, and then trying to explain how one mind can take cognizance of another by means of analogical inference, we must start with the postulate of intersubjective continuity as an elementary fact. By intersubjective continuity I mean the immediate consciousness of mental responsiveness. Without this immediate continuity of minds we should have no incentive for our attempts to know about other minds. It is the fact that we meet in a common continuum that makes us conscious of the need for intersubjective adjustment. "Conditioning" by means of social interstimulation would be meaningless unless there were social interstimulation. Mind, like matter, must be conceived as existing in fields with their own continuities and with their own play of parts. We know each other, as we know physical things,

through common situations. And in these social situations, whatever the physical medium or symbol, mind is aware of mind; else each mind would lead an egocentric, solipsistic, and unconscious existence to the end. It is usually assumed that social communication means the transformation of thought into neural energy, this into physical stimuli, these again into physiological changes, terminating somehow in the other person's thought. This implies complete discontinuity as between these subcranial patches of mind. All continuity of communication becomes material continuity. There can here be no direct acquaintance. The other mind comes to be regarded as an eject, inferred by analogy. That we as a matter of fact do not so infer it, that we become conscious of others before we have a looking-glass acquaintance with ourselves, that we respond to the mental reactions within the total situation as immediately as to the physical, does not trouble the theorist. Minds are isolated by hypothesis and so made private.

It is one of the paradoxes of history that mind should thus have socialized itself into privacy. It was the emphasis on the physical sense-world—an emphasis made necessary through early man's direct and largely individual struggle with the physical environment—that gradually brought this about. As a result of this emphasis individuals came to be looked upon as primarily bodies with a "breath" inhabiting them; and in a more sophisticated age mind is reduced to a function of the brain. Thus mind, by its extreme emphasis of the instrument, not only socializes itself into isolation but actually socializes itself out of existence. Social communication becomes merely the polar relation between organic contexts of a certain complexity. But this emphasis is itself the product of social interaction. It was because of man's practical social demands that the physical world became differentiated from our mental operations, whether in the earlier animistic cleavage of soul and body or in the more abstract separation of psycho-physical parallelism. In the earliest primi-

tive life there seems to be no such differentiation. The earliest distinction is not between mind and body, but between animated bodies and those not animated. Such a distinction, preceding, as it does, all inference, must be intuitive. That such a distinction exists even on the animal level; that animals do as a matter of fact react differently upon animated things from those not animated; and that such an intuition is of fundamental importance in the economy of animal life is amply evidenced by animal propagation. That there should be illusions in animal life, extending this intuition to non-animated things, as in the case of the fish and the fisherman's artificial fly, is easily explained, once we grant the existence of the immediate intuition. The general extension of this intuition to nature, however, as in primitive animistic philosophy, cannot be regarded as a primitive reaction, but is due to more advanced experience with its abstractions and inference, based upon sleep, dreams, etc., as shown by Herbert Spencer.

The general pragmatic[22] significance of this intersubjective awareness is manifest both in the sympathetic furtherance and in the thwarting of individual desire. Such awareness, even for the animal, has a different intuitive value from the furtherance or hindrance by the inorganic processes of nature. It makes a difference whether it is another living dog which is contending for the bone or whether the obstacle is merely mechanical. The sex instinct takes peculiar account of complementary desire or the absence of it. The gregarious instinct implies an intuition of kind and not merely of animated things in general. And no learning process seems to precede such intuitive recognition. Even if this intuition is sometimes

22. Since discovering that the term, pragmatic, originated with the Greek historian, Polybius, in the second century B. C., I feel that I can use it without being involved in recent controversy. Polybius invented the pragmatic method of writing history, i.e., to learn not only from the trials and sufferings of our own people but from the trials and sufferings of other peoples and so forestall a similar fate.

made, positively or negatively, definite by the index of smell, as it seems to be in certain species of ants where a difference in smell makes them attack certain other species, this does not account for the positive intuition of kind. Where the special index occurs it is probably due to special survival reasons.

Throughout the process of imitation and accommodation in which the individual translates his social reactions into terms of himself, there is present the immediate intuition of other minds. These are reacted on differently from things. It is possible for us to become aware of our own purposes only through the consciousness of conflict and cooperation with our fellows. In this we do not first have the consciousness of the physiological correspondence of our bodies with other bodies and then deduce internal correspondence from it. But the whole problem of psychophysical correspondence is the outcome of our social interest —our practical need for intersubjective correlation and correspondence. Man discovered the fundamental laws of language, logic, and ethics long before he had discovered even the existence of a nervous system. It is true that we come to take certain aspects of bodily behavior as signs of intersubjective relations, but they would not even have been signs except in the service of the things signified, the evidence of things not seen. It is because we are immediately conscious of the reality of other selves that we try to understand them and devise instruments for adjusting ourselves to them. Whether on the level of instinctive affection and rivalry or on the level of purposive cooperation, we imply the first-hand responsiveness of mind to mind. In our vices as in our moral evaluations, in our selfish striving for wealth and power as in our seeking for individual or social salvation, we imply the sharing of a common life with others, and their reciprocal response to our aims.

The whole procedure of the supposed inference from bodily analogy to other minds is inverted. We start with a common intuitive life, and through the demands of this

common life, matter comes to have its instrumental significance. Intuitive living and faith come before analogical inference. Unless intersubjective continuities were thus directly felt, we should have neither basis nor motive for inferences about other minds. Indeed, the basis for our arriving at an objective physical world is the practical necessity of our common intuitive life.

The prejudice against social continuities is part of a larger prejudice, pointed out by William James—the prejudice against conjunctive relations and the emphasis on disjunctive. In the socializing process of civilization the world becomes crystallized into diverse concepts or terms; these come to seem more and more fixed and exclusive and as having only external relations to each other. Language gives the illusion of substance to our intellectual abstractions, whether physical or psychological. And so it comes to pass that while it seems clear enough that there are disparate terms or entities—qualities, atoms, and what not—it is hard to find the glue that binds the terms together in a common flow of experience. This intellectual despair leads men like Bradley to mysticism, which, however, is a surrender rather than a solution. What we must do instead is to take a fresh start in the intuitions of concrete experience and to realize that we do not start with terms—these are instrumental abstractions—but that we start with integral situations. In these concrete situations the conjunctive relations have an equal claim with the disjunctive. It is our intellectual one-sidedness merely that makes the world absurd. For a logic hopping on one leg, we must substitute a logic of the concrete.

While William James emphasized admirably the need of our taking the conjunctive relations of the physical world at their face value, he still clung to the social discontinuities.[23] Here we are supposed to have complete

23. In *A Pluralistic Universe* he does indeed, under the influence of Fechner, break away from this view of privacy, but the application is to the supposed hierarchy of cosmic consciousness rather than to society.

insulation. I insist that the prejudice against social continuities is as unwarranted as our prejudice against physical. In each case we must get away from our intellectual abstraction and return to the concrete situation. The agnostics are at least consistent in holding that mind and matter are equally inaccessible and unknowable. But this is a gratuitous assumption. In each case we enter into common situations. In each case we can regulate our conduct by the properties discriminated in such situations. And these common situations, experience teaches us, may be mental as well as physical. We must learn to take the social continuities at their face value, as James has insisted that we must take the physical continuities. Isolation and parallelism are of our conceptual making. The real world overflows and ignores them.

It is true that our imagination encounters several obstacles to admitting such social continuities. We have become accustomed to look upon mental communication as mediated by a nervous system and an intervening physical world. But even if this should turn out to be always true, it is nothing against intersubjective continuities. Electricity, too, is mediated, as we familiarly know it, through wires, but the wires act as conductors. Electricity establishes its own continuum over space. Even in wireless telephony we find it convenient as an aid to our imagination to conceive a medium that facilitates radiation through space. But whether radiation in the last analysis is transmitted through empty space or rides over a medium, there can be no doubt that the continuities, when they are established, are real. They are not material conjunctions but immaterial conjunctions. And the same may be said of the communication of mind. Why should we conceive mind as pushing molecules or as being insulated by them? Why may not neural processes act as conductors of mental energy instead of insulators? But however the communication of mind may be mediated, whatever intervening processes it may ride over, when the continuities are estab-

lished they are recognized as psychological, not as material, confluences. It is to another mind to which we respond over the telephone, not to an electric current. This serves as a conductor of mind. And we respond to the character and intensity of mind. Conative responsiveness is unique. It is recognized as different from mechanical and electrical. And this recognition is immediate and intuitive. This is true even in the animal world long before inference is known. It is as immediate a discrimination as that of qualitative and quantitative difference in physical stimuli and as necessary to survival.

The discovery of the immaterial continuity of electromagnetic fields helps at any rate to emancipate our imagination from the grosser continuities of our senses and of molecular physics. We know that radiant energy possesses remarkable power of intersecting our seemingly solid world in all sort of ways as illustrated in ultra-violet rays, X-rays, etc. Here the difference in wave length as well as intensity must be taken into account. So, for example, what is opaque to ultra-violet rays may be translucent to X-rays. The thickness to be interpenetrated must also be taken into account. Here, as in mental continuities, our practical knowledge of the results is clear and definite, while our knowledge of the descriptive side, that is, the method of spreading, is largely hypothetical.[24] What is certain is that there *are* these immaterial continuities and that they have their predictable empirical effects. There is nothing contradictory, therefore, in material and immaterial continuities occupying the same space, and in the end the material may have to find their explanation in the immaterial. As is the case in radiant continuities, some psychic states seem more contagious than others; and high psychic potentials, in the intenser forms of crowds,

24. Recent evidence shows that the activities of the brain radiate through the skull. The brain mind is not absolutely isolated from its external environment. We need to know more about these "electrical" brain waves before making applications to social continuities, but at any rate we have broken through the conceptual insulation.

make minds interpenetrate more fully the enveloping material husk and lose themselves in the spatio-temporal continuum of mind. At any rate, the sense of comradeship is too convincing and absorbing in its own right to be reduced to the abstract logic of analogy. The intuition of a common life precedes theory. Privacy in our world, in so far as there is such a thing—and there evidently is for special purposes—means disconnectedness for the time being. It means the failure to figure in a certain dynamic situation.

Another difficulty which the imagination encounters lies in an artificial psychology of mind. If we identify mind primarily with sensations, their persistence and combination by means of external association, we have a difficulty, but it is a difficulty due to a false theory of mind. Sense qualities are physical facts, emerging in the interaction of the organism with the physical environment. They may become integrated into patterns through our interests and, in that sense, may be said to exist in mind, as a diamond in its gold setting. They may become instrumental in the will's effort to live in its environment. But they are primarily physical facts. Mind must be conceived as fundamentally conation and affective value. Telepathy, as a direct communication of patterns, would be a very specialized form of mental continuity. Ordinarily, mental patterns are communicated through the *medium* of sense perception—mostly through language—though language must be regarded as the symbolism, not the substance, of mind. Mental continuity may have reference to common will attitudes or common moods, and these may have widely different intellectual coloring as music may have different meaning to different listeners.

There is a further difficulty, arising from the failure to distinguish between acquaintance and description, intuition and knowledge. While this distinction within our experience is purely logical, it is none the less important. What is immediate, in social responsiveness, as in sense

experience, is the acquaintance or intuition, not the knowledge. The knowledge about the situation is bound up largely with the physical contents of the mind and their associative contexts. By physical contents, as I have already indicated, I mean the sensory qualities which emerge in the interaction of the organism with the environment and which are organized into patterns of interest, but are not created by interest. There are other contents of mind —acts of mind, which we may call mental contents. It turns out then that so-called privacy, which merely means indirectness of communication, pertains primarily to the physical contents of the mind, which come to symbolize our intersubjective relations. Even in the direct sharing of physical situations we are as it were one remove from the certainty of a common world, for we imply a faith in analogous sense organs and nervous systems and have to allow for pathological instances. Physical sharing of a common world can only be guaranteed through serial construction and intersubjective comparison and so presupposes social communication.

In studying social facts, therefore, as in studying other domains of fact, we must start with intuition, that is, with immediate experience. Intuition is not truth, nor a substitute for truth, but it is the starting-point and terminus of truth. This is the case in all our investigations. Even mathematics, as Poincaré has shown, must start with intuition, however much it refines upon it in the process. Our intuitions of social continuities are at least as convincing as the intuitions of perceptual continuities. And the former, as we have seen, have at any rate genetic priority, as it is through our social relations that we come to differentiate the world of things and the world of minds.

The convincingness of social companionship, moreover, has nothing to do with our theory as to how it may be brought about. The theory is an afterthought and may undergo all sorts of transmutations. In our blindness we may seek to theorize the facts away even while we are

assuming them. Thus the solipsist must try to convince his fellows. Fortunately the transitions in nature do not depend upon our understanding them. We are not able to follow even the simplest of them from point to point. We perform the juxtapositions but nature establishes the continuity under its own selective conditions. Instead of starting with conceivability or inconceivability, as based upon previous custom, we now believe in regulating conceivability with reference to the facts which we must meet.

If the theory of social atomism, with its assumption of absolute discontinuity, fails to meet the demands of experience, so does the theory of absolute continuity. The absolute, since, like the ether, it explains all continuity in advance, explains no concrete relations. The discontinuities must be taken at their face value as must the continuities. Like other energies, such as radiation, mind obeys certain definite laws of spreading. It is conditioned by interferences. It can establish continuity only when the proper conditions exist.

This conception of social continuity differs, therefore, from that of monistic idealism as expressed by Hugo Münsterberg and von Hartmann. Says Münsterberg: "In real life spirit touches spirit and what mysticism ingeniously unites is in truth not at all sundered. The sundering follows first in the service of psychological and physical description."[25] But the sundering is a real part of our mundane practical life; and a theory which fails to account for it is practically useless. In von Hartmann's philosophy it is the Unconscious which exercises clairvoyant power (*Hellsehen*) as between part and part. Whether the parts thus abstracted are higher or lower in the scale does not alter their clairvoyant insight which belongs to the unconscious cosmic soul itself.

> "If the unconscious soul in the separate portions of an insect, or in the stem and the detached buds, is still one, must it not be the

25. *Grundzüge der Psychologie.*

same also in the insects separate by nature, of a community of bees or ants, which even without union of the organisms in space still act as harmoniously on one another as the several parts of the same organism? Should not the clairvoyance which we have found everywhere recurring in the invasions of the Unconscious, and which is so supremely astonishing in the limited individual, should not it alone invite this solution, that the apparently individual acts of clairvoyance are simply announcements of the everywhere identical Unconscious, wherewith at once everything miraculous in clairvoyance disappears since now the seer is also the soul of the seen? . . . What opposes this conception is only the old prejudice that the *soul* is the *consciousness*."[26]

Yes, everything miraculous does disappear on such a hypothesis, but also everything interesting for our practical purposes. What we require for our purposes is a hypothesis which will account for both the practical discontinuities and the continuities. The hypothesis of a transcendental, timeless and spaceless unity fails to meet our needs as truly as that of abstract atomism. In the case of intersubjective relations, as in the case of chemical and electrical energies, continuities are established under certain conditions, and there are discontinuities under other conditions. We are not dealing with continuity in the abstract, but with the differences made when concrete continuities do take place. The continuities and discontinuities are on the same level with the finite individuals involved, not on a transcendental level, whatever that may mean.

We cannot, finally, deduce other minds from the implications of self-consciousness as *a priori* philosophers have attempted to do. Self-consciousness itself, on the contrary, is the outgrowth of the demands for readjustment and adaptation within the social situation in which we live and move and have our being. All deliberate differentiation and identification, whether of selves or of things, mental or physical, is the outcome of the pressure of social interest. Selves are known by their context or function in this common experience.

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26. *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (trans., W. C. Coupland, 1890), II, pp. 225, 226.

The intersubjective continuum is implied in all intercourse of minds. It does not solve the problem of the existence of social minds. But it helps us to break through the false insulation of minds in past theory. Abstract atomism is a product of our intellect. It does not exist in nature. We must rid our minds of the abstract intellectualism which has so long pervaded all our thinking. We have made our convenient abstractions from the dynamic stream of reality, and then we have imagined that these abstractions exhaust reality. More and more, however, we have come to realize that these abstractions, real as they are when taken as aspects of reality, must, when they are taken apart, be regarded as instrumental. They become conceptual tools by means of which we can predict, and dip into, the stream of reality at definite points. They are "leadings" in our experience by means of which we are guided to the creative processes of nature. The dynamic situation is never a mere addition of certain entities with their separate characteristics. The situation has always its own atmosphere; we must discover its own individual traits.

Even in the inorganic field we have long ago ceased to believe that the reality of water consists merely in the addition of the two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, in the abstract numerical proportion of H_2O, with their separate characters. The formula merely furnishes the leading toward nature's creative process. Water is a unique individual and satisfies specific wants. While it has some of the properties of the constituent elements, it also has new properties which cannot be found in those elements taken separately. We must, besides the abstract factors, take account of a third fact, the creative process of nature from which they are abstractions. We are in the habit, it is true, of identifying creativeness with the freakish and unpredictable. These have always appealed to man as more or less miraculous. As a matter of fact all happenings, all arising of individual compounds must be regarded as cre-

ative. The elements are real only as they move within a field of energy. The negative charges within the atom are conceived as moving within a field of positive electricity. We can understand the life of the complex organism only when we take account of the vital stream of conation which guides and controls its development and its division of labor. And within social unities, we must not stop with the abstract factors of the situation, but we must try to appreciate the soul of the situation itself, the creative contribution of the spiritual process.

Creative synthesis seems to be of the very nature of reality. Out of some ninety-two elements inorganic nature creates endless unique situations; out of only four elements arises the variety of organic compounds. In ideal creativeness, few themes suffice for infinite creative production. In any case, the universe gives back more than we seem to put in—more than our abstract elements or abstract individuals. The properties which we select for prediction are abstractions from the continuities or possible continuities in the flow of reality.

It will be seen that this theory of creative evolution is practically the opposite to that of Bergson. For him evolution means division. The vital impulse breaks up into its component tendencies, as the sky-rocket breaks from the shock of the explosion, due to the resistance of the atmosphere. Such a theory in the end means absolute atomism. For us creative evolution means creative synthesis—gifts which the universe contributes under certain conditions, over and above the parts which our selective interest has separated out. New social as well as chemical unities emerge through the creative energy of the universe in accordance with the complexity of the conditions. It is with social unities, which I call social minds, that we are here concerned. Just as the chemist speaks of syntheses of material elements as matter, so we are justified in speaking of syntheses of psychological individuals as mind.

Proofs of Social Minds[27]

Before proceeding with the arguments for social minds, it may be well to make clear what I mean by mind. I conceive mind as energy, not as "states of consciousness." The fundamental nature of this energy is will or conation in its various stages of complexity. We are conscious of will at its simplest as urge or drive. As it becomes integrated into thought patterns, it becomes purpose. Thought itself is the expression of the will's striving to act intelligently. While in our present existence mind is connected with a physical organism, mind is not a mere function of the body, but uses the body as an instrument. Mind acts upon matter, it also acts upon other minds. In communicating with other minds, mind establishes its own continuum. Mind

27. Those who have criticized the conception of social minds have done so on the basis of some stereotype generally invented by themselves. They have not taken the trouble to find out what a particular author means by a social mind. When Pitirim Sorokin *(Contemporary Sociological Theories,* 1928, p. 465, n.) classifies my theory of social minds (as advanced in the essay, "The Existence of Social Minds," in the *Am. Jour. Sociol.,* July, 1913, republished as this chapter) among those theories which conceive "social mind independent from, and exterior to individuals," he misses the fundamental point, that of creative synthesis. Others have criticized my theory with the same preconception. R. B. Perry has advanced two criticisms of the concept of social mind. One criticism is that the conception of a social mind is guilty of the fallacy of composition in formal logic. The fallacy would presumably be that if someone maintains that an aggregate of particular minds, a, b, c, etc., is itself a mind he would commit the fallacy of composition. Since the argument assumes that only particular minds exist it begs the question, which concerns the synthesis of particular minds into new individuals, just as particular material atoms are synthesized into molecules. Another criticism by Perry is to the effect that the conception of a social mind contradicts a formal argument by Bertrand Russell that a class of all classes is a logical absurdity (neither true nor false). Even if some one conceived a social mind as a class it is not clear how it would be a class of all classes, since it might be conceived as a class in a hierarchy of classes (as some have interpreted Hegel). Perry has failed to notice Russell's distinction between class, on the one hand, and individuals or particulars and aggregates of individuals or particulars, on the other. If those who hold the conception of a social mind regard such a mind as a concrete individual, as I do, and not as a universal, and conceive this individual as a synthesis, in some sense, of individuals, Perry's criticism would be irrelevant. You might as well argue that a molecule cannot exist because it is composed of individual atoms. But in fact a molecule is as truly an individual entity as are the component atoms.

energies combine into new unities or repel one another as do material energies. We may speak of mental chemistry as well as of material chemistry.

It may be well at the outset of the argument to distinguish between personal minds and social minds. There are in fact, as Hobhouse says, "two kinds of unity in the mind world of our experience. There is first the unity of personality, which in our experience functions continuously in a physical organism and unites many psychical and physical elements into a distinctive whole."[28] There is also a "second form of unity in mind which experience reveals—the unity which interconnects minds in beings which each possess mind. . . . Men do form unities, not one but many, and even of many different types, some much more deeply rooted than others, some wider, some narrower, some even cutting across and conflicting with one another as, e.g. the religious bond may cut through the national. All these unities are real and many of them powerful. Also, they bear some resemblance to personality, for in them we encounter psychical elements which meet and strive and may conflict, and may also harmonize and give continuity of character and development. Yet they differ essentially from any personality in the fundamental point that they rest on the relations of units that are themselves personalities."[29] What Hobhouse does not seem to see is that personal minds can arise only through social interactions. They are differentiations within the social field relations. The group, therefore, is genetically prior to personality. Furthermore, while a social mind does not have one physiological body, the physiological bodies of individual minds become instrumental to the social integration. The social unity is not a bodiless abstraction. I agree with Hobhouse

28. L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, 1927, p. 477.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 478. I am pleased to insert this discussion by Hobhouse into a paper published so many years before (1913) because I know that there was controversy over my paper in Hobhouse's circle at the London School of History and Economics and this seems like a defense, and it also clarifies the issue.

that we must differentiate social unities from personalities.[30] But with this differentiation of social unities from personal unities there should be no misunderstanding when we use the term, mind, for unities which are syntheses of individual minds of the first order. We speak of various grades of organization of material units as matter, and I see no reason why we should not speak of various organizations of mental units as minds. At any rate there is no use in quarreling about words. Once we grasp the concept of energy as the fundamental concept of which material and mental are species, there is no more reason for denying the term, mind, to unities of minds than to deny the term, matter, to unities of matter. Social unities, being integrations of particular minds, are minds of the second order. Since social unities may be integrations of simpler social unities we have minds of the third order, etc.

In social unities as in chemical, we must proceed empirically. We must ask: What difference does it make to individuals that they figure in various social situations? Can we take men as the same in their separate capacity and in their social capacity? Is the social group but a collection of individuals with their individual traits? Or must we recognize a new unity, with its own unique properties? Our experience indicates that there is a difference between the feeling and behavior of separate individuals, or mere aggregates of individuals, and the way they feel and act when swayed by a common interest. It makes a fundamental difference to us and to the spectator that we are parts of a social situation. In the empirical testing of this social intuition, I propose two methods of approach—the psychological analysis of the conditions and characteristics of the social situation, on the one hand, and the practical evaluation of these situations on the other. Let us first glance briefly at the psychological side.

In order to have a social situation, there must, in the

30. I am not concerned with personality as a legal fiction. This has reference to imputing responsibility, as in the case of a corporation.

first place, be the consciousness of another person or persons. Mere continuity with natural energies—the sky, the sea, the landscape—is not, for our practical and finite purposes at any rate, a social situation. We cannot agree that all situations are social, however much their *significance* for us is interwoven with our social experience. The other person, however, need not be bodily present. The other mind may be present in a poem, a book of science, a symphony, or a report flashed across the wires. We often become more absorbed in a book than we do in most conversations. In the second place, there must be the consciousness of a common object or impulse. People may be conscious of each other's presence only in order to dodge each other, like so many automata, on the busy avenue. But let an accident happen on the street—the running-over of a child by an automobile—and we have a common object attracting our attention. Even so, however, if I am too busy, trying to catch a train, to stop with the others, I am no part of the social situation. It takes time for the human continuity to be felt, and there must be abandon to the interest or suggestion. Even bodily space-proximity and time-proximity may be dispensed with if there is the sustained abandon to a common interest. In a great international catastrophe, such as the ship-wreck of the "Titanic," largely separated portions of humanity became a genuine and intense part of a social situation.

Mere intersubjective continuity is not sufficient to constitute a social mind. For this more than an intuitive sense of responsiveness by other minds is required. The sense of presence may be negative as well as positive. It may mean a stimulus to fight or flight instead of to co-operation. In order to have a social mind there must be a sense of reciprocal or sympathetic response to the situation. On the lower levels this means the abandon to a common impulse, on the higher levels it means the leading of a common purpose. Without this consciousness of a common conative direction, the social continuum (as well

as the particular stream of consciousness) fails to be an individual.

It would seem that social minds must be real if they possess characteristics analogous to those of particular minds. One of the most important of these characteristics is *fusion*. Social situations present a case similar to the fusion of elementary states within the particular mind; and while the greater complexity makes analysis more difficult, the laws of fusion seem to be the same. Take, for example, the clang in music. This we all recognize as one unique individual; and it is only with practice that we learn to discriminate some of the tonal qualities within the whole. In tonal fusions we have to take into account the quality of the components. This we must do also in social fusion. But in each case, while we can discriminate complexity within the fusion, the whole is one unique individual; and the qualities which we discriminate within the situation owe their character in part to the fusion. While we can identify them, they are not a mere repetition of qualities in their separateness. The social fusion seems as much a new unity as the individual state of consciousness. We must be pragmatic. If the facts indicate such social fusion, we must acknowledge it. We may not understand the how of it—the spatial, temporal, and other metaphysical conditions of this continuity. But we must remember that we have the same problem in regard to physical interaction. Spatial contiguity has not been proved for any entities in the energetic interaction. Physics solves the problem of continuity by means of the field conception. In social interactions we must assume a spiritual field. Somehow, in the situation of sympathetic abandon, fruitful as love's embrace, there is created a new mind, which once it is born, is more than, or at any rate different from, the particular minds which are its antecedents and which enter into the creative synthesis.

Instead of taking as our illustration a specific type of elementary state, we might have taken the individual mind

as such, which may be considered as a fusion of various fields, bound up with different neural substrates. In the various pathological cases of divided selves we see what happens when there is a functional or organic disconnectedness of centers. The continuum of the individual mind offers the same problems as we find in intersubjective continuity. It is just as great a mystery that part-minds within the individual organism can fuse into one as that individual minds can become integrated within the larger social situation. In each case the part-minds must overflow, and ride over, intervening processes. There must be a common field.[31] In each case the part-mind becomes more than itself when it functions within a larger unity. The fact that the fusion may be more constant and intense within the individual mind is a matter of degree, not of difference in kind. What the pathological cases bring out is that normally the so-called individual self is in reality a colony of selves, an integration of systems of tendencies, fusing more or less into a common field and to a greater or less extent dominated by a common purpose.

If we now take account of the individual components of the fusion, we find in social fusions as in those of the particular consciousness that the *quality* of the components makes a difference. You get a different result in a French fusion from what you get in an Anglo-Saxon fusion; in a feminine fusion from a masculine fusion, given a similar situation. A ladies' tea-party is different from a men's smoker, though each may discuss the same subject. Race and sex seem to furnish different overtones, even as different clangs bring a different character to the compound musical result. Different individualities also bring a different quality to the combined result. This is true particularly in deliberative groups, where the individual give-and-take is more prominent in the situation.

31. Recently the distinguished physiologist, E. D. Adrian, has come to recognize that we need the field conception to account for the integral functioning of processes in the brain.

Further, we must take account of the *intensity* of the factors in the fusion. In the simple musical clang, the fundamental by its greater intensity gives the key to the new individual unity. In personal consciousness, some dominant tendency gives direction to the whole. In the case of social fusions, there is generally some one element that furnishes the character to the whole; some volitional factor by its strength of affirmation, its faith in the issue, counts for more than the other confluent factors and gives the key to the whole. This dominant factor we call the leader of the situation. When his will overshadows the other factors, when he attracts a large number to himself and sways them for a sustained period, when he furnishes the enthusiasm which makes the others willing to follow blindly for weal or woe and to the extent of any personal sacrifice, we may call the leader a superman. It may not be the quality of the will that makes the superman, but the intensity of his affirmation. The superman, like Napoleon, has often been madly selfish, though, of course, he must seem to have a disinterested objective. He may employ widely different means; he may use striking metaphors; he may argue; he may dogmatically repeat; he may simply hurl his emotional weight against the future. In any case it is his dominant will that wins. Whatever means he uses—bullying or argument or sympathetic suggestion—he somehow possesses the mystic power of making solvent the other wills in the situation.

The social fusion, however, like the compound clang may be too complex for this single dominance. In a deliberative assembly, such as our Continental Congress or Constitutional Assembly, a group of minds may combine on the basis of abstract principles to mold the whole into unity. The result in such a case is not just the dominance of one personality but the cooperation of several personalities toward a common end.

In social, as in tonal fusion, the *number* of components must be taken into account. A certain social fusion of an

intimate kind takes place when two sympathetic souls meet in friendship or love. Such a fusion is impossible with additional individual factors, however congenial otherwise. "Three make a crowd." On the other hand, when the appeal is to certain primitive instincts, such as pugnacity, anger, emulation, or pity, and where the overtones of human nature, instead of fusing, are inhibited for the time being, the release becomes only more effective, the abandon and fusion greater, the volume of feeling larger, for the larger number that participate. The city baseball crowd, grown enthusiastic over its side or indignant at the umpire, all the more completely forgets itself for the immensity of the number that touch elbows. The solemnity and suggestion of the religious occasion only gathers impetus and devotion from the number of those similarly bent. The fundamental tendency here, so strong and so persistent in quality, grows by more than addition of separate wills.[32] The latent energy of each is released by the presence of the others in increasing ratio with the confluence of the sympathetic tendencies in the common field of interest. On the other hand, tendencies antagonistic to the dominant direction are suppressed. They do not figure in the synthesis.

In order to understand the social fusion we must take account of the dominant interest, the ruling passion or set of the group. Leader and led alike are part of this passion. It may be the illusion of military power and glory as in the Napoleonic age; it may be a religious passion as in the case of the Crusades; it may be a sense of outraged justice as in the case of the Declaration of Independence. But in any case the leader as well as the led are held in the dynamic circuit of one direction of interest.

32. In energy relations, the abstract laws of arithmetic may not hold. The addition of one positive electron and one negative electron does not make two, but zero. In the case of electron magnets Heisenberg showed "that the force acting on each of the electron-magnets was not simply the sum of the forces from all the rest, and that under certain conditions it could be enormously greater." C. G. Darwin, *The New Conceptions of Matter*, 1931, p. 219.

They are swayed by the same fundamental emotion, tapped by the same faith. If the crowd is the victim of an illusion, so is the leader and with far greater abandon. It is the fact that he liberates this fundamental sentiment, that he voices the passion or rationality of the group, that makes him a leader. The strongest individual affirmation, even with divine inspiration, is dashed aside for the time being, when it runs counter to this dominant tendency.

The fact that the leader is a function of the situation, as well as a dominant exponent of it, gives rise to the wide divergence of interpretation as regards leadership. To some he seems a mere cork floating on the current of the common will; to others he seems the entire situation, and they would write history as the biography of great leaders. Both are partly wrong and partly right. He does indicate the set, which holds him in the same grasp as it holds the others. He expresses a situation. But he is not a mere cork. He contributes, to a greater degree than the others, volitional definiteness and precipitating energy to the action. He is important, therefore, in the effectiveness and organization of the common will. Whether he is a creative or merely explosive factor depends upon what he brings, in the way of fundamental insight, with his strength of affirmation.

Since the social situation is thus analyzable into certain conditions—quality, intensity, and number, with the set or field of interest in which they figure—we can to a certain extent predict social fusions as we can predict tonal fusions. But only empirically and partially. In tonal harmonics all *a priori* theories have failed. We must take account of the creative result, the new individual unity in each case, and this can be done only by direct intuition. Our prediction, therefore, can go no farther than our empirical control of the situation. In the case of social situations the complexity is so great and the factors so variant that such control and prediction is at best merely approximate. We may have bodily the same people, the same

leader, the same issue, yet time may entirely alter the result. Some great personalities and some permanent issues are pretty sure, however, to produce an intense social fusion. Religion and the great ethical issues of the race, when strongly challenged, cannot fail to produce a result. Fads, on the other hand, require a very special time and audience to get a sympathetic hearing. As the mood or set here is transient, so is the fusion contingent and ephemeral.

It will appear from the foregoing that there may be varying degrees of social fusion, as there are degrees in the fusion of states in what we can sometimes take as a single stream of consciousness. The social fusion may vary in focalization all the way from active self-conscious social deliberation to the hypnotic abandon of the mob or the entrancing ecstasy of the esthete or the mystic. The activity of the first type, the solemn argumentation of the master-minds who decided on the Declaration of Independence, is a socially centered activity, a self-conscious social situation. The participants were quite oblivious of themselves—their own interest or danger—they were dominated by the common situation. It was the common interest which argued through each, cast about for ways and means, held them in complete subjection to its own intensely active purpose.

This variation in the type of attention has led to diverging theories as to what constitutes social unity. Hegel can see the social only in the rational, the common burden of thought, the articulate sharing of a common plan. For him social consciousness must finally be actively focalized or self-conscious. The immediate, the merely felt or sensed, is for Hegel the private and particular. On the other hand, Tarde and Le Bon identify the social fusion with the passive abandon of the crowd, with the immersed and immediate hypnotic state, with its exaggerated suggestibility. We must recognize that these are extreme types while there exist, between them, all the variations with

which individualistic psychology has made us familiar. As over against the tendency today to call upon the subconscious to solve all knotty problems, Hegel's emphasis shows at least that the social consciousness need not be hopelessly vague and diffuse in order to master our ideas and set free our energies. We may be socially active as well as individually active. Indeed, individual activity resolves itself largely into the particular pull and emphasis which we exercise in the variety of social situations in which we figure, or at any rate that dominate our thinking as to how we would want to figure. Whether thinking or feeling particularizes or socializes depends upon the motive or situation which dominates each.

In producing the hypnotic fusion, certain conditions have been pointed out as favorable, such as the inhibition of the large voluntary movements, the control of breathing, the monotonous fixing of attention, etc. These conditions have been systematized in the mystic oriental religions in order to bring about union with Brahm or disappearance in Nirvana. But these are merely instruments after all and rather variable instruments at best. They do not account for the fusion. Religiously speaking, the external conditions are but the outward and visible signs. The inward and spiritual grace of union, whether friendship, or communion with God, is a creative gift which we must acknowledge and appreciate as such. The conditions seem, moreover, to conflict. In football enthusiasm and religious revivals, free play of reflexes seems to give an even more complete fusion than their inhibition.

We must remember finally in our discussion of any social fusion that it is not a mere intellectual fusion of sensations and ideas. It may not be this at all. At any rate, it is primarily a voluntaristic fusion—a creative unification of conative tendencies, whether of the instinctive or the ideal order. These voluntaristic tendencies we have indeed come to recognize as the fundamental aspect of mind, individual or social. It matters not how many eyes may be looking,

how many ears may be hearing, or even how many intellectual mechanisms may be working at various points of space and in connection with various brains, if there is the identical tendency, the coalescing in one dynamic direction of the various conative energies. When minds recognize each other's presence and abandon themselves to a common direction, a new will comes into existence which is a different individual from the personal wills.

This difference shows itself, on the one hand, in certain releases of energies and, on the other hand, in certain inhibitions. The releases are along the conative tendencies which have to do with the common object. New levels of energy are tapped by the intensity of the common abandon. With this goes the absence of any sense of personal responsibility. Inhibitions are swept away which have held these tendencies in age-long subjection. With the conative releases, there go, on the intellectual side, greater suggestibility and credulity along the common direction. These may even take the form of social illusions and hallucinations under intense conditions. With the releases, too, there follow the emotional elation of invincible power and the feeling of intolerance and dictatorialness as regards any interference with the realization of the heightened tendency—a dogmatism which is only equaled by the suggestibility and mobility within the accepted direction. The same impulse, which releases the tendencies that are germane to its success, closes the channels which are antagonistic, so far as the fitness of the end itself, with the means it involves, wins unqualified approval. What in the usual enumeration seem conflicting and unrelated qualities thus become functions of the same conative control.[33]

Whether we take social fusions, therefore, from the intuitive point of view of the participant or from the point of view of the analysis of the spectator, we must recognize that they are not mere collections of individual entities,

33. This analysis resolves the contradictions which Le Bon has emphasized in *The Crowd*.

but that, on the contrary, they very much exaggerate the facts of interest and unity as we find them in personal experience. From the point of view of psychology we must, therefore, take account of social minds as having their own characteristics which cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the particular minds which enter into the synthesis.

We have dwelt particularly on the phenomena of fusion, because they seemed to furnish the most apparent case for our purpose. But we might have taken other characteristics. In general, whatever can be said of individual minds in the way of characteristics can be said of a social mind, though in the concrete they are distinct types. A social mind is uniquely selective in the particular situation and so can be treated as a subject. It has its own constancy of traits from moment to moment and from age to age. It has its own unique type of unity, whether external or internal—whether association by contiguity or purposive coherence. It has its own degrees of freedom or restraint under varying situations, according as it acts out its own character or is the victim of external circumstances. Instead of the analogy of the organism, therefore, we would substitute the analogy of the individual mind as known to us through psychological analysis. This analogy can be worked out into such detail that we believe that whatever reality can be accorded to the personal mind can be accorded to the social mind.

Another way of approaching the reality of the social mind is from the practical relations which it invites or which it makes obligatory upon us. We have to deal, in a very different way, with a social group from the way in which we deal with single individuals. As a member of a family, a state or a church we have to deal with a man differently from the way we deal with him in his abstract isolation. We must take account of the common bond of which he is a part, of a larger will which approves or resents the conduct toward a member as conduct toward its own united self. Except for this respect for group

solidarity, history, both personal and national, would be written entirely otherwise from what it is now. From our own practical dealings, therefore, we can gain insight into the reality of the social mind, as we thus gain insight into the individual. We must apply our pragmatic principle that social minds are real, if we must take them as real in the practical situations of life. What does the business of human life reveal? What is implied in our fundamental attitudes, our practical faith toward the world? We must follow the leading of experience and regard that as real which practical human experience proves real.

Josiah Royce has shown in a beautiful and convincing way how our spontaneous loyalty may be the means of gaining insight into reality. This is true, at any rate, in so far as we can take that reality as a social situation and can recognize its spiritual direction. Loyalty is not merely a complex of emotions, but a method of conduct, where the intention is being continually tested by its results. "This central characteristic of the loyal spirit," says Royce, "consists in the fact that it conceives and values its cause as a reality."[34] But we must examine carefully the implications of this loyalty as regards the causes which it aims to realize and which fulfil its practical and affectional intent. What causes are those that we can love, hate, and be loyal to, as genuine psychological unities? How is man's instinctive need for intimacy made objective in his environment?

In so examining the implications of our practical attitudes, we find that some involve mutual sharing or overlapping of interests—a unique common life which is something different from individuals as taken in their abstract separation, in so far as that is possible, or at any rate as taken in other social contexts. Take loyalty to friendship as an example: "Loyalty to a friendship," says Royce, "involves your willingness actively and practically to create

34. *William James and Other Essays*, p. 71.

and maintain a life which is to be the united life of yourself and your friend—not the life of your friend alone, nor the life of yourself and your friend as you exist apart, but the common life, the life above and inclusive of your distinctions, the one life that you are to live as friends."[35] Such a sacrament of friendship, while it lasts, is indeed a new life, a spiritual reality. Whether it is better or worse than either individual which enters into the fusion depends upon the dominant motive or character which is brought to birth in this common life.

The attitude of loyalty may be illustrated in various unities of ever-increasing concreteness—the family, the community, the class, the state, the church. In each case, where there is the concrete spirit of loyalty, we have faith in, and evidence of, a larger unity which is something different from the loyalty to the composing individuals, and in which conflicts of loyalty are no longer mere individual preferences or dislikes. Family love and honor, national patriotism, religious devotion imply spiritual unities, with the unique restraints and inspirations of a new and unique life.

We must be careful, however, not to confuse mere conventional or legal unity with the sacrament of a common life. People may be formally married without being a family; they may live in a country and even hurrah for it without any sense of its common responsibilities and ideals; they may belong to one church without entering into a unity of devotion. We must be able to recognize a living consciousness of loyalty in order to be warranted in affirming one life, just as an individual is not one by inhabiting one outward skin, but because of the dominant motive, which makes the various tendencies and ideas converge in one direction. Except for this his name may be *legio*.

Again we must be careful to distinguish potential unity from actual. We may hope that there may be a thorough-

35. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

going spiritual unity of the English-speaking nations; and such a possibility seems indeed to be more than a dream. The unity of humanity is at best a remote potential unity —an abstract ideal which we hope to make concrete in the long ages. It lacks at present both the outside and visible form and the inward and spiritual grace of one spiritual whole. As regards our unity with nature, whatever growing sense of cooperation there may be between the army of scientists who try to write its story, nature itself, as science views it, seems to lack the qualifications for entering into sympathetic social union with man.

It is different with the religious unity. Here, indeed, our loyalty implies both sentimentally, and, in its practical results, a companionship, not only as a communion of the faithful, but as a union with the divine object of worship—the more and better of our ideal nature. A creative union is implied in all genuine religious loyalty of which creeds and forms are mere symbols. In true religious devotion there arises a new trinity, the divine mind meeting our mind in a new bond, where the higher in ourselves is brought into significant and fruitful relief. This bond is merely intensified, not more real nor more worshipful, in the diffuse mystic states.

Anarchism is wrong both as a psychology and as a practical estimate of human nature. We are more than separate units. We live only as we overlap, as we fuse with other minds in common pursuits and interests. We are literally members one of another. This common life must be safeguarded from the accidents of human history, whether from indifference and disintegration within or from selfish manipulation from without. No ideal realization can be even conceived apart from social relations, though such striving may be out of tune, for the time being, with human temporal conditions and may find its only sympathetic complement and inspiration in the divine Socius.

The social mind, further, must be real because in our moments of critical evaluation—as well as in our spon-

taneous loyalty—it can be judged as a moral being, that is, it is subject to praise and blame, not as a collection, but as an individual character or type. We may admire the members of a nation individually though we condemn them as a group. Again and again we have to censure our neighbor for what he is in his larger social capacity—a saloonkeeper, a political grafter—though in his narrower social circles we have no fault to find with him.

The evaluation which we place upon a social mind, such as a nation, differs with different periods of a nation's development. In one period of a nation's development it may be power which furnishes the dominant motive of a nation's life. Considerations of the claims of other unities in such a period have no weight. Fear of consequences is the only restraint on its self-assertion. At this very time we find plenty of instances where the love of power is dominant and where weaker nations can be protected, if at all, only by a combination which inspires fear. The rape of Ethiopia, the murder of Spain, the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia, the devastation of China, are tragic instances where the restraint of fear was not effective. The great democracies carry a heavy burden of guilt for their cowardly failure; and history will make them pay.

Sometimes the commercial motive is the dominant one, and at the present time it is often the deeper motive which underlies the conflict over spheres of influence. Such a motive, when it dare not enforce territory, may force upon a weaker nation its products—sometimes injurious products as in the case of the opium traffic in the Orient. Sometimes the dominant motive is material comfort, which soon degenerates into internal weakness and debauchery. This is the most debasing of all motives in society as in individuals, and soon leads to decay and dissolution, even if external causes do not bring the existence of such a state to an end.

The motives of which we have spoken so far are not ethical. They become immoral when a society violates the

recognized standards of fitness and right. Nations, however, like individuals may be dominated by a moral motive, even if this motive is not always clear and distinct. There is at the present time a powerful idealistic undercurrent in many a nation which sometimes comes into the focus of its activity and dominates its conduct. The reforms going on within various nations for equal rights before the law, for cooperative endeavor—in a word for internal democracy of life—are signs of how vigorous this ethical consciousness is at the present time. Nor are signs wanting of an ethical consciousness as between nations. The settling of an impending war between the two sister-nations of Sweden and Norway by means of the discussion and recognition of fraternal claims instead of by arms; the policy of fair play instituted by John Hay as regards the Orient and its powerful international effect at the time; general arbitration treaties as between nations; the creating of the League of Nations—all show the deeper idealism of our day, however much it is sometimes obscured by passion and prejudice and however easy is the relapse to the primitive impulsive levels. Just because the ethical consciousness as between nations is so recent, relapse is always to be feared, especially in the absence of any other effective sanction than national or concerted international force. There are, however, unmistakable signs of the spread of an international democracy outwitting political states, especially in the growing consciousness of the international solidarity of education, of labor, of justice. This is greatly assisted, as between the English-speaking nations, by the ties of kinship of culture and language.

The motives in these days of complex life are of course mixed. And it is not always easy for the critic, and it is still more difficult for the agent, to realize which motive is uppermost. In the blindness of human nature and the glamor of primitive passion, we often misjudge our motives as nations, as well as individuals. What we want to do intensely comes easily to seem to ourselves a question

of right, and not of primitive irrationality. And as spectators, we may easily be blinded by our national prejudices in judging another national consciousness. At any rate, the very attempt on the part of nations today to make their conduct, as regards both internal and external relations, *seem* ethical to the spectator shows the growing power of the ethical motive.

I might have selected the family or the community instead of the nation in illustrating this judgment of motives on the part of social minds. The nation, however, has the advantage of staging this consciousness in the large. And right now it has the advantage of a greater sense of reality as shown in the intense nationalism which prevails at present both in the dealings with the rest of the world and in dealings with internal problems. The family consciousness has not shown corresponding development. The family, in trying to pass from the ancient bond of dependence and vested authority to the ethical stage, is in a serious state of disintegration. The conception of the family as a moral relationship of personalities is comparatively recent. And even now the light manner in which the family is treated by one part of humanity and the attempt by another part to enforce an artificial unity in violation of all fundamental moral claims show that the ethical consciousness is far from thorough.

The community consciousness, especially the city community, has made considerable progress in recent years from the mere individualistic *laissez faire* ideal and such non-moral motives as numbers and wealth to a more idealistic level of dealing squarely with internal problems for the good of the whole community. More and more the sense of responsibility has increased; and, with it, is bound to come a corresponding simplification and organization of the institutional instruments of the community. A new soul is being born, at least in a number of instances—the community soul.

The church is passing through a similar transition from

a traditional consciousness to a consciousness of thoughtful ethical valuation of its life and functions. It is no longer a case of mere loyalty to a past, however glorious and sacred, with its host of witnesses, but there is a deepening sense of responsibility to the cause of righteousness as made concrete in the whole range of human problems. Loyalty to linguistic symbols and esthetic forms is becoming secondary to the desire for improvement and democracy in our human relations. With this goes a larger sympathy and sense of unity between the different religious communions in the service of a common ideal.

The Complexity of Social Minds

When it comes to the complexity of social relations, William James, even if dealing with the problem from the point of view of individualistic psychology, is strikingly true to the facts: A person "generally shows a different side of himself to each one of these different groups. Many a youth, who is demure enough to his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club companions, to the customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves. Properly speaking *a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him* and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him."[36] These several selves, however, must not be taken as entities, limited to one body. They are rather social intersection points, different types of social continuities. The various social situations cut the personal selves in different planes; they liberate, and make confluent, different levels of tendency and so produce different controls and fusions.

In contrast with the creative chemical situation, which

36. *Op. cit*, I, 293.

is apparently exclusive of other situations, so that a chemical element can figure in only one situation at a time, the social unities are interpenetrative; they are not spatially and temporally exclusive. The same individual life may and does figure in a large number of social unities at the same time, even though one of these may give the dominant tone for the time being. Moreover, social unities, unlike chemical compounds, persist in new syntheses and thus determine the future. These facts make life vastly more complex than the old individualistic atomism could grasp. It also makes it of momentous significance in what social situations the individual life figures. We must try to create and control social situations, in order that we may emerge with the desired social atmosphere. And the more responsive a mind is to social confluences, the more jealously we must guard the social situations, with their soul,[37] since they largely make the individual soul. Enthusiasm and abandon, such as youth alone is capable of, mean the most complete making-over, moral or immoral, refined or gross, of the unstable individual center. We can see the brutality of the arena, the image of the Christ in every feature of the exposed soul. And the individual if he knows himself must say, I am no longer I, my past mind, but the social mind to which I abandoned myself, which I helped to create, but which has more truly created me.

In dealing with social integration on the primary level of integration of individuals into groups, we have oversimplified the problem. Social evolution has been to a large extent the integration of groups. Social evolution started with local groups with their intimate face-to-face relations. Under pressure of circumstances the camp was integrated into the tribe. While the smaller group retained its existence within the larger unity, many of its characteristics changed. It came to have a new meaning. The transformation in meaning was still more evident when

37. Soul is used to signify meaning, purpose, emotional value. It is a very economical word.

the dominant group was enlarged into a kingdom with a hierarchical organization and including many thousands, as in central Africa. Such organization meant a new division of labor and of reciprocal services. In the history of so-called civilized peoples there has been a ruthless warfare to subjugate smaller groups or less militant groups under larger dominant groups, sometimes with the destruction of the organization and culture of the subjugated groups. The Romans of ancient times and the British of modern times have given considerable autonomy to the conquered peoples and so have decreased the strain within the larger organization. Nevertheless, the integration has meant the emergence of new characteristics with a progressive weakening of the original mores. In the ruthless struggle within the economic sphere we have witnessed and are witnessing the same process of integration where the local group has been destroyed or absorbed into the larger organization and superorganization. This evolution has been going on for some time in the capitalistic type of organization, but recently it has shown itself at an accelerated pace, in the field of labor. The study of group mind must therefore take account of different levels of organization with their emergent characteristics. History bears witness to a constant tendency from the small-scale local and personal type of group to the large-scale impersonal type of group.

It must not be forgotten that our classifying social minds as religious, political, etc., is merely a matter of abstract types. *Each* social situation has its own unique mind, which persists with its individual traits and interpenetrates into the further flow of life. Here, too, we must get over our abstractness and come back to first things. And here again we must select and guard, not the genus merely, but the soul of the individual occasion with its creative and persistent life. There is not religion, but religious situations, each with its soul, as unique in its origin as it is lasting, once it is brought into existence. Into whatever new contexts the abstract individuals may

enter, they carry the atmosphere with them, more or less, of the social minds thus originated. These cumulate, more or less effectively, as part of the individual and social structure and so condition our reaction in the future social situations into which we may enter. The actions of individuals will be restrained or set free by virtue of this coexistence and interpenetration of social unities of which they are a part. Thus the dramatic religious situation, like a pervasive melody, still holds them, perhaps in their workaday business, perhaps even in their play, so as to modify and control their conduct. The conduct of the individual must be written largely as the result of the conflict, interaction, and subordination of these social minds, which interpenetrate in his life. Self-conscious personality itself seems little more than the making explicit, and volitionally effective, the clashing and subordination of these social values, good or bad. The ancients felt a spirit for each situation in nature, a continuous presence with which they must deal, friendly or unfriendly. We must at least learn to find this creative presence in our social situations and learn to control their value and thereby control our own individual value.

Since social continuities intersect individual centers in an indefinite number of planes; since, moreover, once created, they tend to persist and interpenetrate in a cumulative life, we can see that social minds are vastly more numerous than personal minds. The same person, so-called, belongs in an indefinite number of unities, more or less distinct, more or less persistent, but never quite disappearing. How many social unities an individual comes to recognize in his loyalty or his aversion depends upon his instinctive qualifications, on the one hand, and the range of social stimuli, on the other hand. The former are largely constant in the race. It is the latter which vary. But if they vary, they are also to some extent under our control. We are reminded of a friend of Lincoln who sent his secretary to Lincoln just to stay there for a time and who said

on the man's return, "I can see it, you have been with Lincoln."

The number, extent, and range of social minds cannot be estimated merely from the unities which we actually do acknowledge or are loyal to at any one time. We must estimate such realities, as we estimate the realities of the physical world, from the extent and the kind of situations which we can and must acknowledge in the course of our individual and racial development. The abstract individual, when unmindful and neglectful of this living relation within different social minds, becomes himself a specialized social abstraction, as is so often the case in our modern division of labor.

If the social continuities intersect individuals in various planes, within which the individual must discover his meaning, it is also true that a personal will may come to dominate the whole current of a social history. The great personalities of history stamp upon their social period their creative faith. Whole eras rightly bear the name of some great genius who thus focuses and in a measure directs the stream of history which runs through him and carries him onward. And so we speak of a Christian era, a Copernican era, a Napoleonic era, a Darwinian era.

In the evolution of social minds, as in the case of indivual, nature seems to strive, in the midst of the fluctuations, to develop and preserve certain distinct *types*—types of race mind, of national minds, of family minds, of religious minds. The Hebrew mind is a distinct entity from the Greek mind, as shown in the genius of its creativeness. But the Hebrew mind itself is a unification of similar tribal types. The various Protestant denominations are contrasted with the distinct Catholic type of Christianity. This tendency to fix clear and distinct types of ideals goes on until some fresh social contact starts anew the process of give and take, or some genius with strong will creates a new mutation, which in turn must run the gauntlet of survival. Periods of mutation, moreover, and periods of stabilization

seem to follow each other in a certain rhythm in history. The standardization of the Middle Ages is followed by the spontaneous variety of the Renaissance.

While we are likely to look upon social minds as merely transitive, as vanishing with the situation from which the individuals emerge, they obey the same laws of cumulative persistence and interpenetration as particular minds. The former may have the greater permanency; and in the midst of the vicissitudes and the coming and going of abstract individuals, they may continue their living reality—not merely the outward form—from generation to generation in the nation, the family, the community, the church. Here, too, there is a survival struggle for dominance. Neither in individual nor in social history is the conservation of values indiscriminate and absolute. In the successive overlapping, as well as in simultaneous fusion, there is emphasis and oblivescence; some factors count for more. Some motif dominates the melody of each historic stream. Thus perished a large part of Greek civilization because the interest had shifted. This motif may persist generation after generation, guiding or prejudicing the current of life. Nor is the social mind, once it exists, dependent upon the individual factors involved in its creation. While individual minds are necessary conditions at the birth, yet the social mind is something more than the abstract individuals. It has a unique reality of its own. This may continue to exist independently of individual bearers, carried on physically by the manuscript, marble, tools, but imbedded and swept on all the while in the evolutionary process of the universe. We may as finite histories connect with a social mind of the past after a long interval of time. Yet when we come upon it, or are enveloped by it, we must recognize its uniqueness, its reality, as it enters into living relation with ourselves, even as our experiences before going to sleep connect with our waking life. It may again sway our conduct, as the Greek mind did the Renaissance. Thus social divisions of mind may be functionally reunified as are divisions in in-

dividual minds.

Again, social minds awaken and come to a recognition of their own meaning in the stresses and strains of experience as do individual minds. Dormant patriotism bursts into passionate loyalty, the feeling of family love and honor into its devoted sacrifice. Over vast stretches of time the social consciousness awakes and discovers its own fundamental direction in the stream of historic change and cries: Be Hebrew, Be Greek, Be British. This has tremendous practical significance. The spirit of the nation or the institution—its persistence and evolution—is not a mere fiction. It is the living creative process in which individual minds are bathed and without which they are abstractions. This psychic unity may be more real and permanent than biological heredity. It constitutes an important survival condition of the latter when different types of social ideals come into deadly conflict. It furnishes the real basis for the communion of saints, for the sacramental relation of the present with the past by means of which the present becomes more than flesh of its flesh—it becomes soul of its soul in living vital continuity, as it contributes to the growth of this social mind and incarnates its meaning.

It is not uncommon for a social mind which has reached its maturity under its own historic conditions to be grafted by imitation upon a new people. Thus the religious mind of the ancient Hebrews has been grafted upon the Teutons, until their own primitive religion seems foreign to them. It must, however, be noticed that the mind thus grafted, while it has continuity with the past, comes to have a new consciousness, becomes a new social mind; the fruit has a new flavor, however faithful in many ways to the original type.

It has been laid down by Tarde as a law that collective imitation proceeds from within outward. That means that ideas and sentiments are imitated before outward forms. The reverse of this would seem to be the law, at any rate on the conventional level of imitation. The African chieftain

has imitated the dress coat without any conception of European ideas. The Goths imitated the external forms of politics and religion, long before they could enter into the spirit of the ideas of the civilization which they supplanted. The American immigrant imitates our clothes and manners, before he understands our language. The Japanese have imitated the militarism and commercialism of the Occident, but the religious, artistic, and ethical ideals of the West have had comparatively little influence upon them. On the conventional level, whether in the case of individuals or groups, we imitate what has prestige. It is different on the rational level. Here social minds, like individuals, imitate discriminately, with reference to intrinsic values instead of external associations. It is in this analytical way that Japan is imitating Western science and hygiene, whatever their national prejudices in general may be. The conventional, non-reflective type, however, still largely dominates even civilized nations. Hence the craze for fashions and dreadnaughts.

Social minds have their own consciousness of familiarity as have individual minds. In fact the category of identity is primarily a social category and only secondarily a category of individual consciousness. We recognize our common memories. We feel a coziness in each other's presence as contrasted with the novelty of the first meeting. In the midst of the differences we recognize the sameness; and welcome or reject this past in accordance with its own value and its setting within intervening experiences. The mere fact of having a common country or even the use of a common language may give us an intense sense of familiarity when we meet in a strange environment. We have particularly a strong sense of ease and security when we move within the traditions of the past, when we recognize the old landmarks within the journey of our social thinking. The strength of this tone of familiarity is especially evident on its negative side. The new suggestions, discoveries, and hypotheses may upset society. They may call forth bitter

attacks. They may jeopardize the individual's position and social standing, if not his life. The vehemence of the resentment is in proportion to the emotional momentousness of the issues involved. It is strongest where the religious sentiment is brought into play, which may be by very remote and external associations, as in the case of the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions. Hence the wise innovator strives to relate the new to the old, to put conventional humanity at ease by making them recognize the continuity in the growth—the fulfilment of the law and the prophets. And so in a time of political unrest the would-be reformers fall back upon the Lincolnian or Jeffersonian ideals.

Social minds, too, fuse even as individual minds, and in accordance with the same laws. Here, also, there is the inhibition of certain factors by the dominance of certain other factors. Here, too, the intensity of affirmation on the part of one factor gives character to the new and larger social unity. Here, also, the volume of the suggestion in a certain direction tends to sweep away inhibitions. It is difficult for a small group to retain its individual characteristics within a larger one, unless it can maintain an artificial isolation. This may be an isolation from communication as in mountainous regions or a psychological isolation as in the case of persecution.

We have seen that social minds may overlap in a hierarchy of greater and greater comprehensiveness. Just as the family includes abstract individuals, so families are included within communities, communities within states, and states may figure in larger schemes of industrial, educational, and military cooperation. For Hegel the history of humanity is a unity inclusive of states; and this history again is but the temporal staging of the eternal life of the absolute. For Fechner the earth soul is a more comprehensive soul than the various souls which are part of our sphere and in turn this exists within galaxies of souls until we reach the inclusive soul of the universe.

Two points must be kept in mind in such generalizations

of social minds. In the first place, we must be careful to follow the lead of experience. If social mind means the conscious abandon of minds to a common direction, we cannot even now speak of humanity as one social unity, even though possible in the future. When we come to inorganic nature, as for instance our earth, our definition of social mind seems still less applicable. We fall here into vague impersonal abstractions. Analogies of any definite kind fail us. In so far as they are applicable, they seem to point the other way. As the movements of the earth are mathematically simple and stereotyped, they correspond at best to the habitual and automatic in our experience. A large part of the earth does not give evidence of mentality at all, and there is no reason, therefore, to suppose that the earth as a whole or any galaxies of cosmic masses have minds corresponding to them.

In the second place, we must remember that passing from a smaller to a more comprehensive unity is not a merely quantitative affair. It is not a case of the mere shifting of attention or perspective, so as to bring within attention larger and larger fields which existentially are one continuum of statically related facts. The "compounding" of minds is creative, not merely a case of more extensive awareness. Each social situation, like each chemical compound, must be understood as such and empirically. So it is with the recompounding of simpler social unities into more complex social unities. These mean new social minds with new properties. They can to a considerable extent be understood and predicted in their creative interactions, but they must be understood *a posteriori*. Each social mind is a unique result of fusing impulses, not a mere intellectual map which can be passed over in smaller or larger relations at will. In his theory of the recompounding of consciousness, William James, following Fechner, seems to hold that smaller fields can be taken over and pooled in the larger mind. While he relied on the subconscious

and mystical for this taking-over, instead of relying on logical implication as has that speculative idealism which he combated to the end, yet he seems to agree with the latter doctrine that the separation of the smaller from the larger field amounts, on the part of the smaller, merely to the shifting of the threshold of attention, while on the part of the larger it means a taking-over and coexistence of the smaller field within the more comprehensive perspective of relationships of the larger. Both of these conditions—the receding of the threshold and the taking-over—he believes to be illustrated preeminently by religious experience of which mysticism is for him the most characteristic type. In a small way, it is illustrated by our ordinary taking-over of smaller fields, as when for example the dog's experience in our library is taken over into our significant relationships.

This view of mind assumes that mind consists of intellectual constellations of content which can be taken over again and again and whose fringes only carry us into further external relations such as the widening fields of memory. It neglects the deeper side of mind, that of volitional energy. While we may state mind, as we have seen, in terms of fusion, it must be in terms of creative volitional fusion, not merely in terms of ideas. This does not mean that experience is made up of absolute private circles of consciousness, as James himself at one time seemed to hold, but it means that mental situations like all energetic situations must be understood empirically and that prediction is possible only as we learn *a posteriori* to abstract certain constant and controlling factors in recurring similar situations. A social mind is not a mere taking-over of the abstract individual contents, a, b, c, etc., as blocks with a new external context. It means a new volitional unity which must be understood as such. And if there is a more comprehensive social mind, such as the divine mind, here too, as indeed is adumbrated in the religious consciousness, we have not merely a neutral recompounding of finite minds into a larger constellation,

such as our external mathematical perspectives have made us familiar with; but we have a unique creative synthesis which must be appreciated as such and cannot be stated as merely an extension of our workaday unities. Whether it is sincere prayer, or solemn moral tightening, or mystical elation, the man of this world knows it not except in an external way. It cannot be translated into content of eye and ear nor into the narrow categories of the worldly heart, though it is perfectly understandable by those who have entered into the divine communion themselves. You might as well try to resolve love into pressure, motor and vascular sensations to the man who has not experienced it, as try to recompound the worldly man into the religious consciousness. In either case, what is recompounded is but the superficial intellectual aspect of the situation, not its deeper volitional and emotional value. The creative view of social situations, with its implied empiricism as regards knowledge, must be maintained throughout the hierarchy of mind. The larger mind may intersect the individual centers at a different level from that of the less extensive social minds. The dominant direction or interest may be different. While within the national mind the smaller group-minds, such as families and neighborhoods, must overlap in a certain respect, there may be temporary conflicts. War sacrifices the family. Sectional interests are sometimes brought into jeopardy by the national will. In any case a compound of compounds does not in the case of society, any more than in chemistry, mean a summing-up of the characteristics of the smaller units.

The unity of the Absolute, if it exists, is so intimate and solvent that all other minds, individual and social, are merged into its one field, be that logical or esthetic. The Absolute tolerates no unities but its own. The others are fragments at best of what a fuller insight reveals as one and unique. It gives rise to only one immense fusion. Our failure to know this completely, we are told, is merely a limitation of our attention. The field is eternally com-

plete. In our practical life, however, we must recognize a number of individual fusions in various bonds, in which we must empirically share in various degrees in order to live life reasonably and efficiently.

Inclusion within a social unity, finally, does not mean that everything pertaining to the individuals within the group is shared. As in the fusion of contexts within the particular mind only the relevant aspects enter into the fusion, so in the fusion of individuals into social unities. The common level of intersection, in any one case, necessarily leaves out much which may be precipitated in other situations. And in the larger groups, such as a nation, within which many smaller groups, such as families, neighborhoods, etc., overlap, many opinions and characteristics may remain unique to the smaller groups. It is not only the extent which is different; the basis of fusion is different. But some overlapping there must be. Some common characteristics however thin, some common traditions and sentiments, some common symbols must exist if there is to be a national mind. The group mind also, like the particular person, must in order to rise to self-consciousness have a name, by means of which it can set itself over against its non-ego—other group minds or it may be refractory persons.

In the integration of social minds, as in the integration of individual personality, history must be taken into account. In order to integrate personal habits and ideals into a more comprehensive personality, we must endeavor to understand the history of the individual. If we try to superimpose an abstract ideal for which the individual is not prepared we may produce a divided self instead of a new integral personality. It is so in social evolution. To superimpose an artificial form of organization upon a people whose training has not prepared them for such integration is bound to lead to an unstable equilibrium with consequent danger of revolution. Many peoples have taken on a form of government for which they were not prepared. Democracy presupposes training in deliberation and give and take.

In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, of which the United States of America is a part, democratic procedure was a long process of training in local unities with the discipline of self-management. The carrying over of these habits into national affairs involved a long struggle of compromise of several hundred years, and the mastery of the large-scale problems is far from complete. We should not wonder that peoples who, as a result of a sentimental ideology, passed from feudalism, as integrated into an autocratic control, into a democratic form have suffered and do suffer relapses into autocratic control. It was a century before the French Revolution was realized in a stable form of democratic capitalistic control and the more fundamental implications of democracy are still to take concrete form. No wonder that the Latin American republics are still in an unstable equilibrium with frequent relapses into dictatorships. While history does not indicate an absolute sequence of steps in social integration, a higher harmony of integration must be bought with experience and discipline. Russia attempted to pass directly from feudalism into a socialistic democracy. But in fact it has been obliged to exercise an autocratic control as exacting as that of the old tsarism, however different the motive and however different the economic regime. It is no small matter thus to foreshorten history. That the strain of reorganization is great, there can be no doubt. What the emergent form of the new organization will be, no one can foretell.

The Morality of Social Minds

The moral question, as we have already intimated, is a different one from the question of the psychological fusion of individuals into new unities. We must estimate the larger unities, as we estimate the smaller, in terms of the ideal requirements which we bring to their dominating purposes. The mere fact of social unities being larger does not necessarily make them ethical. More comprehensive class unities, such as labor or capital, or military cooperation, may be stimulated by a negative rather than by posi-

tive loyalty—by the pressure of common danger rather than by the articulate consciousness of the common good. So far from loyalty itself being a criterion of value, the ethical problem is generally an evaluation of loyalties and the consequences of such loyalties. Social unities, in order to be ethical, must have for us the consciousness of being ultimately worth while, of being a clear and distinct resolving of claims.

In the past there have been two opposite attitudes as regards the morality of the social group. Some have held that morality can be attributed only to individuals. For them only individuals in their abstract and reflective capacity can be regarded as the subjects of moral judgments. This view confuses the group with the mob. The mob is always immoral, because it means the dominance of the primitive instincts and the inhibition of the later instincts and intellectual processes. But the group may be deliberative and self-conscious. It may pursue articulate ideals. Even when the unity is emotional it may be the confluence and reinforcement of the ideal tendencies of human nature rather than of the primitive. The social mind may mean an enthusiastic loyalty to a great cause. It may mean self-forgetfulness for family welfare or patriotic sacrifice for country. It may mean a deeper and richer sacramental communion with God than the individual is capable of in his abstract capacity. The worth of the social unity must be determined by the worth of its cause and its relation to other causes, not by any specific type of consciousness. It may be better or worse than the individual in his separate capacity. In the end, moreover, all ethical value is social, is bound up with social relations. There is no goodness in the abstract. Individual morality is potential—what we have a right to expect in social relations.

Others have held with Hegel, that morality, in the true objective sense, is civic. There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the attitude that the social is the moral—the concrete personal supplementation within the group. Often

at least the abstract human relations are synonymous with the immoral. At any rate the converse, we have seen, namely, that the moral must in the long run be the social, must always hold. There can be no private morality. But social minds like individual have various degrees of ethical worth. Some of them are non-moral, some of them are immoral. If the social were always the moral, the problem of boys' gangs, of questionable clubs, of lynching mobs, of political Tammanies, would not be so serious, as it is now. Some social minds, like some individual minds, need to be stamped out. Social loyalty may be mistaken. Sometimes the individual is wiser than society. Organized society stoned the ancient prophets, gave Socrates the hemlock, crucified Jesus, and burned Bruno. Yet these indicated the direction of history. The group must not, at any rate, be taken as static and isolated. It must be taken in its historic movement. The moral life consists not merely in loyalty to that which exists. It does not signify merely the conservation of past value. It includes also criticism and desire for improvement—the striving to create new types of values, higher unities whether of higher quality or of greater extensity. Criticism and loyalty both have their place in social progress.

Beside the commandment to be loyal, we must, therefore, add another commandment: Be critically creative. Loyalty must not be blind. It must be accompanied by selection and criticism, a passion for improvement, a striving to make real your individual insight. And with the reaction, the insight grows. We seem to "recollect" (in the language of Plato) the supra-individual life which lies about and envelops us, from the dreamy infancy of the race, throughout its age-long struggle for meaning and freedom. This commandment looks toward the future as the other looks toward the past. It lays stress upon the contribution made by the individual will. It urges each of us: Help in the measure you can, whether great or small, to make clear and distinct the human relations of the changing world,

of which you are a part. Do your part to produce greater harmony of claims in the midst of our human complexity. If we are intersection points in enveloping and overlapping social minds, we are at any rate not mathematical points, but dynamic points—centers of initiative. We can give and take. We help create the atmosphere, the *Weltgeist*, which for better or worse reacts in turn upon us. It is our common impulse forward, our common faith in the future, our common willingness to risk, which creates the tension that selects and inspires our type of leaders, whether demagogues or statesmen, charlatans or prophets. It is our common sentiment, which elevates or corrupts. Without our common faith the prophet can do nothing. The sophist and political grafter are but symptoms of a diseased or unorganized social mind.

If the law of loyalty makes us sharers in the great, warm living stream of humanity, past and present, the law of critical creativeness makes us a part of the eternal direction of history—prophetic of the kingdom of heaven. Furthermore, it is only through this individual endeavor, this travail and sacrifice to make ourselves creatively a part of the human stream, that we can gain true insight into the social heritage and into the direction of history; and thus make our loyalty rational and significant, instead of being a mere blind imitation—an intolerant conservatism which builds the tombs of the prophets that are dead, but crucifies those that are sent.

CHAPTER V

THE LAW OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Conduct as the Starting-Point

It is a profound truth that we know human nature through behavior. But the study of mere physiological behavior does not take us far. We are still largely ignorant of the physiological expression of human nature. The measurements of the pulse and breathing, and some obscure organs that we do not usually mention, have not thrown much light on human conduct. At best the physiological reactions are a dubious index. The same physiological reflexes may be the expression of different emotions and attitudes. And again the same emotions and attitudes may have different expressions. To get any adequate knowledge of human nature we must study it in the milieu of social relations through the variety of social responses and in the social products of language, art, and institutions. It is thus that we get an insight into the propensities, capacities, and limitations of human nature. It is thus that we come to understand the canalization of human conduct into habit and its organization into the existing patterns of behavior.

Behavioristic psychology has introduced a pseudo-simplicity into the conception, or I should rather say talk, of human behavior, for to the behaviorist thinking is nothing but movements of the larynx. It is true that to manipulate such pseudo-concepts as the behaviorist's "reflexes" and "conditioning" does not require thinking. "Reflexes" for the behaviorist are separate events which occur in the early days of infancy. There seem to be three or four of these. "Conditioning" means the occurrence of external events simultaneously with reflex responses. Such coincidences are supposed to produce a modification of the nervous system, thus altering future behavior. In general, however, what we call reflex responses, such as the winking of

the eye, do not seem to alter with repetition. Behaviorism took over the term "conditioning" from Pavlov but not his explanation. Pavlov had a bell sounded when he offered a hungry dog a piece of meat. He found that when he afterwards rang the bell, when the dog was hungry, the dog's mouth watered as though the meat were present. But Pavlov recognized the biological drive of hunger. It was not for him a merely physiological reflex. It was the drive which produced the interest which led to the association, called "conditioning." A reflex is an intra-organic adjustment which must be understood in terms of the integral life of the organism.[1] A knee reflex is not just a separate event but part of the complex equilibrium of the organism. Hence its great diagnostic value. An instinctive drive, on the other hand, is a vital adjustment to the external environment. Hunger is a powerful emotional drive which makes those stimuli interesting, and therefore remembered, which occur in the integral experience of satisfying hunger. This is a very complicated situation and involves the whole racial and individual history of the animal, as well as the external situation which ministers to that life. The behaviorist deals with consequent functions, as externally observed, instead of attempting to explain the inner structural meaning of these functions. For him a human being is a jumping jack. It has no inner significance. For us the most interesting aspect of human behavior is that which is socially stimulated and which takes on social patterns. Such "conditioning" involves social participation, which cannot be expressed in merely physiological terms.

As an illustration of the limitations of the physiological method a simple example will suffice. Who would dare say that the physiological reaction to the command "hush!" expresses the variety of tendencies involved in such differ-

1. See "Anticipatory Reaction," Raymond Dodge, *Science*, Sept., 1933, p. 197. Some behaviorists have substituted response for reflex and then we have conditioned responses. But this is even more unintelligible. Reflex at any rate suggests structure. But a response is an event which occurs but once.

ent situations as the sick room, the school, the church, the game of hide-and-seek. The physiological reaction may be the same, yet the meaning of these situations to the participants is vastly different. It is only when we understand the social genesis of such meanings that we can follow the process of stimulus-response from the kinesthetic-auricular language situation in actual social communication, through the stage of incipient action to which it dwindles in remembered speech, until an automatic cerebral set may be the only equivalent of the social meaning on the side of the individual organism. There is indeed an innate biological disposition to talk, which reports itself in the motor-auditory sensations, but these would be mere senseless babble except for the group situations, for which the disposition of speech has evolved, and which in turn have been greatly extended by articulate speech.

If we cannot understand human beings as physiological automata, neither can we understand them as abstract psychological units. It has been said that "sociology, or the study of man in the group, evidently must found its results upon a study of the individual."[2] It is true that sociology in the past has been largely particularistic. It has proceeded from individual to individual and has ignored the reality of the group. It has been prone to select some particular factor—environment, instinct, habit, sympathy, imitation—and thus tried to explain social conduct. This accounts for the barrenness of sociology in the past. It has failed to discover its own unique problem. In other words it has failed to take into account the reality of the group. It has tried to synthesize society from abstract individuals, instead of starting with the analysis of society as it exists. And so it has found itself with bricks without mortar.

We need to awake to the fact that with the group—its consciousness of participation, its cumulative tradition and control—a new fact appears in the history of the earth's crust and this fact must become central in our science of

2. W. B. Pillsbury, *Essentials of Psychology*, 1930, p. 11.

human conduct. Just as with the creative synthesis of life we have a new order of reality which science must take account of as such, and not merely as a sum of elements entering into the life compound, so with the creative synthesis of the group we have a new order of fact which thenceforth conditions human conduct in a unique way. No doubt there are transition links from the group to the individualistic animals which stalk alone. Such a link is the instinctive herd. But the herd is not a social group. It does not have the consciousness of participating in a common life with its tradition and symbols. Once this situation exists, it becomes a unique factor of selection and survival. Like the life compound, it is not only itself a unique creative synthesis, but it is the basis for further creative synthesis in its cumulative growth and reactions. Not only does the social group have its definite place in cosmic and organic evolution, based upon an immanent law of creativeness which we do not understand, but it also becomes a creative factor in determining the conditions of further evolution. By an inherent law of rectigradation,[3] instincts and capacities for further development of group life emerge in evolution and in turn individuals and groups with defective instincts and capacities are eliminated or subordinated.

One thing is clear, at any rate: that to understand human beings we must understand them as functioning or failing to function with reference to each other in society. This has never been clearer than in the present transition in human history. As the electric furnace has enabled us to study the bonds in material compounds—the effect of their dissolution in the stress of heat and the forming of new compounds—so in the heat and stress of the social struggle which we are watching today we can see the effects of the dissolution of old group bonds with their sanctions and the precipitation of human elements into new compounds with corresponding liberation of energy and of temporary disorder.

3. J. E. Boodin, *Cosmic Evolution*, 1925, p. 28.

To understand the conduct of human beings we must understand their participation, consciously or unconsciously, in group beliefs and ideals, with the control that these exercise over us. Eliminate this social factor in conduct, and we no longer have human conduct. The sociologist is little concerned with the question of the psychological content which symbolizes this social factor in the individual consciousness. This content may consist entirely in sensations. There may be no central images in the old sense, least of all any generic images. No doubt movements and motor sensations occupy an important function in the fixation of meanings, since meanings are uses, operations to which we can put contents, not mere abstract pictures. But movements and sensations do not account for the social planes of meaning which intersect us as individuals and which make our actions converge on common ends. The infant shares in action directly only in an external way when certain reflexes are set off by the physiological movements in others as in yawning or smiling. At any rate such psycho-motor actions are relatively unimportant. The important part of conduct to us is conduct which has reference, consciously or unconsciously, to social meanings—conduct which looks to the control of present sensations and impulses by the common matrix of customs and ideals in which we must somehow share in order to manifest human conduct. In short, human beings are not physiological automata, but social beings. Their conduct can be understood only as we understand their interstimulation within a network of social relations with its cumulative tradition. It may also be well to suggest, in these days of quack reform, that the sociologist should make an effort to understand human conduct before he tries to reform it. If he deals with human beings as abstract individuals that can be ushered into a democratic paradise if they only can master the technique of counting ballots, his reforms are likely to be as futile in the future as in the past. We had better learn the art of diagnosis before we administer remedies,

and this we can learn only by first investigating the anatomy and physiology of society.

Lévy-Bruhl's Law of Participation

The French sociologists, especially Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, have taken advanced ground in their emphasis on the reality of the social group. It is to Lévy-Bruhl that we owe the phrase, "law of participation," though his statement of the law is too specialized and too limited in scope to serve as a universal principle of explanation. It is rather a theory of the primitive mind, which he distinguishes sharply from the European mind; and this theory is based upon a study of the totemic beliefs of certain aboriginal races. He sums up his conclusions under two heads:

1. The institutions, practices and beliefs of the primitive races imply a prelogical and mystical mind, oriented differently from ours.

2. The collective representations and the connections among these representations which constitute this mind are governed by the law of participation and, being so governed, are indifferent to the law of contradiction.[4]

This "law of participation" he states as follows:

> Lacking a satisfactory formula, we can attempt an approximation. I should say that in the collective representations of the primitive mind, objects, beings, phenomena, can in a manner incomprehensible to us, be themselves or other than themselves at the same time. In a manner not less incomprehensible, they emit and they receive forces, powers, qualities, mystical influences which can be felt outside themselves, without ceasing to exist where they are. In other words, for that type of mind, the opposition between the one and the many does not impose the necessity of affirming one of the terms if the other is denied, or reciprocally. The opposition has only a secondary interest. Sometimes it is perceived; often it is not. Often it disappears before a mystical essence, common to two beings, which, to our manner of thinking, cannot possibly be taken, one for the other, without leading to absurdity. For example the Trumai (a tribe of Northern Brazil) boast of being araras (red parrots).[5]

The primitive mind is, according to Lévy-Bruhl, indif-

4. *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inferieures*, p. 425. (*How Natives Think*, trans., L. A. Clare, 1925.)
5. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

ferent to logical classification and to verification in terms of experience which are supposed to characterize the European mind. Instead of logical classifications there "are established complex participations:"

> They are equivalent to, or at least they correspond to, what for us are classifications; the social participations being felt with great intensity by each individual consciousness and serving as a center, so to speak, around which other participations mass themselves. But there is nothing there which resembles, except in appearance, our logical generalizations. The latter imply series of concepts of definite extension and intension and constitute a ladder whose rungs are tested by reflective thought. The prelogical mind does not objectify nature in this way. It lives rather by feeling its own participation in it, and by feeling nature's participation everywhere; and it translates these complexes of participations into social forms. The element of generality, if it exists, can be sought only in the participation which radiates, in the mystical property, circulating between certain beings, which unites them and which identifies them in the collective representation.[6]

In the first place Lévy-Bruhl has exaggerated the role of totemic mysticism among primitive peoples. Not all primitive peoples are totemic. And totemism varies all the way from the mystical totemism of the Australian aborigenes to that of the North American Indians where the totem is scarcely more than a heraldic emblem and where there is no theory of totemic ancestry and no totemic taboos. We must also remember that among primitive peoples there is a distinction between sacred and profane. The ordinary work-a-day life is carried on in very much the same way as ours.

In the second place, Lévy-Bruhl has overemphasized the difference between the primitive type of mind and that of the European. Franz Boas, the American anthropologist, finds no such gulf. The difference between the savage mind and ours would seem to be due to the background of tradition rather than to any absolute difference in mental processes. The contrast which Lévy-Bruhl has made so striking is due to the fact that he has selected a set of customs, long ago stereotyped, among certain savage peo-

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 141.

ples and contrasted them with the science of the European. But we also have our crust of custom in which we participate as groups and where we are indifferent to contradictions. Our etiquette, our religion, our moral and political traditions, are full of them. Just think of accepting the Copernican view of the world and that of the ancient Hebrews at the same time. Lévy-Bruhl himself recognizes the persistence of the prelogical mind in certain fields, namely, "in morals, politics and religion"—just as in the more primitive type of civilization. In any case we, like the savage, accept a vast mass of tradition and convention uncritically, on the authority of the group of which we are a part and because we are a part of it, requiring no other ground than the collective faith or opinion of the group. Beliefs thus accepted may be called alogical as contrasted with beliefs which we consciously subject to the test of experience. With most people even their science is accepted in that manner. They have no more logical ground for the Copernican theory than for the doctrine of the Trinity. When we do question the conventional beliefs it is because of some stress, and then our thinking lasts only as long as the stress.

There are, to be sure, certain periods of transition when a wide readjustment of our mores takes place. It is also true that the primitive mind in the past was more likely to harden and stay put because of less complexity in the social structure and less pressure from external contacts. But this is a relative matter. The intricate social system of savages, such for example as their marriage classifications, did not arise without thought, even though the reasons they give us now may have nothing to do with the founding of the institutions. And in spite of the monotony of conditions, we find savage peoples today in various stages of evolution and transition. Thus we find, in the marriage customs of adjacent tribes in Australia, the maternal totem, the maternal and paternal totem coexisting, the paternal totem alone, and finally the disregarding of both the ma-

ternal and paternal totems. It is evident that in some parts of Australia the whole system of totemic beliefs and practices is becoming antiquated and intermarrying takes place very much as it does among us. If they move slowly it is because of lack of pressure. Under their relatively simple conditions of existence, many of their customs are well adapted, though different from ours. Other customs seem to work because of the inadequacy of their knowledge, as for example their ceremonies to produce rain. But we must remember that it is still customary among European peoples to pray for rain, inconsistent though it is with our natural science. The breaking and reconstruction of customs, with savages as with us, is due to their failure to work in the light of experience, especially their failure to produce prosperity.

It is hard to see why totemism as a system of beliefs should be regarded as so peculiarly mysterious as to differentiate the mind of the races that hold it from our own mind, as Lévy-Bruhl seems to think. It is true that the origins of totemism, as of so many ancient beliefs, is wrapped in mystery. Perhaps Andrew Lang is right that the exogamous marriage relations which are the rule in totemic society have their origin in the discipline by the male in driving away the sons from his mates and forcing them to seek their mates elsewhere and that the animal names are sobriquets thrown at these wife robbers before the connubium and friendly exchange existed. But that is speculation. We find totemism as an established social system in many primitive cultures. Whatever may be the origin of the totem emblems, they are now bound up with a belief in kinship. As Durkheim puts it: "The fundamental thing in this religion is that the men of the clan and the different beings whose form the totemic emblems reproduce, pass as being made of the same essence. Now when this belief was once admitted, the bridge between the different kingdoms was already built."[7] The totem names

7. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (trans. by Swain, 1925), p. 236.

and emblems of the clan came by a natural psychological process to signify the social bond, the common life, of the clan. To quote Durkheim again:

> Since the clan cannot exist without a name and an emblem, and since this emblem is always before the eyes of men, it is upon this, and the objects whose image it is, that the sentiments which society arouses in its members are fixed. Men were thus compelled to represent the collective force, whose action they felt, in the form of the things serving as flag to the group. Therefore, in the idea of this force, were mixed up the most different kingdoms. . . . Moreover, the cause whose action we observe here is not peculiar to totemism; there is no society where it is not active. In a general way, a collective sentiment can become conscious of itself only by being fixed upon some material object; but by this very fact it participates in the nature of this object.[8]

That some primitive peoples should have confused the social kinship of membership in a common group and common tradition with the biological kinship of common ancestry does not seem so extraordinary when we remember that the official anthropologists of certain highly civilized nations of today have seriously tried to show the unity and superiority of race of such nations without any regard for well-known historical facts. I refer of course especially to German anthropologists. But, aside from anthropologists, it seems to be natural for peoples who have become unified in tradition and sentiment to regard themselves as of one blood. The more primitive races simply have a more picturesque way of symbolizing the belief.

Mysticism is not peculiar to any stage of civilization. In situations of great emotional intensity it is natural for the individual to feel his unity with the group. In intense moments of patriotism the individual identifies himself with the nation and counts his life as nothing. This identification also extends by psychological association to the symbols and other expressions of the national life. The flag for the soldier becomes the embodiment of the spirit of his country and he gladly gives his life to recover it. In intense religious moments, the soul feels its unity with God, sometimes in an abandon of mystic ecstasy. Here too the

8. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

tendency is to identify the life of religion with symbols which not seldom come to be regarded as the reality itself. This is abundantly illustrated in the Christian religion. The hymns speak of the saving grace of the cross. In the medieval conception of the Eucharist we see how the symbol of the spiritual bond of the community with its Founder became identified with the reality itself and how the words of the communion office: "This is my body" and "This is my blood" became the basis of the mystical theory of transubstantiation, though we must not forget that the transubstantiation concerns the substance and not the accidents of the consecrated elements. The cup out of which Jesus drank was supposed to have mystical power, as shown in the stories of the Holy Grail. Mystical participation is not limited in any case to savage societies nor does their psychology offer any absolute peculiarities.

There is, however, not merely the mystical side to such systems as totemism, there is also the intellectual. In its more elaborate forms at any rate, totemism is a theory of the universe. So far from such a theory being opposed to modern science, we must regard it as the beginning of scientific classification—the attempt to identify the somehow unlike. I quote Durkheim:

> The great service that religions have rendered to thought is that they have constructed a first representation of what these relations of kinship between things may be. . . . The essential thing was not to leave the mind enslaved to visible appearances, but to teach it to dominate them and to connect what the senses separated; for, from the moment when men have an idea that there are internal connections between things, science and philosophy become possible. . . . It is far from true that this mentality had no connection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic. . . . Today, as formerly, to explain is to show how one thing participates in one or several others. It has been said that participations of this sort, implied by the mythologies, violate the principle of contradiction and that they are by that opposed to those implied by scientific explanations. Is not the statement that a man is a kangaroo or the sun a bird, equal to identifying the two with each other? But our manner of thought is not different when we say of heat that it is a movement, or of light that it is a vibration of the ether, etc. Every time that we unite heterogeneous terms by an internal bond we forcibly identify contraries. Of course the terms we bring together are

> not those which the Australian brings together; we choose them according to different criteria and for different reasons; but the processes by which the mind puts them in connection do not differ essentially. . . . We do not believe that it is possible to characterize the mentality of inferior societies by a single and exclusive inclination for indistinction. If the primitive mind confounds things which we distinguish, he also distinguishes things which we connect together.[9]

In any case it is from the consciousness of social interpenetration and social unity that we extend interpenetration and unity to the larger world. And the collective consciousness of primitive peoples, stimulated by their religious emblems and sacraments, gave them their categories for dealing with the universe. It is well to go back to these beginnings occasionally, to remind ourselves of the social character of all knowledge.

It is not easy to say whether there is an increase in the relative amount of thinking. Each age flatters itself that it is the most intelligent, since it naturally must interpret the universe from its point of view and hence other points of view seem more or less unreal to it. So we are likely to take for granted that the age in which we live is the high-water mark of civilization. But to the more or less detached critic who takes longer perspectives, this axiom may not seem indubitable. Thus, to Galton, the Greeks in their heyday were as much beyond us in the scale of intellectuality as we are beyond the African negro; and, to Gladstone, we are far inferior in logical thought to the masters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. We certainly should have appeared slovenly to them. But it is not a question so much of the amount of thinking as of how the thought process is controlled. To what extent is it controlled by the authority of the group? And to what extent is it controlled pragmatically, that is, by the tests of experience? In the Middle Ages, thought, however exact and systematic, was controlled by reverence for religious dogmas. The church furnished the premises for men's reasoning. Today we feel

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 238.

that we are more original and less dependent upon group participation because we contrast our habits of thought and action with the older tradition. It is true that scientific method has gained great headway since the Middle Ages, and this means liberation in some domains from blind custom and corresponding control by experience. But it is after all a small corner of even the scientist's life that is thus affected. The greater part of his world even in science he takes on trust, on faith in some group. And when we take the mass of the population, the originality is more apparent than real. Which shows more originality—to produce fire by striking flints or by striking a match? Our conduct is determined almost as much as that of primitive man by the group attitude. We may boast of our modernism and our lack of respect for the past; we may follow winds of doctrine rather than theological dogmas; we may be controlled by fashion rather than custom, but are we therefore more logical, more sane and reasonable than our ancestors? Are we not as much slaves of the standards of the group, though the standards may have changed? We accept the Copernican theory of the universe and the Darwinian theory of evolution, as we accept the fashion of our clothes, because they are the thing. We have substituted the ideal of novelty for loyalty to tradition, the ideal of a democracy of counting heads for the conception of supernatural authority, the ideal of self-expression for social restraint. But are we therefore any more thoughtful than our forbears? We are controlled by crowd suggestion rather than institutional sanctions. But do we therefore have a more reasonable standard? Is the prestige of the new necessarily more logical than the prestige of the old? Are we not in either case bound by the control of the group, do we not dance to its tune, do we not find things reasonable because the group stamps them as such, and worth while because the group emphasizes them? Are we not for the most part like sheep following the lead of the herd, though we imagine (as sheep may do) that we are choosing

our own way?

Lévy-Bruhl has done a great service in calling attention to the fact of participation. But he fails to give us the *rationale* of the process. He deals with effects rather than causes. The important aspect is the consciousness of group participation. The participation in things is the consequence of group participation. It is because of the consciousness, however vague, of a common bond that men create names and emblems to symbolize this bond; and in turn the signs make the reality objective and effective. That the primitive peoples should have inverted the process and conceived the signs, the common emblems, as the reality is not to be wondered at when we understand our own psychology. Rather the tendency is inevitable so long as the participation in group life is uncritical. Furthermore, Lévy-Bruhl has unduly narrowed participation to the automatic acceptance of the beliefs and practices of the group. We shall try to show later that there are various types of participation. At one end of the scale we have participation which is controlled by the authority of the group through prestige and habit. Here the standard is group conviction. At the other end of the scale we have participation which strives to understand the social matrix in terms of individual experience and to evaluate it in terms of objective standards—the workability of customs in terms of conscious human needs, utilitarian, logical, ethical, esthetic. Any one epoch in the development of a race or individual is shot through with these various types in varying degrees, depending upon the stresses or problems that may arise. But in any case group dependence constitutes a large part of life, even of the most thoughtful, since we must share the heritage of the group in order to interpret it and since our human limitations make it possible to cover only a small part of life in terms of first-hand experience, and even this only in cooperation with past and present workers in the field.

The Law of Social Participation Stated

We have seen now that social participation is a fact of which we must take account in order to understand the beliefs, standards and conduct of human beings. Human beings do not live unto themselves nor die unto themselves, as the non-social animals do, but in their science and in their illusions, in their virtues and in their vices they are influenced by the fact of association. The group sentiment, we have seen, must have emblems to focus the common consciousness, and these emblems become part of the association. It may be a totem sign or an institutional name or a flag or a constitution. In any case the emblem is invested with the collective life of the group. And in turn the emblem becomes an independent source of group sentiment, so that we worship the name of France or Britain or the United States of America; we pay homage to the flag and die for it as a thing having value in itself; we come to regard the constitution as the source of our rights and liberties; the religious ritual itself becomes a means of salvation. The fact of group participation is the same at all stages and in all conditions of social life; it is only the accidents that differ. The extension of the association to include things, as well as human beings, is obviously itself an accident and varies with the emotional intensity. And so is the relative identification or detachment on the part of the individual participant. What is important is the fact of social participation as a factor determining in a large degree the attitude and conduct of the individual.

If we accept social participation as a fact, as we must, then it follows as a law: that in order to understand the beliefs and conduct of human beings, we must take them in their social matrix—the temper, attitudes and cumulated experience of the group and age in which they live. Some of our characteristics in social relations are due to the integral situation. Men are not merely individuals. Sometimes they are the group and the group is they. Membership in a group is not merely an external relation. It is

an internal relation. Men are different because they are members of groups. A group is a creative synthesis. A new fact emerges. We cannot understand men merely as abstract individuals, with certain instincts and capacities, as our individualistic psychology and our individualistic sociology have alike tried to do. This is as true of the scientific type of mind as of the dogmatic; of Bruno and Galileo as of the inquisition; of Protestant reformers as of medieval theologians; of the modern European as of the totemic clans; of Herbert Spencer with his philosophic anarchism as of Hegel with his submergence of the individual in his state-god.

There is a profound intuition implied in the primitive man's feeling of participation. We are really members of one another. We do not live to ourselves. Our minds are confluent, even physically or metaphysically, as we have seen. European science of the nineteenth century, with its abstract atomism in nature and society, fails to meet the facts, as we have discovered in the twentieth century. Reality exists only in mutuality, in relativity, as Hegel saw in an abstract way. Once we accept this as a fact the contradiction which troubled Lévy-Bruhl vanishes. We do as a matter of fact participate in a number of groups. It is only so that we realize ourselves. We do not ordinarily find any contradiction in participating in different groups—social, economic, political, religious, scientific, esthetic, with the obligations and loyalties which they involve—though there may come crises in which loyalties conflict.

When we examine the identification of the individual with the group we find various degrees. We may state this consciousness of identification under the following laws: First, it varies with the unity of conviction or devotion to a cause on the part of the participants. Some causes awaken conflicting reactions in the members of the group. Such conflicts give rise to discussion and individual consciousness as contrasted with group consent. So far as there is collective consciousness in regard to disputed issues it is the

collective consciousness of sub-groups rather than the larger group. In the present political state, such issues as the tariff, the size of the income tax, the claims of labor, the regulation of business, give rise to more or less definite sub-groups as well as to individual reactions. The issue, moreover, must be felt to be a vital issue in order to produce any marked consciousness of participation; it cannot seem a dead issue or a trivial issue. The causes which stimulate loyalty are those that are felt as momentous to the safety and prosperity of the group. This can easily be illustrated in any group—a labor union, a political state, a business corporation.

Secondly, the consciousness of identification with the group varies with opposition to the cause. Loyalty is likely to be dormant until the common cause is challenged. The devotees of a religion may be comparatively indifferent until persecution, the violation of the religious conscience, sets in. And then we have the marvels of martyrdom where the contagion of courage and faith stimulates even the comparatively weak to sublime sacrifice. People may speak indifferently and even critically of their nation until its life is threatened; and then the flood tide of emotion and heroism rises to meet the crisis. The love of family may dwindle to a mere "of course" until loss of a member is threatened, and then a mother's sacrifice knows no bounds. So strong becomes the feeling of solidarity in times of crisis to the group, that the utmost impatience and even vindictiveness is felt toward members who fail to participate in the loyalty and sacrifice. This has been abundantly illustrated in national wars as regards the attitude toward the conscientious objector and still more toward the wilful slacker. The greater the danger to the group, the greater the intolerance to dissenters who attempt to follow their individual judgment. Crises always take on a religious character and the devotion to the group becomes mystical or sacramental. In time of danger, individual abandon to the cause becomes complete on the part of those who participate

in the group consciousness. This, of course, does not apply to those who share in group conduct from fear of the group or for selfish advantage. They still remain individuals, apart in their consciousness, even though dominated by the group.

Thirdly, the group consciousness varies with the number of participants and their spatial and temporal proximity. Temporal proximity is as important as spatial proximity. People who belong to the same age of development, whether age is taken in the individual sense or in the historic sense, enter into more complete fusion than those belonging to different ages of development. Fusion increases with numbers. Men find it easier to renounce their individual and class claims in the crowd under the inspiration of a common cause than as separate individuals. The consciousness of being one in a mass tends to inhibit individuality and to intensify the abandon to the cause. Hence the importance of mass meetings for stimulating enthusiasm, as opposed to individual canvassing or printed communications. The intensity of the totem bond grows by the contagion of the mutual excitement in the dances, mutilations, and various ceremonies carried out. Conversions take place from the hypnotic excitement of the religious occasion, when even hardened sinners yield. Courage spreads to the indifferent through army discipline and through the participation of millions in common danger.

Two observations may be ventured in connection with the consciousness of this identification of the individual with the group. One is that the conceptual meaning varies inversely with the emotional fusion, that is, it is greatest when the individual is most wide-awake, in other words when he differentiates himself from the mass; and it decreases as the individual becomes submerged—approaching its vanishing point as our individuality is lost in the group. Conversely, feeling or the emotional meaning is in inverse relation to abstract intelligence. It is greatest in moments of self-effacement, such as the state of patriotic excitement

and religious rapture, and decreases with the intellectual scrutiny of our relations to the group. Hence those who wish to inhibit individual reflection and action and to ensure abandon to a cause strive to produce a crowd effect. They make use of symbols and formulae, charged with feeling; they use music; they shout; in short, they try to produce the maximum of emotional excitement so that they may take us off our guard and sweep our customary scruples out of the way. It is so that conversions are produced; so people are made to part with their money for a cause; so their fighting blood is roused, when calm individual thought might decide otherwise.

Types of Participation

If we now study social participation from the point of view of the control by the group over the mental processes of the individual, we may distinguish three types. In the first place, the participation may be *automatic*—the individual accepting unquestioningly and unthinkingly the customs and beliefs of the group. A great deal of our common life is ordinarily thus accepted. It is thus that we take our etiquette and fashions. We accept similarly a whole body of conventional belief—the science, religion, and institutions of the day. Among custom-ridden peoples the past is accepted because it is old and venerable and presided over by ancestral spirits. Among convention-ridden peoples, the current beliefs and practices are accepted because they are the thing. Most of us, and all of us to a great extent, are swayed by the authority of the group. We accept things because they are approved and standardized for us. We live mostly second hand. We are rarely masters of destiny; we are mostly slaves. This is what Rousseau means in the opening sentence of his *Social Contract*: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains." But Rousseau was mistaken in affirming that man is born free. Freedom is something he must win in the school of society; and the chains are part of the discipline of man that he may eventually

learn to walk—not alone, but a free man among free men, a free creator among comrades, if that time ever comes.

While it is a fact that we are largely dominated by the group, the fact is not a justification of such control. The ideal for humanity is rather that we should bring our conscious personal reactions and thus enrich the common fund of life. But this is more easily said than done. Life is overlaid with group opinion and group standards before we are mature enough to think. The prestige of the authority about us, backed as it is by the entire pressure of group conviction, overawes us and impresses the habits of the group upon us until we become social automata. We fall unconsciously into the ways of evaluating and judging that are socially approved. It is easier to follow the herd than to assert one's individuality. Society, moreover, from the beginning has put a premium on conformity and discourages dissenters by all the means at its disposal. It praises loyalty as the supreme virtue. After ages of social selection it is a wonder that there is any individuality left. And indeed the mass of human beings are content to follow the lead, whether of custom or fashion. They fall into step whether in institutions or in crowds.

The first instinct of the group, as of the individual, is self-preservation. Hence its strong emphasis on conformity. It took untold ages to build up social restraint. Back of it is the jungle. And the jungle returns whenever social restraint lapses. Hence the group is always nervous about individual innovations. Its chief interest is stability and order, the conserving of the values of the past and handing them on. Its motto in case of doubt is that it is expedient that the individual should suffer rather than the whole people perish. If the group cannot accomplish the end of suppressing nonconformity by legal punishments and so dispose of the refractory individual, it does so none the less effectively by social sanctions. It bribes the individual by preferment when he furthers group interest and dazzles him with future glory. If he persists, on the other hand, in

his individualistic way, he is ostracized. His opportunities for advancement are barred. He must lead a lonely existence. To its mundane means of restraint, it sometimes adds the supernatural sanction—a glorious heaven for conformists.

In its punishment of nonconformity, society does not distinguish between nonconformity that is atavism and nonconformity that is progress. Jesus of Nazareth was crucified between two thieves. It is nonconformity which society punishes in its blind zeal for self-preservation. The merits do not matter as a rule. The greater the danger seems to the existing order, the more relentless is it in suppressing the individual. The motto of society is "Safety First." Progress must be bought at a risk. There will always be the antinomy between the demands of security and those of progress. Bernard Shaw ironically puts it: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

It is true that of late we have gone a long way in breaking down old customs. There is today but little reverence for authority in the old sense; instead we are slaves of the herd, of crowd sentiment. And while we have thus a consciousness of being more free and independent and while we boast our superiority over the past, we may as a matter of fact be even more of slaves. Our tolerance today is probably no deeper seated than that of former generations. We are tolerant perhaps in what they condemned. But they too built the tombs of the prophets of the past. If our prejudices are really affected—our pride in nationality or race or class—our passions flare up as quickly as theirs, and even more so because of our lack of permanent sanctions. Real emancipation must come—not from substituting the authority of the crowd for the authority of custom, but from the cultivation of greater thoughtfulness in human beings. It means the substitution of utility, of welfare, of enlightened experience for blind conformity.

Such emancipation does not mean the breaking with the past nor walking aloof from men. It means, on the contrary, a profound sympathy with human striving through the ages. While the Prophet proclaims: "Ye have heard those of old say . . . but I say unto you," the same Master of men also says: "Think not that I am come to destroy but to fulfill." For the striving of the past is pregnant with the future. It is only man's deadness and idolatry of the past that must be broken through. Even when a man fancies himself most original, it is easy for the critic to point out his indebtedness. The true pioneer, the creator in any field, participates in the real striving of the race. He shares its life blood. He brings into clearness its deepest motives —motives encrusted by convention and often hidden from society which vents its wrath on those who guide it into the light, because the light destroys many gossamer illusions. After all, those who carry on the pioneer work of the prophets of the past are truer to them than those who build their tombs and crucify those which are sent.

It is, moreover, not merely as a matter of intellectual, moral, or esthetic enrichment that we should cultivate individuality and open-mindedness, but it is even a matter of group safety. Blind loyalty, herd conformity, when it breaks under stress, results in anarchy. No peoples are so tragic just now as those who, because of their thraldom in the past, lack intelligent experience to rebuild their shattered social structures. A people that is accustomed to discuss and to think cannot run wholly amuck. We must, therefore, break the spell of blind loyalty to the group, be it state group or church group or capitalist group or labor group, if we would save the group. Only the group which loses its life in wholesome regeneration can ultimately find it.

Only through such encouragement of individual expression can there be genuine progress, whether in religion, morals, science, or art. In order to make the group significant, we must break away from automatic participation

and advance to intelligent sharing and experimentation. We must emancipate the individual from slavery to the mass, whether it be the slavery of custom or the still worse tyranny of passion. We must dare to think, to interpret the meaning of life in the light of our experience, mindful that this is made out of the tissue of the past and that the eternal pattern of our dreams is forever beyond. This will make us humble in the worship of the best as we see it.

Automatic participation may take many forms, but it always means the suppression of the individual—his conscience and reason. This is well brought out in Harold J. Laski's account of De Maistre and Bismarck:

> The fundamental faith of each was beyond the sphere of reason—with De Maistre it was the dogmas of Catholicism, with Bismarck the revelations of an evangelical Christianity. Each saw in a world of individualization the guarantee of disruption and evolved a theory to secure its suppression. Each loved passionately the ideal of unity since that seemed to them both the surest guarantee of survival . . . . Each failed to understand that tremendous truth inculcated by Lamennais when he urged that the real unity of doctrine—whether political or religious—can come only from possession of freedom. . . They did not see that however organic be the community in which we live, man is a solitary no less than a social being, and his ideal world is at bottom interstitial. However much he acts in common, he wishes also to act alone; however much he thinks as a member of the herd, he will wish also to think as a lonely wanderer. It is perhaps an antinomy; but it is one which no theory of the State dare afford to neglect. For an attitude which makes the boundaries of authority commensurate with the bonds of mind is at war with the instincts most pregnant with human good.[10]

I should not say that man wishes to think as "a lonely wanderer," but that he wishes to think society in terms of his experience as well as his experience in terms of society. He becomes conscious, in short, of being not merely an imitative, but also a creative intelligence.

A transition type of control is where the authority of the group is recognized as supreme, but where the individual devoutly strives to understand and to interpret the meaning of the group. This we may call the *dogmatic* type. This attitude of mind is best illustrated by the piety of the

10. *The Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917, pp. 264, 265.

Middle Ages. After Augustine there was no question of the supremacy of the church in matters of belief and conduct. Men bowed reverently to its authority. Belief in the authority of the church came first. But the pious upholders of the authority of the church did not feel that there was any fundamental antagonism between faith and reason. If the motto was: "I believe in order that I may understand," it was still thought possible, allowing for our finite limitations, to understand. Augustine, indeed, became more and more depressed by the depravity of human nature in its natural condition and correspondingly emphatic in his belief in man's dependence upon the church and its means of grace; but he never abandoned his postulate that the faith of the church is reasonable. Anselm, in a somewhat apologetic way, attempts to state the entire gamut of church doctrines in the light of reason, though always mindful of its limitations. It is Abelard who with characteristic boldness and brilliance proclaims the right of reason to understand what faith has already accepted. For him there are no dark and impenetrable recesses in the solemn edifice of beliefs that the church has erected. But it must always be remembered that, even in the most speculative period, men bowed to the authority of the church; and their recantations, when the official verdict was against them, were no mock ceremonies to save their skin. Hence martyrdom of intellectuals within the medieval church was rare, even though the spirit of a pioneer like Roger Bacon was broken by long years in dungeons before he was allowed to walk out of his prison.

Toward the end of the Middle Ages the church grew fearful of the boldness of an awakened reason. It insisted more and more upon mystical acceptance of the characteristic church doctrines. Even then there was room for the systematization of dogmas and their defence against unbelievers; and there grew up such magnificent systems as that of Thomas Aquinas which still are marvels of formal logic, even though the premises are put beyond the reach of

reason. Reason could no longer claim a domain coextensive with that of faith even though consecrated by faith. It became merely the handmaid of faith. And as time went on even this humble role of reason was abandoned for the automatic acceptance of all that pertained to the supernatural world, thus limiting reason to the world of nature. Even here, it was restricted by the official acceptance of Aristotle and the Ptolemaic theory. Copernicus, the unconscious founder of a new era, still bowed reverently to the spiritual authority of his superiors in dedicating to his abbot the heliocentric theory. It was only in succeeding generations that reason succeeded in emancipating itself from the authority of the church. Bruno preferred to die for the truth as he saw it rather than compromise by even a technical recantation; and Galileo was no doubt convinced, in spite of his recantation, that the authority of facts cannot be invalidated by the authority of the church. A new consciousness had begun to assert itself which set the authority of experience above that of ecumenical councils. And a strange authority the latter have exercised when one recollects that their decisions were often arrived at by methods which would have shamed a modern political caucus.

It is not necessary, however, to go back to the Middle Ages to illustrate the type of control where reason is made the handmaid of custom. We find it no less in Protestantism where the Hebrew Scriptures were made the supreme and sufficient guide of life. Faith in a written oracle set the end and limitations of interpretation. The premises lay in tradition, reason was the method by which they were built into a structure which, however man-made, became itself the object of religious reverence and which has held a denomination enthralled sometimes for centuries and thus created artificial cleavages, preventing men from cooperating in the great fundamental cause of human betterment.

Nor is it only in the religious field where reason becomes the mere handmaid of custom. We can easily illustrate the

same process in the political field. Thus the American Constitution, which was the outgrowth of earnest discussion and compromise, and which was regarded as having its saving grace in the possibility of amendment, became itself the embodiment of authority, until the criticizing of the Constitution became well-nigh synonymous with treason. It was indeed encumbent upon the courts to interpret the Constitution; but the interpretation was determined by tradition and in turn became invested with the same group-reverence until the cake of judicial custom became well-nigh unbreakable. We are only gradually beginning to claim our birthright of using our reason to meet the crises of experience as our forbears claimed that privilege for themselves.

Even in such fields as science, where reason is supposed to be most at home, there is a tendency for theories to become dogmas. Darwin's hypothesis of chance variations and natural selection became not merely a dogma of science, but was erected into a philosophy of the universe; and the limitations of the hypothesis and the empirical spirit of its creator were lost sight of in an intolerant tradition which has had serious consequences, not only for the development of natural science but for social philosophy. In every field of science we are haunted by ghosts of the past to which lesser minds pay superstitious reverence and by which even greater minds are misled into false assumptions. And the most dangerous ghost of all has been that mechanical materialism which, while it had no scientific credentials but was simply a dogma tacked on to science, was for a long time fashionable among scientists. If science is always in danger of subordinating reason and experience to dogmas, the danger is even greater in philosophy and art where the emotional element naturally plays a greater part. And hence, in philosophy and art, we are prone to go in schools with corresponding blindness to the real merits of the issues.

The dogmatic type of social participation which we have just discussed, namely, where social interpretation is con-

trolled by the collective faith of the group, is a higher and more fruitful type than that of mere automatic acceptance. For, in the dogmatic type, reason is at work and eventually the new wine must break the old bottles. While the activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was controlled by pious obedience to the church it was a genuinely creative activity. In their disinterested loyalty to the cause, they builded better than they knew. Their mysticism knew no trammels in its religious devotion; and their hymns and prayers still satisfy a deep spiritual need. Their Gothic cathedrals, which are the objective form of their deep devotion, would, in Ruskin's mind, abundantly justify the ages which have been mistakenly called "Dark Ages"; and we still value them as among the highest creations of the human spirit. A theology which gave us Dante's *Divine Comedy* cannot be said to have been in vain. By their sincerity and devotion, the creators of the Middle Ages made a reconstruction of social ideals inevitable and thus set future ages their task. Their disinterested loyalty to the common bond, moreover, may well be an inspiration to us in our futile individualism.

In the *critical* type of social participation, the control is objective. We do not accept beliefs and ideals merely because the group holds them, but because they prove themselves in human experience. We examine into the purpose of social institutions and reconstruct them to meet the needs of man. We accept them, if we do accept them, neither because they are venerable nor because they are fashionable, but because they satisfy the demands of human experience. We accept theories, not because they are the collective judgment of the past nor because some distinguished individual may have held them, but because the facts of human experience vindicate them. Sometimes one man of great vision may be worth all the rest. Galileo was right and the ecclesiastical tribunal that forced him to retract was wrong, in spite of the authorities of the past and the authority of the church. The test of truth in the end

is objective experience and not the strength of group conviction. Human appreciation is the criterion of beauty, not the traditional canons of any school. The real test of a social system is its results in the way of human cooperation and human happiness.

When we speak of this type as critical participation, we do not mean a merely negative or mephistophelian criticism. It is critical in that it strives to examine the merits of social institutions and beliefs instead of taking them for granted. It evaluates them in terms of an objective standard instead of accepting them wholesale. It inquires into their fitness to meet the present, instead of tracing their family tree in the past. It follows the maxim to walk in the light as God gives us to see the light, rather than in the light as it was seen through man's experience some hundreds of years ago. Instead of trying to fit human beings arbitrarily into the models of the past, it strives to remake the models to fit real human beings. It is constructive criticism. It uses the material of the past to build the nobler temple of the future. It is individual criticism, in that it brings the richness of individual experience and individual insight into the common fund of life. But this does not mean that it atomizes society into abstract individuals and regards the end of life as an individual end. On the contrary it is creative participation in a common life, bending all its energy to enrich the common life.

Creative participation is social. It is a mistake to regard the creator as set off from his kind. On the contrary he is truly creative because he drinks more deeply than the rest from the fountain of our common life. In the first place, the material he deals with is social material. In order to reconstruct the past, he must first sympathetically participate in the past. He is part of the creative succession of the centuries. He carries the spirit and work of his predecessors forward to meet the new needs and problems of man. While he shares in the capital of the past, he does not do so as a parasite, but enriches it by his thoughtfulness and sacrifice.

He gratefully uses the heritage of the past. Only thus is progress possible. The more original he is, the more indebted he is to the labors of the past. It is because he stands on the shoulders of the past that he can reach higher than the past. Not because he has more genius, but because the creators of the past have given him the greater opportunity. An individual or group which breaks with the past and ignores its lessons flounders in chaos. Accomplishment is possible because we participate in the labors of others.

While the tendency in the past was toward loyalty to custom, today the tendency is to caprice and novelty. But not all novelty is creative. A great deal of it, most of it in fact, merely litters up the universe. Every illusion, nightmare, error, sin, has an element of novelty; but they are not therefore creative. Creative novelty is significant, it enriches the meaning of the world, its goodness, truth, and beauty. It has continuity with the past, it is soul of its soul. It is cumulative in that it recreates the past and in turn makes possible greater creativeness in the future. This is creative intelligence as contrasted with the riot of caprice. Chance rarely, if ever, produces anything worth while. It is but the raw material of creative intelligence. The passion for mere novelty is no more reliable as a guide than the passion for tradition. Of the two the latter is the safer, but life can go on only by creating itself anew out of the past. If mere novelty is anarchy and dissipation of energy, mere tradition is a stagnant and deadening pool. The past must take on new life by being fructified through the stream of present creativeness.

In the second place, creative participation is social in its incentive. Individual creativeness must be understood in its living social matrix. Creativeness has come in waves in the history of the race. Criticism, the loosening of the crust of the past, comes in epochs. Isolated instances of creativeness, when by any chance they come, are apt to fail of fruition. The creator must come in the fullness of time. The fifth, fourth and third centuries B.C. are a notable

epoch in European development. There was the breaking of the old crust, due to contacts of West with East. There was a new westward movement of adventure and discovery. There was the interstimulation of genius in Miletus, in the Pythagorean fraternity, in the Socratic circle, in Plato's Academy, in the University of Alexandria and in Syracuse. There was a high plateau of creativeness, not merely individual instances. Thought, too, is contagious as shown in the great epochs of thought.

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D., which give us another high-water mark in civilization, were likewise an epoch of new cultural contacts—the Crusades, the influence of Saracen and Jewish civilization upon Western Europe, the rediscovery of Greek thought—and the interstimulation of genius in unselfish devotion to a common cause in monasteries and universities. The Elizabethan age was again a high-water mark with its geographical and scientific discoveries, its large contacts of cultures, its sense of expansiveness, its interstimulation of genius. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further in order to show that creativeness is not a matter of isolated stars, but of constellations; that the ages have their springtimes when events conspire to bring out the latent qualities of genius. Great creators come in groups, great epochs are the crests of the rising tide of humanity. Genius remains barren without the social incentive to produce.

In the third place, creative participation is social in its test. While the test of critical creativeness is not the collective conviction of the group, it cannot be merely individual experience or individual satisfaction. The scientific theory must be capable of being tested by other workers. The art work must be capable of being appreciated by human beings who are prepared for it. Virtue must be tested by the social relations which it makes possible. There can be no such thing as purely individual validity. The insight does indeed rise in the individual brain, under the artesian pressure of social stimulus and the labor of

events, the total extent of which we can only dimly grasp. The value, too, has a certain uniqueness from the peculiar texture of the individual mind and its refraction of the light. But the validity can never be purely individual. Truth must be a common chart to life, so far as it is truth. Else it is illusion. Beauty must be capable of entering into the common stream of appreciation of those who are duly and truly prepared. Virtue must manifest itself in superior capacity of living together, in common helpfulness.

Finally, the ideals which guide and inspire the creator must be social ideals. They must be ideals of human sharing. The creator does not create for himself alone but for society; and his reward is his joy in sharing and in enriching the life of society. He does not live unto himself. What scientist desires truth for himself alone? What artist creates beauty for his private satisfaction alone? What virtue can there be in living unto one's self? Even the monk in his cell strove to purify himself for the communion of saints.

Creative intelligence means discovery—discovery of facts, discovery of order, discovery of values. But it is not passive discovery, not mere photography, be it in science, art, or morality. Discovery is possible only by creative imagination. It requires also the cooperative effort of numerous workers within a common plan. It must be based upon a cumulative creative tradition, through generations of workers, if there is to be genuine progress, else genius becomes a mere fleeting will-o'-the-wisp against the darkness of our ignorance. The creative genius of the universe does not yield its secrets without concerted effort on our part. It can be comprehended, if at all, only by individual geniuses working together devotedly on the same problem over a period of time. Nature reveals its law, order, and beauty to those in whom the instinct for order and beauty is awakened through social conflict and who strive to make real this feeling for order and beauty by selecting among the seemingly confused details of experience those charact-

eristics which make the world significant for us. Not that the selection is arbitrary where creative intelligence succeeds in bringing clearness and distinctness. For our creative intelligence is part of the humble crust of the earth, the crest of the wave of cosmic star-dust, and part also of its creative synthesis. Law may be man-made, but man is made by the earth and the universe. Creative intelligence is meaningful and ordered selection, with a color and radiance all its own, in its varying creative contexts of man and nature—a light that never was on sea or land. It is this uniqueness of significance which constitutes the infinite richness of the universe. This creativeness is going on perhaps everywhere, though known to us only in connection with the particular organization of the earth's crust that we call human nature. But who shall say that the larger order, of which we are a part and expression, does not manifest in an even greater degree this creative synthesis, with a cumulation of the significant increments of creativeness?

Creativeness, in any case, does not consist in mere novelty, but in making a significant addition to the meaning and value of the world. It is not enough that this particular moment is in some respect different from other moments, that this perception is not just identical with other peoples' perceptions. In every genuine thought-process, there is an enrichment of the universe, as the old and the new are wedded in a new act of insight. The succession of moments seems for the most part a mere repetition of a tale that is told, because it is irrelevant, it adds nothing of consequence. Creative intelligence makes all things new. If it discovers the past, it also gives the past new significance and value in the larger context of experience. If it prepares for the future on the basis of the past, it also brings about a new synthesis which is a genuine surprise to itself as it weaves the available material into new form. It is superior to rules and canons for these are but the abstract reflections upon its activity. And creative intelli-

gence is always orderly; it has a cumulative unity and harmony of its own which outstrips our conventions in its spiral flight of recurrent melody with ever new value. It brings a formative idea to the life of individuals and groups; and it is with this formative idea that a soul is born, be it in the individual or in the group. Yea, the formative idea is the soul. All else is raw material. It is not that the group bond becomes less real when it becomes conscious of its reality and meaning in the individual consciousness, but then we become creative sharers instead of mere slaves.

Mysticism and Reason

We have so far contrasted mysticism and reason, and it is true that the mystical mood is at the opposite pole of the scale from the critical mood. But the critical mood can at any rate recognize the place of the mystical mood. Life is more than analysis. We have need not only of science, but of poetry. It is true that we can only be conscious of our destiny by being awake as individuals, but it is also true that we can only realize our destiny, and the destiny of creative intelligence itself, by participating in the common life of the group and the race. Mysticism and criticism are exclusive as attitudes but they must both be present as forms of realization of a creative personality. Mysticism instead of being alogical or anti-logical, as blind, automatic mysticism is, may be the florescence of creative intelligence; and reason, instead of being anti-mystical, may be the awakening in the individual of the love of the wholeness of things, that thus it may bring its meaning into clearness and distinctness and create wisely. There is a satisfaction in mystical communion which abstract reason alone cannot give, but this satisfaction is meaningless if bought at the expense of reason. On the other hand, the life of reason needs its mystical moments. Creative intelligence cannot always be strenuous and wide-awake; if it is to accomplish anything worth while, it must some-

times take a holiday and dream. The individual who contributes most significantly to the definition of life is the one who has also the greatest capacity for sharing life, for identifying himself with his kind—your Socrates, your Dante, your Shakespeare, your Lincoln. And it was the greatest of them all who said, "He that loseth his life shall find it." But it makes a world of difference whether a man lose himself in the hypnotic counting of beads, the performance of meaningless ceremonies, the repeating of dead formulae, or participates creatively in the common life. The latter alone shares really and truly in the life of the group, because he grasps the meaning of the group; the former is an automaton, a sleep-walker. There is a world of difference between a dervish and a St. Paul.

We must needs leave behind that false contrast between mysticism and reason which would make the former primitive and anti-intelligent and the latter cold and individualistic. There is, as a matter of fact, no dry light of reason in true genius, but reason enamored by harmonies, propelled by a faith which outstrips its attainment; and there is no true appreciation and communion which is not the condensation of intelligence touched by emotion. Reason when it is abstract and individualistic goes to seed; and mysticism without its awakenings in moments of criticism becomes a meaningless jungle of superstition.

What we need to emphasize, in an age of heartless science, is not merely intellectual criticism, but a new sense of emotional unity, if science is to be an instrument of reconstruction, instead of selfish destruction. As the poet Yeats puts it:

> Many have grown weary of the individualism of the nineteenth century, which now seems less able in creation than in criticism. Intellectual agreements, propagandas, dogmas, we have always had, but emotional agreements which are so much more lasting and put no constraint upon the soul, we have long lacked. . . . There has been a development in various forms of literature—in French *unanisme* for instance—toward the expression through an intellectual difference, of an emotional agreement with some historical or local group or crowd; toward the celebration, for instance, not of one's self but of one's neighbors, of the country or the street where one lives.

At any rate what we need today is less emphasis upon the individual or class or separatist group, and more emphasis upon community and humanity, if we are to weather the storm of elemental forces, so violently set loose, and to construct a nobler future—less of the spirit of particularistic realization whether of individual self, or of individual group as antagonistic to other groups, and more of the spirit of devotion to the common life and the common welfare, less pan-Teutonism, or pan-Slavism or pan-Anglicism and more of pan-humanity. In this participation, mystical devotion and clarifying reason must both enter as complementary factors, if the result is to be worth while. And with intelligent devotion to the larger human community there will come such restraint of passion, whether passion for self-assertion or passion for class or nation, as is consistent with and necessary for wholesome living together—a new passion for the realization of humanity even when inconsistent with our particularistic and separatist claims.

It is not an accident that we are turning back to the later Middle Ages for lessons in our present crisis. There was then a strong sense of solidarity, of self-restraint, of devotion to a cause. It is seen in the creative work in art, in religion, in philosophy. It is seen also in the industrial realm in the organization of the guild system and the experiment in government by the cooperation of guilds. But while we need the social consciousness of the Middle Ages, we cannot return to that period. That would be worse than repeating its failure. With Ibsen's Master Builder we have broken away from the building of temples to a past tradition which had little respect for the individual and which made the institution supreme. In our revolt, we have decided to build human homes and to improve our material conditions—to give man what belongs to man. But we are now seeing the futility of mere economic and material advancement unless we also build the air castles of the spirit; not for self-gratification, as Ibsen's Master

Builder did and fell, but for community ideals, the ideals of humanity and of the future. Science without mystical devotion to the common good cannot save the world. The next epoch must be that of an enlightened devotion to the realization of humanity—science working out the dream of faith, faith clarified by science; the individual self or the particular group awakening to its reality and value and in turn contributing that reality and value to the whole. Reason thus ceases to be the slave of authority and asserts its right to experiment and to know; and mysticism ceases to be regarded as an irrational residue and comes to its own as a genuine and essential fulfilment of life without which reason must be abstract and barren. Each becomes complementary to the other in creative participation—a participation not only in the past and present but also in the future, the prospective whole of life. Creative participation then becomes a third category by means of which we can solve the long-standing antinomies of mysticism and reason, the community and the individual.

In a deep sense the medieval formula, *Credo ut intelligam*, "I believe in order that I may understand," holds— not in the sense that the tradition of the community is all-sufficient and contains all truth, but in the sense that we must start with sympathetic faith in the community and the cumulative labors of the ages. We must live society in order to interpret it. But we must also have faith in our creative intelligence to carry forward the labors of the past, to express its trend and the trend of the cosmos of which it is a part in more adequate forms and thus enrich and make meaningful the spirit of the ages. For it is by recreating the past in devotion to the creative spirit of history that we come to understand the past, at the same time that we help to create the future.

If there is to be a new era for humanity, if we are going to emerge from the jungle of our passions and prejudices into a harmonious society, we must develop intelligence and individuality, that men may give of their best; we must

encourage experimentation and criticism that so we may find out what is best. We must possess the spirit of thoughtfulness, the venturesomeness of the creative life, the comradeship of free men. Anything else will fail. We have tried the sanction of force, but now it fails to hold. We have tried religious opiates, but now they fail to put to sleep. We must meet the problem conscientiously, for it will no longer down. Ahead is either a redeemed society or the jungle. And the second jungle bids to be infinitely worse than the first.

But while we must encourage individuality and criticism, we must also remember that it is only in devotion to the whole that individuality can become fruitful and criticism constructive. And so reason and mysticism must supplement each other in a complete realization of life. Both are fundamental aspects of life. Mysticism cannot be banished by civilization. There is more to life than logical abstractions. There is the common bond of sentiment and loyalty. If reason cannot create this bond, it can at least acknowledge it as a fact, and—more than that—it can constructively guide its realization. In such a life, the mystical comes to its own as a vital aspect of life without which society would disintegrate into atoms. Reason, on the other hand, instead of being hostile to the mystical, becomes the clarifying light which keeps mysticism from degenerating into superstition and makes it a healthy part of our common life. The mystical element in our experience is not forced always to be blind or the intellect to deal with barren abstractions. In order to understand the unity of nature, we must feel our own unity with nature. In order to understand the meaning of society we must live the social bond.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Are There Social Facts?

If we set out to analyze social systems, the first question that arises is naturally: Are there social facts? Is there a distinctive material which is not covered in individualistic psychology or in any other science?

The science of social theory has been seriously handicapped by two false traditions, one that of physiological materialism, the other that of juristic formalism. The former doctrine is the logical outcome of a solipsistic psychology. So long as mind is looked upon as inert and detached states of consciousness, it is impossible to have any intelligent theory as regards the interrelationships of minds in society. Causality, on such a theory, must be accounted for in material terms, and mind becomes concomitant to the going on of material processes. This treatment may have its convenience for the abstract type of interest which the psychologist has set himself, though one cannot help feeling the unreality of it even here. When, however, such a conception of mind is taken over by sociology, it leads to an impasse. American sociologists in particular have been infected with the old germ of solipsism, and have been inclined to limit real causality to the physical world. To quote F. H. Giddings: "Thought and feeling, merely as states of consciousness, are not energy. Apart from energy, however, they can do nothing. They can manifest themselves in external action only through the physical energy of nerve and muscle. Therefore, all that is done in society or by society, whether consciously or otherwise, is accomplished by physical energy."[1]

In an essay published later, namely, *A Theory of Social Causation*, Giddings tries to sidestep the problem by an

1. *The Principles of Sociology*, pp. 365-66.

ingenious conception of parallelism. He attempts to show, by a number of illustrations, that the phenomena of population—its density and homogeneity—correspond to the character of the material environment—its productivity and accessibility. This is interesting so far as it goes; but the relation of society to its environment is not merely that of correspondence, but in a degree, at least, the making over of the environment to fit its needs. In such a reconstruction of the environment, plans and purposes figure as real factors, and not as mere by-play to atoms and molecules. It is precisely in dealing with the social mind—with social stimulation and response, tension and equilibrium—that physiological materialism becomes so obviously inadequate. That there are common understandings and purposes, and that they are effective in the reconstruction of our environment, must be for social theory now, as in the days of Socrates, the starting-point. With such facts, moreover, we can deal independently of our ignorance of the physical world, as the Greeks likewise have shown.

We must recognize the fact that minds, purposes, are themselves causes, and not merely the by-play of physical energies. The Marxian philosophers speak of mental activities as "secondary causes" because of their materialistic metaphysics. But they, at any rate, recognize volitions and purposes as genuine and momentous energies, and we are not concerned with their metaphysics. The only sense in which mental activities can be spoken of as secondary is that in the local evolution of life upon our earth they are later than physical and chemical causes on the inorganic level and even than such physiological activities as reflexes and habits. They are a new energy level in the evolution of life, as the Marxians recognize. When creative thought appears it establishes a new mode of adjustment to the environment. And it can remake the environment, physical as well as social. That science is a manifestation of this creative energy of mind and its power to remake the world cannot be questioned in the twentieth century. How it

remakes the world depends upon the social ideals which furnish the motive and drive.[2]

The other type of prejudice, that of juristic formalism,[3] has no less serious consequences. If the former type of attitude is the outcome of physiological psychology, the latter is the result of an extreme intellectualism which has found its home especially in Germany. This has tended to hypostasize the institutional aspect of social life, and to treat the individual as a mere accident, and in practice as a mere means to an end. But customs and institutions, when abstracted from the common life of which they are the expression, lose their reality and significance. Important as they are for the development and the significance of social life, they cannot be regarded as the whole of that life; and to treat them as such must lead to dangerous consequences in practice as well as in theory. Apart from the living bond of interrelated individuals with their interests and ideals, institutional forms are but lifeless fossils, symbols of a reality that has passed.

In order to steer clear of solipsistic individualism on the one hand, and abstract formalism on the other hand, we must examine afresh the nature of those social facts which must be our starting-point. What seems clear on unbiased examination is that we know minds not as isolated entities, but as entering into social contexts, with resulting intensification and inhibition of activities. These relations are not statable as interactions of atoms and molecules, but are relations of a unique kind. If we speak of these contexts

2. See in this connection, *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, by H. Levy, 1938, esp. chap. V.
3. This type of theory is best illustrated by the Hegelian conception of the constitution and the state as the substantive reality, in the *Rechtsphilosophie*. The same formal tendency may also be seen in W. Wundt's *Völker Psychologie*, where language and custom are emphasized as the social facts. E. Durkheim's emphasis on the extra-individual character of social facts betrays the same tendency: "Est fait social toute manière de faire, fixée ou non, susceptible d'exercer sur l'individu une contrainte extérieure; ou bien encore, qui est générale dans l'étendue d'une societé donnée tout en ayant une existence propre, indépendante de ses manifestations individuelles." *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, end of chap. 1.

as compounds, we have to do at any rate with a peculiar type of chemistry—with mental, not material, chemistry. A new bond, with its own characteristic traits, is formed as a result of association. To this creative synthesis the individual units are indeed indispensable factors, but the whole is a new synthesis, and not the mere arithmetic sum of individual traits. Unlike mechanical processes, social processes are irreversible, that is, the components are modified in the process, and these modifications are cumulative in their determination of further changes and relations.

Two factors must be taken into account in order to understand the social situation. The primary fact in social contexts is that of the real presence of minds to each other, in their interstimulation and interaction. Beside the living interrelationship of minds, we must take account of tradition, the cumulative mores of the race. Tradition may be said to be the correlate of the social mind, as the body is the correlate of the individual mind. As the brain conserves the results of individual experience, so tradition conserves social experience. The difference between one age and another, between our own age and that of the Middle Ages, for example, lies primarily, if not altogether, in the difference of tradition. There is no reason to suppose that our instincts and capacities have undergone any fundamental modifications since the Middle Ages. The difference, therefore, must lie in those beliefs and customs which constitute our peculiar web of life as distinct from theirs. It is a sociological difference rather than psychological, in the individualistic sense of that term. In the varying traditions, the destinies of men are interwoven as threads of tapestry. It would be a mistake, however, to regard tradition as itself the agent. It is rather the cumulative expression and objectification of common beliefs and purposes. And when it ceases to be such an expression, it is no longer a social fact, but a survival, a flag without a country.

What Émile Durkheim[4] has so strikingly shown in regard to totemism holds in regard to tradition generally. The vital social fact is always the common bond, a unifying interest which holds the individuals together and controls them in a common direction. This bond is primarily one of will, of tendencies to be satisfied, of interests to be organized through intercommunication and interaction. Language and concepts are instruments by means of which this will becomes conscious of its needs, and can the more effectively strive for their realization. Social relations, in other words, are energy relations and must be described as such. They represent a higher level of energy fields than those dealt with by the physical sciences, but not less real.

General Postulates of Social Systems

If there are social facts, then the next question is: Do these facts possess the general characteristics which are necessary for systematic treatment? Those characteristics I have found, in another connection,[5] to be three, namely, variables, recurrence, and form. These characteristics obtain in social situations. First of all there are variables or factors which we can identify in various contexts. The primary variables are human individuals with their reactive properties. Such properties are, on the one hand, the native tendencies in the way of instincts, capacities, and temperament, and on the other, the derived tendencies in the way of habits and purposive reactions which are grafted upon the native. But there are also various grades of secondary variables which must be taken into account, for human individuals do not function as mere abstract entities, but as belonging to groups; and their actions consequently differ with the type of tradition and the complexity of the group organization to which they belong. The fact that men already exist in groups, with their systems of beliefs, determines largely the course of the changes that can

4. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (English translation by Swain), esp. Part II, chap. 7.
5. *A Realistic Universe*, *Macmillan*, 1916, 1931, chap. 3.

arise.[6] While the original characteristics of human nature present a great degree of universality as between different ages and races, it is precisely the group centrism with its mores that presents the main problem in the fusing of human individuals into larger unities. We must take account of the folkways, the reactive properties of the groups as such. It is not as biological individuals that the Chinese offer resistance to Western civilization, but as part of a tradition which determines their outlook and conduct, and which we must respect in order to deal with them successfully. A Chinese baby brought up in Western civilization would offer no resistance. The problem of variables becomes, therefore, vastly more complex in the case of social compounds than in the case of material. In either case, however, we must strive to discover the characteristics of the constituent elements, and their different combining valencies in specific compounds. If we fail to do so, we may find ourselves participants in an explosion.

Beside the characteristics of the units, which enter into social compounds, we must take account of the space and time conditions of social changes. Under space conditions, I include geography generally, with the conditions for living which it envolves. While society is a creative factor and not the mere result of external conditions, yet the external conditions must be taken into account. It has been shown by sociologists that the density or sparseness of the population makes a great deal of difference to the activities and problems that arise. While this condition has been altered through modern means of communication, the problem itself has been intensified by modern conditions of living. The modern city, with its congested population, provides a different set of phenomena from the old rural life. If the space condition is always with us, so is the time condition. We live in a world of change. We are part of history. In

6. I cannot, however, agree with Durkheim that association entirely determines the course of changes. We cannot neglect individual variations or external factors. *Les règles de la méthode sociologique,* chap. 5.

the course of time, old customs and forms of organization grow antiquated, and new ones arise to meet the new conditions. We cannot pour new wine into old bottles. In attempting to initiate social changes, we must have regard to their timeliness. We must respect the laws of social growth. "Watchful waiting" is as important as action, if we would accomplish the desired results.

In the study of social variables, certain cautions are necessary. In the first place, social facts are seldom the result of one set of determinants. The tendency has been to emphasize now geographic environment, now economic conditions, now social conflicts, now ideal factors. Social facts, however, are generally the result of a multiplicity of causes. We must therefore adopt the empirical method rather than the speculative. In the second place, social contexts are not so closely woven but that we can note individual variables, functioning relatively independently of one another. Otherwise analysis and specialization would be impossible. As it is, we have various social sciences, each studying some aspects of social changes. Sociology selects for its material the most generic characteristics of group life, while other social sciences, such as economics, deal with more special phases. Such an abstraction is not only not vicious but necessary, though we must always guard against substituting the part for the whole. In the third place, social structures may function independently of their origin, as determined by the systems in which they actually exist rather than by those in which they may have taken their rise. The study of genesis, interesting and important as it is, is not a substitute for causal explanation, nor is it always indispensable to it.

The other two postulates, namely, recurrence and form, require perhaps less explanation. Social facts, like physical facts, are in a degree predictable. While they are subject to change in the ever-new syntheses into which they enter, they do possess certain persistent traits which make it possible to anticipate their conduct from moment to mo-

ment, in similar situations, and to a certain degree in different situations. Only so would it be possible to have social institutions. Only so could we have that degree of confidence which is essential to business as well as to all other human relations. It is true that, owing to the enormous complexity of the factors which enter into social situations, our predictability is limited. We are able, however, to eke out our personal observations by the statistics of large numbers; and while we cannot predict, perhaps, in each individual case, the choices and preferences and attitudes that may be effective, we may be able to do so for the larger group, and so regulate our conduct. Thus we are able in an approximate way to meet the business needs of a community in spite of the great variety of individual tastes.

In social facts as in physical, we can discover a certain form or organization. Just as a mathematical equation has not only its variables with their recurrence, but its organizing relation, which we must understand, so with social systems. There is, to be sure, a great difference in the degree of organization. Some human associations are comparatively formless. But even the mob can be understood in terms of some one impulse or tendency, however primitive, which gives its conduct direction. The degree of form depends in group life, as well as in personal life, upon the persistence of a certain purpose or ideal toward which all the activities are made to converge. It is this which makes them intelligible. The worth of group life, as of personal life, is measured by the degree in which the variety of interests is harmonized consistently and proportionately within a plan which is adequate to the human situation at the time. In actuality, we have all the variations from a well-organized democracy to a primitive mob. To deal effectively with social facts, we must understand the degree and type of organization which prevails, the bond which gives unity to the facts. We cannot deal with the mob in the same way that we deal with an articulated, purposeful

group, or *vice versa*. We must grasp the organizing idea of the group if we would establish relations with it or effect changes in it.

Some Empirical Laws of Social Systems

We have seen that social facts are unique facts. They are not to be confused with physical facts on the one hand, nor on the other hand are they mere aggregates of individual psychological facts. We have come to recognize the reality of the social bond with its creative synthesis. Social facts, moreover, are activity facts. They are known by the changes which they produce. They are not mere intellectual abstractions. We have also seen that social facts possess the general characteristics which are essential to systems. We must now consider how far it is possible to state social energies in terms of empirical laws. For this purpose we shall adopt a procedure that is generally used in science and deal with social systems as closed systems, in so far as that is possible. In speaking of generalizations about social facts as "laws," we must admit that they are rarely capable of that exact statement which we associate with the term "law" in the physical sciences. There are, however, certain tendencies which we can formulate into fairly definite propositions.

But a difficulty confronts us. By a historical accident scientific genius in the modern Renaissance turned its attention to the physical instead of the social field. The result was that the general laws of nature were formulated with reference to the material world instead of the world of mind. When sociology arrived belatedly on the scene, the second half of the nineteenth century, it inherited the language and concepts of the established physical sciences. The fundamental concepts of physics had become so integrated into the thought of the time that the pioneers of sociology couldn't help using the language of physics. They didn't see that, even though we are obliged to use the language of physics, it needs to be translated into the

facts of another domain.

It has been customary since Herbert Spencer, at least among American sociologists, to assume that the laws of physical energy hold in the same sense in the domain of social facts. They have not recognized, as Marx and Engels saw, that in dealing with social relations we must recognize a new level of energy. Both Lester F. Ward and F. H. Giddings accept Herbert Spencer's vague formula for evolution: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."[7] But this formula is too thin to be of any value in explaining social facts; and its validity is doubtful even in the physical realm from which it is borrowed. Ward makes the assertion that "the conservation of energy and correlation of forces are as applicable to psychic and social forces as to physical forces,"[8] but he does not attempt any proof. The same assumption is implied by Giddings: "Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution. All social energy is transmuted physical energy. The original causes of social evolution are the processes of physical equilibration, which are seen in the integration of matter with the dissipation of motion, or in integration of motion with the disintegration of matter."[9] No wonder, then, that such laws as the conservation of energy, the law of least action, the law of rhythm, etc., can be predicated of social facts. While we agree that "social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution," we must be careful to derive the social laws from their own unique facts. Even when the same verbal expression is used, we must be careful to recognize the difference in meaning in dealing with different levels of energy. A different meaning of a law amounts to a dif-

7. *First Principles*, end of chap. 17.
8. *Pure Sociology*, p. 99.
9. *The Principles of Sociology*, pp. 363-64.

ferent law. I shall try to show how the broad postulates, established by physics, may be translated into social postulates.

There *is* integration in the social world as well as in the world of matter. But social integration is not an integration of matter. The latter is conceived by Spencer as the bringing together of independent units which exist in merely external relations. Social integration must be conceived as a through-and-through relation, an interpenetration within common purposes, where the individual components are modified by the common bond, past and present. There is differentiation both in the physical and in the social world. But there is no analogue of the differentiation of matter in space to the differentiation of functions in society. Even the organic analogue is inadequate, since the individual in society does not function merely in specific ways but can function in a variety of contexts. Nor does biological heredity determine wholly such differentiation. At most, it furnishes certain generic capacities. We can discover coherency in both physical and social systems. But the coherency developed in society is not the external coherency of a mechanical system. It means organization within a common purpose, the coadaptation and telescoping of individuals within a common life, with its impulse to live and to continue to live. Social integration, finally, means not the dissipation of energy, but the storing of energy in customs and institutions. Contrasts might be multiplied indefinitely, but these are sufficient to show the danger of confusing identity of words with identity of relations.

Let us examine now in detail some general propositions concerning social energy. In social energy as in physical, we find it convenient to distinguish between kinetic energy and energy of position. The work done in the case of social energy depends, on the one hand, upon the number of individuals, with their characteristics, their density, their organization within the group, and, on the other hand, upon

the degree of emotional excitement. This excitement, moreover, gathers force as it proceeds, perhaps in geometrical ratio, but it is impossible to verify any such definite formula as that for mechanical kinetic energy or $\frac{1}{2}$ MV^2.

That inertia is a reality in social relations, as well as in dealing with the physical world, is a matter of common experience. In the world of social energy, action tends to proceed in a straight line—that is, directly—unless interfered with. Impulses act themselves out, unless there are inhibiting impulses or considerations. Folkways will persist unless there are interfering circumstances. To rouse a group to action, it is necessary to overcome its inertia or the habits of past ways of acting. In the case of social inertia, as in physical, the inertia varies with motion. A group stirred to passionate action offers more resistance to contrary suggestion than a passive group. Inertia also varies with direction. It is easier to meet prejudice by slantwise or indirect suggestion than by direct suggestion.

We have noted that Spencer, Ward and Giddings assume the validity of the law of conservation of energy in the social realm. It is usually admitted, however, that the law cannot be given exact statement outside of the physical sciences. While there is, on the one hand, dependence of mental energy upon physical, such as nourishment and heat, and while, on the other hand, mental energy seems to be converted into motion and heat, it would certainly be assuming too much to say that we can establish exact equivalences as between mental changes and physical changes. Conservation has, moreover, an entirely different meaning in the mental world. In the physical world conservation means constancy; in the social it means accumulation. Progress is made possible by the running up of social energy in the way of tradition. Thus society is able by its own creative activity to lift itself to a new level. To such storing, there is, so far as we know, no analogue in the physical world. The difference between the mores

of primitive man and the civilization of today is due to such accumulation. It does not seem clear that such accumulation or secondary storing of energy affects the total amount of physical energy in the world. Here, at any rate, we have creative evolution, though we cannot say that the accumulation is absolute, since sometimes whole civilizations have been destroyed with barely a record to show that they existed. If we cannot account for the storing of social energy in physical terms, neither can we account for its loss. What will become of the accumulated social energy in the way of tradition, art, and institutions when this old earth returns to its former chaos? Will there be equivalents of human civilization in the atoms and molecules of whatever physical elements can be said to persist? It is hard for us to think of such equivalences. If Fechner is right that the larger cosmic reservoir of experience, in the hierarchy of the universe, takes up and holds within its unity all the constellations of experience that ever existed, then we have indeed conservation, but we have more than equivalence in terms of the mechanical theory of the universe.

One thing seems clear, and that is that the quantity of mental energy is a limited amount at any one time, and that spending more of it in one direction means less to spend in divergent directions.[10] The absorption in a great war must necessarily drain energy from most of those activities which are not directly involved in the survival struggle. Absorption in material pursuits tends to lessen the available energy for ideal activities. It is also well to keep in mind that there is a dependence of mental energy upon physical conditions, even though we cannot state an exact law. Proper nourishment, proper temperature, proper bodily position, proper rhythm of work and rest, relative freedom from distracting physical stimuli, have been shown to be important conditions of mental efficiency.

10. Cf. *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, 1894, A. W. Small and G. E. Vincent, pp. 332-35.

The law of equilibrium is a pervasive and overlapping law. All change might be stated in terms of two fundamental groups of tendencies—tendencies toward equilibrium and tendencies which upset equilibrium. Organic change, as well as physical, may be stated in terms of equilibrium. In organic evolution the tendency to equilibrium shows itself in the evolution of a new structural adaptation in response to environmental changes, the proper equilibrium being reached when the internal structure of the individual is adapted to its external conditions.[11] In the case of the plant colony it shows itself in the cycle of forms which succeed each other until a climax formation has been reached which is adapted to the conditions, organic and inorganic, and thus becomes stable so long as the conditions are stable. On the level of human adaptation we have similarly a cycle of forms of folkways and institutions until a climax formation is attained for the time being. Of such a climax formation we have an illustration in Eskimo civilization before the white man upset the equilibrium with his new mores, or rather vices. On the level of conscious social experimentation the tendency to equilibrium still holds:

> Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief or thought at rest. Only when our thought about a subject has found rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits.[12]

This is as true in social as in individual conduct. The history of society presents a constant striving toward equilibrium or organized structure. When a disturbance is produced, whether due to contact with outside groups or to disturbing factors within the group itself, there is a tendency for a settlement of some sort to be reached, for the

11. It is highly improbable that such progressive adaptations as the eye could have taken place without direct action of the environment upon the germplasm. There is ample evidence now for direct action, in the case of X-rays for example.
12. Article by C. S. Peirce, *Popular Science Monthly*, XII, p. 286.

time being at least. Every revolution has its reaction when society settles back with the least disturbance of old customs. Unlike the mechanical equilibrium, however, as in the swing of the pendulum, the social equilibrium is never a mere return to the previous *status quo*. New experience has accumulated into structure, and things can never again be quite the same. Nor need the new equilibrium be an average of the forces involved. Higher ideals than the average of the group may dominate, else reform would be impossible. Unfortunately the ideals may also be lower, as shown in the reversion to the mob.

The tendency to rhythm seems to be a universal tendency. According to Spencer "rhythm results whenever there is a conflict of forces not in equilibrium."[13] This definition does not seem complete. We may have a conflict of forces without rhythm resulting, since the process may be a one-way process. Such a tendency has been generalized into the second law of thermodynamics, according to which energy is continually tending toward an equal distribution of potentials. To be sure, in an infinite process this tendency must be counteracted by another tendency, or the universe would stop. It would seem, then, that the cosmic process as a whole must be rhythmic. But in accordance with Spencer's definition, every change would be a rhythm, which does not seem to be the case. Rhythm implies a movement from one equilibrium to another, where constant antagonistic forces predominate alternately in an ascending and descending scale of intensity. It would be easy to multiply illustrations of this tendency to rhythm. Planck has shown that radiant energies come in quanta or rhythmic pulses. We are all familiar with the rhythm of the tides and some of the large cosmic movements. In the organic world we can see it illustrated in the developmental series of complex organisms. In the growth period anabolic changes predominate over katabolic; at maturity the

13. *First Principles*, p. 220.

two tendencies balance; and in senility the katabolic changes in turn predominate—the cycle being ever repeated in the continuous stream of life, so long as life lasts.

We are here concerned primarily with social rhythm. There are certain periodicities in group life as well as in organic life. At one time individualism is dominant, at another time centralization; at one time radicalism, at another conservatism. The movement of society is ever from a disturbed equilibrium to a new equilibrium. Now society breaks the crust of mores to meet new emergencies, and again it settles back to organized ways. Some rhythms may indeed be temporary. The rhythm of inflation and panics in business may be due to a poorly articulated economic system; but some rhythms seem to be fundamental in the life-process itself. Periods of plasticity are followed by periods of stability and degenerating structure. Like biological organisms, societies have their youth and old age. But unlike an individual biological organism, a society may be old and yet grow young again, if it has sufficient vitality to reconstruct old customs to meet new situations. While it is true that society is made up of individuals, and therefore dependent upon the plasticity of biological organisms, yet a society is not limited to one biological generation. In a society biological generations overlap, the old with the young; and while one generation may grow too stereotyped to adopt new ideals, a new generation can do so. The biological correlate of society is not the individual organism but the species. This is a fact that Vico, Spengler and others have overlooked. Unlike mechanical rhythms, social rhythms are cumulative and not a mere repetition. The recurrence of social rhythms is spiral in its cumulative significance rather than a repetition on the same plane, as in the case of mechanical rhythm.

In social systems as well as in physical, there is a law of degradation of energy, though it would be meaningless to transfer the physical law to the social facts. In the social realm there is the constant tendency for purposeful

conduct to be simplified into habit or custom. Social structures tend to solidify and become stereotyped, and thus reach a dead level. This does not mean, however, a running down to the lowest level of primitive beginnings. The degradation is relative, not absolute. New plateaus of mores are established which may mark a far advance over previous levels. Even the worst customs of our own civilization are superior to those of the man-eaters, to use Plato's illustration. Moreover, the energy solidified as custom is still available for further reconstruction. It has merely passed from the active to the potential stage. While habit or custom is a degradation from active thinking, it is, nonetheless, important in the total economy of social life. If a great deal of our life, individual and social, could not be reduced to routine, it would not be possible to give thought to the new problems which arise in a changing society.

As a special form of this law of degradation, we may note the tendency in human integration to substitute impersonal relations for personal relations. The more extensive the organization, the greater the tendency for indirect machinery to take the place of face-to-face interstimulation, with a consequent suppression of personal relations. This can be illustrated in the political realm by the ever-increasing tendency to centralization of control in the larger, more inclusive group, and the corresponding effacing of the smaller, more personal groups. With this centralization grows the sense of power, with its vaulting ambition, and the tendency to use the individual and the smaller group as instruments merely. The larger the group, the more it is likely to be cursed with this impersonalism, unless it can find a place for the smaller unity within the organization. The fact that of late the small nations of Europe have contributed to civilization far out of proportion to their size is due no doubt to the fact that the personal element has there been less submerged in the impersonal machinery with its impersonal ideals. Since the coming of

the Great Industry, this tendency to impersonal integration has been especially conspicuous and tragic in the economic field, but it is a tendency in all social integration. The critical task of the day is to make the impersonal organization the instrument of the needs of a personal humanity, instead of its master and undoer, as it threatens to be.

There is a law of relativity in the social world, as in the physical. Our standards of value are conditioned by the age in which we live and the group in which we are educated. In the social world, as in the physical, we make our evaluations from our own frame of reference. We can no more grasp an absolute direction in history than we can in space. Our new insights are conditioned by standards already established. We measure our advance with reference to these, as we measure our time with reference to the stars. That which meets the requirements within our sphere of relations, and which is not contradicted by other beliefs, seems absolute to us. While we bring certain formal demands to bear upon experience, these, after all, are limited by the content of experience. Our world may be consistent and harmonious, yet narrow and prejudiced. Our ideals themselves vary in meaning with the ongoing of human experience. Absolute progress, therefore, must be regarded as an article of faith rather than as a scientific induction, though in some respects we may note progress.[14]

The law of parsimony would seem to hold in social relations as well as in physical, even though not in the same mechanical sense. Ward speaks of this law as being "the highest generalization thus far obtained in psychic and social phenomena,"[15] and as having a "quality of exactness the most clearly apparent of all psychic and social laws." It is stated by Ward as "the law of greatest gain for the least sacrifice," which he regards as equivalent to greatest

14. See chap. XIII.
15. *Pure Sociology*, pp. 161-62.

pleasure for least pain. Tarde calls it "the law of least effort" and Giddings "the law of least resistance." But they agree in holding it to be an exact mechanical law, implying complete determinism in human volition.

The whole treatment of the law of parsimony in the past is shot through with ambiguities. In the first place, we cannot admit that "least effort" is equivalent to "least pain." It suffices to point out that the amount of expenditure of energy bears no exact relation to pleasure or pain. The maximum expenditure may be pleasant and the minimum may be disagreeable depending upon whether the expenditure is in line with, or contrary to, the dominant conative tendency. If we try to state the law of parsimony in terms of effort, we must contrast the spectator's point of view with the agent's point of view, on the one hand, and the point of view of a moment of activity with the process as a whole, on the other hand. It is not true that the agent necessarily selects what would seem the least effort from the spectator's point of view. Risk and hardship seem to appeal to some human beings at any rate. In volunteering for the recent war, the lines of enlistment which promised sure and immediate service at the front were more popular than the safer and easier forms of service (though public opinion must be taken into account). It cannot be said, at any rate, that we always prefer the things requiring least effort in the objective sense of least work. If it is an economic law that value depends upon scarcity, we may say that we strive for things in proportion as they are difficult to get. Healthy life, at any rate, enjoys activity and finds idleness irksome.

If we say that social activity follows the line of least resistance, we must make clear, further, whether we mean what *seems* least resistance, or what is actually, in the long run, the least resistance. This question would hardly occur in the realm of mechanics. It is a matter of common experience that an individual or group sometimes follows what seems for the moment the line of least resistance, as

in yielding to a temporary passion, but which turns out in the long run to be the line of greatest resistance. We must remember that human beings are moved by remote considerations as well as immediate; by ideals as well as by impulses. Acting along the line of ideal considerations often seems for the time being like acting along the line of greatest resistance, though there can be no doubt that, in the long run, life moves more easily in that direction. William McDougall has suggested that in those cases when we seem to act along the line of greatest resistance we are, in fact, drawing upon an organized sentiment.[16] He emphasizes the self-regarding sentiment, though it might, of course, be any other forward-looking sentiment with its remote considerations. It is not possible, however, to lay the controversy of free will and determinism in the realm of group action, any more than in the realm of personal action. In each case the problem resolves itself, as William James has shown, into the question: Can we attend more or less than we actually do at any one time?[17] If we, individually or collectively, could attend the least fraction more, further considerations and sentiments might be brought into play, and the outcome might be different. Scientifically, at any rate, the problem seems insoluble from the subjective point of view; and we might add that for sociological purposes the subjective approach is futile. We may suggest, too, that the seeming determinism of our statistical averages may be due to our taking the facts in the aggregate, not to the determinism of the individual facts. If indeterminism is a fact of nature, then least action can have only statistical meaning.

In order to give any intelligent sociological meaning to the law of parsimony, we must abandon the subjective standpoint, whether feeling of effort or pleasure-pain, and interpret parsimony in terms of the dynamic life of society. Benjamin Kidd has attempted to state an objective law of action

16. *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1921, pp. 164-178.
17. *Principles of Psychology*, II, 561-79.

in evolutionary terms: "In the evolutionary view, the development of human society is regarded as the product of a process of stress, in which progress results from natural selection along the line, not of least effort in realizing human desire, but of the highest social efficiency in the struggle for existence of the materials of which society is composed."[18] And, he should have added, of the societies themselves. Kidd conceives social evolution as a "process developing by inherent necessity towards social efficiency" and, towards that end, "ultimately over-ruling all desires and interests in the individual." He thus transfers the measure of action from the individual plane to the social plane. But if the action takes place by inherent necessity, "least action" has no meaning. That holds for "least action" on any theory—physical or social—which assumes determinism for under this assumption only one action is possible under a given set of conditions. For practical purposes we are not concerned with least action but with action which will suffice, and the choice of such action varies with our knowledge as well as the conditions in nature. "Least action" when applied to nature implies an anthropopathic view of the universe. In nature, externally viewed, there is merely action. On a deterministic view, "highest social efficiency" is merely that which prevails. We must wait and see. Evolution proves merely that societies which survive are more efficient, in the characteristics that count in the struggle for survival, than those that perish. But Kidd is right in looking for an objective measure of action. If evolution has an objective direction, as both Darwin and Kidd imply (and as I have tried elsewhere to prove[19]), then survival has normative significance on the whole and in the long run, but if human choices count in the social process and if the outcome is not absolutely predetermined, then

18. "Sociology," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (eleventh edition), XXV, 324.
19. *A Realistic Universe*, chap. XVII. See also "Cosmological Implications of Normative Structure," *Proceedings*, Ninth International Congress of Philosophy, 1937; "A Revolution in Philosophy and Science," *Philosophy of Science*, July, 1938.

the attainable maximum may vary. In other words, there is no absolute maximum.

Looking at the matter pragmatically, we may say that in social evolution there is a tendency to economy in the long run, but it is a trial and error process and anything but an exact law. In terms of inertia, it means that we try to get along with the least disturbance of established mores, though in our ignorance we often produce the maximum disturbance. In terms of positive reconstruction, it means that wherever there is effective competition of methods the simplest or most economic methods will tend to prevail in the long run. In the case of science, this means that the simplest hypothesis which will meet the facts prevails over more cumbersome hypotheses which might also be made to fit the facts. The Copernican theory prevails over the Ptolemaic. The same is true of inventions in other realms. In free industrial competition, the machine which saves energy in supervision and operation drives out the less economic competitors. In economic and political organization, the simpler type tends to prevail in the long run over the more complex, because of its greater efficiency in meeting the needs involved, but there may be no long run. The same is true in the moral field. The inventions of the great prophets make life proceed more simply and harmoniously. They indicate the lines of social survival. But the prophets may be ignored for the time being. It must be remembered, in all these cases, that simplicity is a relative term. The simplest hypotheses which will meet the needs of modern science seem enormously complex as compared to the hypotheses of the early Greek scientists. The simplest organization that will answer the needs of modern business is complex in comparison to primitive barter. Economy in social evolution means the simplest methods—so far as we can discover them—which will meet adequately the social requirements. It is noteworthy that the great inventions, whether intellectual, economic or moral, have not seemed, at the

time, the lines of least resistance, since they have antagonized established mores. Society likes its customary ways. It is hard to break old habits. It has, therefore, violently opposed the new and superior ways. But these prove themselves by the objective tests of competition and survival, though the particular society may perish in the meantime.

In the social world, as in the physical, we may say that *in general* there is no action without reciprocal reaction. In the process of social interstimulation the agent is modified as well as the patient. Which of the two is modified more will depend upon their respective organization and inertia. In the relation of parent and child, both are normally transformed in the process of adjustment. But since the child is relatively unorganized, its transformation is the more conspicuous, though the more subtle transformation of the parent is by no means to be neglected. What is true in the interaction of individuals holds in the interaction of groups, whether it be peaceful cultural dominance or friendly competition or hostile conquest. The reciprocal effects on the interacting groups will be in proportion to the relative advancement in civilization in the line of competition, and inversely as the inertia of established custom. Rome was more advanced than the Greek peoples in military organization and readily enforced its political will over the Greeks, but succumbed in turn to their superior culture. In each case the opposing mores had been seriously undermined by previously operating causes. The Greeks were demoralized in military organization, the Romans in cultural mores. Each group, therefore, offered little inertia to the superior mores of the other group.

While the law of action and reaction applies in a general way in the social domain, it is evident that we cannot transfer Newton's law of mechanics bodily to the social facts. It would be rash to say that reaction always equals action and is in the opposite direction. The compensa-

tory reaction may not take place at all. The loved or hated or admired individual or group may be entirely unconscious of the other party's emotion, and hence not affected by it. Where the reaction takes place it may not be the same in kind. Sexual love may give rise to aversion, the attempt at domination may give rise to contempt, anger may stimulate the sense of the ridiculous, instead of the corresponding emotion. The compensatory reaction need not take place at the time, or only partly so. In the case of parental affection, the reciprocal filial reaction is usually weaker than the parental emotion. The deeper compensatory reaction is projected to the next generation, when the offspring in turn becomes parent. Where the parental affection is not thus stimulated, the compensation does not take place, or is transformed into the more general affection for the species, as in philanthropy or public spirit. Other emotions may be similarly projected to those having no immediate part in their stimulation. Thus anger may produce a fretful mood affecting those who are entirely innocent in the production of the original emotion. The problem of action and reaction is, therefore, very much more complicated in psycho-social relations than in mechanical relations. Moreover, the psycho-social situation which results from interaction is an emergent fact and not reducible to the mechanical resultant of forces. It resembles chemical synthesis in this respect. But unlike the ingredients in chemical synthesis, the ingredients in social synthesis are permanently altered through the interaction, and thus project the effects indefinitely beyond the unique particular situation into all future situations into which they enter. This fact has no parallel in physical situations. In the case of social reactions, as in certain chemical reactions, the reaction may be out of all proportion to the action, the latter serving merely as a releasing stimulus to the unstable equilibrium of the reacting system with its enormous pent-up energy. A person or a group in a suspicious or irritated state of mind may respond ex-

plosively to a comparatively slight action. In any case of interaction, it holds that we must understand the composition, organization, and equilibrium of the interacting systems.

We may consider the problem of social communication as a special aspect of the problem of interaction. There is a tendency on the part of social activities to spread their energy to the neighboring social environment. This law of spreading has been stated in various terms. Gabriel Tarde uses the term "imitation" to cover all of social communication. William McDougall[20] suggests that the term "suggestion" be used for the spontaneous communication of ideas, "sympathy" for the communication of emotions, and "imitation" for the spreading of action. At any rate, greater clearness of terminology is to be desired, and the current vague use of the word "imitation" should be discouraged. One of the few attempts at exact mathematical statement of a sociological law is Tarde's law of imitation: "In the absence of interferences, imitation spreads in geometrical progression."[21] This formula could hold only for abstract conditions. It assumes the absence of interference, which is another way of saying that it assumes an abstract imitative man, whatever that may mean. It also assumes that the group concerned is an infinite quantity, since otherwise the imitation would of course stop. (For certain purposes humanity may be regarded as an infinite quantity in time, in the case of life insurance, for example, though not as regards contemporary units.) But sociology has the right, as other sciences have, to assume abstract conditions, if explanation is facilitated by so doing. Such procedure is illustrated in Newton's first law of motion and Gibbs' Phase Rule. As such an abstraction, Tarde's law no doubt has its value. In fact, however, man is not merely imi-

20. *Op. cit.*, p. 93.
21. *The Laws of Imitation* (trans., E. C. Parsons, 1903) chap. 1. For a clear and concrete statement of the Tardean conception of imitation see E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*. A critique of Tarde is given in *Psychological Interpretations of Society* by M. M. Davis, Jr., 1909.

tative. There are indeed cases where the communication is practically mechanical, as in the learning by rote of nonsense syllables, and in the unconscious adoption of habits, but in the degree in which these are passive imitations they are meaningless. There can be no real spreading of meaning without assimilation. This involves the translation of the stimulus into the mental constitution of the recipient individual and the tradition of which he is a part. Communication implies interpretation. The mind is not mere passive wax to receive impressions. It makes a selective response to the stimulus. There is no impression without expression, no repetition without variation. This Tarde himself recognized by adding a second law: "Imitations are reflected by their media." But he was hampered by his physical analogies; and his statement fails to make clear the dialectic of the learning process.

Giddings' well-known attempt to explain the spreading of psychic activities, and for that matter to account for society itself, on the basis of like-mindedness or "consciousness of kind," seems to be, in part at least, a circle. Like-mindedness or similarity of interest must itself be the result of the socializing process; and while, once existing, it facilitates and intensifies social unity, it cannot be said to be a primary cause of the arising of such unity. The gradual unification of mankind, from relatively heterogeneous groups, does in a measure tend toward like-mindedness, but this is evidently the effect rather than the cause of the process. That each generation is to a large extent like-minded in tradition and interests with its predecessors is due to education. Children do not imitate their parents because of like-mindedness; but because of the social pressure brought to bear in the way of sanctions; because of prestige; and eventually, to a certain extent at least, because of the recognized merits of the ways already established. The same relation exists, in the main, between different social groups. There is, indeed, a fundamental likeness as regards the principal instinctive dispositions, but

this is not like-mindedness. A thousand English children transported to Germany and a thousand German children brought up in an English environment would each be like-minded with the group in which they are brought up, and would be loyal to its tradition. It is, of course, true that like-mindedness is both cause and effect. Some unities presuppose a considerable degree of like-mindedness. This is the case with such intimate relations as friendship. Where marriage is based on sentimental preference, likeness, both physical and mental, is more striking than is difference. But, in general, differentiation of interests is as characteristic of social development as likeness. Both are aspects of the process of adaptation of "internal relations to external relations"—the reconstruction of the latter in terms of the former, and *vice versa*. In the words of M. M. Davis: "Society is neither similarity nor difference, but is a co-adaptation of members partly similar, partly different. Historical progress is primarily to be interpreted as an increasing co-adaptation, accompanied by increases of difference as well as similarity."[22] It is not necessary that there should be like-mindedness for ideas to spread; the mere absence of antagonistic beliefs may be sufficient. Witness the wide uniformity in primitive societies, as well as the credulity of children.

In this connection, perhaps, should be mentioned two spurious so-called laws. One is to be credited to Tarde, namely, that imitation proceeds from internals to externals.[23] This seems, so far as automatic assimilation is concerned, a reversal of the facts, whether in inter-personal or inter-group relations. The adoption of externals comes first, the understanding of underlying ideas later. It is of course different where the assimilation is rational, as in the deliberate borrowing by one group or individual from another. But this could not properly be termed imitation. Another so-called law is that individual minds respond similarly

22. *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, p. 193.
23. See chap. IV.

to similar stimuli. But individuals may respond similarly to different stimuli. This is shown even on the level of instinct. Such instinctive responses as fear and anger are called forth by a variety of stimuli. These responses are greatly complicated and multiplied on the level of conscious experience. Again, it may be shown that individuals or groups respond differently to the same stimuli. It is true that a frog without its cerebral hemispheres can be counted on to respond in the same way to the same stimulus, but this is not true of a frog with its hemispheres intact, and the sociologist is presumably dealing with individuals with cerebral hemispheres. To be sure, in proportion as we have similarity of mental structure there is a probability of similarity of response, but that is a truism, not a law.

Variation is as characteristic of social stimulus-response as similarity. When the variation is significant in the reconstruction of the situation for further response, we call it invention. Two factors must be taken into account in inventiveness—the individual constitution with its tendencies, and the social matrix of which the agent is a part. The former accounts for the uniqueness of the response, the latter for its content. The social epoch makes the difference largely between the results of an Archimedes and a Newton. It is the creative reaction of such geniuses that makes new eras in human development. The scattered issues and fragments of life must lie in solution and germinate in a great mind for new and comprehensive syntheses of experience to be possible. Mechanical imitation and creative invention are limiting cases of the stimulus-response relation, where the constitution of the reagent must be taken into account as well as the character of the stimulus, and where both are abstractions from a unique situation.

A fundamental tendency, wherever psychic activities are involved, is that of selective emphasis. Some type of interest holds the center of control for the time being, subordinating other interests to itself, or crowding them out.

It may dominate during long periods of the life of a people; it may be temporary. Giddings suggests that there is always a conscious hierarchy of interests where power ranks at the head, and utility, integrity, and self-realization follow in the order indicated.[24] This he calls the "law of rational social choice." But, in the first place, the process of selection is largely unreflective. Few individuals or groups are fully conscious of their dominating values. The larger part of our selection is apt to be determined by sentiments which are largely in the background of our consciousness. On this level of non-reflective selection, our choices are controlled by the more or less unconscious scale of values that dominates the group and perhaps the age. If we adopt ideas which depart from the usual regime, we may be determined by the prestige of the ideas, or the way in which they are communicated, rather than by the merit of the ideas. Competition, whether it be between individuals or groups, will tend to weed out those ways of living which are injurious or ineffective. This may be done by eliminating the individual or the group. It may, however, be accomplished by forcing reflection upon the inadequate ways of living, and thus result in the invention or the adoption of more adequate ways. While group life may rise to the reflective level and exercise rational choice, and it does so under the stress of new problems, yet for the most part the collective mind tends to drop back to the automatic level, only to be aroused as a sleeping giant, by the necessity of finding a more comfortable position.

As regards, again, the selected content, we may well doubt that the group has such a definite and constant scale of interests as that indicated by Giddings. The emphasis is likely to vary from time to time. On the whole, however, it would seem that the interests which have to do with self-maintenance must ordinarily come first. The economic interest of procuring means of food and shelter,

24. *The Principles of Sociology*, pp. 401-9.

of maintaining a standard of living, and if possible improving that standard, has always been more or less present and dominant. Most, if not all, of the wars of aggression have been economic in their final basis. Another basic interest is racial continuity and the institutions which this involves. The numerous regulations of sex relations and of the family, in primitive life, show that this interest was early recognized; and there are those today who would trace all our social activity back to the sex instinct. At any rate, the two interests of self-maintenance and race-maintenance must always have a conspicuous place. Other interests are emphasized in turn, and may overshadow, for the time being, the economic and racial interests. In early Christianity the interest in the kingdom of heaven overshadowed the interest in this world. But always there is the tendency to emphasize some one interest, and to subordinate others to it more or less definitely.

An interesting characteristic in connection with emphasis is that of centrism. Just as in the field of vision the things that are nearer look larger, and objects seem to diminish with the distance, so in the field of valuation there is a tendency for the individual or group to exaggerate the importance of its own immediate interests and to become correspondingly blind to larger contexts of interest. When it is a case of an individual, we speak of this tendency as self-preference or, less euphoniously, as egoism. When it concerns a people, we speak of it as ethnocentrism. Familism, localism, provincialism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, are terms indicating widening spheres of centrism. Ordinarily the nearer circle seems the more real. Its interests seem peculiarly vital. In crises, however, the larger circle may claim the dominance, since the existence of the smaller may be conditioned upon the larger. Thus the national interest in time of war dominates the smaller circles of interest. The tendency to centrism holds as regards an age or epoch of history. Thus the medieval mind, with sublime faith in itself, subordinates all values to its religious emphasis.

There is, in any case, a certain self-hypnotization which makes our own immediate context of interest loom peculiarly large and important. This tendency has profoundly influenced both personal and group relations. It is the source of many of the maladjustments of life. But it seems also to be an important element in the efficiency of life. On the whole, by working loyally for the things that are nearest to us, in the normal relations of life, we are likely to do most for the remoter ends of life. We are likely thus to promote unconsciously that "projected efficiency" of which Benjamin Kidd made so much. This group centrism is evidently a conservative agency, and militates against the confusion which might come from the indefinite spreading of ideas and emotions. It thus prevents endless dissipation of energy, though it also furnishes inertia to progress.

Subjective selection must, in the end, stand the test of objective selection. What determines the significance and permanency of our emphases is not the strength of our individual or even our social preferences, our likes and dislikes, but the adaptation of the life process of society to its environment. And by the environment we mean not merely the physical environment,[25] with its demands and limitations, but also the social environment, with its competition of individuals and groups, and its ever-growing requirements. It means not merely immediate adjustment, but adjustment to the future as well. In this survival struggle, social fitness, the capacity for team work, becomes more important than mere individual strength and cunning. In the words of Kidd: "The social process is primarily evolving in the individual not the qualities which

25. T. N. Carver, in common with sociologists of the geographic and economic schools, seems to overemphasize the physical environment. "The ultimate problem of any variety of life, including the human race, is that of adjustment to the material universe."—*Essays in Social Justice*, 1915, p. 24. While not committing myself to Carver's theory of social justice as outlined in this book, I am in thorough sympathy with his vigorous and bracing use of the objective method of evaluating social evolution, as opposed to the subjective pleasure-pain approach.

contribute to his own efficiency in conflict with his fellows, but those qualities which contribute to society's efficiency in the conflict through which it is gradually rising towards a more organic type."[26] The tendency of evolution, therefore, is to produce a socially minded type. To quote Kidd again: "For it is thus not the human mind which is consciously constructing the social process in evolution; it is the social process which is constructing the human mind in evolution."[27]

Organization is a tool of as great importance to human survival as teeth and claws to certain animals. For the potential efficiency of an organized group "must always be taken to be greater than the sum total of the potential efficiency of all its members acting as individuals." In Kipling's words:

> For the strength of the pack is the wolf,
> And the strength of the wolf is the pack.

Social adaptation is not merely a passive adjustment to a static environment, be that environment physical nature or the folkways of society, but in part, at least, a creative adaptation, in which the environment and its survival conditions are themselves changed. Science has done a great deal to change the physical environment. Nor is reason helpless in the presence of human mores. With each change of social standards new selective conditions are established. The task of civilization is not merely adjustment to things as they are, but the making over of the conditions of existence in obedience to the demand of the life impulse. Adaptation within a growing society is, therefore, an infinite process with ever new survival conditions.

While the persistence of mores is determined in the long run by their aptness in meeting the conditions of existence, not all mores, any more than all biological struc-

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26. *Op. cit.*, p. 331. An organic society, according to Kidd, is characterized by mutual responsibility as opposed to closed classes, but also by subordinating the individual to the social movement as a whole.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

tures, change at the same rate. Those mores which are most vital to the maintenance of the group are the ones most responsive to change.[28] Other mores will tend to change in consistency with these. Social structures, like biological, which are not directly affected by survival selection may persist for an indefinite time, simply because they exist and possess the advantage of inertia.

Variation, selection, and adaptation constitute the dynamic categories of social evolution. They are present throughout the cosmic process in its various stages of creative synthesis. The seeming uniformity of nature is probably due to our gross averages. Selective reaction is characteristic of reality throughout, and so is adaptation. The present familiar inorganic compounds, as well as biological structures, are the result of a long process of adaptation, and, with radical changes in cosmic conditions, would fail to survive. But in social adaptation, on the reflective plane at any rate, adaptation ceases to be merely automatic. Conscious participation, criticism and experimentation short-circuit in many ways nature's hit-or-miss unconscious methods. Society itself, however, is after all but a part of nature's creative striving, and is subject in the end to the great cosmic process that brought it forth.

The relation of complexity to development has been obscured by a false tradition started by Herbert Spencer. Spencer assumes as a postulate "the instability of the homogeneous." This postulate is a paradox. A homogeneous system would be stable unless it is disturbed from outside. It is the disturbance which introduces instability, not the homogeneity. This fact is made evident in Spencer's statement of his postulate: "Any finite homogeneous aggregate must inevitably lose its homogeneity, through the unequal exposure of its parts to incident forces."[29] But the basis of instability, in that case, lies not in the "homo-

28. Cf. A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, 1915, especially chaps. III-V; also, W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, 1911.
29. *First Principles*, p. 473 (American reprint of fifth edition).

geneous" but in the heterogeneity of the interactions.[30] Instability increases with heterogeneity. In the words of J. L. Henderson: "The number of degrees of freedom increases by the same number as the number of components or different forms of energy which are involved in the system."[31] In terms of physical systems, the law would read: "Other things being equal, the stability of a system *diminishes* with increase of the number of its undecomposed constituent molecular species, and of the number of different forms of energy, e.g., heat, pressure, electrical potential, surface tension, which are involved in its activities."[32] The same law would seem to hold for social development. Stated in sociological terms, the law would read: The degrees of freedom of movement increase with the complexity of social relations. It may be heterogeneity of interests within the group, or the contact of different groups, or both types of heterogeneity. A group with few and uniform interests is bound to become bigoted and stationary. "Magnificent isolation" is likely to produce stagnation, while culture contacts with other groups, particularly more advanced groups, will tend to accelerate development.[33] This will be all the more evident if they are competing groups. War furnishes such competition in a one-sided way, that is, so far as the activities relate to war. But friendly competition in science, arts and industries is likely to be more thoroughgoing and permanent in its in-

30. If we presuppose an initial cosmic equilibrium for the evolutionary process, as Jeans does, such a system would have to be disturbed from without in order for the process to start. Jeans sees that and therefore introduces a miracle—"the finger of God."
31. *The Order of Nature*, 1917, p. 136. Henderson states the researches of J. Willard Gibbs.
32. *Op. cit.*, p. 137.
33. L. Gumplowics and G. Ratzenhofer have emphasized the acceleration of development when two societies "conjugate" by a process of conquest. See Gumplowics, *Der Rassenkampf*, secs. 34, 35; Ratzenhofer, *Sociologische Erkentniss*, chaps. XIII and XIV. For a brief statement see F. W. Blackmar and J. L. Gillen, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 423-427. C. P. Tiele has shown the stimulating effect of the contact of a lower stage of cultural development with a higher. *Elements of the Science of Religion*, I, p. 239.

fluence, as it loosens the inhibition of the mores and conduces to real like-mindedness, while war, with its antagonism, tends to stiffen the ethnocentrism and to inhibit profounder influences. The diversity may also be due to internal problems—individual variations in the way of genius or new problems forced by new conditions of existence.

But creative social development requires more than the interaction of simultaneous forces. Moral freedom implies more than freedom of movement in space. It is directed to the future. It has a time-form and cannot be expressed in merely spatial interactions. Its whole-form includes the future. It is a creative fact and not a mere resolution of forces. It cannot be expressed merely as spatial causality. For continuous and fruitful development it is not enough that there shall be complexity, but that the complexity shall be harmonized with reference to a fundamental and comprehensive ideal. Else there may be mere confusion and dissipation of energy. The law of combination has been well formulated by Giddings for sociological purposes: "A population that has but a few interests which, however, are harmoniously combined, will be conservative in its choices. A population that has varied interests which are as yet inharmoniously combined will be radical in its choices. Only the population that has many, varied, and harmoniously combined interests will be consistently progressive in its choices."[34] An adequate ideal of social combination must mean the realization of the genius of a people in terms of the conditions with which it must cope. Herbart pointed out, long ago, the importance of complexity for the sanity of personal development. It is equally important for the sanity of the group. For groups, as well as individuals, are subject to obsessions and fixed ideas. And curing a powerful group which has run amuck may require all the

34. *The Principles of Sociology*, p. 411. Cf. Spencer: "The penultimate stage of equilibration in which the extremest multiformity and most complex moving equilibrium are established, must be one implying the highest conceivable state of humanity."—*First Principles*, p. 475.

forces of civilization, with enormous sacrifice to the energies of the race.

As regards the motive or aim of conduct, sociologists, following Spencer, have been inclined to psychological hedonism. It has been held that the motive or aim of conduct is always pleasure or the avoidance of pain. This view has been sufficiently exploded by psychological analysis. We aim to realize tendencies. We do not aim at pleasure, but at *goods*—satisfactory activities. In this sense of good, the law of motive may be expressed in the medieval phrase, *sub specie boni.* If we cannot say that we aim at pleasure, neither can we say that we aim at the maximum of pleasure, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. We aim at the harmonious realization of our desires, whether individually or collectively. Furthermore, we must not confuse the descriptive inquiry into what actually *is* the aim that moves human beings with the ethical question, or what *ought* to be the aim of human beings. The goods aimed at may be one-sided and selfish, whether in the case of the group or the individual. It is true, however, that an aim can only persist in the long run, whether it be that of a group or of an individual, when it conduces to the larger human good. Our aims, whether individual or group aims, are subject to survival selection in the further development of the race. We may say with Kidd: "All the tendencies of development—political, economic, ethical, and psychological—and the contents of the human mind itself, have therefore to be regarded as having ultimate relations to the governing principles of the process as a whole."[35] What these "governing principles" are our little fragment of history can only dimly foreshadow at best. But we may entertain the faith that just as the child has the best preparation for being the right sort of man, impossible though it is for it to know what a man's life is, when it lives the most normal life of a child, so we, in proportion as we

35. *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

succeed in living normally and sanely now, shall best prepare the way for the higher destiny of the future.

The foregoing is a meager sketch of some of the tendencies which seem to be operative in social processes. By statistical methods we may sometimes give such tendencies and other tendencies a quantitative formulation. But as compared with the laws of mechanical science they must indeed seem vague, and we are indeed rightly suspicious of exact formulae in the social sciences. Sociology, however, does not differ in this respect from other sciences which deal with complex material. The difficulty of formulating social laws is no excuse for not trying to do so, since understanding social facts must be a matter of supreme concern to social beings. In the measure that we understand the laws of social processes, we can also hope to control them. For the purpose of the study of social laws is not that we shall lie down under them in fatalistic supineness and say that what is must be; but rather that, through our knowledge of the tendencies of society, we may be able to control human development and make it significant by weaving it into more comprehensive ideals.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATION OF VALUE[1]

The basic fact of value consists in a certain restlessness on the part of the will, and the allaying or satisfaction of this restlessness. To understand the nature of this restlessness, as well as the type of realization which is possible, we must glance at the canalization and organization[2] of the will in its biological, psychological, and social aspects.

The Canalization of Value

Biological bases. —To obtain insight into the nature of value we shall first consider the racial organization of the will as indicated by instinctive tendency and temperament. The will as we find it in human experience is already canalized in the form of certain typical drives, which are of vital importance in the orientation of life to its environment. If we speak of instincts in human beings we must remember that they are incomplete and forward looking. They become organized in the course of experience into various patterns of sentiment and disposition, but they persist as basic roots in this creative transmutation. We cannot understand social relations without taking into account such biological drives as the parental instinct, the band instinct, the instinct of gregariousness. To understand the thrill in the search for truth, we must go back to the primitive emotion of wonder which becomes socially organized into the drive of thought. To appreciate the nature of esthetic activity, we must recognize a certain fundamental organization which makes us take delight in certain com-

1. First published in the *American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1915, but the theory of value goes back to a paper, "Knowing Things," in *The Philosophical Review,* 1911, and later republished in *A Realistic Universe,* 1916, 1931, pp. 107 ff.
2. The term canalization as here used has reference to the forming of special tendencies for adaptation to special types of stimuli, while organization has reference to the correlation of tendencies and beliefs.

binations of sound, color, and movement. The past and the future of man are thus indicated though in vague outline in his biological constitution—not only in the primitive appetites which he shares with the brute, but in the later urges such as the love of truth and beauty which furnish the program of his destiny. These biological capacities furnish both the limits within which realization is possible and the type of realization for each particular individual. Defectiveness in the scale of biological endowment must mean a corresponding defect in realization. Special endowment in some particular direction furnishes the opportunity of distinguished realization in that direction, whether it be artistic or practical.

This does not mean that we can compound in an arithmetical way the later sentiments and dispositions out of the primary tendencies. To understand the later complex organization, we must respect its own uniqueness. The organization itself is not a mere reshuffling of certain elementary constituents, but is productive of new dispositions with new possibilities of value. The elemental impulses are transformed and reconstituted in the chemistry of life. But still we can recognize the reminiscences of man's animal ancestry in human nature. We must also take account of certain tendencies which are prophetic of a higher order of life and indicative of man's peculiar destiny.

The interrelation of emotional dispositions into sentiments[3] is in part foreshadowed in the congenital structure of human nature, however much it is complicated by later intellectual organization. The rudimentary sentiment of love, for example, must be regarded as innately present. In the higher animals, the maternal disposition shows its interrelation with such other dispositions as anger when the object is threatened, fear for its safety, as well as numerous organized tendencies for the care and succor of the offspring. What the later intellectual organization does

3. For the analysis of sentiments see A. F. Shand, *The Foundations of Character*, 2nd ed., 1926.

is to complicate vastly the number of tendencies interrelated, as well as to make the sentiment more definite and conscious in terms of its typical object.

The more general fact of temperament has also a good deal to do with the nature of our activities, the strength and persistence of their realization, and their affective tone. Some temperaments are slow, others quick; some warm, others cold; some strong, others weak; some flare up quickly with violent fluctuations of feeling, others have a steady tone with a cheery or melancholy level. Temperament thus enters as a fundamental and constant factor into our capacity for enjoyment. It determines to a large extent the difference in the threshold of satisfaction as between different individuals and as between different races.

These primitive presuppositions of biological endowment and temperament enter into the fundamental texture of life throughout. They enter as roots or radicals into the more conscious processes of life, and they remain as basic variables in the complex transformations of our experience. Without understanding these presuppositions, the complexer organization is left in the air.

Psychological elaborations. —We must furthermore take account of the intellectual canalization and organization of the restlessness of the will. The primitive values are transformed and re-created into new patterns with the development of the higher intellectual activities. Memory enables us to conserve past values and to live them over again indefinitely. The values of the past come to figure thus in two contexts. We must recognize the context of the past, with the values of realization and failure which this implies; but the past context, beside its own value, borrows a living present value from its relation to our present purposes. This means sometimes the enhancement of the values of the past by the recognition of further implications of development which come to light in the course of experience. The movement of the past is taken up and adds

its energy to ever-larger organizations of human experience, and so the joys and sorrows of the past become intensified by the consciousness of the further success and failure to which they contribute. It is also a well-known fact that the values of the past may sometimes be reversed from the point of view of the later movement of the self. What seemed success at the time becomes failure in the further reorganization, with corresponding disappointment; what seemed hardship and misfortune at the time may from the point of view of a later moment be seen to contribute to a larger realization. Thus the values of the past are ever transmuted, ever re-created into new patterns, ever shifting in color, with their integration into the larger development of life.

What memory does for the past, imagination does for the future. By means of imaginative selection and reconstruction, we are able, in part at any rate, to anticipate the future, to enjoy its values in prospect. Such values are again subject to transformation in the actual carrying out of the activity. They may shift their tone from positive to negative, from harmony to discord, and from discord to harmony in accordance with the actual movement of the will in its success or failure to master its situations.

Not only are we able to prepare for and to enjoy the future by means of imagination, but we are able to create new worlds for the free play of our activities, the world of pure mathematics, of fairyland, of artistic activity, and thus to enhance indefinitely the values of life. Thus we add to the meager situations of actual life an indefinite number of opportunities for stimulating the emotions. This applies equally to the negative values of unpleasant foreboding and to the positive anticipations of realization. Infernos and Paradises are alike the product of creative imagination and eke out indefinitely the meager values of every-day attainment.

The more somber creative activities of abstraction and generalization, of induction and deduction also have their

tone and value; and in lives organized in those directions such values may be fully as intense and absorbing as those of the freer play of creative intelligence. Each type of creative activity has thus its own kind of value, which can be understood only by taking account of the specific organization of the will. In each type there is the ever-shifting play of values, as past tendencies are successfully or unsuccessfully reorganized into the more complex patterns of life. In each case the primary values are vastly transmuted in the new organizations; and the organization itself, with its redirection and transmutation of the past, is ever a source of new values. The world of value is thus fundamentally a creative world. The reflection upon values, in recognizing their implications, in taking up the past into new creative situations, is itself a source of values. To understand the world of values, therefore, we must understand the laws of the intellectual reconstruction of the primary experiences.

Sociological patterns.—In order to understand the world of values, we must also take into account social organization—the social matrix into which our consciousness is born and in which it must find its meaning and definite fulfilment. Psychology in the past has been too prone to treat mind as a subcranial affair. Whatever justification such treatment may have for the abstract purpose of psychological description, it is an artificial method at best. Mind becomes organized and takes on new meaning from its living intercourse with minds in its historic epoch, with its world of social patterns. Values as we find them in adult experience are largely the result of social emphasis, suggestion, and organization. This social world of accumulated experience we assimilate largely at second hand. Society is ever at our elbow admonishing and enforcing conformity to its standardized estimates of value. It bribes us with rewards, it threatens us with punishments, it exercises its constant pressure to make us into its likeness. Our instinctive and intellectual activities are

thus canalized and organized in the directions approved by the social mind within which we live. For the most part, we find it easiest to be carried on the wave of social energy. What we choose and value is largely the result of our desire to live as part of society and to win approval within it. Our own tendencies and needs are transformed into the socially organized life of our day. In desiring a dress, a woman does not want it merely as clothes, but as it is socially approved by the fashion of the day, however poorly it may serve the purpose of clothes. She does not desire to be immodest, if the fashions are such, but to conform and excel within social standards. And we cut our other activities, our thoughts and ambitions, to conform to the styles of the time. Even though we would be original, we must still take account of the background of socially organized experience, and if we succeed in our originality, it is by divining the deeper trend of human experience. Novelty and conformity are alike to be understood with reference to the social matrix and its pressure.

The Value Situation

The nature of value.—We have seen that value somehow has to do with the restlessness of the will and the canalization and organization of this restlessness into definite activities with their typical objects. Value may be defined as the congruity[4] of an object of activity with the organized tendencies of the will which seeks realization in terms of the special situation. This means congruity with the instinctive and temperamental tendencies as intellectually organized into the social network of definite relations. Values are first of all standardized for us by the systematic purposes of society. It is this standardization into which we are educated, and which for the most part we unquestioningly accept. If value is defined as a realization of a

4. The aspect of congruence has been emphasized in John Dewey and J. H. Tufts' *Ethics,* 1932, pp. 281-84, a book replete with suggestions for a theory of value. A similar concept, that of harmony or fitness, is beautifully expressed in G. H. Palmer's, *The Nature of Goodness,* 1903.

more or less organized tendency in terms of the object which it seeks, or as the congruence of an object with the direction of organized activity, we find that there are two variables of which we must take account in order to understand the nature of value. These two factors are organized tendency and feeling. Of these factors, I regard organized tendency as the primary and feeling as the secondary factor. The two are relatively independent variables. The strength of the desire depends upon the strength of the particular conative tendency as organized into the system of an intellectualized and socialized sentiment. The strength of the particular impulse itself may be relatively weak, as in the case of the later ideal tendencies, but its integration with other tendencies into a sentiment may give it preponderating strength in determining the choice of values. The strength of the feeling in a particular individual varies with the struggle or resistance in the attainment of the end and with the postponement of this attainment. Organized sentiment means steady pressure through all kinds of weather. It is a constant through indefinite stretches of time and throughout the complexity of the conditions of its realization. Feeling flares up into emotion with conflict and sinks down again into mood and attitude, with the resolution of the conflict and the more fluent movement of realization. Feeling is likely to be strongest with natures least organized, as in such cases the ups and downs are more numerous. The relatively unorganized life of childhood and early youth furnishes us the most conspicuous examples of joys and sorrows, of the ups and downs of feeling. Feeling also varies with temperament, some temperaments being peculiarly of the hair-trigger type, ready to burst forth into explosive energy of emotion, while other temperaments manifest a steady tenor of activity with a correspondingly permanent level of feeling.

The steady pressure of organized conation may have but little feeling or emotion accompanying it. We might contrast the French attitude, at the beginning of the World

War, with its unbounded enthusiasm, and the British attitude with its quiet, undemonstrative, but "grim determination." It meant to stay in to the finish whatever the cost, yet the emotional expression was largely suppressed. Some of us come to do almost everything with a grim determination—even playing and eating. The realization of an organized aim through years of ill-health, as in the case of Herbert Spencer, or in doing much of our work past the threshold of fatigue, may have largely a negative tone of feeling. Feeling depends upon the visceral and sex systems[5] of an organism, their health and buoyancy; desire depends upon the organization of the conative tendencies, and so is comparatively constant, however much feeling fluctuates. In the organized life of the will, feeling tends to become largely neutral—the striving of the business man for success through years of toil, the long plodding of the scientist in the mastery of his tools and in the accumulation of his facts. Large stretches of a life of achievement may lack dramatic excitement so far as feeling is concerned; and at best the attainments in a life, with a large ideal, fall far short of the ambition, with a corresponding sense of failure. Scientific instruments in such cases of organized activity will probably indicate but slight fluctuations in the conditions upon which feeling depends. There are sometimes of course the more marked variations—the conspicuous success or failure in the turn of business, the lucky hit of the scientist, and these have indeed their strong affective tone—but they are a comparatively small part of life's activity and in many lives may scarcely exist.

The strength of the feeling may often show itself in what are comparatively trivial aspects of life, while the more fundamental values of life remain largely subconscious. A man's attitude toward his home, his relation to his happy

5. The dependence of value upon such primitive systems, may seem to degrade value. But the worth of a value does not depend upon its origin but upon the object of realization. The pond lily is a thing of beauty, though it has its roots in the slime.

family of beautiful wife and children, his loyalty to his country, or to his religion, may indicate but little affective fluctuation and, if undisturbed and unimpeded, may have almost a neutral tone, while his consciousness of becoming bald may be a matter of considerable fretfulness. And yet it is not to be supposed that the man values his hair more than his family or his country. We cannot, therefore, regard feeling as the sole factor in value. Organized desire must be regarded as the more essential and the more constant condition.

If feeling cannot be regarded as the primary condition of value, the existence or at least the possibility of feeling must be regarded as a *sine qua non* of the realization of value.[6] A machine may grind out products in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, but to the machine itself there can be no such fact as value. Somehow, therefore, realization must be *felt*, or at any rate be capable of being felt, in order that we may speak of value at all. While the irksome activities may prove to be more valuable than the pleasant diversions, and while an organized aim makes us comparatively independent of the ups and downs of fortune, still in the further realization of life the agreeable feeling or in any case the sense of being at ease in one's situation is an aspect of successful activity.

The threshold of feeling varies with temperament and with the organization of tendencies. As the former is a constant in a particular life, we can leave it out of consideration.[7] With little organization, as in childhood and in some natures throughout life, the threshold is particularly low. It takes but little to stimulate the child to joy.

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6. We cannot eliminate feeling from value altogether, as seems to be done by Hugo Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, 1909, ch. V. Cf. Plato's *Philebus:* While Plato emphasizes structure, he does recognize feeling as an aspect of the good, though in dignity it comes lowest in the scale.
7. There are other variables which affect the threshold from time to time, such as surplus energy and fatigue. Their influence, however, decreases with organization tendencies. There are also pathological conditions which affect the organic bases of feeling. But from these we must abstract here.

The simplest toy may be an occasion of great merriment. The smallest disappointment for the time being is unalleviated in its bitterness by any perspective of the future. In the organized life, the affective threshold is correspondingly high. Feeling varies in inverse ratio to organization, so that with habit feeling tends to fall to zero; yet, if there were no threshold of feeling, we should become mere machines and value would be impossible.

We are now in a position to understand certain ambiguities in the use of the terms "value" and "interest." We sometimes use the term "value" or "interest" in the singular, having reference particularly to the affective tone at the time. We sometimes use these terms in the plural, having reference primarily to the objects which satisfy an organized system of tendencies. Both usages have their genetic significance in the development of our consciousness of value.[8] In the primitive value situation, the tendencies are relatively unorganized and the object correspondingly accidental. In this case values become the momentary likes or dislikes that are stimulated by the particular occasion. As our conative life becomes organized in terms of intellectual processes and social institutions, value comes to mean, not merely the momentary feeling, but that which *can* satisfy the organized tendencies. Having eaten our dinner, we do not desire food, yet still we recognize that food is desirable because the appetite for food is a recurrent impulse, and so we prepare for further emergencies. While our mind is bent upon a particular type of realization, a social engagement for example, a business interruption may be emotionally unwelcome; and yet we recognize the value of attending to our business. Value no longer becomes the fulfilment of a mere momentary set of the will, but has reference to the temporal organization of life as a whole with its multiplicity of wants. Moreover,

8. R. B. Perry, in his book, *General Theory of Value*. 1926, emphasizes the object of value. "Value," he says, "is any object of any interest." But since interest implies value, positive or negative, the definition appears to be circular.

we are social beings and while certain types of realization may have no direct bearing upon our own individual wants, we may recognize their bearing upon the wants of others, and the realization of such activities becomes valuable as part of a socially organized life. Hence, the plural of values or of interests, as having reference to a complex intellectual and social organization, comes to take the place in our consciousness of the feeling of value as a momentary affair. This again goes to illustrate the primary importance of organized tendency as contrasted with the more secondary though essential function of feeling.

If we look now at the process of valuation as such—the whole series of activities involved in the realization of an organized tendency in terms of its object—we must recognize certain implications. Realization implies, for one thing, *persistence* within the process of realization. This applies equally to the aspect of organized tendency and to the object toward which it aims. To be conscious of realization, the tendency which strives to be realized must be relatively persistent and the object striven for must be relatively constant. To be sure, both tendency and object receive new significance in the process; but if every moment were entirely a new fact with no reminiscence of the past, we could be conscious neither of tendencies realized nor of an object attained. In either case the striving would become meaningless—a mere restlessness without aim or fulfilment.

There must further, in order to have a sense of realization, be a consciousness of *movement* or development. On the conative side this means the satisfactory integration of tendencies, with the intellectual reconstruction which this implies. In its objective aspect, it means progress in the mastery of the situation by transforming it into terms of the particular want. The will must not be wholly balked or stare at mere vacancy. There must be the consciousness of control, of redirection, of transformation, in order to have a sense of realization.

There must, thirdly, be a consciousness of *achievement*,

of congruence of the consequences of the operation with the direction of the process, that is, of organized desire as satisfied in terms of its object. For the complete consciousness of value there must be the consciousness of consummation, relative though this may be to further activity. If nothing comes of the movement; if the plot does not eventually take form in its material; if the development stops in the middle, the process is not as a whole satisfactory. This is easily seen in the simpler processes of conation, such as hunger, with their periodic restlessness and striving for fulfilment. In the more complexly organized activities, it is true, that no climax may be reached, each moment of the process leading on to other moments. Within an indefinitely complex scheme, such as the search for truth, the end can never be completely realized. Yet here too there must be, in some measure, the consciousness of achievement. While a stage in the process cannot be regarded as a thing in itself, yet it must be felt to contribute in some measure to the total movement of a life's plan, even though this partial success may be subject to further revision and rearrangement in the process as a whole. The consciousness of something done, of some degree of success, is an indispensable part of the sense of realization, though in striving for an ideal this realization may not permit of a final climax. This is why the Greeks were averse to praising a man till he was dead.

The value judgment.—Value as we have treated it so far is a part or an aspect of a complex life-organization. We have taken it in its concrete matrix as implying as its background, not only conative tendencies with their feeling tone, but the intellectual and social organization of experience and the executive aspect of conduct. For purposes of science it is necessary to abstract from this concrete situation and to single out the value aspect itself for consideration. This singling out of an aspect of experience and making it explicit in relation to a context is an act of judgment; in terms of value, it is an act of evaluation.

In the case of values, as in the case of sense qualities, it is possible to distinguish logically between the content of the judgment and the act of judgment itself. In the case of physical qualities, this separation is facilitated by the fact that qualities must be recognized as part of other contexts besides the context of judgment. Our perception of a quality may be a judgment, but a physical quality need not be perceived in order to exist. It may be a fact to another consciousness or it may exist in a context which, so far as we can see, is independent of any consciousness.[9] Vast geological eras, with their changes, had passed before our consciousness on this earth existed. In the case of values, the problem is more subtle because values are fundamentally dependent upon mind. They cannot exist except as realizations or possible realizations of a more or less organized will. Here, therefore, it would seem to be more difficult to distinguish between the act of judgment and its value content. But here, too, we are aided by the social organization of activity. Values are not dependent, at any rate, upon our individual judgment. They may be part of a socially organized system of realization quite independent of any one individual's consciousness of them. There are values in the past, too, of which we must take account, but which do not depend for their existence upon the present individual consciousness of realization. While values, therefore, are somehow bound up with the organization of the mind and its consciousness of realization, we have ample opportunity in the complexity of the realization of value to distinguish between the individual judgment of value and value as a content.

The value judgment, however, must not be confused with the theoretical judgment, making due allowance for the abstraction in each case. Value judgments do of course

9. Sense qualities depend upon the organism as one factor in the dynamic situation, but they do not depend upon our interest. Other physical qualities are independent of the organism and are inferred from changes in the sensory situation. See the author's *A Realistic Universe,* 1916, 1931, Ch. V.; *Cosmic Evolution,* 1925, 342 ff.

imply intellectual judgments and intellectual judgments do have their value; but it does not follow that the value judgment is a mere intellectual judgment. Our reference in the case of a value judgment is to a value context, organized in the case of the individual into sentiment and in the case of society into more or less definite objective systems of value. Take for example our esthetic judgments of value. What we are here concerned with is not the cognitive significance of our judgments, not their factual truth or falsity, but their relation to a scale of preference, individual and social. The individual preferences have generally been organized with reference to the prevailing social scale of values, though sometimes they may become critical of this scale. Our placing of the particular objects in a series or system has to do with the degree of satisfaction which they furnish as compared with other objects of the same type. Value, in other words, has its own method of judgment and its own type of organization. Verbal abstraction, while important for some purposes of communication, is not of the essence of the value judgment. Our preferences become clear and distinct in relation to the various objects upon which they are exercised. Judges in an art competition or in a literary competition are asked to arrange the objects of the competition in a scale of merit. They need not talk. Our emphasis in evaluation has to do with a scale of appreciation, not with a truth-scale in the scientific sense. Abstract symbols become of importance only if we wish to make a verbal record of our judgments or if we wish to talk about them. But the real communication of our judgments of value is made through our scale of preference in terms of the objective situations of value. The scale of preference is not arbitrary. But it is based upon characteristics intrinsic to the value situation, not upon such extrinsic characteristics as true or false in the theoretical sense.

Objects of value have meaning. There are schemes of valuational meaning as truly as there are schemes of conceptual meaning. A great symphony, like Beethoven's *Fifth*

Symphony, is a marvelous and satisfying system of meaning, but it is not science. Since human beings live by schemes of valuation, including the value of science, great art and literature may reveal more of the meaning of a people or an epoch than its theoretical products, but they reveal the emotive meaning, the values that motivated a people or an age, not the conceptual meaning embodied in scientific propositions about matters of fact. To grasp the emotive meaning, the spirit of a people or an epoch, may indeed be more important than understanding its science and machinery because it would show us why they were interested in science and machinery and what use they made of them. We may say then that value judgments are more fundamental than scientific judgments, since the value attitude of a people determines not only its tolerance of science but its interest in science. Note that I have not contrasted value judgments with logical judgments for valuation has a logic of its own which is just as exacting as formal logic. A symphony has consistency and harmony as truly as a scientific system or *vice versa.* But the two move in different media.

It is unnecessary to point out how thoroughly social is this whole process of value judgment. In value judgment as in theoretical judgment, it is social pressure, in the way of social problems and perplexities which raises consciousness above mere submergence in the evanescent likes and dislikes of the situation. We can no more understand our first-hand value judgments than the second-hand judgments, excepting in terms of the social matrix of which they are a part. Our first-hand judgments are indeed made in terms of personal experience. They indicate the merits which the object has for us in terms of our tendencies. But in the first place, our tendencies in mature life have already been organized in terms of social systems of evaluation. To a large extent that satisfies us which has the stamp of the valuation of our group. And even in the more conscious and critical processes of valuation, we are

still largely subject to our age. The striving for conformity or for novelty is itself in a large measure due to the temper of the age. In an age which emphasizes conformity to tradition, novelty in values will be suspect. In an age which emphasizes novelty, conformity will be despised. Few have the courage to stand out against the current standards of valuation, and they do so as a result of another kind of social loyalty than the one prevailing. The creator of values is part of history and strives to interpret its meaning to some one even though it be to a future audience. Creative valuation is social interpretation. It involves social interstimulation. The creative souls receive their inspiration from some other soul, past or present, but best of all from a living master.

How subtle is this social interplay in everyday life! How little we live by our own testing; and much of that testing is itself modified by organized or even by chance suggestion, and our finding is prejudiced. We are prone to regard that as beautiful which conforms to the organized standards of the times and to be suspicious of new movements in art. This holds even more as regards the introducing of new gods into our practical life. How our values rise and sink, again, with chance suggestion. You think well of someone; and some friend, or even acquaintance, suggests a fault and spoils the harmony. You are indifferent and someone else's enthusiasm warms your admiration. Who has not felt it—marrying a wife or not marrying, selecting a suit of clothes, a college, a church, a friend? In the world of values, who can say I am myself and myself alone? The scale of values with its subtle balance is for the most part a social scale, and in weighing values we are weighing to a large extent social influences rather than the direct relation of things to us. However individual our strivings, however remote from the market place, however seemingly isolated, we desire to live with our fellows, to win social commendation, to be well thought of at least in the future, to be counted and approved of in the clearing-house of his-

tory, and to have our values standardized—to have them stamped even as gold is stamped. We may select our judges differently—the crowd or the select few, the present or the future; but through it all we move within the matrix of society.

If this is true of our first-hand value judgments, how much more of our second-hand judgments. And most of our values we accept necessarily as standardized for us by society. It is the organized social matrix which judges in us for the most part rather than we ourselves. And these values come to seem our own values, because we have already, more or less unconsciously perhaps, assimilated the social standards. In this assimilation mere psychological contact necessarily counts. We accept the values of those about us, repeated as they are from day to day in our experience. Some, however, have greater weight than others in influencing our attitude. They may have the prestige which comes from superior personal qualities and strength of affirmation, or it may be the prestige which comes from superior position, the dazzle of circumstance, but in any case they serve to inspire admiration for their own type of value in proportion to our lack of critical organization in that particular direction of activity. Mere numbers too—what everybody feels about it—tend to overawe us. We come to feel that there must be something wrong with one whom everybody criticizes, or something particularly meritorious about what everybody admires. It is hard for us to break away from the tyranny of majorities.

We cannot, however, reduce values altogether to social relations. We must take into account the surd of instinctive and temperamental endowment and the creative factor of the individual life. It is this individual factor which in the last analysis, when raised to consciousness through social pressure, must give us the variations which make new values and new interpretations of value possible. Only so can we have progress in evaluation.

If we now stop to consider in more detail the content of the value judgment, we find that our preferences imply certain elementary qualitative distinctions, certain differences in the intensity of values as related to one another, and certain differences in organization. There has been considerable controversy as regards the value qualities. Some have regarded values as having only the general qualities of pleasantness and unpleasantness. They hold that pleasures differ not in kind, but in quantity. Others distinguish qualities of pleasure. This controversy has been due in large part to identifying value either with "affections" in the sense of the abstract feeling tone, or with concrete feelings. We are not interested here in the abstract qualities of "affection" which some profess to have verified in introspection.[10] When they tell us that there is only one quality of pleasantness and one of unpleasantness and that these vary only in intensity and duration, their finding is open to suspicion. It seems that introspection has here played the trick, which it has so often played, of substituting words, class names, for elementary perceptions. The facts which introspection reveals are feelings. And feelings at any rate seem to vary in a number of directions. They have a sensory basis in the visceral and sex systems of sensations; and these systems present an indefinite number of variations. Sometimes the kinesthetic and respiratory sensations play a prominent part. Particularly is this true in the more exciting situations of stress and its cessation. We have seen, moreover, that the feelings themselves must be regarded as secondary in making up the value qualifications of reality. They may even sink to a comparatively neutral point in the organized life of realization. The primary aspect of value we have found to be congruence

10. For the theory that "affections" possess only two qualities, pleasantness and unpleasantness, see E. B. Tichener, *A Text-Book of Psychology*, 1913, pp. 226 ff. Josiah Royce in his *Outline of Psychology*, 1911, adds another dimension, excitement and calm: and William Wundt in his classic work, *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, 1902, gives three dimensions, including, besides the foregoing, strain and relaxation. See Vol. II, p. 263.

with conative organization. This furnishes a practically infinite number of variables, involving, as it does, not merely the tone of feeling, but various grades of complexities of the tendencies which are realized.

Are values to be regarded as real qualities of our world?[11] Two extreme positions have been maintained in regard to this point. One holds that values are independent qualities of things,[12] quite irrespective of any relation to human nature. The logic underlying this position is doubtless the same as that which has led some to regard sense qualities as existing abstractly in things. Once we can abstract from any particular context, it becomes easy to regard qualities as independent of all contexts. We have seen that values can be distinguished from the individual experience. They come to attach to objective situations which are regarded as desirable, quite independently of whether they are momentarily desired. Hence it is easy to fall into the error of regarding them as independent of all relation to experience, that is, as abstract qualities of things. The other position holds that values are mere gifts to the universe by human nature and in no sense qualities of the real world.[13] This position emphasizes the importance of the emotional-volitional aspect of the value situation and ignores the importance of the object.

The truth seems to be that values are real qualities of our world, in the same sense that sense qualities can be regarded as such.[14] Values, as we know them, are the qualifications of objects in the organized contexts of human conative nature. They give us a real insight into the character of the world as it is related to our wants. They cannot be said to exist independently of situations, but no more can other qualities. It is only as qualifications of

11. See *A Realistic Universe, op. cit.*, pp. 107-112.
12. See G. E. Moore, *Ethics*, 1912, pp. 67 ff., also *Principia Ethica.*
13. For this view see William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, pp. 150, 151.
14. See *A Realistic Universe*, op. cit., pp. 84 ff.; also "Functional Realism," J. E. Boodin, *Phil. Rev.*, March, 1934.

objects within emotional-volitional situations that value qualities can be regarded as real. Such qualities can be arranged in series according to degree of preference. The preference may be due to rankings among the elementary qualities as in the ranking of pure colors or tones. Or it may be based upon the difference in intensity of the qualities. Or it may be based upon the organization of qualities. At any rate values, like sense qualities, are capable of being related with reference to each other in various patterns within the judging process.

Value qualities have sometimes been called tertiary qualities. This seems to involve a false assumption as regards values. It is based upon the distinction of primary and secondary in estimating sense qualities—the latter qualities being generally regarded as more subjective and unreal. We cannot go into this distinction here, except to say that it is purely pragmatic and that the so-called secondary qualities are no less qualities of things in the situations in which they figure than are the so-called primary. To call value qualities tertiary would imply that they are sense qualities of a more subjective order. The important objection here is that they are not sense qualities at all, but that they must be regarded just as primary in their own relation to reality as the sense qualities. They differ from sense qualities in two important respects. They may vary independently of the sense quality of the stimulus. What pleases us at one time may be unpleasant at another, though there has been no alteration so far as the sense qualities are concerned. Furthermore, the judgment of value is a creative judgment. Reflection upon sense qualities does not as such vary the qualities, but reflection upon value, the taking it up into new contexts of organization, produces new values and may reverse the original values. We must, therefore, regard value qualities as a unique order of reality and not confuse them with sense qualities.

While value qualities are for us relative to human nature as a reagent in the situation and vary vastly with organi-

zation as between different individuals and as between different groups of individuals, still there are certain constants which make social prediction and agreement possible. That is particularly true in the same period and stratum of development; and for certain fundamental types of value, it holds for large stretches of time and is well-nigh as broad as human nature. We can still enjoy Homer, though much of his world has become a myth-world to us. Love and hate have not changed as fundamental types of sentiments since Homer's day. That there are limitations in our possibility of participation in other worlds of values must of course be self-evident, since full sympathy would mean, not merely similar sentiments, but a similar world of beliefs to which those sentiments are related. A great deal of the value of the Homeric age must be lost to us who can no longer take the Homeric world as a world of reality, but must deal with it as a world of mythology. The greatness of Greek art still appeals to us in the few remaining fragments, but Greek art as an interpretation of the real life of a great people cannot be reproduced in our appreciation. Agreements in the world of values, therefore, are more limited by social conditions than agreements as regards the world of sense qualities; yet real agreements there must be, or we could have no institutions of value, no laws governing human appreciation and conduct, no standards of value.

Pareto rightly inveighs against some writers on value who "cram everything they could into it as regards both factual data and the objectives they desire to obtain."[15] From this confusion come such eulogistic expressions as "eternal values." The root of the confusion lies in the failure to distinguish between value and worth. The worth of an activity lies in the objective which it strives to realize.[16] If we mean by values satisfactions, then values are transient events in the stream of life. What is eternal, in the

15. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (Trattato di Sociologia Generale), trans., Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingstone, 1935, vol. III, p. 1035.
16. J. E. Boodin, *A Realistic Universe,* pp. 188, 189.

sense of persistent, is the normative structure of value, the ideal which we strive to realize. But the meaning of the ideal grows with experience. If eternal has any absolute meaning with reference to such an objective, it would, as with Plato, have to be conceived as a limit, like a mathematical limit, which we can only approximate. For Plato normative structure is not subjective. The form of the good is the form of the cosmos. But value itself, in our world at least, is temporal and passing. Nor is there any reason for eulogistic ecstasy in speaking of value. Values may be devilish as well as divine. They are for the most part of the earth, earthy. But the animal satisfactions have their place in life as well as the esthetic. Plato saw that the good man must be a healthy animal, though of course he must be more than an animal.

The Systematization of Values

The systematic organization of values takes two directions. It has to do with the correlation of our values with other values, and it also has to do with the organization of our beliefs as regards the objects of value. Desiring the fulfilment of a purpose means the realization of the implications of the purpose whether as regards the relations within the world of values or as regards the beliefs about the object. In the primitive value situation the presence of an impulse makes it imperative. The presence of an object to consciousness, whether that object be fact or fancy, makes it real. In the organized life of experience, distinctions as between grades of value, on the one hand, and as between degrees of reality of the objects of value on the other hand, both become part of the value realization.

Fortunately for us, we are born into a world already pretty thoroughly organized both as regards the interrelation of values and as regards the beliefs toward the object. We adopt, first of all, the classes of values as socially organized—their rank and standardization. We similarly adopt certain organized belief-attitudes toward the objects

of value. We distinguish between dream and waking, fact and fancy. It is only upon later reflection, if at all, that we come to regard critically this social systematization and try to appreciate and perhaps revise the institutional world of values in terms of our own experience.

Classes or types of value. As a result of the judging process, social and individual, we have come to group values under certain types. Each type has its own organizing relation, found as a rule in some important sentiment which itself has become organized in terms of social objects. Any classification of values, however, must be regarded as purely pragmatic. It has been suggested that we divide values into immediate (that is, values involving no previous experience) and derived values. The trouble with this classification is that the really immediate values, values with no background of intellectual organization, are for us purely speculative. No doubt they exist in some of the lower types of animal life and in the early life of the child, but they are inaccessible to us as psychologists. All our values are intellectualized and socialized values.

We may divide values for the sake of convenience into *naturalistic* values, on the one hand, and *formal* values, on the other hand. Under naturalistic values we may include the biological values or the realization of such impulses as have not been institutionalized to any large extent in our experience, but persist in a rather amorphous form. Such satisfactions as come from ordinary physical exercise, from eating, from casual associations of human beings, from the casual sex impulse, and a large number of other impulses which may remain in a relatively unorganized state, may be classed under this general heading of biological satisfactions. They are, of course, subject to social suggestion and control, and they may in individual cases be organized into systems.

Among naturalistic values we may also class utilities, when no reference is made to an ideal of satisfaction, but when we attempt merely to establish certain ratios or laws governing the demand and supply of certain objects furnishing

satisfactions. The organizing relation here is the idea of exchange. This implies some common measure of exchange, which with civilized countries takes the form of some metallic equivalent in the way of money. Gold has generally been used as a standard of exchange. The standard itself is thoroughly conventional and has no justification except its convenience. It must have a certain exchange value of its own, though that value is doubtless affected to a considerable degree by its having been made a standard of exchange.

The psychology of utility values is decidedly unsatisfactory. If utilities were determined in the way in which some have defined economic value, that is, as based on marginal utility and a marginal consumer, the problem would be comparatively easy; but economic value in this artificial sense can hold only under very artificial conditions of free competition and an equally artificial human nature.[17] Utility values, as we know them, are determined by a number of factors, some of which are economic in the way of capital and cost of production; some are legal, having to do with certain privileges granted by the state, such as a protective tariff; some are extra-legal, such as control by monopolies; some are social, in the sense of fluctuations of social emphasis, as in fashions; some are ethical, in the way of condemnation of certain types of utilities by strong public sentiment; some are esthetic, making craftsmanship and beauty count; some are purely psychological, in the way of successful advertising. The science of economics, therefore, has difficulty in finding any definite organizing relation for its facts. At any rate, values regarded as utilities have that in common that they pertain to things which are bought and sold and which are statable in terms of some medium of exchange.

In the formal organization of values, certain implications

17. For an excellent criticism of the Austrian school and of some other theories of economic value see B. M. Anderson, *Social Value*, 1911, especially chaps. III, IV.

must be recognized which are not present in the naturalistic type. There is the consciousness of a norm or ideal in the realization of formal values and not merely of values as events in the course of experience. We demand that the object of value shall have unity—that it shall express one idea. We also demand that the parts of the object shall support one another and constitute a harmonious whole. We further demand clearness and distinctness in the expression of the idea. The object must be unified in the simplest way that will satisfy the specific interest. We require, finally, that the formal object of value shall have objective validity—that it shall appeal to all who are competent to judge it. The formal object of value cannot be merely private, though the audience may be limited and may even be in the future. These criteria of the formal realization of value hold for all types of formal value, whether it be a work of art, a scientific hypothesis, a good life or an object of religious worship.[18]

We may be concerned with the value of cognitive activity —the search for truth. The value of truth lies in the successful striving of the organized activity of truth-seeking —the verification or confirmation of the hypotheses in terms of intended facts. We may find that we can integrate the newly discovered facts into the system of accepted postulates. Or it may be necessary to change the structure of a science, as in the case of recent physics. The value, in any case, lies in the success of our curiosity in realizing its end under its own formal rules. Beliefs, however, may be satisfactory for reasons quite irrelevant to what makes them true. We may adopt a belief because it fits in with other organized tendencies—because it is satisfactory to our religious, patriotic, or social sentiments. It is hard indeed for us to divest ourselves of the bias of long accepted social postulates. The latter is tragically shown both in our national economy and in international relations. At any rate, we may welcome beliefs for what they bring in

18. See *A Realistic Universe, op. cit.*, pp. 307-325.

the way of emotional or esthetic or other satisfactions, rather than for any intrinsic interest in the truth activity itself.

We may be concerned with the organizing relation of beauty. Here the organized object is isolated from ulterior uses for the time being, so far as this particular interest is concerned. At any rate, to be appreciated as beautiful an object must be recognized as a complete and satisfying expression of an idea without reference to practical utility or the satisfaction of animal cravings. It must be capable of furnishing a unique equilibrium of tendencies while the mood lasts, embodied now in tonal harmonies, now in color and perspective, now in sculptured marble, now in towering temples, now in flowing verse, now in the grace of the dance, but everywhere suggesting the unity, proportion, harmony, and simplicity of a whole, static or moving, which is valued on its own account.

We may be concerned with the organizing relation of ethics—the value of realizing a good life. Ethics, as the normative control of conduct, implies two types of attitude.[19] It implies security or a definite social order—organized expectancy of cause and effect in conduct—, an order enforced by definite social authority in the form of organized government or by the sanctions of custom. Life must be safe from petty interference. Every man must be able to sit under his own fig tree and to enjoy the fruits of his own labor. He must have the opportunity to realize his capacities in terms of the organized division of labor in society.

Ethics implies morality as well as law. It implies not only loyalty to the laws of the land, to organized institutions, but it also implies criticism and improvement. Only by evaluation of the actual organization of society in terms

19. This conception of ethics agrees in the main, I believe, with that of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times and with that of Hegel in modern times. The tendency of late has been to identify ethics with morality. Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty* and Dewey and Tuft's *Ethics* return in a measure to the earlier tradition of emphasizing the social side.

of formal ideals of fairness and proportion, on the one hand, and by striving to make those ideals prevail in a concrete social life, on the other hand, can the ethical sentiment be fully satisfied. It must be loyalty not merely to things established, to an order that is, but also loyalty to improvement, to an ideal order.

The type of value to be organized may have reference to our concrete life of association, to love and friendship. Here, too, the significant values must be emphasized; there must be fulfilment of an ideal tendency in terms of its object. The actual bond must become clear and distinct in its significance and harmonious in its reciprocity of feeling and cooperation.

The type of value to be organized may be religious value, where the organizing relation is our attitude toward a mysterious higher power or powers with which man feels he must get into rapport if he is to prosper. This involves indeed a unification of many elemental sentiments; but we cannot regard religious reverence as a mere compound of certain primitive emotions of fear, wonder, the tender emotion and other primitive dispositions. No doubt there are those and other reminiscences of simple impulses, but the ideal tendencies, which enter in, and their more abstract organization must be taken into account as well as the more primitive impulses. The significance of the religious situation, from the simplest to the most complex stages of development, is the sense of dependence upon a higher power and the belief that this power, if proper relations are established, can and will cooperate in the realization of our needs—at any rate of our momentous needs—however differently those needs may be conceived. The prayers of man range all the way from the primitive petitions for food to Socrates' prayer for "the beauty of the inward man."

The separation of values into distinct classes is indeed an artificial affair and in real life these types of value interpenetrate in all sort of ways. We found that economic values could be understood only in connection with legal,

social, ethical, and other values. Truth has its value of beauty as well as its value as agreement with its intended object. The most successful hypotheses have also been found to be the most beautiful. Truth may be pursued for its practical usefulness; and indeed when we speak of knowledge we have generally in mind applied knowledge—knowledge as an instrument in the control of the forces of nature for the needs of man. Art and literature, beside furnishing esthetic delight, may also interpret the meaning of human life and so reveal truth. This indeed may be the chief aim of great works of art and literature. Homer's *Iliad*, Sophocles' *Antigone*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Shakespere's *Hamlet* reveal the meaning of an epoch of culture, as well as universal humanity. Again, the moral and the beautiful have been recognized as having a close kinship. The good life is also the beautiful life. Religious value includes ethical, esthetic, cognitive and other values, unified in the supreme object of worship.

The hierarchy of values. Values, besides being co-ordinated into classes of value, may be arranged within a scale of ranking, where some count as higher than others. F. H. Giddings has arranged values with power at the top of the scale and with utility, integrity, and self-realization as the successive gradations under power. But this must be taken as a relative and personal arrangement. Power is sometimes estimated higher than all other values. That has been true of individuals and of nations; Sparta and Rome in ancient times and the Fascistic nations of today emphasize power, but Athens made beauty the highest crown of values and subordinated all other values, including power, to it. With some individuals and nations, utilitarian values and their estimate in terms of exchange are the dominant motive of life. Commercial values are often the real drive behind other values such as the struggle for power or even "making the world safe for democracy." Some individuals and nations make the general welfare the chief consideration. That is true of the Scandinavian nations today which

have abandoned the struggle for power. Again the sense of right may sometimes be the dominant motive of nations and individuals. There can be no doubt that our nation as a whole was inspired by moral idealism to enter the recent great war, whatever may have been the motives of the international propaganda or of its own munition makers and international bankers. With Kant the moral law overarches all other values, like the starry heavens above.

It is impossible to establish any absolute hierarchy of values for all peoples and for all ages of development. But some ruling sentiment can generally be recognized. History might be written in terms of the dominant values which furnish the motives of nations and races at various times. Sometimes the love of power has been the dominant motive; sometimes the cupidity for territory and commercial gain; sometimes curiosity with its fascination for exploration and the mastery of the unknown; sometimes self-regard and honor; sometimes the sentiment of justice with the demand for fairer relations between man and man; sometimes the religious sentiment with the zeal for the dominance of its own type of faith—these in turn, and more often in varying combinations, have dominated the current of history. In group life, as in individual life, some values are ranked at the top, others become subordinated as means to an end—external relations to be translated into terms of the movement of the ruling passion.

It may be said to be a tendency of human nature to rank values in importance. But what shall the criterion be? In the larger number of our valuations we generally go with the majority. Democracy is based upon the principle that the majority is right, or at any rate more likely to be right than the individual, and so must be obeyed for the time being in matters of importance to the group. To be sure, not all individuals in this majority count alike. A few leaders generally formulate the inchoate feelings and beliefs of the many. We may distrust the verdict of the majority and turn to the élite, to the experts who are

supposed to know. But they, too, are part of a social stratum of evaluation. They may be hidebound by tradition and as unwilling to welcome revolutionary, though superior, perspectives of values, as the Scribes and Pharisees of old. Sometimes the individual is wiser than the élite. Galileo was wiser than all the authorities and would-be-experts who tormented him. The new gifts of insight come to the individual; and sometimes it is the very superficiality and formalism of his age which rouses the individual genius to activity. He must combat established schools and institutions with their inherent will to live. In this struggle, the new evaluations very often become recognized only after the individual is sacrificed. Organized society is likely to be retrospective—wise, looking backward. In this lies the tragedy of progress. In such a conflict, the individual may appeal to an ideal order as against existing standards. This appeal is not necessarily an appeal to the future. Indeed, it used to be an appeal to the past, to a golden age when men were reasonable, to the great prophets and sages who came before society got incrusted and who fore-shadowed and made possible the greater progress. But whether the ideal order is put in the past or in the future, so far as human history is concerned, in order to be effective it must inspire a sense of living companionship and cooperation. It may be the faith in an ever present superhuman reality which we feel, perhaps too readily, is in sympathy with our strivings, and which can make our cause prevail, somehow, in the end. However strong our faith may be in such an ideal order and however absolutely we may believe in its validity, it is well to remember that *our* valuations are pragmatic—relative to our experience. They must be tested in the ongoing of the life of the race. We must not be too dogmatic, therefore, in speaking for the absolute. Progress implies risk—a risk which we must take courageously and in faith, hoping to approximate a little nearer to the ideal order of the universe.

The social ranking and emphasis of values have a great deal to do with what values are stimulated in individual striving and what values survive. If the social judgment, the spirit of the *Weltgeist* of which we are a part, emphasizes certain values as supremely worth while, individual genius and achievement are very likely to take that direction. If society puts a premium on showy preferment, on ostentatious power or the display of wealth, as it usually does, the best talents of society are sure to be drained in that direction. The more ideal values of truth and right and beauty are accordingly neglected. They either fail to be created at all; or, if by dint of higher inspiration they are created, they fail to become effective and to survive. Plato with right complains that society is the great sophist, the real corrupter of youth.[20]

The emphasis of one set of values is sure to lead to the neglect and suppression of others. The emphasis of the values of beauty, as with the Athenian, may lead to the neglect of the more rugged values of righteousness. The emphasis of the values of power and efficiency, as with the Roman, is likely to lead to the neglect of the esthetic and intellectual ideal of creativeness. Thus perished a large number of the most precious products of Greek genius—the majority of the dramas of the great tragedians—while barren and largely worthless libraries of rhetorical treatises, supposedly more practical in the service of the state, survived. (They were at any rate more lucrative for professors of rhetoric.) The one-sided emphasis on religious values in the Middle Ages led to the neglect and suppression of ancient culture (except as it seemed to further the ends of the Church), of the spirit of scientific discovery, and of pagan art, though it gave us in turn a new sense of religious unity and created Gothic cathedrals. The spirit of the scientific Renaissance, again, could see nothing significant in the massive architectonic of the Schoolmen; and the very name "Scholastic" became an opprobium, though the think-

20. *Republic*. book VI.

ers of the Renaissance absorbed an astonishing amount of Scholasticism, and we might learn much from the Scholastics in careful habits of thought. Great nations today are bending their entire energies and genius on military power and commercial supremacy, with little respect for the creative life of other peoples and with corresponding warping of values at home. Thus we have the greatest tragedy of history, not only in the destruction of noble manhood and in filling the cup of life with bitterness for millions of human beings, but in the deflection of the energies of the spirit from all that characterizes the highest in civilization.

Conversely, creativeness in any one direction is sure to be in direct proportion to social stimulus and appreciation. The Golden Age of Pericles, with its supreme encouragement of ideal creativeness, set a high-water mark for achievement in art. Rome unified the world through its laws and institutions in a way that provided a permanent heritage when political Rome had perished. The medieval church, with splendid missionary zeal, extended the idea, if not the reality, of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man to all boundaries of Europe. The Elizabethan Age showed the possibilities of modern Europe in literary achievement. The Germany of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel perfected for the world an idealistic philosophy. The same effects of emphasis can be seen in our political and social relations. That the so-called lower classes have been socially lower is not due necessarily to inherent incapacity, but to social hypnotism. Witness in modern times the progress from slavery to political equality of the masses, the growing emancipation of the industrial classes, the liberation of the woman and child. Thus the ruling sentiment of an individual and of a people ranks, encourages, and suppresses the values of humanity in accordance with its organizing principle.

The unification of values.—It is the aim of social interpretation and systematization to constitute a whole of values—a happy life. This involves the correlation of the

various types of values, naturalistic and formal, so that they may constitute a unity through the various stages of a life's development. It is an axiom of long standing that all human beings desire happiness. But happiness cannot be a series of discrete pulses of pleasure, a mere sum of discrete satisfactions. It must, somehow, have some organizing principle which makes the present activity refer to the past and to the future, and which is adequate to the complexity of claims within the social matrix in which we live and move and have our being. While we may all desire happiness, we learn from experience that it can come only through a harmoniously realized life. And considering our ignorance of human nature and the complexity of external conditions, there is plenty of chance to miss happiness. Yes, one might say, small chance of finding it.

The content of life varies indeed, from moment to moment, from period to period, from individual to individual, and from race to race. The relative strength of tendencies also varies. In some individuals some tendency is particularly strong, in others weak or lacking. Endowment and temperament vary in individuals and peoples and affect the complexion or mosaic of the whole. In the same individual and in the same people, we find that sometimes one tendency, sometimes another, predominates—now love, now hate; now self-assertion, now self-abasement; now anger, now pity; sometimes the striving for property, sometimes the striving for truth; sometimes the feeling for beauty, sometimes the zeal for righteousness; sometimes the somber mood, sometimes the cheery. In an organized life, however, some one sentiment, whether conscious or unconscious, can be seen to run through the various moments of life and to give connectedness to its various parts; some theme recurs in the symphony of life and makes it a whole. It may be any sentiment—the love of a human being or even a dog, the striving for wealth, the passion for fame, the desire for truth. But always there must be loyalty to some cause toward which the multitudinous

details are made to converge, if there is to be unity. The problem is to discover an ideal comprehensive enough to organize the interests of human life with the minimum of loss and the maximum of realization.

If we look at the formal categories of unification, we find that these are indeed implied wherever a whole of life is being created. There must be *agreement.* One part of life must be seen to be consistent with the rest. There must be a common direction. This, we have seen, is furnished by any ruling sentiment. Further, there must be *harmony.* Each part, both longitudinally and in cross-section, must be seen to support the main idea and to support it in due proportion. It must be a harmony which relates to the future as well as to the present because we live forward and therefore must try to divine the form of the future. The sort of harmony is, of course, controlled by the principal theme and the relevance which it implies. Not any theme will do. Pursuing any interest will, of course, give consistency to a life. But consistency may be bought at the expense of harmony. Pursuing wealth as the dominant value will give consistency to a life. But at what sacrifice of other values! To establish a harmonious life the guiding ideal must be comprehensive enough to play the entire scale of human nature in a symphonic whole—not ignoring the tendencies at the primitive end of the scale, but integrating them into the ideal values at the upper end. Flesh has its claims as truly as spirit, but the health of a human being cannot be achieved by the balking of its ideal demands any more than a good life can be attained by ignorance and neglect of our animal heritage. A fair mind in a fair body is the ideal of harmony. Then there must be simplicity. The leading idea must be seen clearly and distinctly throughout the various details. Finally, the ideal of a good life must possess universality. It must be such that it can be socially approved—that is, approved by those who are competent to appreciate, whether it be by a present or future gallery of spectators.

Besides these formal categories there are other categories which pertain more particularly to the content of the moving whole. We demand the *conservation* of values. We demand that the largest number of values consistent with a whole of life shall be conserved. And, conversely, we regard that as a more perfect whole which destroys the fewest values. It is the "recklessness" of values which makes the history of humanity seem so irrational an affair to our limited view point. Whole civilizations have perished with scarcely a trace—the civilization of the Hittites with its meager inscriptions but recently discovered, of ancient Carthage with but "a few lines in Pliny."[21] It is this chance element in history which makes us suspicious of such philosophers as Hegel who would interpret history as a logically cumulative system of values. With the growing unification of humanity we may hope for more continuity of values. But there still remains war with its irrational devastation.

We must also have regard to the *quality* of the whole.[22] While any dominant sentiment produces some type of unity, we demand that the unity shall be of the highest possible quality. It has been maintained that preference for a supposed higher type of values is in reality a preference for a greater amount of value, that quality is always reducible to quantity.[23] Even John Stuart Mill, who insisted upon quality of happiness, thought that a higher level of quality means a greater quantity of happiness. But who shall prove that a primitive unity based upon some strong animal instinct, where ideal tendencies are weak or lacking or not elicited, does not furnish so great a quantity of satisfaction as the more ideal type of unity with its infinite demands and its inevitable sense of failure. Who can meas-

21. Recent excavations have increased our knowledge of both the Hittites and of Carthage.
22. The noblest statement of the qualitative view is to be found in J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism.*
23. The theory that values can be stated entirely in terms of quantity has found classic expression in Plato's *Protagoras* and in Jeremy Bentham's *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.*

ure the quantity of satisfaction as between the man and the pig, the fool and Socrates? Some of us, at any rate, regard the unity of life, which is produced by the dominance of some ideal tendency, such as love of truth or right or beauty, as more worth while than that produced by a more primitive sentiment, though the latter, too, has its claim which must be recognized. Bentham was right that everybody's happiness should count. Let us have no pharisaical snobbery. We prove our higher quality by loving all humanity as Bentham did. Perfect happiness would be the realization of a human nature, complete in its endowment, in terms of all the types of stimuli of a perfect social environment. But we are at best one-sided, and our realization is limited by our endowment, on the one hand, and our opportunity, on the other. Some of us are specialized in one direction, some in another, with corresponding limitations. We are but fractional men. And out of the variety and supplementation of values we hope to constitute a social whole, which shall make up for our individual limitations, and perhaps be greater because of them.

We need to emphasize the *extent* of happiness, as Bentham did. We have been too much concerned with happiness as an individual business. Since true happiness is the realization of humanity and humanity at its highest possible level, we must will that humanity everywhere, whether in ourselves or others, shall be realized and realized at its best. The realization of happiness implies not only individual realization but also social realization; for the individual must realize himself in society. We must organize society with a view to the common good of its members. And we must strive to organize humanity into a cooperative society. We cannot hope for a happy humanity so long as it is divided by mistrust and misunderstanding into warring factions. We cannot isolate happiness individually or nationally. We must work for the happiness of humanity. The present world condition is sufficient evidence that we can only hope for peace and happiness when our ideal is broad enough to in-

clude the whole human race. Such a unification can be realized only at the highest level of humanity—the moral respect for humanity. I do not mean that we should neglect the small intimate groups in the realization of happiness. We are made by instinct and capacity primarily for small unities. Happiness must literally begin at home—in the family and neighborhood. But we must be careful not to cultivate family selfishness or local selfishness or even national selfishness. Such egoism has proved tragic.

Finally, the realization of a human whole of value must mean the *enrichment* of values. The will must seek new adventure, new fulfilment, in order that sustained happiness may be possible. Life must be creative to maintain its significance, else it retrogrades to the mechanical level. The sentiment for truth must ever find its satisfaction in new discovery, the love of beauty in new creations of beauty. Some formal themes must indeed continue, in order that the process may have unity, and in order that the past may be conserved in the ongoing of life. But the past can be significant only in new variations, in new creative unities. To rest satisfied in the moment is to miss the significance of life—to sell out to the devil.

It must be clear now that the organizing of happiness involves a corresponding organization of the conditions of happiness. It was Bentham's great service to shift the attention from abstractions to conditions. What a mockery it was and is to talk about happiness under the conditions in which a large part of humanity lives. We must remake social institutions so as to furnish human beings with at least the minimal opportunities for decent living before we can discuss the maximum of realization. Happiness has been an aristocratic ideal so far. While the Athenian gentleman realized his dream of beauty, what about the slave? And what about the vast majority of mankind today, who are doing the drudgery of society? We have, indeed, made some advance during the last fifty years toward making the cumulating ideal values more accessible to the many.

Public education, public libraries, public art museums show what can be accomplished by an enlightened public opinion in these matters. And we have directed some thought toward making the economic conditions of the mass of human beings more comformable to ideal realization and more proportionate to their claims for happiness. But we have not really begun to plan for a happy society. Men and women must be given greater opportunity to realize their humanity through education, through adequate wages and leisure, in such human fellowship and cooperation as their capacities may make them capable of doing. We must remove the conditions which destroy the security, health and peace of human beings by making them the instruments of the selfishness and vanity of the few, whether captains of industry or war-lords. With improved means of communication, with increased imagination, and with greater moral sensitiveness, the presence of conditions of misery in a large part of humanity must act to decrease the happiness of the remainder and spur to efforts for improvement. Any thoroughgoing organization of happiness must mean the joy in the common task of realizing a common humanity and the control of the means for so doing.

Much needs to be done in the way of social organization for happiness, especially in the Great Industry, as Graham Wallas[24] pointed out many years ago. The experiment to have workers divided into groups of twenty-five or thirty, so that they come to know one another as human beings and not just as part of the machine has increased the efficiency as well as the enjoyment of those concerned. With the shortening of the time of labor, it becomes all the more imperative to provide healthful community recreation. But such group organization for mutual friendliness is called for not only in industry but in our mass life generally, with the break-up of the local community. If such groups can be encouraged also to study and to discuss the problems of our common life, they will have an enduring motive for

24. *The Great Society*, 1915, Ch. XIII.

getting together. But not only the social side but the material side of happiness requires serious attention. Working hours and the hygienic conditions of work have improved in the last generation but much remains to be accomplished. There remains the terrible fact that millions are deprived of the opportunity of work and, even with a small dole, are facing misery which makes happiness impossible. In facing the conditions of unhappiness, we shall prepare for greater social safety, for unhappiness breeds unrest and revolution.

Systematization of Beliefs in Regard to the Object

Let us now turn to the implications as regards the object of value. The organization of our beliefs in regard to the object proceeds *pari passu* with the organization of our interests. We have seen that, in the primitive value situation, the presence of an object to consciousness is equivalent to a belief in its reality. There is no distinction here between grades of existence—between ideal and perceptual objects. The controversies as to whether an object must exist[25] in order to be valuable have, for the most part, missed the point at issue. In the organized value situation, the object, in order to be satisfactory, must have such existence as is implied in our expectancies with reference to it. This may mean perceptual existence, as in satisfying hunger. We do not want to eat imaginary food or to be hypnotized into thinking that we have eaten when we have not. Not all value situations, however, imply the perceptual existence of the object. A mathematical proposition is said to "satisfy" the existence postulate when it harmonizes with its presuppositions and with other propositions in a logical system. It is mathematically satisfactory when it fulfils this function. It may relate to a fourth dimension.

25. Meinong emphasizes the "existence judgment" in regard to the object of value in his important work, *"Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie,* 1894, Part I, Chap. I. Tarde seems to take a similar point of view. See "La Psychologie en economie politique," *Revue philosophique,* XII, 337, 338.

In any case, perceptual existence is here irrelevant. *Alice in Wonderland* is a thoroughly satisfactory system of relations in so far as it is consistent within its imaginary world. We do not expect to verify Alice's adventures in the world of perception. We should feel that we had gone crazy if we thought we did; and that is not very satisfactory. While the Homeric world has become for us a world of myth, we none-the-less enjoy the appeal which its organized values make to our imagination. When we watch a moving-picture film we should be shocked to have the characters step off the film into the audience; and it would make our flesh creep to have a madman step off the canvas, or to have marble statues take life in the manner of Pygmalion's Galatea. To say that the value object must have existence does not, then, define the situation. To be satisfactory the object must have *such existence*—whether perceptual or ideal, verifiable or mythical—as harmonizes with our system of beliefs within the type of realization selected. Our expectancies in regard to the object may, indeed, be wrong. In that case the situation becomes satisfactory only when our beliefs have been revised so as to agree with the object which we have set ourselves. In any case, the object becomes satisfactory when it exists as imagined or conceived. And this may be the filmy structure of imagination rather than "this too solid frame of things."

What needs to be emphasized in this connection is that the belief attitude enters, as a fundamental ingredient, into the value situation. It is not merely external to it, as is sometimes implied in theories of value. That the former is the case is, of course, apparent enough in all our practical values. In business we may sometimes take a gambling chance at winning out. In some enterprises, such as mining promotion, so many unknown variables are involved that we realize that the odds are against us. But still we have a right to demand that the conditions shall be such as they are represented; that they shall conform to the expectancies which we are led to entertain. In the normally organ-

ized business of credit and exchange there are also unforeseen vicissitudes, but in investing our labor or capital, we have a right to demand that the consequences shall be such as to harmonize with our expectancies in so far as these consequences can be foreseen and controlled. We demand, in other words, that business shall be done in good faith; and our sense of realization and satisfaction imply such observance of the rules of business. We condemn selfish manipulation and the advertising of fictitious conditions as real.

But belief enters into artistic values as well as practical. It makes a profound difference to our appreciation whether we believe that art interprets a real world or merely furnishes play for our imagination under such formal restrictions as our creative activity may adopt. There is a momentous difference whether we believe that Phidias is interpreting a real Zeus and a living Athena or is merely delighting us with a myth world. The Athenians convicted Phidias of impiety, while we delight in the formal beauty of the remaining fragments. Our appreciation of the Sistine Madonna is very much affected by our being part of a certain Christian belief world. It cannot have the same value, though it may still be art, to one who has no sympathy with that world. Art not merely fulfils certain formal requirements; but great art is the interpretation of a content, of the life of its age, its peculiar epoch of civilization. It makes this content clear and distinct; it selects, condenses, and frames; but it must be true to the meaning of the content in order to be appreciated as a realization of our will. Hence the difference in the reality of the appeal that is made to us by such art works as the Venus de Milo, the Sistine Madonna, or the Angelus. The first appeal needs a faith in the Greek gods, the second in medieval Christianity, the third in modern democracy, for its full appreciation. The reason that even so great a critic as Browning found Greek art impersonal and formal, while modern art seemed to him personal and passionate, is that he lacked the

reality feeling for the content of Greek life which made art so vital to the Greek world. We always find another civilization formal when judged by our standards—the Moslems burned the library of Alexandria, the Christians the library of Cordova; we destroy other peoples' cathedrals and art works. We don't burn our own libraries or art works for they are vital—to us.

What we have said about the existence of the object holds equally as regards its properties and its quantity. We find the object satisfactory as regards its properties when it has such properties as are implied in our expectancies. If we expect the object to be sweet and find it sour; if we desire bread and receive a stone; if we pay for woolen goods and get cotton, we are dissatisfied so far as the particular purpose is concerned. Our expectancies may, indeed, be upset in a favorable direction, when our beliefs are understatements of what we want the facts to be. We had expected to see none but strangers and we find an old friend in the crowd; we had expected but small return from our investment and discover that it is profitable; we had conceived a man as having indifferent moral qualities and find him heroic. Here there is congruity, however, with our fundamental, organized desires and the feeling is only enhanced by the unexpected realization.

As regards quantity we find the object satisfactory when it is attained in such quantity as is implied in the organized tendency. We may pray the gods to save us from embarrassing riches as well as from grueling poverty, for wealth which interferes with our deeper purposes of achievement is no longer satisfactory. We do not want to be forced to be bankers when we have set ourselves to be scientists. Some tendencies in human nature seem to be insatiable as regards quantity. If the sentiment for ownership or for power is the controlling motive, there seems to be no limit to the quantity. Such sentiments grow with what they feed upon. Every attainment raises the threshold of satisfaction, perhaps in geometrical progression, and so

makes impossible anything like permanent satisfaction or happiness. What is more, such one-sided emphasis on what should be instrumental contradicts the deeper end of life, as regards both individual and social realization. It is treating one's self, as well as others, as mere means to an end. Even such insatiable sentiments imply, however, that the object of the satisfaction is limited, if not in its supply, at least by virtue of its artificial control. Objects which can be had without limitation, such as fresh air and sunshine in the open country, fail to impress the will as valuable even though they supply fundamental needs. We sometimes speak of them as "absolute" values; but it is the relative and limited values, the utilities which can be controlled and withheld, for which men strive. And what wealth and power strive for is unlimited control of their objects.

Some sentiments imply a definite limitation of quantity. Conjugal love in most birds and in some human beings limits its object to one. The higher the realization, the more circumscribed is the notion of mere quantity. Artistic creativeness and appreciation, as well as love, demand uniqueness. We do not want more than one artistic creation of a kind. We demand that the artist shall express himself again with a new soul in a new work. We do not attach a high value to mere copying. The same is true in ethical relations and in friendship. We want virtue with individuality, not mere conventional virtue. We may have more than one friend, but we do not want duplicate friends. We want uniqueness, the ministration to different purposes. We may have to find ruggedness and sweetness in different personalities, and we want both types. Even as utilities, we value objects more highly in terms of gold when they possess individuality, when they are craft-made and not merely machine-made, even though the abstract utilitarian need might be served as well by the latter object as by the former.

Finally, we demand that the object, in order to be satis-

factory, shall possess such organization as agrees with the implications of the specific value attitude. This organization may have reference to external association. If we value a painting because it is a work by Rembrandt, we are not satisfied unless it is the work of Rembrandt. We do not want even a perfect copy or a work by another artist, though it may be intrinsically just as good. But the organization implied may be intrinsic, it may have to do with the relation of the object to our formal postulates. We may find the painting, even though by a master, to be unsatisfactory because it does not harmonize with our standards of art. We are disappointed by the conduct of a man when it falls short of what we have conceived him to be. In such cases the organization upon which we pass judgment is objective. If it were merely subjective we should have no one to blame or to praise but ourselves. We recognize the object's own organization and approve or criticize accordingly.

In the organization of our beliefs as regards the object, as in the organization of our interests with reference to each other, we must recognize our dependence upon the social matrix of which we are a part. It is the social organization of our world of beliefs which gives us, on the whole, our grades of existence; which prescribes largely what properties are satisfactory, what quantity is necessary, and what organization we shall approve. We may, indeed, criticize and attempt to improve the objects of our choice; but it is with the advantage of the social background and with the expectancy of at least eventual social approval that we do so.

Of the world of values, at any rate, it can be truly said that it is an idealistic world. Not, indeed, a world of subjective idealism. Value is not merely what the individual approves or enjoys at the time. It does not rest merely on his immediate perception. It is a world of social idealism—a socially organized world in which the individual appreciates and judges. His own idiosyncracies do, indeed, count for him. There may be private and evanescent values. But

over and beyond his private likes and dislikes, there is the historical social world of values, which furnishes organized objects of realization, which tests and standardizes our individual evaluations, and which gives the private evanescent values such significance as they have for the individual. Within this world, whether in loyalty to organized values as they are, or in loyalty to social improvement, we must find our realization and happiness, so far as it can be found. The world of values has, at any rate, minds for its poles of relation. It rests on human nature as a conscious organized community of interpretation. Should mind disappear, should Endymion sleep without waking, the world of values, too, would disappear. There would remain, indeed, physical changes, but they would not be even junk. Things are but instruments in the world of values, raw material to receive the stamp of creative spirit. The real ends are selves. And the respecting of such selves—the encouraging of their realization in a reciprocal social community—is the fundamental condition of the organization of values.

Value and the Unity of Human Nature

If value is the congruity of an object with the specific realization of human nature, it seems clear that we must take into account the whole organization of the self in order to understand value.[26] For in order to have realization there must be an end to be realized; and this implies intellectual as well as conative organization. We must also take into account the executive aspect, for successful realization implies control and action.

We are still prone to divide human nature into watertight compartments. The latest manifestation of "faculty" psychology is the tendency at present to explain values by referring them to a sentiment—moral values to a moral sentiment, religious values to a religious sentiment. Having coined a name for a certain aspect of the process of realiza-

26. W. M. Urban has done valuable service in showing the importance of the presupposition of the total psychosis in understanding value. See *Valuation*, 1909, pp. 14-16.

tion, we proceed to treat the abstraction as an entity. It was important to call attention to the fact that the organization of the intellectual and executive aspects of the self involves a corresponding organization of the appreciative aspect.[27] Philosophers have been prone to take the intellectualist view of Hegel that feeling remains indefinite and amorphous, while it is the cognitive aspect which is organized and therefore has superior claim to our attention and regard. But there is no organization of one aspect which does not involve, in so far as it is genuine and real, the organization of human nature as a whole. To indicate this parallel organization of the self, at its upper level, we have invented the term reason for the intellectual aspect of systematization, character for the volitional, and sentiment for the emotional. But these are not separate organizations. They are complementary aspects of the conscious realization of human nature. Each has to do with the whole self. Intellect is for the sake of conduct, though the conduct is scientific experimentation, and conscious conduct implies the realization of ends. Value has to do with the conscious realization of the whole self. There is only one organization of normal human nature.

This unity of human nature is foreshadowed in the simplest value situation, that of instinctive realization. Here we have the cognitive aspect represented by a certain specific way of perceiving the situation, the executive by the organization of a series of adaptive movements, and the appreciative by the unique satisfaction of the specific realization. Instinctive realization implies a specific conative direction, on one hand, and a specific complex of affective factors, on the other. The case does not differ essentially in purposive realization. The complexity of the situation is here greater and the process is conscious of its own direction, forward and backward, but much depends still upon

27. Important contributions to the psychology of sentiment are A. F. Shand's paper in G. F. Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology*, Chap. XVI, and W. McDougall's *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chaps. V, VI.

unconscious tendencies. The postponement of the satisfaction may indeed become indefinite, with its corresponding effect on feeling; but on the animal level, too, there is postponement. The wolf must sometimes hunt for days for food, and he has other instincts with a constant pressure which can be satisfied only at rare intervals. The difference is, therefore, a matter of degree.

We have seen that the organization of values involves, on the one hand, the classifying and ranking of values with reference to each other, and on the other hand, the organization of our expectancies with reference to the object. In either case the organization of value implies intellectual organization. It must be equally clear that our value attitudes and value judgments imply the cumulative organization of reactions into character. Value owes its reality and vividness to reaction. Its strength in an organized self depends, not merely upon the primitive impulse, but even more upon the organization of impulses into character. The worth of a value, as J. S. Mill indicated, must be measured by the hierarchy of dispositions as organized into personality. It is this, too, which makes possible that sustained sense of realization which we call happiness. What we must emphasize is the wholeness of human nature in its realization. The aspects interpenetrate; they are complementary to each other in one life-process, the successful realization of which is recognized as value. There is only one organization, whatever aspects and moments we may emphasize.

Doubtless some will insist on cases where one aspect has developed comparatively independently of the others. Sentimentalists, normal and otherwise, will be dragged forth as horrid examples of the dissociation of sentiment from character or from intellect or from both, as Pope's coupling of "meanest and wisest" has been intended to show the dissociation between reason and conduct. But as we might quote Aristotle to show that real insight, as contrasted with mere vague or drunken repetition of words,

involves motor control, so we could show that the sentimentalist is chaotic in his sense of values just in proportion to the vagueness of his conceptions and the indifference of his reactions. The stagy illustrations, usually brought forth, either prove this to be true or are libels on the personalities in question, when these are estimated in their own social setting. What is at the bottom of the confusion in our judgments—on ourselves and others—in such cases is that we confuse second-hand evaluations, or the sentiments of the group, which we have imitated externally without assimilating them into our own experience, with *bona fide* sentiments, or our real habits of evaluation. It is easy enough to find people who indulge in pious cant and who are Pharisees at heart, but such people just serve to illustrate the principle which we have already stated. Their real sense of values is quite proportionate to their conduct; or their conduct would be different. We value things—family, country, friends—in proportion to our willingness to sacrifice for them.

The unity of human nature of which we have spoken implies, not merely the unity of abstract individual nature, but the social unity of human nature. Realization must mean realization within social groups. It may be family realization, or civic realization, or national realization, or the realization of friendship or the realization of truth; but it is always realization within a social community. We may indeed aim at an ideal community which we wish to attain by such reconstruction and inspiration as we are able to bring. The organized realization of value implies the temporal solidarity of humanity. In its ideal creativeness and self-criticism there is implied further the unity of humanity, somehow, with an ideal order, which draws us onward in our groping endeavor to realize ourselves as parts of an unseen future, and which makes us "more than we are and wiser than we know."

CHAPTER VIII

ORGANIZATION OF COGNITION

At the outset of our inquiry it may be well to point out certain general presuppositions that we now recognize as implied in the activity of cognition.

Postulates of the Cognitive Process

The conative basis of the cognitive process. This postulate has to do with the subjective aspect of the process. As over against the sensationalist type of psychology we seem to be pretty well agreed now that the springs of mental activity must be found in conative tendency as organized into the social matrix. Our instincts and general tendencies condition our primary interest and attention; they enter as basic factors into the motives of our action. They are, indeed, complicated and transformed in the course of experience, but they furnish the warp of the texture of experience, though the patterns are largely due to our social environment. But if it is futile to try to compound our experience out of sensations, it is equally futile to account for our behavior as imitation, as was once the fashion. There must be selective tendencies as basic motives in assimilating our environment, be it social or physical. Not everything can be reduced to social exchange, because then there would be nothing to socialize. We should be like the two boys of whom their mother boasted that on rainy days they made two dollars a day by staying at home and trading with each other. The social environment furnishes tools, stimuli, mutual supplementation and correction; it gives us the benefit of the accumulated experience of the race; but the primary basis of interest and action must be found in the conative constitution of the individual as it is integrated into the social environment, through the reaction to stimuli in the developmental process. The biological constitution, at the human level, includes the drive for thought

as well as the drive for food and other specific tendencies. There is a restlessness of human nature which can only be satisfied in the understanding of its world; and this drive has its own characteristic structure and its own characteristic satisfaction as truly as the specific instincts. The urge for thought manifests itself as the architecture of the brain emerges in its interaction with its social environment. By the age of three, in a normal child,[1] we find definite manifestations of analysis and of insight. The child begins to ask questions, usually unheeded, of the why of things. The feeling for connectedness, the referring of effect to cause, the demand for consistency, are biological characters, which become conscious in the course of social experience, but are not produced by experience. They are *a priori*, though only late in the history of the race are they expressed as logical propositions. For this expression a highly analytical language is necessary.

The character of recurrence. The postulate of recurrence has reference to the objective content, as the former postulate has reference to interest. Its importance has been emphasized in some form or other since Plato. It has recently received fresh statement from Poincaré and others. Without some constancy in the midst of the flux of experience, predicates, descriptions, predictions, in short, knowledge, would be impossible. It is true that Bergson has recently revived the ultra-heracleitean doctrine that constancy itself is an illusion, due to the limitation of our experience in following the infinitesimal changes of reality. But this is after all a dogmatic assertion, a passing (by means of a supposed intuition) from the particular premise of empirical experience, which testifies to the reality of some change, to the universal that everything is change. Such a universal could never be affirmed in a world of absolute flux, for in such a world no statements could be

1. The abnormal child, the idiot, for example, shows, in a negative way, the biological character of the structural qualifications for thinking. You cannot teach an idiot to think.

made, no social rules of action would be possible. As a logical theory the assumption of absolute flux will always be self-contradictory and must be left to those who share the superhuman intuition attributed by Bergson to the hymenoptera. Recurrence implies, indeed, a world of process, but a process in which predicates in the midst of the somehow novel can be singled out as leadings in our reactions to our world.

The intersubjective continuum.[2] This implication of our cognitive experience has been slow to be recognized in psychological theory. We have, on the contrary, assumed, tacitly or explicitly, the opposite, namely, that human experience is insulated in individual centers and that the only relations between minds are physical relations. From this absurd assumption of modern psychology there are signs of revolt, particularly in British thought.[3] The truth seems to be that the intersubjective consciousness of mental responsiveness is an immediate fact. In the words of Samuel Alexander:

> The recognition of other beings as conscious subjects depends on a direct experience to that effect. It cannot be regarded as a mere inference from the outward actions, gesture, and speech proceeding from certain bodies, and an interpretation of them on the analogy of ourselves. Such interpretation and inference do occur, but only when there has already been a basis of direct experience of others as conscious beings.[4]

Such immediate recognition can be found already on the instinctive plane. An animal reacts differently not only to the animate and inanimate but to different species of the animate. Such differential responsiveness is manifest in the instinctive reactions of gregariousness, of sex and of the band instinct, but every instinct has doubtless its sympathetic inlet for taking account of corresponding responses in other animals. It appears on a higher plane

2. See Chapter IV.
3. See particularly J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, chaps. XVI, XVII; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, Book III, chap II; Book IV, chap. III; G. F. Stout, *Groundwork of Psychology*, 1927, pp. 160-166.
4. *Mind*, January, 1913, p. 17.

wherever purposeful cooperation and division of labor are involved. The common water of experience overflows our artificial measures. This intersubjective character of mind has found a poetic champion in Maurice Maeterlinck:

> It is vain for us to keep watch upon ourselves, to shut ourselves up within ourselves; our consciousness is not water-tight, it escapes, it does not belong to us; and though it requires special circumstances for another to install himself there and take possession of it, nevertheless it is certain that, in normal life, our spiritual tribunal . . . is a kind of forum or spiritual marketplace, in which the majority who have business there come and go at will, look about them and pick out the truths, in a very different fashion and much more freely than we would have believed.[5]

The egocentric predicament is the product of our artificial abstraction. In reality experience is social experience, the predicaments are social predicaments. It is through the stress of intersubjective responsiveness, cooperation, and rivalry, whether on the practical level or the highly intellectual level, that conciousness rises to the recognition of ego and alter. The frank recognition of the immediate character of the intersubjective continuum will rid us of the difficulty of accounting for what the old realism called the transsubjective reference of thought. Such reference remains an absolute impossibility if we hold to the conception of mind as isolated subjective states. If we start with solipsism, we can never get anything but solipsism.

Types of Social Interpretation

In an interesting and suggestive discussion in "The Problem of Christianity,"[6] Josiah Royce distinguishes three types of knowledge—perception, conception, and interpretation. The first two he conceives as individual processes, using Bergson as the representative of perception and Plato of conception. Interpretation, as opposed to these, he conceives as a social process and in connection with it develops his own theory of the interpreting community and of the universe as a self-interpreting unity in time. But perception and conception, when considered merely from the point

5. *The Double Garden*, pp. 156, 157.
6. See particularly chapters XI and XII of Vol. II.

of view of the individual, are abstractions. The three types of knowledge which Royce has in mind presuppose, at least as known in our human experience, the social consciousness. They are all types of social interpretation. They interpenetrate, moreover, in various ways, so that the types mark rather dominant aspects than exclusive categories. We must now restate these types in our own way. Cognition, as we are concerned with it, involves judgment and judgment implies interpretation. If we define judgment as the conscious use of experience in adjusting ourselves to a larger whole, practically or theoretically, then we may, I think, distinguish three types of interpretation—perceptual, conceptual, and mystical.

Perceptual interpretation.[7] The level of perceptual interpretation is a far advance upon the immediate matrix of experience with which the learning process starts. How far this goes back into the prenatal period we do not know. We know that the learning process is dependent upon the growth of cortical organization. The localization of stimuli in two and three dimensions, the response to rhythms, and the quantitative taking account of cause and effect, without which there can be no learning process, presuppose the development of a cerebral schema. We know that when the cerebrum becomes disintegrated through disease or accident these adjustments fail.[8] To understand the learning process we must start with the development of the organism in its environment and its urge to live. The organism does not start as an introspective psychologist, abstracting certain sensations. These are artifacts of sophisticated analysis. The organism starts as an integral life with its conative drive for maintenance. This life is spatially voluminous, it is rhythmic, it is active, it is charged with affection, though at first it is organically rather than psychologically conscious. A human organism requires social nurture to

7. Hobhouse uses the term "practical judgment" for this type of experience. See *Mind in Evolution*, 1901, chap. VI.
8. J. E. Boodin, *Cosmic Evolution*, 1925, pp. 142 ff.

survive and through this nurture its drive to live becomes conditioned in specific ways to the external environment. It is capable of eking out its meagre original responses to the external world not only by building up chains of habit but also by constructing memory patterns and thus shortening vastly the period of learning. Through its social consciousness and the acquiring of linguistic habits it comes to share in the experience of the race, and thus enlarges vastly its adjustment and meaning.

Perceptual interpretation involves the spontaneous non-reflective drawing on the concrete association of past experience in the service of some immediate need. Our concern in perceptual interpretation is with concrete things in their spatial and temporal matrix. But while our concern is with concrete things it is a mistake to suppose, as common sense does, that we have an immediate perception of things. On the contrary, a thing as we perceive it, is to a large extent the product of interpretation. When Wordsworth says: "We half create what we perceive," he is making an understatement. What we immediately sense is merely an aspect of the thing. When we see a rectangular patch and call it a table and act upon it as a table, we have, largely subconsciously, performed an act of interpretation through which the visual datum has been integrated into the total pattern of the situation as reproduced from past experience. Illusion is misinterpretation either from the strength of habit or from prepossession for the time being with the idea of some other thing. Such error must be corrected by further experience, including social checks. The name which we apply, and without which there could be no consciousness of a distinct individual thing, bears testimony to the social character of this experience. An animal does not perceive a thing but certain stimuli that lead to action, though a high grade animal, such as a dog, is assisted no doubt by being part of a social community and at any rate reacts to a name.

Perceptual interpretation like conceptual interpretation

(which I shall discuss later) involves selective interest. Some sense quality—tactual, visual, auditory, olfactory—arrests the attention. But this sense quality is important as an ingredient in an interesting thing, of which from the spectator's point of view it is a sign. A dog smells a cat and sets out in pursuit. Cats, to a dog, have a characteristic cat smell, but the dog reacts to a particular smell as part of a thing, either in sight or out of sight. If the dog could abstract the cat smell from individual cats, it would have a concept. Such an abstraction would require analytical language and is far beyond the dog mind. What I want to emphasize is that in perception the sensory experience is interesting because it suggests a concrete situation and the characteristic behavior to such a situation, while in conception the interesting sensory aspect is substituted for the concrete situation. Perceptual interpretation is further distinguished from conceptual interpretation by the absence of an articulate plan. We act from habit, memory or suggestion. When we confront an emergency we are perplexed. We strive to reproduce our own experience in the past or what we have seen others do or what has been told us about such a case, and we try to act accordingly. Perceptual interpretation may imply analysis and principles, but these are taken over as the result of concrete imitation of others or perhaps as the products of the individual's previous thought. They are not at the time due to conscious analysis by the individual. If we acted upon conscious analysis, that would be conception. Perceptual interpretation owes its significance in large part to social suggestion. The social matrix of which we are a part dictates to a large extent our emphases throughout our life-history. In the early stages of experience, it is social suggestion which by its selection and repetition of stimuli makes possible that consciousness of recurrence which in the motley, ever-shifting stream of processes of infant life makes certain objects stand out as satisfying definite expectancies. Thus the bottle, through its association with the satisfaction of a primi-

tive need, the objects which minister to the impulse of play, etc., become fixed in the consciousness of the child.

If we take such a sophisticated process as that of the psychologist's introspection, whether under ordinary or experimental conditions, it is easy to see that this is a highly socialized affair. Not only is this true of the conceptual methods he employs, but of the observed data themselves, the things and qualities which he analyzes. It is dangerous to speculate as to what experience is like in animals that are practically unaffected by social intercourse. But the sense qualities here must be fused with the affective and impulsive aspects. They must adhere in one vague disposition. This is not subjective, as is sometimes mistakenly supposed. For the animal the cleavage of subjective and objective has not risen. Fact and value are not at strife. Even in higher animals, like the dog, where social consciousness plays a considerable part, the sensory experience is fused with the disposition to action and is submerged in the satisfaction which the dog seeks. The same must be largely true on the most primitive level in human experience, whether in the child or in the race. The satisfaction of curiosity must in the more primitive experience be auxiliary to, and submerged in, the more pressing instincts of fear and self-assertion. Hence it is that the religious sentiment, with its intensely practical implications, develops so early in human experience.

The interpretation of things and their values begins long before we realize what we are about, long before we are self-conscious. Subtle suggestions by gesture and action first serve to guide us in learning the uses of things. In the words of Ames: "The only way in which objects come to have significance for us is in reference to our conduct, and that conduct is social in its nature. . . . The uses of objects, their names, their values, and their properties are designated for us."[9] This is true even of the satisfaction of our

9. C. S. Ames, "Social Consciousness and its Objects," *Psychol. Bul.*, VIII, 409.

most primitive needs. Our eating and drinking are socially regulated in early life. With the use of names, carefully provided for us, we learn to individualize things and qualities with their characteristic satisfactions. Without language the distinctions must be merged in the instinctive uses which they serve, and even after language has individualized things for us, the use or satisfaction remains the most significant factor of the situation on the perceptual level. How subtle the intersubjective emphasis and guiding may be was well illustrated a few years ago in the familiar instance of the clever horse, Hans, who had learned to take account of indications quite unbeknown to his master and for a long time to psychological experts, and who was thought for a time to possess extraordinary means for reading his master's mind. In human beings such social rapport must be far more subtle than we realize. Our emphases and evaluations of life are largely based on indications only in part articulated—frowns and smiles, attitudes of behaviour, rewards and punishments, approval and disapproval, unnoticed suggestions, particularly effective when there is the consciousness of prestige, in short, all the influences that go to make for us the social atmosphere in which we live.

Even our memory, the most profound element of personality and psychic life, borrows from society the forms (*cadres*) without which it cannot be constructed, as demonstrated by M. Halbwachs in his beautiful book, *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire.*[10] Most of our memories, according to Halbwachs, are brought back to us when our parents, friends or others recall them to us. Institutions embody the memories of the race. "Religious dogma is the collective memory of the church." We remember what we feel is worth remembering and this feeling is largely the result of social emphasis. As Kate Gordon has so well expressed the matter: "Values govern memory and society governs values."[11]

10. See in this connection, C. Bouglé, *Bilan de la Sociologie Français Contemporaine.*
11. The *Journal of General Psychology,* 1937, 17, p. 121.

So, before we know it, we have standardized the facts and values of our experience in social terms; and we remain for the most part slaves of those standards except as new intersections of social currents may serve to liberate us for a time. What is sometimes called intuition is shorthand for manifold experiences—impressions, suggestions, judgments —packed together. Very little of this assimilation is self-conscious and hence the product seems so mysterious. It is the noes and yeses, the emphases, the urgings and inhibitions of all those about us, compounded into our own instinctive nature. To define insight as intuition does not explain, but obscures, the real causes of the process.

We have already indicated how essential the process of naming is to the explicit consciousness of distinctions. What a vague world was Helen Keller's before the discovery came to her that things have names and she became a part of the world of conscious intercommunication. "For weeks Miss Sullivan had been spelling words into her hand which Helen had repeated and associated with objects; but she had not yet grasped the idea of language in general, the fact that everything had a name, and that through names she could share her own experiences with others and learn theirs—the idea that there is *fellowship in thought.* This came quite suddenly,"[12] and with it a new joy and a new world. For those of us who have the advantage of the more social senses of sight and hearing, the dawn of this world of intersubjective fellowship came by degrees and is prehistoric; but it is none the less responsible for our sense of community in things and thoughts. It is this need for common action rather than any one group of sensations, such as the touch-motor, that gives us the consciousness of the world "between you and me."

We need only stop to take stock of the objects of perception to find how socialized they are. If we take, for example, the spreading-out of qualities into kinds and the evaluation of their importance, this is obviously the result

12. Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization,* 1927, p. 62.

of long social elaboration. The subjective idealists, in attempting to account for qualities as subjective modifications, neglect the social character of these qualities. We must not assume, however, that the perceptual world, as over against the ideational, is, *a priori*, a world common to several observers. We no more have direct guaranty that we have the same sensory qualities than that we have the same ideational processes. That we believe them to be the same, in each case, is itself the result of social comparison and correction. We can no more say in the case of sensations than in the case of ideas: Here it is, come and see or hear. The person may be color-blind or tone-deaf. Such defects can come to light only with social comparison and serial arrangement. It did no good for Dalton to tell his Quaker co-religionists: Come and see, these stockings are black. They saw and were horrified because they saw the stockings as scarlet. By social comparison Dalton thus discovered the phenomenon of color-blindness. A common perceptual world is the outcome of the social process, not the presupposition of it.

The ranking of qualities as primary and secondary is a matter of social convenience.[13] To be sure, the qualities that have traditionally been regarded as primary are least capable of social elaboration. The senses that furnish the greatest opportunity for social communication are sight and sound and yet colors and tones have not been included in the traditional primary list. But this list is biased by the importance which the physical sciences have attached to the mechanical qualities. Such an emphasis is unknown to the animal and to the primitive man. If the dog had a primary list it would probably be in terms of smell, as he relies for the most part on this sense for the identification of things. The fact is that the whole distinction between primary and secondary is relative to social purposes and varies with those purposes. It would be different for art from that of mechanical science. Even in scientific description the convenience

13. See J. E. Boodin, *A Realistic Universe*, ch. V.

which qualities serve for purposes of indentification varies vastly as between different sciences. The chemist finds taste and smell very useful. Botany and anthropology have different lists from physics.

It is true, however, that while the tactual-motor qualities furnish a very narrow world so far as social communication is concerned, they give us a first-hand acquaintance with material things—resistance and space occupancy—which cannot be furnished by any other sense. It is because of the important role which material things have played in the socializing process of the race as instruments for satisfying man's primitive needs that common sense came to assume that, while other senses might give us more varied and more extensive information of the world in space, yet "touching is the real thing." Carlisle is only giving emphasis to this verdict of common-sense when he says: "It is in this capability of being passed from hand to hand that both 'objectivity' and identity primarily exist."[14] "How do we prove that any appearance corresponds to reality? . . . There it is, we can say to our neighbors, 'Come and feel and handle this alleged thing also, and tell us how it presents itself to you.' If they do this and pronounce it real, that we conceive settles the question. But why? Simply because common consent entered originally into the genesis of thought of reality. Proof and genesis again are found to be one and the same thing. Both are products of intersubjective intercourse."[15] But the stage of perceptual interpretation which Carlisle describes presupposes the conception of things with names and the ranking of qualities. In the psychological genesis of things the satisfactory use must have been of primary importance. In the primitive instinct for food, if sight or smell is instrumental to handling, so is handling to eating. The emphasis of the tactual-motor qualities must itself have been the result of the process of social differentiation in the service of practical satisfaction. It was worth while handling

14. W. W. Carlisle, *Mind*, N. S., Vol. 21, p. 512.
15. *Ibid*, p. 517.

things that were good to eat. Empedocles is nearer the primitive consciousness when he insists that we must give equal weight to the evidence of all the senses. They are all equally instrumental at the outset. Recent physics has been called optical physics; and entities such as electrons and photons are certainly far beyond the sense of touch, but when we speak of action and inertia we imply more than sight could supply.

Bergson has taken his cue from our highly abstract physical sciences in his thesis that the intellect is fashioned on matter and for dealing with matter. This seems plausible enough if you rely, as he chooses to do, on uncritical intuition. It is a fact that there is a striking fitness between our intellectual ideal and what we conceive as matter. As an account of genesis, however, Bergson has reversed cause and effect. So far from the intellect being molded on matter, the latter owes its definiteness and simplicity to the logical laws of the intellect and our need for common plans of action. The intellect has created the limit of the rigid solid because in this way it could describe most economically certain phenomena of the physical world. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the intellect first discovered law and uniformity by impinging upon solid things. It was from the stern school of custom with its impersonal and effective sanctions that men first learned the meaning of regularity and necessity. The physical world was for ages interpreted as an extension of the social order of wills. It was to be controlled by sacrifices; and at best it seemed a freakish and incalculable sort of world. Witness the terror of the sea for the Homeric Age. It is only a comparatively modern civilization, with its training in abstractions and tools, which substitutes mechanical sequences and mathematical equations for the earlier anthropopathic conceptions. Each generation, however, continues to go to school to the social order before it has any conception of law in nature.

The emancipation of the instinct of curiosity from its subservience to other instincts, more practical in the immed-

iate struggle of existence, is itself a highly interesting result of civilization with the security and leisure which it brings. Truth meant originally what was conceived as bringing practical satisfaction. For primitive man to keep peace in an anthropomorphic way with the powers of nature was intensely practical. The strange was the dangerous. While the element of companionship was not absent, the gods were worshipped mostly for their use in the direct conflict with nature and with other tribes. Three-fourths of the Vedic hymns are addressed to the rain-god, Indra; and Iahweh is originally a fierce war-god. The importance of the proper method of dealing with the mysterious powers made the tribe exceedingly careful about the performance of religious customs; and these again served to strengthen the power of all other customs of the tribe. Inventiveness, however, was not absent on the primitive plane of society. The discovery of the fundamental tools of civilization—the ax and hammer, the bow and arrow—, the singling out from the jungle of experience the categories of thing and quality, of space and time, of cause and substance, mark epochs in human evolution, however slow the process and however nameless the discoverers. It was by such means that men rose to freedom to play with nature, to seek to discover its properties and laws—just to satisfy the curiosity of seeing the wheels go round; and then the test of truth came to mean agreement with reality instead of practical satisfaction. But it is well to stop at times to ask what this agreement means. It is not a pre-established harmony but the outcome of our selective procedure.

What we call perception is shot through and through with conceptual distinctions. It is highly conventionalized. From those about us we assimilate, without thought, the fruits of centuries of discovery as to the names and uses of things. When we perceive an inch, or a minute, or a chemical element, what centuries of socialized experience is implied in those perceptual judgments! For perceptions as we come to know them in our experience are judgments, they are

conscious meaningful reactions. And so, previous to abstract thought on the part of the individual, he comes to assimilate social thought with its named things, its standardized qualities—conventionalized shapes, sizes, colors—and its conventionalized measures in terms of yard-sticks and clocks. What becomes difficult for us is, not to perceive things in the customary ways, but to recover the innocence of the senses so as to take account of the perceptual things as they really appear. The old controversy between Reid and Hamilton is thus seen to be based upon a false psychological abstraction. For Reid, "when ten men look at the sun or moon, they all see the same individual object." For Hamilton, "the truth is that each of these persons sees a different object."[16] The solution of the dilemma is that we do not perceive physical objects as though we were passive mirrors. Neither do we, except as psychologists, take account of the psychological processes by means of which we become aware of objects. What we perceive is the standardized object with a name and with its social uses.

Nowhere is this socializing process more evident than in the traditional statement of the categories. For Kant such general concepts as space, time, cause, and substance are assumed as *a priori*. Kant is able to extract directly out of his intuition the axioms of Euclidean space and the properties of serial time, the categories of cause and effect and of substance. While it is true that the organism through long ages is at home in the world of space and time, and is predisposed to react in certain ways, it is clear to all of us now that the categories as we have them—the postulates of a common space and a common time, with their artificial measures; of the invariable sequence of phenomena; of constants in the midst of the flux—have come to exist in the service of social prediction and are the results of ages of social analysis and elaboration. Kant did get them out of this intuition, as every mature person growing up in a complex society will always discover them, but he

16. James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1907, II: p. 165.

only got them there because they had been packed in by social suggestion before he realized that he had them. It seems evident then, that our perception of things, their qualities and their arrangement, is not an affair of abstract individual psychology, but a highly socialized affair, the result of our first having assimilated second-hand the social discriminations and elaborations of ages, under the pressure and guidance of our social environment.

We have so far illustrated the social character of perceptual interpretation in terms of our physical world. We might with even more advantage have used our social perceptions. Our social judgments are for the most part unreasoned—the result of the condensation of our past experiences and the assimilation of the experience of the race. That we treat human beings as familiar or strange, as reliable or unreliable, as friends or enemies, as good, bad, or indifferent; that we behave toward one social group in one way and to another group in another way, that we act differently in church from what we do at the club, at home from what we act abroad—all this intricate, subtle, and varying response to our complex social environment is a matter of interpretation, but it only seldom comes within the light of reason. The feeling of rationality clothes opinions which harmonize with the conventional axioms and the cumulative social customs which we have assimilated. In the words of William James:

> As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the name of "authority" to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity, and the duty of fighting for 'the doctrine of the immortal Monroe,' all for no reason worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clearness, and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the *prestige* of the opinions is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticized

by someone else. Our faith is faith in someone else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case."[17]

Whether the prestige of these social axioms is due to our loyalty to the customs of a hoary past, or to the impressiveness of great contemporary leaders, or to the tyranny of majorities which carry us by their very mass, it is true that our social judgments are for the most part unreasoned —the condensation of social suggestion. Borne on the crest of the historic stream of interpretation, we are able to raise our heads for a moment, now and then, so as to do a little surveying for ourselves. But by an ever-acting law of psychological gravitation, we tend ever to sink to the level of practical routine.

Conceptual interpretation. Conceptual judgment is a wide-awake, self-conscious use of experience in the service of the problems which we must meet. Instead of dealing with experience in the concrete, we seize upon the features of the situation which are relevant for the special purpose and ignore the other details. William James has wisely said: *"There is no property absolutely essential to any one thing.* The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another. . . . My thinking is first and last and always for the sake of my doing and I can do only one thing at a time."[18] *"The only meaning of essence is teleological, and classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind."*[19] In conceptual interpretation, instead of relying upon concrete association, the mind, "running back and forth like spiders on the web they weave," seeks to discover the persistent elements or relations which will enable it to pass from one fact to another and thus find its way in the labyrinth of experience. James makes the "ability to deal with novel data the technical differentia of reasoning. . . . An empirical or 'rule of thumb' thinker can deduce nothing

17. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays,* 1897, p. 9.
18. *The Principles of Psychology,* II, p. 333.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 335.

from data with whose behavior and associates in the concrete he is unfamiliar."[20] Novelty, however, is incidental. It furnishes a spur in the way of perplexity and doubt. It sets us a problem. But in organized research we do not just stumble on problems. We seek problems. What conceptual judgment strives to do is to reduce our situations to types, by singling out and abstracting the similar features that will enable us to predict and meet such situations in whatever variety and at whatever time they may occur. It liberates us from immediate needs and helps us to prepare for the remote. At any rate it provides us with the tools or principles for dealing with the remote when it comes. It economizes vastly our commerce with reality by substituting abstract aspects for the mass of concrete facts. To quote James again: "Reasoning may be defined as the substitution of parts and their implications and consequences for wholes."[21] James has reference to concrete situations. We may say that conceptual analysis and synthesis aim at arriving at symbolic wholes—wholes on a different level from concrete experience—built upon selected aspects, significant for the purpose of prediction and clarification.

In taking account of this self-conscious process of conceiving the world, this active sorting of experience into its proper types and the fixing of labels for these, there ought to be no difficulty in realizing the social dependence of the cognitive process. While the animal may build up specific perceptual dispositions which serve its simple requirements of reaction, there is no possibility of conscious definition without membership in the social community with its heritage of tools and of abstractions. Marett has pointed out the great advantage of an analytical language for thinking. Primitive language is holophrastic, that is, it conveys a whole-impression of the perceptual situation. "You can express twenty different kinds of cutting, but you simply can-

20. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
21. *Ibid.*

not say 'cut' at all."[22] In an analytical language, such as our own, there are separate names for separate things and functions and relations. "When every piece in your playbox of verbal bricks can be dealt with separately, because it is not joined on in all sorts of ways to other pieces, then only can you compose new constructions to your liking."[23] Order and emphasis become the important factors in sentence building. Analytical language is both effect and cause in conceptual analysis. It originated, no doubt, because of conceptual analysis but it is also the most important instrument in conceptual analysis. The danger is that the verbal symbols become substantive entities and that the functional concreteness of the situation is lost sight of. But there can be no doubt of the convenience of analytical language. When so-called primitive peoples—the African Negroes and Zulus—are taught an analytical language, English for example, they are able to compete with the European in verbal intelligence.

The purpose which leads to description and definition must be a social purpose, the outgrowth of common situations and common needs. Man in his solitude could not invent concepts. James, to whose psychology of the conceptual process we owe so much, seems after all to have looked upon it largely in a solipsistic way. What he emphasizes is that there must be recurrence within the stream of individual history: *"The same matters can be thought of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other portions meant."*[24] But we should never have risen to this introspective consciousness of identity within the individual stream if we had not first been obliged to recognize that our social fellows can intend the same situations as we do and can remember and hope as we can. James had indeed a clear grasp of the functional character

22. R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, p. 141.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 142
24. *The Principles of Psychology*, I, p. 459.

of the concept: *"The whole function of conceiving, of fixing, and holding fast to meanings, has no significance apart from the fact that the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private ends."*[25] But he shows also that he had not yet liberated himself from the old solipsistic psychology in making the concept the function of "private ends." While the springs for action must be found in individual human nature, it is because we have social instincts and common needs that we strive to understand each other and cooperate in a common task. Our concepts are both the results and tools of such cooperation.

Not that the characteristic individual reaction can be neglected: there can be no creation except through individuals. But the individual constitution with its tendencies must be translated into the communicable forms of society in order that it may become conscious of its meaning and value. No one realized this better than Plato who is usually made the chief sponsor for conceptualism. Plato finds the dialogue, the stress of conversation, of social response and correction, the indispensable method of developing concepts. It is here that he differs so vastly from his predecessors, the Sophists. For them discourse was a means to a concrete end—the mastery of particular situations and the securing of the satisfactions that such mastery brings. If the Sophists were accused of making the worse appear the better reason, it was because the reason did not interest them except in securing the particular end—the winning of the decision of the court or of popular favor. Even for Socrates, the father of the concept, the interest in the concept was concrete. Good meant for him good for something. Conceptual definition meant the defining of concrete uses and satisfactions. It is with Plato that the concept itself becomes an object of research. He is interested not so much in the concepts of things as in concepts themselves: justice and goodness and squareness in the abstract, the concept of the concept. With him philosophic wonder, the disinter-

25. *Op. cit.*, p. 482.

ested curiosity in the fundamental natures of things, is for the first time a dominant motive. And the essences or characters which the conceptual process singles out are no subjective abstractions for Plato. They are the essential extracts, the defining principles of reality, which seem to him far more real than its motley flux. On such principles, on such insight into the universal uses of things, social action must be based, whether in governing the state or in dealing with nature. The abstract concept is for Plato only more ultimately practical for being abstract and universal, for its emancipation from immediate particular needs. Hence the true statesman must be a philosopher. He must have a vision of the whole.

But scientific discovery is not merely a contemporary dialectic, as it seemed to Socrates and Plato. It is a historical process. The scientist is part of an epoch of time. There is a dialectic of history, though since creativeness comes through individuals there is also a certain indeterminacy. Genius cannot be predicted. While the scientist is concerned with the future, he must work with the instruments of language and concepts which are prepared by the epoch of which he is a part in order that he may transform these instruments into the service of further experience. Einstein could not have produced the revolution in thought which he has effected if he had not had the background of Galileo and Newton, of Faraday and Maxwell, of Riemann and Gauss, not to speak of his earlier contemporaries such as Poincaré and Michelson. Einstein introduced himself into the stream of time and by his creatively prepared mind divined the direction of scientific progress. If he had come a century earlier, he could not have made the contribution which he is making though he would no doubt have been a creative factor in that epoch. No one realizes better than Einstein that scientific discovery is relative to history, that it depends upon progress in the past and that every stage of progress is in turn subject to transformation through the future. There is no stopping

place. Only small minds can be dogmatic. The creative thinker realizes that the concepts arrived at must be used as instruments for further discovery.

The danger of conceptualism lies not in the process itself. This is essential to human progress, the supreme method of man in mastering his world. The danger lies in human laziness—the tendency to routine, to substitute words and formulae for first-hand acquaintance. This is indeed a vice, not of Plato, but rather of his mediocre imitators in all ages. When the interest in the conceptual essences becomes dogmatic and when the human roots and uses of the concept are neglected; when we forget that concepts are but abstractions for the leading of the mind in its control and understanding of that concrete world from which they are wrested; and when the mind is lulled to sleep by the sonorousness of its linguistic substitutes which have now become ends in themselves, then the concept becomes the means, not of social mastery and progress, but of social stagnation. Hence, there is need of a fresh humanistic awakening —the call to first insights, the realization that concepts are tools relative to social needs—substitutions for a relative purpose, but not substitutes for reality. Essential they are for our living, but only for the sake of the purpose which created them and which must ever revise and correct them in the cumulative experience of the race. What they leave out may indeed be the more essential for concrete living. This furnishes the end for which they exist and in the service of which the abstractions are made. Hence the lazy giant of society must continually be aroused from its dogmatic slumber by the pain and travail of fresh adjustments, the rebirth into larger and more adequate conceptions of the life-process. Conceptual interpretation owes its efficiency to its abstractness, but we must ever be on the alert lest the larger prize of meaning and value is lost sight of. When the concepts become masters instead of servants of the social process they defeat their end, and genuine living and progress become possible again only

when the social life-process awakens to its own reality and realizes anew that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath.

That science is a social enterprise is splendidly illustrated in the division of labor, consequent on our cooperation in conceptual interpretation. In the early development of science, work was largely individual and discovery was largely a matter of chance. The great Greek scientists, such as Democritus and Aristotle, aimed to cover the whole field of scientific investigation and to correlate the results into a philosophic system. There was, indeed, a sense of dependence upon the past, the appropriation and criticism of the results of predecessors. This accounts for the rapid cumulative progress from Thales to Aristotle. There was, too, a certain amount of contemporary cooperation where a teacher surrounded himself with "associates," as in the schools at Miletus and Elea, and in the still closer affiliation within the Pythagorean community and in Plato's Academy. But, on the whole, there was but little conception of division of labor, each man holding himself responsible for the whole of knowledge. The same is true in early modern science. The brilliant discoveries by Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and others were primarily individual enterprises. Francis Bacon's contribution to science lies largely in his ambition to develop a definite technique which would make possible a division of labor and systematic discovery. Says Bacon: "Though it may happen once or twice that someone by chance hits upon what has hitherto escaped him, while making effort in the inquiry, yet without doubt the contrary will happen in the long run. For chance works rarely and tardily and without order, but art constantly, rapidly, and in an orderly manner."

In the *Novum Organum*, Bacon tried to formulate the methods of scientific procedure. The technique he suggests is neither very original nor thorough; and his dream that discovery would now become a mechanical affair was very much mistaken. Though we formulate all sorts of rules and

cautions, yet creative imagination will always be indispensable to scientific investigation. Data accumulated mechanically without reference to a definite hypothesis are, as Karl Pearson pointed out, largely useless. But, while constructive imagination is as important as ever, the rapid advance in modern science is due in no small part to the fact that a universal technique has been developed and that the problem has been divided again and again as a result of increasing specialization. Our modern means of communication, which have made it possible for men in distant parts to work at the same problem and to criticize and to corroborate each others' results, have greatly stimulated the consciousness of a common task. In the course of a comparatively short time, the increasing division of labor and the rapidly cumulative results from generation to generation have made possible systematic discovery of just the kind that Bacon had in mind. While chance, in the way of individual surprises, such as the discovery of the radioactive elements, still plays a part in the development of science, it is true that the problems are becoming more clearly defined and that discovery is often mathematically foreshadowed. While we may agree with C. S. Peirce that the rapid progress of modern science points to an attuning of the human mind to the universe—hints at the orderly character of the world of which mind is a part—, it is the development of a universal scientific technique and the consequent possibility of mutual supplementation, criticism, and division of labor which marks the difference between the rate of progress in modern as contrasted with ancient science.[26]

Science, however, like every institution, runs the danger of defeating its own end by becoming the victim of its own complex machinery. We can hardly speak with Royce of a

26. When there was genuine cooperation in ancient times, as in the Academy at Athens in the fourth century and in the University of Alexandria and at Syracuse in the third century, we do find great acceleration of research. The tragedy was that the power regime of Rome and the mysticism of the East put an end to such research.

community of science. The individual scientist, like the worker in the factory, has become part of a whole so intricate that sympathetic understanding becomes increasingly difficult. Not only are men blinded by their own interest to the significance of problems remote from their own—the physicists to the interests of the recent social sciences—, but it is humanly impossible for one mind to attain mastery of the whole. The consciousness of cooperation is more and more limited to the specialists of a small field. The knowledge and appreciation of the vast outlying region is at best largely second-hand and conventional.

Were the unity of science conditioned upon the sympathetic unity and mutual understanding of an interpreting community, then science would indeed be a self-defeating enterprise. We should have the paradox that the greater the growth of science, the less possible it becomes to have a community of understanding among scientists. In the early history of science the unity of appreciation was at its height, whether the task was an individual venture or that of a small group who severally and collectively attempted the universe. But if the unity of the interpretant was at a maximum, the unity of the content of science was at a minimum. With the growth and division of the content of science, a community of interest becomes increasingly difficult. And yet the unification of knowledge must be effected, if at all, by human interpretation. *We* do not have recourse to an absolute interpreter. The ideal of science remains as ever the making clear and distinct the entire object of human knowledge. Science, like the recent fashions[27] in woman's dress, must cover everything and conceal nothing.

Fortunately we are not dependent upon the finite capacity of the interpreting mind for the unity of science. There is a dialectic within the content of science itself which makes it impossible to chop up the content of science arbitrarily by our limited interests. It is the coherency of the content which compels coherency of interpretation.

27. The fashions have changed since 1914.

Science discovers larger concepts which integrate previously disconnected sets of facts. The discovery of the electromagnetic field by Faraday and Maxwell, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity are examples of such connective concepts. The special sciences break through our artificial boundaries. The overlapping of physics and chemistry has given rise to physical chemistry, the overlapping of chemistry and biology to biochemistry; and the more concrete our content the more complex are these interrelations of the sciences seen to be. This new intersupplementation promises in a measure to remedy the necessary limitations of specialization. Thus specialization comes to the rescue of specialization by virtue of the impersonal dialectic of the content of knowledge.

Some problems, moreover, are common to the various special fields with their subjective demarcation. These problems consist, in part, of the need for criticism of the general methods of science and for the bringing into clear consciousness the nature and test of truth; in part they consist of those common features of the content of the sciences which lie outside the interest of the special investigator. To bring these problems into clear relief and thus supplement and interpret the work of the specialist is the task of philosophy, which in turn has its cumulative unity of supplementation and criticism. When now and then some great scientific genius like Poincaré possesses also the philosophic consciousness and translates a vast scientific content into the vernacular of the philosopher, this very much facilitates the systematic survey at which philosophy aims. Thus the historic process of knowledge by its very specialization, and guided by the orderliness of the content of knowledge, seems to forestall the tragedy of the world of knowledge breaking into fragments by virtue of the limitation of interest and capacity on the part of the individual human interpreter. A growing correlation there is in the world of science, but this is due to our growing consciousness of cosmic unity, which shows its sublimity

by its very outstripping of our apperceptive unity as interpreters. We can no longer say with the confidence of Kant: We make the unity of nature. Our role is not to create but to discover, though we must create the means for discovery.

In the conceptual interpretation by science, there has been a tendency to give priority to the concepts of the physical sciences and to make them legislative for the biological and the psychological sciences. It has been supposed to be scientific to reduce all description to physical description. Such procedure is an over-simplification. Historically, it is easy to understand how this emphasis was established. The physical sciences were the first to take on systematic form and, with their mathematical technique, they are still the most impressive. There is still a general opinion among scientists that science deals with the measurable; and with this emphasis there generally goes a corollary, not always explicit, that the quantitative character of nature is more important than the qualitative. That quantitative correlation itself depends upon quality and may be just a rough average of individual actions has only recently been recognized. But back of the exaltation of the methods of the physical sciences, there has been a metaphysical assumption, not always recognized, that the processes with which the physical sciences deal are more real than those dealt with by the biological and psychological sciences and that therefore the facts dealt with by the latter sciences must be "reduced" to the concepts of physics.

We must, on the contrary, learn to respect the facts for what they are. We must recognize different levels of causality in nature and try to discover the laws, qualitative or quantitative, which are appropriate to the respective levels. This is especially important in dealing with social facts. The social sciences must emancipate themselves from the physical sciences and learn to recognize the distinctive facts of their own domain—the laws which govern the interrelation of human wills. If there is to be a unification of sci-

ence, it cannot be realized by reduction to the simplest level of nature, but by showing the interdependence of the different levels of nature. If the quality of the social level of nature can be realized only in a physical world, it is also true that social purposes can reconstruct the physical world, and make it the servant of man. The materialistic assumption is based upon a local interpretation of cosmic evolution, namely, that because the physical level in the history of our earth appears to be earlier than the biological and psychological levels, therefore matter produced the later levels. It is the hoary fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc.* The materialist fastens his attention upon a local sequence and neglects the matrix of the cosmic whole within which the local sequence takes place. The cosmos as a whole has a space-time structure of its own which guides the part histories, of which our earth history is one. From the point of view of the cosmic space-time structure, the separation which we make into past, present and future is arbitrary. The future interpenetrates and guides the present and past as these become integrated into the future. History must be regarded as a space-time whole.[28]

Mystical Interpretation. Conceptual interpretation deals with selected aspects of reality. But reality is not compounded of aspects. Some characteristics of reality can only be experienced by taking reality as wholes or individuals. One doesn't select a wife or a friend by physical measurements or by statistical averages. Love furnishes an insight into individual reality which abstract analysis cannot give. I shall call the larger and more concrete realization of meaning—the empathy or living into the individual wholeness of reality—mystical interpretation. Mysticism, as I conceive it, is not opposed to knowledge or ex-

28. Since materialism is a cosmology, it can be answered only within the field of cosmology. See for a brief statement of my position my paper "A Revolution in Metaphysics and Science," *Philosophy of Science,* July, 1938, and "Man in His World," *University of California Press,* 1939.

clusive of it, but is a genuine type of knowing. It is not the bog or darkness at the end of the cognitive process, but the culminating stage of full-blown knowledge. It is, I think, what Plato had in mind when he said: "Many are the torch-bearers but few are the mystics"—those that have been initiated into the inner meaning of reality. It is what Aristotle meant when he said that the individual can be grasped only by intuitive reason, not by logical analysis. It is what Bergson means when he contrasts intuition with conceptual description. Only intuition, according to Bergson, can give us metaphysical knowledge: "By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."[29] If we conceive knowledge as a hierarchy of perception, understanding and reason, as Plato does at the end of the sixth book of the *Republic* or as Hegel does in his similar stages of immediate, mediate, and Idea, then mystical interpretation is synonymous with reason or what Bosanquet calls the concrete universal. In Spinoza's division of knowledge into opinion, conception and intuition, mystical interpretation would be the third type of knowledge—the intuitive love of God, of the unity of the whole, which for Spinoza is not a cold intellectual abstraction but a mastering yet illuminating emotion. It is significant, in this connection, that Spinoza has often been called a mystic, yet he is also called a rationalist. In J. Loewenberg's description of knowledge as pre-analytical, analytical and post-analytical, mystical interpretation would be post-analytical. Neither Hegel nor Bosanquet seems to have been able, in spite of his intention, to transcend the analytical stage. Plato, in his conception of reason as the ultimate synthesis in terms of the good—the ideal synthesis of reality into a wholeness of value, higher than dialectic—or in his vision of beauty in the *Symposium*, had in mind, I think, what I mean by mystical

29. Henri Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 1912, p. 7. (Trans., T. E. Hulme.)

interpretation. It is an interpretation in terms of individual wholeness as a felt living wholeness in which we participate in living communion and first-hand insight, rather than by external logical analysis and synthesis. It is the insight through which we act in personal moral relations. It is the insight which we feel in the appreciation of a work of art. In either case we live ourselves into the meaning of the object of interest as an integral whole. It is manifest in religious communion in a still more intimate way. In extreme mystical states, which we generally have in mind when we speak of mysticism, the feeling dominates so completely that the intellectual element is submerged. Yet even the extreme mystics have felt that the mystical trance is a supremely meaningful enjoyment of reality, and though it is unspeakable they have been very loquacious about it. By mystical interpretation I mean a knowledge which is the wholeness of personality realizing the meaning of the wholeness of its object.

The abstract cognitive process, whether as conventionalized perceptual interpretation or as abstract conceptual interpretation, seizes upon an edge, an aspect of reality, which is held in the focus for the guidance of some particular interest. But the focal part of experience, important though it be for logically defining the process—for indicating its set or trend—is an almost infinitesimal portion of the total situation. It is the myriad unnoticed factors of the fringe which furnish the meaning and value of the abstract focal part. They constitute the sense of the more, of which the focal present is a sign—the more of the perceived, or conceived, or appreciated—which gives reality to the process, and toward which the abstractions in the light of consciousness crowd as Charon's ghosts crowd to the blood of the sacrifices. They furnish the interest and motive for which our focal abstractions exist. It is the marginal field which is responsible for the persuasiveness or the inhibition of the content which is attended to. It is this which makes us mean more than we know and

whose penumbral leading is brought to light in the stress of the give-and-take process of social communication. In the mystical consciousness this more looms peculiarly large and vivid and the edge in the focus becomes correspondingly symbolic. The up-surge of masses of undated and inchoate associations in the margin of consciousness give us the fascination of novel insight, the feeling of hidden recesses, the opening-up of strange, yet welcome, perspectives. By mystical interpretation I mean, then, this peculiar sense of enlargement in the way of meaning and value, of concreteness and individuality, of interpenetration and fluency, where the focal content fuses with the massed fields of ideas and sentiments of the marginal and subconscious reaches. This general significance of mysticism in human experience has been exquisitely stated in the literary language of Maurice Maeterlinck:

> In Sigfrid's life it is not the moment when he forges the prodigious sword that is most important, or when he kills the dragon and compels the gods from his path, or even the dazzling second when he encounters love on the flaming mountain, but indeed the brief instant wrested from the eternal decrees, the little childish gesture when one of his hands, red with the blood of his mysterious victim, having chanced to draw near his lips, his eyes and ears are suddenly opened; he understands the hidden language of all that surrounds him, detects the treachery of the dwarf who represents the powers of evil, and learns to do in a flash, that which had to be done.

Whether this concrete and novel insight comes in a flash or dawns by gradual processes, it constitutes the essence of mysticism.

Mystical interpretation does not exclude analysis. My friends who are musical experts and who can follow in detail the structure of a symphony appreciate it not less but more than myself who am an amateur. We do not love a person less but more adequately when we are conscious of the many fine qualities which go to make his character. Plato's love of the good was for him the ultimate rationality of life. It made life an organic whole. Spinoza's love of God was an intellectual love which gave a luminous and coherent meaning to his world. The appreciation of wholeness must be an appreciation of parts in

relation and rises with the ability to grasp the synthesis of parts. But the emphasis is on the love of wholeness, on the integration of parts, not on the abstract aspects. Mystical interpretation is immediate in the sense that we live the wholeness—the wholeness in which past and present merge into the future, as they do in creating or listening to a symphony. The immediacy of mystical realization differs from what James Mark Baldwin called "primitive immediacy" in that the former is an immediacy of meaning while the latter is an immediacy of presentation.

The strangeness or novelty which has been emphasized so often as characteristic of the mystical experience is due to the absence of dating, on the one hand, and to the interpenetration and blending of the marginal fields of meaning with the focal, on the other. Reverie, indeed, presents a character of novelty, but the fringe of meaning is here relatively simple and the associated constellations relatively distinct. They lack the whole-organization. In the conceptual type of process the aspect of the object in the focus looms large and the fringe or meaning is merely instrumental in the control of the process. In mystical interpretation, on the other hand, the presented aspect is felt to be a mere passing symbol for the sake of the intimate and living fringe which loses itself in the recesses of the subconscious where the finite seems to merge in the infinite. Whether trailing clouds of glory or of dark foreboding, insight is here suffused with a strong affective color. This marked value character of the mystic states, on the one hand, and their fluent character, on the other, have made us for the most part oblivious to the important cognitive implication of such states. To those, however, who have had a vivid realization of this mystical meaning, our abstract knowledge may seem a mere shadow and symbol:

> Alles Vergaengliche,
> Ist nur ein Gleichniss;
> Das Unzulaengliche
> Hier wird's Ereigniss;
> Das Unbeschreibliche
> Hier ist es gethan.

This mystic enlargement or supplementation of meaning may exist on any level of intellectual unification. It may come with our perceptual synthesis, the mystical feeling for color, for example. It may be a vivid sense of value and reality that is suggested by an abstract concept such as the feeling of sublimity which came to Kant in contemplating the moral law. It may come with emotional types of unity —with a new glow of the ruling sentiment which unifies the novel with the concrete background in our experience; which selects the germane and rejects the irrelevant as strictly as a logical principle, but which has been neglected in our abstract treatment of the mind. In its most typical form it is the enlargement of our ideal activity, a vivid sense of the reality of ideal unity and wholeness, of the real presence of that which the conceptual intellect regards in the abstract. Such an insight it was which filled Plato with wonder and rapturous contemplation and became for him the real motive of philosophy, and which, with the absolute idealist and the religious mystic, gives rise to the feeling that our finite experience is but a fragment of a larger whole which envelops us. When it comes to us on the perceptual level it is sometimes called naturalistic mysticism. It seems higher when it inspires us with the sense of ideal wholeness, but the psychological fact is in any case the same, the feeling of living enhancement, a sense of "lurking universality, the adumbration of greater things."[30]

Wherever we find it, analysis will show that condensed social suggestion furnishes the content. We may note this even on the perceptual level. A year ago last spring[31] I walked in from Cambridge to the Boston Public Gardens. Everything was green and in bloom after the long winter. I was filled with an indescribable delight. On reflecting upon it, there came back to me the tremendous significance which spring, after the long winter and the long nights,

30. Richardson Hovey's introduction to his edition of the *Plays of Maeterlinck*, 1895, p. 5.
31. This essay was first published in 1914.

had for us in my ancestral home in Sweden, where I was a child. It was this which lived in me and came back. A little later I passed the Christ Church cemetery and saw the wind sweep over the grass and felt a vivid exhilaration. There were of course the movement and shifting of light and shade, but these would not have been enough. There was somehow the dim recollection of childhood when waving grass and fields of grain meant a hard-earned victory over parsimonious nature and the prospect of comfort and well-being. This same feeling comes to me whenever I see a wind-swept field of grass or grain. The joy in the babbling brook in a similar way reinstates for me the intense childhood experience of spring. The exhilaration I feel in a storm at sea is harder to account for unless one admits ancestral recollection. My ancestors were doubtless daring seamen. It may, however, be only a sharing of the temperament which made the storm a thing of joy to them. Maeterlinck has evidently a strong sense for perceptual mysticism: "There is nothing that is puerile in nature; and he who becomes impassioned of a flower, a blade of grass, a butterfly's wing, a nest, a shell, wraps his passion around a small thing that always contains a great truth."[32] The mystical thrills that came to primitive man in his perceptual converse with nature, before he became case-hardened by abstraction, are evident from the myths, epics, and hymns that have come down to us, and not least from our Teutonic ancestors who have given us the Norse *Sagas* and the *Niebelungenlied.*

Not only was this sense of mystery felt by early man in his converse with nature, but also, and first of all, in his converse with his fellow-man and in the human phenomena of life and death. He had not yet built up walls of abstraction between the individual and the species as we have. Rather was his feeling for life that of "participation." The species, the ancestral totem, lived in the individuals and they in it and the participation could be constantly renewed

32. *The Double Garden*, chapter on "Chrysanthemums," p. 245.

in the sacramental sharing of the blood of the ancestor. This sense of participation remains, in an idealized form, in the mystical consciousness that He lives in us and we in Him. If we could live ourselves into this early spirit of participation we should better understand the sense of community life of the bee with its division of labor and the sacrifice of the individual for the race. We should also understand better that living intersubjective continuum which moves and controls in all of us.

It has long been recognized that the life of conceptual generalization with its verbal counters is hostile to our concrete sense of meaning and reality. It is this atrophy of the sense of immediate meaning which Darwin felt as a tragedy in his old age, efficient as was the conceptual machine which his intellect had built. He could no longer enjoy poetry and music, the vehicles of perceptual intuition; and he felt that his moral sense, too, must have been calloused by this phobia of abstraction. It is this artificializing of life which makes us lose the sense of social mystery until even Maeterlinck, the mystic, complains that we "cannot even, without the mightiest difficulty, avail ourselves of it (the awful unknown), though in all loyalty, to raise to the point of mystery the gestures, actions, and words of the men we pass every day."[33] This lack, except under extraordinary circumstances, of the sense of reality of the inner life of our fellow-men and of its interpenetration with ours is a genuine loss and shows how dearly bought are the victories of abstract civilization. It does, however, come back under the stress of emotion, particularly in love and in religious emotion. It is this sense of mystery, of unexpressed meaning, which account for the comfort and value we find in our religious formulae, when intellectually they either have ceased to mean anything to us; or, if reflected upon, seem contradictory and absurd. They persist, for the living spiritual community, as symbols of a subtle growing emotional meaning which the words serve

33. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

to suggest but which seldom becomes reality to us in our sophisticated civilization.

It is in the larger ideal perspectives of meaning, with their categories of consistency, unity, economy, and harmony, that the great scientific mind and the Christian religious mystic alike feel the sense of enlargement which outstrips our conceptual divisions. These ideal tendencies have their roots in our instinctive nature, though they only gradually come to consciousness in our experience. I agree with Maeterlinck as to the fundamental claims of our ideal tendencies:

> It is fitting that we should come to an understanding, once for all, on the rights of our instincts. We no longer allow the rights of any of our lower instincts to be contested. We know how to justify and to ennoble them by attaching them to some great law of nature. Why should not certain more elevated instincts, quite as incontestable as those which crawl at the bottom of our senses, enjoy the same prerogatives? Must they be denied, suspected, or treated as illusions because they are not related to the two or three primitive necessities of animal life? Once that they exist, is it not probable that they are as indispensable as the others to the accomplishment of a destiny concerning which we do not know what is useful or useless to it, seeing that we do not know its objects?[34]

I have argued long ago for the instinctive basis of the ideal tendencies; but I would go farther than Maeterlinck by holding that in the realizing of these tendencies in terms of our experiences we are also gaining insight into the object toward which they aim. They are indeed homing instincts, indicating our highest human vocation and the constitution of the universe of which we are a part. As the birds are moved irresistibly by the spring winds to seek the northern climates, and as the bees build their intricate homes for a future they can not see, not knowing what they are doing, so the human mind in a social world of stress and strain is awakened to the longing for the ideal— the complete reality, the vision of God, the life of beauty and holi-

34. *The Measure of the Hours*, 1907, pp. 131, 139. (Trans., A. T. Mattos.) I have argued for the instinctive character of our higher categories in an article, "Mind as Instinct," published in the *Psychological Review*, 1906, since reprinted in *Truth and Reality*, 1911, chap. 2.

ness, pushed on step by step, through mistakes and errors, to the realization of its immanent destiny. "He guides me and the bird." It is through the dialectic of social experience, as Plato so clearly saw, that we become clearly conscious of these ideal tendencies and their implications. For the abstract intellect they are, indeed, limits. But it is not as logical limits or abstract unmoved movers (to use Aristotle's language) that they motivate conduct, draw us onward, but as parts of our instinctive nature. This, indeed, Plato realized in his half-mythical theory of the recollection of Ideas, as he also realized the mystic glow which abandon to their leading furnishes the soul as it mounts to the absolute beauty, "which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauty of all other things."[35] But Plato was not only a poet but a mathematician and a mathematical astronomer. It was in fact what Plato conceived as the mathematical order of the heavens which filled Plato with the greatest admiration. This harmony we should strive to imitate in our lives. Another philosopher, also a mathematical astronomer, Emanuel Kant, found inspiration, like Plato, in "the sublimity of the starry heavens above." Here Kant becomes a mystic.

A recent great mathematical astronomer felt the mystical meaning and poetic zest of the quest of truth. Says Henri Poincaré:

> The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing, and if nature were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living . . . . I mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious order of the parts and which a pure intelligence can grasp. . . . It is, therefore, the quest of this especial beauty, the sense of the harmony of the cosmos, which makes us choose the facts most fitting to contribute to this harmony, just as the artist chooses from among the features of his model those which perfect the figure and give it character and life. And we need not fear that this instinctive and unavowed prepossession will turn the scientist aside from the search for the true. One may dream a harmonious world, but how far the real world will leave it behind!

35. *The Symposium,* par. 211.

> . . . And it is because simplicity, because grandeur, is beautiful, that we preferably seek simple facts, sublime facts, that we delight now to follow the majestic course of the stars, now to examine with the microscope that prodigious littleness which is also a grandeur, now to seek in geological time the traces of a past which attracts because it is far away. We see too that the longing for the beautiful leads us to the same choice as the longing for the useful. And so it is that this economy of thought, this economy of effort, which is, according to Mach, the constant tendency of science, is at the same time a source of beauty and a practical advantage. . . . This intellectual beauty it is which makes intelligence sure and strong. . . . But this disinterested quest of the true for its own beauty is sane also and able to make man better.[36]

Thus it is written in our instinctive nature and in the fundamental constitution of the universe that we shall work together to become conscious of beauty and to create beauty; and as we so follow the mystic leading of that which is most truly characteristic of our human nature we shall attain not only beauty, but success, because we shall discover the laws of our world and be adjusted to it.

While mystical meaning, like all first-hand meaning, must come through individual experience, the historic significance of mysticism comes from its being bound up with massive thought systems and their strong emotive meanings, which have dominated humanity from generation to generation and have determined to a large extent its activities. Primitive cultures are organized in terms of primitive religions. We must remember that primitive religions have their theologies as well as their sacred rites and ceremonies and it is the theology that gives significance to the ceremonies. We call the theology mythology because we do not agree with it. But historically it was primitive man's way of thinking about his world and orienting himself to it. Religion was the vital communion of the group with the primitive man's world. It was a controlling force in his social activities. With man's advance in culture came more unified and elaborate schemes of emotive meaning. There is a history of advance in religious interpretation. Old ideas give place to new as man's experience obliges

36. *Value of Science,* 1907. (Trans., C. H. Halsted.)

him to readjust himself to his world. But the ideology is part of man's effort to establish community with the living and directive order of history. There can be no merely intellectual religion. It is not possible to go into detail in regard to the evolution of these religious schemes of meaning. The culture of the Middle Ages, for a thousand years, must be understood in terms of the Catholic interpretation of the world. It elaborated its philosophy or theology into great systems, but the motive of its thinking in science, art and institutions was communion with God.

In contemporary life other massive systems of emotive meaning are challenging Christianity: Fascism, Naziism, Communism are more than political or economic ideologies. They are, or attempt to be, religious, focusing all the energies and the whole devotion of a nation upon a way of life. They have ideologies, to be sure; they argue, they propagandize. But the appeal is ultimately mystical. It is an appeal to values and rather primitive values. They may campaign against traditional theologies, with the schemes of living which these imply. But they seek new mystical symbols. They attempt to apotheosize the new leaders, and they are evolving ceremonies appropriate to their ideals.

What I wish to emphasize is that mystical meanings not only have to a large extent controlled human destiny but continue to control it; and they do so when we think we are most rationalistic. We may feel that fascism is mystical but we may not realize that faith in democracy is also mystical. It is a massive historical meaning, charged with value, and the value is the important thing not the ideology. Among these systems of mystical meaning there is a struggle for survival. In fact, human history might be largely written as the struggle for survival of mystical interpretations. In the long run we may believe that the system of meaning which expresses more adequately the purpose of life, social and cosmic, will triumph, though we must not forget that in the realm of social purposes the will to believe is an important factor in their success. We can be

sure that the system of meanings which triumphs historically will be in the future as in the past a mystical interpretation—it will be not just verbal concepts but a community of life. And we may also be certain that the dominant type of emotive meaning, whether we call it religion or not, will control or attempt to control all our thinking. Our ideologies and our art will tend to be expressions of the dominant scheme of emotive meaning, though there will always be heretics and they may be prophets of another scheme of values.

We have discussed three types of social interpretation; first, perceptual interpretation, the practical acknowledgement of things, of individuals with their qualities, their concrete space and time patterns, and their causal implications; secondly, conceptual interpretation, the sorting of experience into kinds or types and establishing expectancies on the basis of such analysis; and finally, mystical interpretation, the sense of enlarged meaning, due to the fluency and blending of the field in attention with the massed fields of association and sentiment of the fringe. The last-named we have seen is not peculiar to Bergson and the higher insects, but a normal part of interpretation, in its various stages, with its intuitive element of faith and the sense of reality which it implies. There is here, especially on the highest stage, that of ideal interpretation, a peculiar sense of prevision, a feeling for unity and harmony in time which far outstrips our actual generalizations. It is a massive forward-looking feeling for unity at each moment of knowledge, a sense of convergence and wholeness, which guides our search for truth. Though the realization is finite, yet in each moment the sense of convergence, of blending or fusion, has a different significance. As the process itself is a growing process, this ideal can never be realized. The future somehow casts its shadow behind, the time-form directs the process, or rather the mind divines, feels into, the beyond, toward a complete ideal. This feeling for unity and harmony is not the result of ratiocination,

but the living motive of it. It is this idealization of the actual, or perhaps better, the sense of "the real presence" of the ideal, which constitutes peculiarly the mystic consciousness.

The implicative function within the interpretative process manifests itself differently at different stages of the process. On the perceptual level the implication is longitudinal. It is prospective. If it refers backward to antecedents, to remembered sequences, this is only in the service of the forward look, the practical adjustment to its world. On the conceptual level, the implication is transverse; it intersects the concrete sequences in all sorts of ways, to establish convenient leadings for action. On the level of ideal mystical interpretation, the reference or implication is circular. Seeking and attainment blend in obedience to a guiding principle into one unity, an individual whole, though this whole is largely in the future. The guiding principle is here first of all felt and only secondarily and as an afterthought abstracted into a bloodless logical limit. Perceptual interpretation aims at factual acquaintance and delimitation for immediate action, conceptual interpretation at description and definition for remote action, mystical interpretation at idealization and living communion, where the remote and ideal becomes a living present.

The Unity of the Interpreting Process

Recent thought has emphasized the unity of the interpreting process.[37] Not only has it been shown that the logical concepts and categories are significant only for the fuller life of action and appreciation, but it has been made clear that all the aspects of human nature blend in the cognitive process. The cognitive process is rooted in instinct; the affective and emotional elements are fused in varying degrees with the presentational and intellectual. There is

37. This idea received its brilliant impetus from William James, *Principles of Psychology*. It has gained new strength from F. C. S. Schiller. Its most thoroughgoing expression is to be found in the Dewey School.

no such thing as a cognitive faculty, divided off from other compartments of human nature. Even "disinterested" knowledge, the play of creative curiosity, is rooted in an emotion of wonder, has its characteristic satisfaction as part of an organized sentiment, as well as its intellectual character of agreement with the intended facts. In the cognitive situation, therefore, the whole unity of the self is involved, not abstractly merely (*Uberhaupt*), but as concrete living process. This process, moreover, is a social process. It is because of intersubjective pressure or problems that the interpretation comes to take place at all. Even when we think in solitude, or "without a fellow," we do so by means of social tools and social distinctions and as part of a social community. It is only thus that self-consciousness can arise. In the words of A. E. Taylor: "To realize your own ends, you have to take note of the partly coincident, partly conflicting, ends of your social fellows, precisely as you have to take note of your own. You cannot come to the knowledge of one without coming by the same route and in the same degree to the knowledge of the other."[38]

C. S. Peirce and Josiah Royce have tried to show that our thinking is always triadic. In the language of Peirce, judgment involves presence, reference to a ground and an interpretant idea. Such distinctions, however, are artificial, the product of the particularization and substantiation of language. Whatever convenience such treatment may have for formal logic, it throws no light upon the psychological process of thinking. There is nothing in psychological analysis to indicate that when we compare two facts we always compare with an image as Peirce assumes. Rather our interest in comparison is in the concrete relation, from which the terms are intellectual abstractions. We may, of course, in our distinguishing of similarities and differences, have in mind a scheme (such as a color cube) within which we classify and link them, or an hypothesis,

38. *The Elements of Metaphysics*, 1912, p. 206.

like evolution, which makes the relations significant. But the scheme or hypothesis is part of the interpreting context, not external to it. A judgment is an interpretant idea which selects the facts and organizes them within a system of intended relations. For Royce the trinity in interpretation is the interpreter, the interpretee, and the social community.[39] But the social community does not stand outside the interpreting context. It is interwoven with the interpreting context. We interpret as part of a social epoch and are understood by the other party, if we are understood, because he too is part of the same epoch. The psychological situation in interpretation is that of a volitional, socially organized context of meaning, taking account of a datum. But the datum is not something external to the volitional context. It is a datum because it has been selected by the context though it is not created by the cognitive context. This context, moreover, need not rise to self-consciousness. It may be of an automatic kind. It always tends to become so with familiarity. Psychologists like Titchener, noting this solidified character of the context, speak of it as a cerebral context. This, however, seems a confusion of terms. Cerebral contexts do not supply meanings, they supply causal conditions. What is shown is that self-consciousness has disappeared with the absence of stress. The context has become organized in terms of its datum. It has a constant set. It meets the situation with facility and precision, instead of with a shock and the need for readjustment.

But whether the context of meaning rises to self-consciousness or not, it is not something over against its terms. The latter are part of its intent or set. It matters not how many terms are implied in the cognitive interest. This may imply a single item, selected by some need or uneasiness or it may imply an infinite number of terms, or

39. The relation in Royce's scheme is really quadratic: the interpreter, the interpretee, the social community and the interpreted. The reason that the relation seems triadic to Royce is that he regards the object as constituted by the social community.

even grades of infinities, as in the number series. But these terms are after all merely abstractions from the interesting relation within which they are comprehended. They do not exist as bare presences, referred to an abstract ground and interpreted by means of an abstract idea. Nor is the intersubjective relation a term external to the individual situation of interest. But the active interest is a socialized interest, determined in part by the intersection of social currents. Self-interpretation is itself social interpretation, the translating of our needs and tendencies into terms of social standards and these in turn into our own requirements. Only so can we discover our own meaning and value. Society, in truth, can say: When me you fly, I am the wings. We do not have to do with a socius *and* a self, but with a socialized self—a self transformed and played upon by social suggestion. It is this socialized self which constitutes a cognitive situation by its selective delineation. In the process of interpretation society lives in us and we in it. We interpret in order to be understood and, therefore, imply society. We require the give and take of social dialectic to give clarity to our meaning. But society does not constitute the object of our meaning, unless the object be a social institution.

The problem does not differ essentially whether we are dealing with a cold-storage meaning in manuscript, or with our own past meaning, or with a present socius, or with nature. In each case we are part of a community of interpretation which has already standardized our facts and values, which is ever at our elbow whispering its judgments in our ear, pulling at our coat-tails when we would depart from the beaten path of custom, even as the force of gravity keeps us to the earth in the physical world. In each case our socialized meaning strives to take account of a selected context and is tested in the process. In each case the validity of the cognitive purpose is determined by its success in translating the selected fact into its intent, in meeting the intended situation; and, in any case, the sympathetic co-

operation of a living present socius greatly aids the process of correction and supplementation. Whatever be our objective, whether the meaning we try to interpret be scientific or esthetic or ethical or religious, our verification must meet the whole situation so far as it is intended. And since, in our attempt to interpret another meaning, there must be sympathetic participation in that meaning, and not merely external control, the verification must be adequate to the intent, which is to share the other meaning, so far as we can from our personal perspective. This is true also when we deal with our own past meaning, a part structure within our personal history. To be sure such a past meaning becomes part of the present situation when it becomes an object of interest, but it has, nevertheless, a character of its own. Our present interpretation must be relevant. We cannot make the past anything we please. We are as likely to err in the interpretation of our own past meanings as of other meanings. Finally, interpretation and verification is not limited to logical meanings which are expressed as propositions. These are really a small part of the world of meanings in which we live, however important they may be in science. Not many are scientists and the scientists don't live their life entirely or mostly within the realm of scientific propositions. And even in scientific procedure the transition may be felt without being expressed. Language is important, but it is not everything. We should have something to say, strange as that may sound to the linguistic fanatics in philosophy. The real drive in our thinking is the feeling for consistency and harmony, not the mere verbal syntax.

Whether we are dealing with another existent meaning which we must recognize or with external nature which *we* at any rate are obliged to construe in terms of our meanings from its external evidence, verification always means the termination of an idea in the intended facts. Since verification must always be tentative, Carnap suggests the substitution of confirmation for verification. In

scientific verification, an hypothesis, with its structural implications, is regarded as provisionally true when it is consistent with present evidence. If the evidence does not confirm the logical structure, through which we try to interpret it, we are obliged to revise the structure. What validates or refutes the hypothesis is the evidence and this consists in the last analysis in direct observation. Very elaborate operations may be required to make possible the required observation. But it is not the operations which constitute the test but the evidence. We cannot eliminate the observer if we are to have empirical science.

Recently the term operationalism has come into vogue and has been very much overworked. It is one of those omnibus words, like pragmatism, which, when pontifically pronounced, is supposed to carry everything. Knowledge is operational, we are told. But do operations include mental operations or just physical operations as involved in devising experiments? By ideal operations, we suggest to nature, we try to divine its structure. That is what Plato, Descartes and Einstein mean by saying that we know only by the mind. But we must use observation and experiment to eliminate irrelevant suggestions. Of course, hypotheses are not just caught out of the blue. There is a history of discovery with its logic which furnishes a background for a new hypothesis. One thing is certain, unless we have ideas, operations do not tell us anything. Through ideal construction we may be able to predict facts which have not been observed, as illustrated by Einstein's general theory of relativity. But the final test is direct observation. We may have to carry out elaborate operations in order to get a test observation, as in the Compton effect. Was the x-ray photograph of electron tracks, which Compton got as a result of his experiment, an operation? It did require most ingenious operations, but it was itself a qualitative visual experience. This visual experience would have been meaningless except for the conceptual construction, with its basic implications, which gave rise to the ex-

periment. We shall not advance, in the understanding of scientific procedure, by substituting a part for the whole. In some kinds of knowledge, especially the physical sciences, operational instrumentation is very important, but it is not the whole even of such knowledge, as we have pointed out. And there is a great deal of knowledge which is on the plane of simple qualitative observation. To call the observational test a "protocol proposition" is not illuminating, since it is not its expression as a proposition, if it is so expressed, that is the significant thing, but it's being a direct experience of nature.

We always interpret for the future. We live forward. But this does not mean that the future is an external presence which can be addressed, as Royce seemed to feel. The future is our own pregnant life, our forward-looking experience, to which our interpretation must prove relevant. The future, in the sense of a new meaning, with its own character, cannot be addressed. It comes as the fulfilment or the negation of the present meaning. The form of truth is always finite, the definition of a present purpose. That the process which is intended is infinite is due, not to our knowledge, but to the metaphysical time character of the process itself.[40] The past is not immutable, as is so often asserted, except as we take it in its abstractness. And then it is a mere symbol. From the point of view of significance, as *our* past, it is ever re-created, ever taking on new coloring, new meaning, and value, from figuring in new contexts. From the point of view of our practical relations, the attitude may even be reversed. The friend who has betrayed us does not figure as a friend in our present context of practical relations. The enemy whom we have forgiven does not figure as an enemy. The past deed has been taken into a new context—re-created within the synthesis of more comprehensive relationships. The past itself,

40. My own theory of time I have expressed in *Time and Reality, Psychol. Review Mon. Series,* No. 26 (see especially chap. IV) and in *A Realistic Universe,* Pt. IV.

apart from such relationships, is a mere abstract record, but a record has no significance unless it is interpreted. Nature, too, so far as we attempt to know it, is part of our social situation. Our conception of nature is the product of the interpreting community, active in some individual constitution which strives to understand and to adjust itself to its world, but it does not make the world in so doing.

If we look at the conditions of the interpreting moment, instead of its living functioning, we shall indeed find a number of variables. The object of our interest may undergo transformations while our meaning remains constant. Again our meanings change though the physical object remains comparatively the same. Both the physical object and the interpreting meaning are subject to variables which we must take into account in order to understand their history and present content. Since humanity is an infinite quantity, the number of individual variables which go to determine the content and direction of history, is practically infinite. But however important these conditions—physical, biological, psychological, and institutional —may be for the causal explanation of our meaning at any time, the interpreting moment itself is a unity, an interesting situation, in which biological causes, social influences, personal feelings and ideas function as a living whole in selecting the object; and the object in turn is a *significant* object for us only because thus selected.

We must insist, therefore, upon the wholeness of the interpreting moment as against all abstract formalism. The interpreting moment, moreover, must not be separated from history. Its wholeness includes the future as well as the present and past. The present and past are significant as figuring in the integral movement of life which is always forward-looking. We can understand the intricate interplay of motives in any interpreting activity only by placing ourselves within the stream of history with its intersubjective relations and its forward reach—its time-form which makes the present moment significant. That individual

thinkers have been neglectful at times of such implications does not lessen the responsibility of those to whom the task of carrying the process of interpretation forward has been entrusted.

In emphasizing the social character of interpretation, we must not neglect the individual contribution to the interpreting process. For after all, the process must run through individual constitutions. The light must be refracted through individual media with their genius, history and temperament. If we neglect the individual dynamics of the process, we shall not only strike a dead level of conservatism, with no invention or progress, but we shall have nothing to socialize. Hence, as over against abstract universalism, we must emphasize the creative importance of the individual—his transformation of the social heritage in assimilating it. The individual is not a mere mathematical intersection point of social currents, but a creative factor from which the initiative of the process must in the last analysis proceed. This individual constitution must always translate the social heritage into terms of itself. The result in every genuine case of interpretation is in part unique —not a mere appropriating of the past. Only so is progress possible. Progress means ever new demands for readjustment with the ever-recurring social tragedy, as society strives to mount on its dead past to higher things.

Objectivity and Social Interpretation

Intersubjective interpretation does not constitute the objectivity or validity of truth. This must be found in the coherence of our judgments with each other and their termination in the intended object. Intersubjective relations furnish us, on the one hand, an incentive, without which the cognitive process could never rise into clear consciousness; and, on the other hand, they furnish us means for supplementation and correction of our individual data. But social agreement does not make a judgment valid. Error and illusion may be social for the time being. Social

interpretation liberates us, indeed, from the egocentric predicament. It makes truth impersonal, the same for all of us. But it does not, by itself, constitute the validity of knowledge. It does not constitute the cognitive object, unless this be itself a social meaning; and even then the meaning thus selected must be treated as objective to the meaning which takes account of it and evaluates it; error of interpretation is still possible. We may fail to know what we mean, either in our individual or our social capacity. Nothing is more difficult to interpret than present history; and we all know what transmutations take place as each individual and each generation interprets past history.

Nature seems to have an objectivity which is independent of us finite interpreters, whether in our individual or social capacity. Can this objectivity, in the last analysis, be regarded as constituted by a superhuman experience? That seems to be the view advocated by two recent thinkers, James Ward and Josiah Royce. Both start with the assumption that an object implies a subject. According to Ward, "It is not on the practical or historical side that common knowledge conflicts with individual experience, for there the reference to individual subjects is still present and essential. But intersubjective reference on what we may call the individual side leads almost inevitably to the omission of this reference; and so for the living green we have the somber gray and Man at least and nature are at strife."[41] This omission of reference to a subject, according to Ward, comes about in this wise: "Regarding the sun as independent of L, and M and N *severally*, it concludes that it is and remains an object, independent of all collectively."[42] We may affirm that the House of Commons is an estate of the realm independent of each individual member, but we cannot therefore draw the conclusion that it might be addressed from the throne though there

41. James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 3d Ed., 1907, II, 170.
42. *Ibid.*, II, 197.

are no members. Ward's analogy, however, does not seem convincing. It is clear that the House of Commons could not exist apart from social consciousness, since it is a social institution, constituted by a common purpose. But it is not obvious that gravitational relations are so constituted. Ward himself evidently feels that something more is required than our finite social consciousness. "Intersubjective intercourse secures us against the solipsism into which individual experience by itself might conceivably fall, but it does not carry us beyond the wider solipsism—if I may so term it—of Kant's consciousness in general." Like Berkeley, therefore, he has recourse to a transcendental subject, reaching beyond our experience. He arrives at this by a curious method of abstraction. He insists that, as in individual experience every object has a subject and *vice versa,* so the universal object implies a universal subject. But this leap from the implication of *our* reflective experience to the nature of the universe is a doubtful analogy. It is merely another way of saying that because we think, therefore the universe as a whole must think, which is an act of faith and not a logical proof. What seems transparent is that our finite social experience cannot account for the objectivity of nature.

In *The Problem of Christianity,* Royce takes as his starting-point the implied reality of the social community and its historic process of interpretation. His emphasis on the reality of the social community is important and profound. The historic world of social institutions is a world constituted by our social purposes—a world ever growing with human experience and productive of fresh surprises, which in turn must be assimilated into the social tissue by fresh acts of interpretation. It is true, too, that the interpreting community, with its individual accretions and discoveries, in its cumulative unity in time, constitutes for us the significance of the world. In infinite ages it may take over the seeming brute world into its meaningful context so as to leave no dark corners, no unexplained residue. But is

the interpreting community the whole of reality? Does it constitute the reality of the cosmos? This is what Royce would seem to say: *"An interpretation is real only if the appropriate community is real, and is true only if that community reaches its goal.* In brief, then, the real world is the Community of Interpretation. . . . *Unless both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world."*[43] Nature exists only for an interpreter. *"The world is the interpretation of the problems which it presents."*[44] But who is this interpreter? Here we find the same leap from analogy as in Ward, the same shifting from the finite community of interpretation to a universal interpreter, the spirit of the universal community.

> *You are an example of the principle whose active recognition lies at the basis of my only reasonable view of the universe. As I treat you, so ought I to deal with the universe. As I interpret the universe, so, too, in principle should I interpret you.* We have no ground whatever for believing that there is any real world except the ground furnished by our experience. . . . In your ordinary social life, you postulate your fellow-man as the interpreter of the ideas which he awakens in your mind, and which are not your own ideas. The same principle, applied to our social experience of the physical world, determines our ordinary interpretations of nature and guides our natural science. For, as we have seen, the physical world is an object known to the community and through interpretation.[45]

This argument from analogy seems to be defective. It argues from facts which we recognize to be signs of a living, communicating will to facts where we cannot recognize such a will. Royce does not take into account that the *recognition* of the existence of another mind must be prior to our interpretation of facts as signs of such a reality. Where we are able to recognize a will, consciously furthering or thwarting our purposes, there we come, indeed, to interpret certain sense data of gesture and speech as signs of that will. The real question, then, is whether we can recognize in nature such a sympathetic will of which its sense facts may be taken as signs.

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44. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
45. *Op. cit.*, pp. 322-24.

Assuming that nothing can exist without an interpreter, we pass easily to the conclusion: "The World is the Community. The world contains its own interpreter."[46] But the inference from the truism that the knowledge of an object implies an interpreter to the conclusion that no object can *exist* without an interpreter seems to be a leap of faith and not of logic. The finite historic social process is for Royce sublimated into a transcendental Spirit of the historic community, and this Spirit furnishes it a supra-temporal and supra-individual unity. This Spirit, while immanent in the historic community and revealed in the infinite process of interpretation, infinitely transcends any finite moment of the historic community. It is both its goal and its perennial reconciliation to the plan of the whole. " 'In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye' the whole of time, with all its tragedies, is by the interpreter of the universe, reconciled to its own ideal. And in this final union of temporal sequence, of the goal that is never attained in time, and of the divine spirit through whom the world is reconciled to itself and to its own purpose, the real community, the true interpretation, the divine interpreter, the plan of salvation—these are expressed."[47] But this only makes it evident that the social consciousness as ordinarily understood does not constitute the cosmos, if that need to be made evident.

Epistemological idealism, it would seem, can be resolved, in spite of its varieties, into four basic propositions. In the first place, it is laid down that all facts are data of experience. This is, of course, a truism. A fact is a fact for cognition only when it is selected by our interest. The first proposition is closely associated with a second proposition, namely, that all data of experience exist within a unity of apperception. This proposition, like the first, is a truism, since objects[48] become data only by being selected

46. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 378, 379.
48. By object I mean anything that may be selected by our interest—thing, structure, quality, relation, etc.

by the interpreting interest which is the functional unity of experience. A third proposition is that nothing can *exist* except as a datum of experience. This proposition is not so innocent as the first two. It is in fact a sophism, though no doubt unconscious. It owes its persuasiveness to the confusing of existence with significance. Objects have significance for us only as selected by our interest. But it is not self-evident that selective interest creates the objects. Within *our* experience, at any rate, objects are prior to our interest in them or there would be nothing to stimulate our interest; and sometimes, at any rate, nature seems to pre-exist in patterns to which the category of interest is not applicable. A solar system or an atomic pattern is not, so far as we can tell, interested in its own existence, though it may become an object of interest to us. Epistemological idealism owes a large part of its convincingness to the failure to make clear and distinct the third proposition. The fourth proposition develops the implication of the third proposition. It may be stated as follows: Since there are data of experience which exist between you and me but are also independent of you and me, severally, as finite interpreters, there must be a larger unity of interpretation, in which all the data of experience exist. This larger unity has been conceived either as a single timeless experience, the Absolute, or as a continuous cumulative and, in some sense, self-transcending community in time. It is evident that the fourth proposition presupposes the first three propositions, namely, that all facts are data of experience, that all data of experience must exist within a unity of apperception, and that nothing can exist except as a datum of experience. The third, crucial proposition would hardly be adopted by any sane man except as supported by a belief in the fourth, that of a larger inclusive unity, though some philosophers have professed to be solipsists and have argued the matter! Even Berkeley, in spite of his paradoxical approach to the problem, did not believe that the stellar world ceases to exist on a cloudy night. He could always

fall back on God as a guarantor of the constancy of nature. As an effort to account for the objective character of nature, epistemological idealism is at best circular. It is true that it is the social character of our objects—the testimony of practical experience to the effect that objects exist between you and me—that raises the question of a third unity, inclusive of you and me and the objects. But what is that third unity? It is no explanation of it to call it social, since what we want to know is how it makes social experience possible. We cannot just assume that the subject-object relation of our reflective thought is mandatory upon the universe. Such a proposition requires empirical proof. The interpreting moment is capable of establishing direct continuities with other subjects; and the community of subjects can share a common world of objects and cooperate in their use and interpretation, whether these objects can be recognized as centers of experience or not. This seems to be as far as *our* experience carries us, and whether we would or not, we can use no other.

Nature would seem to be independent, at any rate, of *our* interpretation. The relativity of the qualities of things to someone's perception of things, which has been the stock argument of idealists since Berkeley, does not seem to hold, even though we substitute the community for the individual. The variation of the image with the distance, the variation of the shape with the angle of perspective, the illusion of the stick which appears bent when seen in the water—these appearances are not relative to our perception in any other way than they are to the physical camera. This takes account of them precisely as the organic camera of our vision. They are physical phenomena, that is, they are objective to the process of interpretation, and must be explained by causes independent of our perceiving them. It is true that the sensory qualities of things depend in part upon the percipient organism. They are compound functions, involving both the special physical stimulus and a specific sense organ and nervous system. But that fact

does not mean that they depend upon the percipient's interest. Kant realized that there must be an objectivity beyond our social experience when we deal with nature, that is, that experience does not constitute the existence of its object; but as he had been led to believe that the sense qualities are mostly subjective modifications and that the categories of the mind are *a priori* in an arbitrary sense, there was nothing left to indicate the existential character of nature except the thing-in-itself. His intuition was sound, however, that whatever nature may be in its own right, it is not constituted solely by our experience. That sense qualities are subjective modifications and that our biologico-social categories are arbitrary—these are gratuitous and pernicious assumptions. Nature, on the contrary, enters into common dynamic situations with our organism, as things within external nature enter into dynamic relations with one another. The qualities of nature are precisely what we must take them as being in these dynamic contexts. Energetically the world is a community.

The strength of speculative idealism has been in dealing with social institutions. The institutional facts, the social meanings of custom, science, art, language, of which we must take account, fall within social schemes which the interpreting community must acknowledge as flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood and with which it has a living, sympathetic continuity. These institutional facts of which we, individually, take account have a prior stamp, a meaningful context of their own, which we must recognize in the process of interpretation. Are the facts of nature at large thus socially pre-stamped with an absolute stamp of interpretation? Have they a prior locus within an absolute system of significance? Evidently there is a mutual fitness between the knowing mind and the cosmic environment, since they have evolved together. The categorical laws of thought may be assumed to be also the laws of things. The selective process which resulted in what we call mind and cognition is itself a cosmic process. In

this sense it must be regarded as intelligent and vastly more intelligent than we creatures of a day. But must we recognize this process as itself a self-conscious cognitive unity?

The fact that the scientists are becoming a community, taking cognizance of the past, and mutually correcting and supplementing one another within a more and more complex division of labor, does not prove that the object of science is such a spiritual community, unless we suppose that the community of science constitutes its object; and this would defeat the end of science itself, which is discovery. The only answer that can be given is a pragmatic one. Nature for us is a spiritual community just in so far as we must take it as such in realizing our own social purposes of truth, right, and beauty. Our present organized insight does not seem to make it possible to recognize nature as a whole as such a unity, though in individual mystic temperaments, such as Wordsworth, sympathetic companionship with nature as a living social presence seems to have been a reality. Perhaps it is our ancestral blindness which debars the rest of us from feeling that way. In the meantime the rest of us are not able to recognize nature as such a unity for our practical purposes; and the religious consciousness seems to be better served with a finite presence within nature, as the embodiment of its ideals and as the Great Companion.

When we deal with cosmic interpretation, intellectual, esthetical, ethical or religious—and in the end these fuse into one—, we cannot hope for such definite verification as when we deal with specific meanings.[49] Alternative interpretations, due to the historic setting and to the individual initiative of the interpreter, here obtrude them-

49. Elsewhere I have attempted to furnish a metaphysical and cosmic interpretation—*A Realistic Universe*. Macmillan, 1916, 1931; *Cosmic Evolution*, 1925; *Three Interpretations of the Universe* and *God*, 1934, and in a brief form in "A Revolution in Philosophy and Science," *Philosophy of Science*, July, 1938, and "Man in His World," *University of California Press*, 1939. Also *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 135-166.

selves, as the history of culture plainly shows. This is true to a considerable degree even in the limited domains of the special sciences, but here more definite checks are available than in the large cosmic schemes of meaning. Hence it is more difficult to measure progress in cosmic interpretation. Here it has seemed to some as though there were recurrence of certain eternal types. But we must not forget that these large schemes of interpretation are part of the history of the race and must prove their relevance to the growing experience of man. Ultimate agreement in cosmic interpretation may not be possible, because of the limitations of human experience. The available evidence may fit into more than one pattern. The scientifically minded interpreter will prefer as simple a pattern as possible and one as close as possible to the observed facts, though obviously a view of the whole cannot be a literal interpretation. Over-beliefs necessarily play a large role and interpreters will differ as to the over-beliefs of postulates which they feel are essential to a meaningful life. I incline to the side of those who feel that the universe which brought us forth must in some sense be responsive to the ideal cravings of human nature, as well as to its biological cravings. But we must not suppose that our little candle's light reveals the whole truth. When we try to formulate a view of the cosmos, we can only claim probability, as Plato clearly saw. Yet we are obliged, in our limited existence, to act upon the probable as though it were real, or all action would be paralyzed. We must adopt the interpretation which seems most reasonable in our epoch of experience, but always be open-minded to the future. We must be critical of our limitations or we become victims of the will-to-believe, and we must be tolerant of divergence of interpretations or we may fight against the progress of truth.

CHAPTER IX

ORGANIZATION OF WILL

The Will to Live

The deepest thing in nature is the will to live, with all that it implies. This was a great insight of Schopenhauer's. Schopenhauer thought of the will to live in cosmic terms. Everything in nature, as Spinoza pointed out, strives to persist in *esse suo*, that is, to maintain itself. But we are concerned with life, which not only strives to maintain itself but to transcend itself by assimilation and growth into more complex patterns which stretch from the future into the present and past. Perhaps this is true also of the vastness which we call inorganic nature. Nature knows not our artificial boundaries in its whole-movement. But we must here limit our problem to the will to live as it manifests itself in the immediate history of life of which human life is the outcome.

Schopenhauer tried to simplify his problem by reducing the will to live to its lowest terms: the mere blind restlessness of nature. Because of his metaphysical predilections he denied reality to space and time. But without space there could be no interaction of parts and without time there could be no development. The world of multiplicity and transformation is for Schopenhauer illusory, and the result of his philosophy is mysticism. While Schopenhauer denies reality to time, he, nevertheless, incorporates evolutionism into his account of the will as appearance. The will, by unconscious genius, shapes itself organs to further its life—stomach, sex organs and finally a brain. But intelligence is not for Schopenhauer part of the evolutionary pattern of the will. It is but an instrument for the more effective realization of its unconscious striving. It has no power of action. It is a paralytic carried on the shoulders of a blind giant. In the end the intellect takes its revenge by showing the illusoriness and futility of the will's striving and so

prepares the way for the final stage: the will's denial of itself as the root of all evil and at length attaining the willessness of nirvana.

We are not concerned with Schopenhauer's philosophical system. We are only concerned with his profound insight that the most fundamental thing in life is the will to live. Unlike Schopenhauer we regard the urge of the will to live as an urge to development "from lesser to greater perfection," to use the language of Spinoza. The will to live is a striving to express temporal wholeness in the multiplicity of the changes of nature. In its interaction with the environment, it evolves greater complexity in space and time. Like other energies it spreads in space and time. We must speak of a field of conation as we speak of an electro-magnetic field. From the very beginning, it is a will to live racially as well as individually, for the individual perishes and the will-to-live must be a will to go on. Its realization includes the future. For its adequate expression, life requires a relation of mutuality, not merely with the external environment but also a mutuality of life with life. In its more advanced stages life craves not merely the transitory union of sex but expresses itself in permanent groups for more successful maintenance, individually and racially.

The will to live, in its advance, becomes the will to live socially. It becomes the group will to live. And in order to live successfully socially it becomes the will to live intelligently. Intelligence is not a mere tool, but is the form of the will's realization as a more complete and satisfactory will, until in a few choice incarnations it no longer finds its supreme satisfaction in the animal appetites but regards these as instrumental to the realization of the spiritual satisfactions of truth and beauty. Schopenhauer's denial of time made it impossible for him to see the will to live as a time-form and to see in the evolution of life at its choicest a more complete actualization of the meaning of life. His egotism prevented him from seeing that life finds its realization in the complexity of mutuality, and his obsession

with the animal cravings of the will prevented him from giving it credit for its ideal aspirations.[1]

But it would, on the other hand, be a mistake to identify life solely with the ideal activities of its later stages and to neglect its community with the whole striving of life, as philosophers have been prone to do. The will to live not only has its tendrils in the future but is rooted in the whole past of life. This past is concentrated in our organism which is the summation of our racial life and gives the background of reality to our passing consciousness. The will to live includes the alimentary system, the sex urge, breathing, circulation, glandular secretion, in short the maintenance of life in its environment. The life hunger of the ages expresses itself in our bodies, crying for more life. Every cell of our bodies is hungry for life. The cry of millions of years past and of millions of years to come is in our organism, for the will to live includes the future as well as the past. It is the will to development, the will to actualization of the whole pattern of life in its environment. For the whole of life is a time-whole and not merely a space-whole. It is a creative whole, and is significant for us only as in some measure, however fragmentarily, we divine its trend.

The greater part of our life is submerged in the vegetative and animal levels of our history. The will to live is first of all an organic urge, the yearning of our bowels. In its interaction with its environment it preserves the past as habit. It further increases its range into the distance of the past and the future by creating structures for memory and imagination—first adherent to the particular desire but later becoming free to roam over the past and the future as free imagination. The will in its dynamic aspect expresses itself as feelings and emotions which in the experience of man become organized as social patterns of sentiments, which provide the woof of life. The will may

1. In the third book of *The World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer becomes a Platonist. Here the will strives to realize certain types.

at times become consciously constructive, through analysis and synthesis, to create new patterns of conduct. Since creative thought can only be realized in groups, with their communication and clashing of ideas, the will to live becomes the will to construct appropriate group patterns. For "man is not only content to live but desires to live well," as R. R. Marett has so well said. Society was created for the sake of life and has been reconstructed and must be perpetually reconstructed for the sake of better life.

Civic Society

The most momentous step in the history of man is the evolution of moral control. The origin of civic society is wrapped in mystery. Wherever we have evidence of human conduct, whether in records of the past or in contemporary primitive society, man lives under moral control. This fact distinguishes human society from animal societies. In the societies of the higher insects we find marvelous organization of conduct, with division of labor in subordination to the life of the group, but the pattern is biological. In the non-human primates there is evidence of dominance and restraint, but it is the dominance of force and the restraint by animal fear. There is no moral control. By moral control I mean the consciousness of certain beliefs and practices as having to do with the welfare of the group and being followed for that reason. There is no evidence of any such consciousness in the animal realm.

The question is raised by Marett whether human social evolution is a natural or an artificial process. Marett's answer is: "If 'natural' be used so as to exclude the 'artificial,' then I am prepared to say that human life is pre-eminently an artificial construction, or in other words a work of art, the distinguishing mark of man consisting precisely in the fact that he alone of the animals is capable of art."[2] By saying that "human life is pre-eminently an artificial construction," Marett does not mean to deny that

2. R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, pp. 155, 156.

society has a biological basis. The full statement would be that society is partly a product of nature and partly a work of art—art divining with greater clearness the direction of nature. What we need to emphasize is that creative intelligence is an essential condition of the evolution of human society, as opposed to those who would explain human society as the mere result of external conditions. Social organizations are inventions by man. That does not mean that they are always or mostly deliberate. Trial and error and luck play a considerable role. But, even so, conscious selection is involved. Primitive man is pragmatic and is absorbed for the most part in his immediate problems. We haven't gotten far yet in remote social planning. The social organizations with which we are here concerned are will organizations. They have to do with the conduct of groups as groups, with their integral self-sustaining life. Whether we should call the independent, self-controlling primitive community a sovereign state is a matter of language. The independent primitive group exercises complete control of its own life and of its relations to other similar groups. If such are the marks of sovereignty, then such groups are sovereign.

Rationalistic theorizers on society have lacked biological and historical perspective. Civic society did not start as a deliberate contract of independent individuals as Hobbes seems to have thought. However civic society may have started, it presupposes a community held together by some bond. Civic society did not originate because of the division of labor, because the division of labor presupposes a community. Civic society is not based on force. On the contrary, the exercise of force is incidental to the maintenance of a community. Force does not constitute a community. A civic community is not the result of conflicts of interests and consequent compromises. There must be the will to unity or there would be no attempt to reconcile conflicting interests. Without a sentiment of unity, conflict means war.

In one sense we may say that societies grew. However far we go back we find no deliberate start. That does happen in the case of modern corporations. But they are abstract affairs, not the life of a people. Human society started as an animal group, but it did not remain an animal group. There are certain binding instincts, such as the parental instinct and the band instinct. They persist as the biological background of human society, though very much transformed. The gregarious instinct is fundamentally amorphous. It is a notable fact that instincts which bind may also separate and those that separate may bind. The parental instinct and the band instinct bind certain members together, but they also separate those members from other families and bands, sometimes with bitter conflict. Pugnacity, jealousy, vanity separate but they may also combine. People combine because they love, but they also combine because they hate. In animals with memory and imagination, such as man, the instinctive emotions figure as sentiments and become the most powerful cement of groups.

One thing is clear: human society could not originate without intelligence. A permanent group must have not only its instinctive roots into the past; it must also have its common memories which constitute the living tradition —the only tradition that people without records can have. But human society also involves creative planning. Man, through the ages, invented his social organization, with the ideas and practices which it involves. It was a supreme moment in human history when man consciously adopted forms of restraint and cooperation to maintain the welfare of the group. This converted the animal community into human society, as we find it everywhere. It required a great deal of intelligence to invent, and to see the necessity of, moral control. When we consider that the Neanderthal man (not to speak of the Cromagnon) had a brain capacity equal to that of the modern European, that he invented a theory of life after death, that he discovered a new method of making tools by chipping the flint, we need not

be surprised that primitive man could exercise intelligence in human relations. He was, indeed, inferior in the development of language, but his visual language supplemented marvelously his oral language. We can observe the same fact in young children. They show far more intelligence in their responses than they can vocally express.

The view that civic society is created by intelligence contradicts Bergson's theory that intelligence disintegrates, makes man selfish. Hence in order for society to exist it was necessary to curb intelligence, and this was done by mythical religion. What Bergson forgets is that religious myth is a creation by intelligence. Religion was primitive man's science and philosophy of his world. And man invented religious beings and rites because, according to his experience, they brought luck, not for the sake of restraint. Since religion was man's conception of the order of things and since he realized that his group could not prosper except as it was on the right side of the order of things, religion did exercise a tremendous control over conduct, though a large part of conduct even in primitive society was recognized as secular and depending on man's own efforts. In the secular field we have striking evidence of man's inventiveness, as we can see in the progressive adaptation of tools. Religion, too, was experimental and man, even though tardily, adopted new "medicines" when prosperity required it.

The secret of primitive society, and of all society, is *reciprocity*. The primitive group is held together, not because of the restraint of fear, but because of mutual interest, though defence against a common enemy may be part of the mutual interest. Since in primitive society, as in modern society, there are recalcitrant members who will not play the game according to the established rules, there must, of course, be external restraint but this is exceptional in primitive society. It does not constitute the meaning of society for the normal body of members. Nor is primitive society, any more than modern, held together by a cake

of custom, pressing upon the members from without. There are certain ways of living which experience has proved advantageous for a common life. These folk-ways cumulate as tradition. They are sanctified in primitive life by their association with religious ceremonies and sacraments. But they are not maintained merely because they are custom, but because primitive man feels that acting in those ways brings prosperity and acting in contrary ways brings danger. There is a certain sense of security which man—primitive and modern—feels in acting according to the established ways. But the important thing is the will to live and if possible to live better. And primitive man, as well as modern, does change his ways when success in living requires it.

Primitive man has shown considerable readiness in borrowing new ways—ritual, tools, modes of fighting—from his competitive neighbors, as the evidence for circulation of culture in primitive life shows. The Australian aborigines barter ritual as they barter weapons and food. Primitive life is not the stereotyped affair that external observers in the past have led us to believe. Primitive man may answer when asked why he does things in a certain way: "It is always done that way," just as we would answer if asked about matters of etiquette—holding your spoon in the right hand when eating soup. But back of the primitive man's answer is the belief that the current way is the best way for life in the group. The long record of the invention of tools shows that primitive man could change his ways and invent new ways for his greater success. And the same is true, over a period of time, in regard to his social ways. Such changes, in primitive life as in modern life, come in periods of stress especially when a great personality leads the way. When a civilization has reached a successful adjustment, internally and externally—as in Eskimo and Melanesian civilizations—and so long as it is not disturbed from outside, it will naturally attain stability. But to the people who live the civilization, it will not be a cake

of custom but a satisfactory way of living.

A beautiful illustration of reciprocity as the fundamental principle of primitive society is found in Malinowski's intimate study[3] of Melanesian society in the Trobriand Archipelago—a group of flat coral islands surrounding a wide lagoon. The method of Malinowski, in studying this primitive people, is the method we must pursue in the understanding of any society. "We found the real problem not in a bald enumeration of rules, but in the ways and means by which these are carried out. Most instructive we found the study of the life situations which call for a given rule, the manner in which this is handled by the people concerned, the reaction of the community at large, the consequences of fulfilment or neglect."[4] We must look at the problem as it arises in the matrix of the life of a people. "Law and order arise out of the very processes which they govern. But they are not rigid nor due to any inertia, or permanent mould."[5] There is a considerable range of fulfilment, with corresponding rewards and penalties.

The chief problem of Trobriand, as of any society, is that of maintenance. The economic occupation of the Trobrianders who live around the lagoon is that of fishing. There are certain accepted rules for the building and ownership of a canoe, for the manning of it, for its joining with the other canoes in the fishing expedition, for the division of the catch. There are definite obligations governing this chain of services. The owner may not keep back his canoe when there is an expedition, though he need not go himself. There are definite rules governing the division of the catch between the owner, who is usually the leader, and the crew. Everyone must play the game. Excess of fulfilment of an obligation is rewarded by extraordinary approval, failure makes the situation for the offender intolerable. Such egoistic motives as vanity play an important part in social

3. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, B. Malinowski, 1926.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

fulfilment, since primitive people, as well as modern, have a weakness for applause. The arrangement of reciprocity extends further to the exchange by the coast people of their product for the vegetables cultivated by the inland tribes. Here too excess of fulfilment is rewarded and niggardliness is penalized in the normal course of events. To stimulate further the idea of reciprocity the ceremonial feasts of the coast people emphasize the inland product and *vice versa*.

While tradition, including religious ceremonies, plays a part in these reciprocal arrangements, in the main such rules are respected because they conduce to harmonious cooperation in the practical relations of life. Other rules have to do with social amenities, such as the relations between friends, relatives, superiors, equals. These rules are obeyed because not to do so makes the person look ridiculous, and primitive man cannot endure ridicule. Good manners are an important part of primitive life as they are of modern. Only in primitive life they are required. There are rules governing sports and festivities, rules of magical rites, funerary pomp, religious ceremonies. But they all come under one head: playing the game of reciprocity according to the accepted standards. The Melanesians may not have formulated the golden rule in so many words. But the golden rule may be expressed in one word: reciprocity. This was Confucius' summing up of the social code. We must not forget, however, that among the Melanesians there are evasions of the moral code and these, as with us, may be connived at by public opinion.

The culture of the Melanesians is of a simple type. But in all societies there must be a certain degree of reciprocity or there would be no society. The test of cooperation is in the distribution. There may be cooperation in getting the necessary products and yet the distribution may be individualistic in the sense of having to do with smaller units. A cooperative culture in the true sense is one where the distribution has to do with the whole society. An in-

dividual may hunt in the bush, but bring in the result to the larger unit. The Maoris of New Zealand cultivate rivalry in the attainment of the products, but they are all brought into the common stock of the tribe. The unit of cooperation varies a great deal in different societies. With the Ifugaos of the Philippine Islands, where the family is the unit of control, there is cooperation within the family, but competition and conflict between families. With the Dakotas, the clan was the unit of cooperation, but the tribal control established peace between clans; and on some occasions, such as the buffalo hunt and war against neighbors, the tribe became the unit of cooperation. Among an unorganized people like the Eskimos the hunting and the fishing was individual, every family for itself; but in the case of famine they became cooperative; and there was always borrowing without expectation of return, when a family was in need. Among the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, with their hierarchic organization, there was cooperation within the feudal unit, while there was competition between the rival families, the competition taking the form of spending in order "to flatten out" the rivals. As would be expected, societies with an integrated political organization, such as the Maoris, reach the greatest degree of communal cooperation. But naturally a great deal depends upon the history and temperament of the various cultures.[6]

Force plays a small role in primitive society. If an individual does not play the game he has nowhere to go. Education and initiation into the customs of a society are as a rule sufficient with primitive peoples. That of course is also true with us, but there are fewer transgressions in primitive society than with us. Custom is reinforced by supernatural sanctions. It is dangerous to offend the ghosts. Margaret Mead makes the interesting observation that the cooperative societies are the ones who "have an

6. See in this connection *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, edited by Margaret Mead, 1937. This cooperative work gives a careful analysis of thirteen cultures.

ordered view of the universe. They conceive of a supernatural system which operates on its own rules and which man may propitiate and influence in an orderly way."[7] For this purpose, there are regular ceremonies which, of course, vary in different cultures. There can be no doubt that religion plays an important role in the working of primitive custom. In the comparatively unorganized societies, suspected violation of custom is likely to bring about mob action, but in the higher cultures there is orderly procedure for dealing with suspected culprits.

Sorcery is generally looked upon with suspicion in primitive cultures and may bring drastic treatment. Such is the case especially in Africa. The objection against sorcery is that it is generally practiced for individual gain or malice. But the sorcerers may be in the employ of the rulers, as in Melanesia, to ferret out and bring punishment upon offenders. They, then, constitute a sort of secret service. Because of the beliefs of the people, the sorcerers can produce striking, even mortal effects. But the sorcerers are subject to control by public opinion and if working mischievously may even meet with death. There is also counter-magic which may neutralize the effect even when there has been transgression. It has been said that magic, as contrasted with religion, is always bad. But magic may be used by the forces of law and order. It is irresponsible and malicious magic which is condemned as bad. Nor is it possible to draw a sharp line between magic and religion. Prayer and ceremonies may be used to control the forces of nature. Even modern Christians pray for rain in periods of prolonged drought. It has been said that magic is the fore-runner of science. But magic is stereotyped and arbitrary. Science is the descendant of man's technological inventions to improve his control of nature.

In primitive life responsibility is collective. The killing of a member of another clan, whether accidentally or intentionally, may mean that the injured clan must retaliate by

7. *Ibid.*, p. 492.

killing a member of the offending clan. This situation may lead to a continuous feud, as in certain parts of our own country so vividly described in Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn.* An evolution from this is the duel when a representative of the injured party meets a near relation or friend of the aggressor. It is said that among the Eskimos the thought that a man may sacrifice his best friend in such a duel acts as a powerful restraint. Among some primitive people the ordeal may take the place of the duel—walking over hot stones or putting one's hand into scalding water. But those in charge of the ordeal, who have intimate knowledge of the accused, temper the ordeal to their suspicions. Over a large part of the primitive world, the fine has taken the place of retaliation in kind. The fine is, of course, collective, but bearing most heavily on those nearest in kin to the offender. One cannot say that such relations are explained by an instinct of revenge. The situation is more complex than that. In some way the social balance, which has been upset by crime, must be restored.

In the Njal Saga of Iceland, from the tenth century, we have an instructive account of the process by which law took the place of the feud. There were the heroic pioneers who worked for change and suffered. The conservatives, egged on by the women, thought that having things settled by the court, instead of fighting them out, was cowardly and disgraceful. There were several reversals to the old method and it took three generations before the advocates of law prevailed and feuds were settled by the court. Internationally we are still living in the era of feuds. It may well take three generations before reason and good sense will prevail and disputes be settled by law.

It should be clear from this sketch that the effective sanctions of social life are those which grow out of the activities of the group at a certain stage of development. Since the primary fact of life is the will to live and a desire to live well, beliefs and practices which experience indicates will further man's efforts to live have the force of the

group on their side. This force may operate without any feeling of restraint. No society can maintain itself where the mass of its members do not willingly work together for the common welfare. Such working together may entail sacrifices which could not be borne as a mere matter of routine. The consciousness of the common welfare is the only adequate bond. This faith may work comparatively automatically in times of stability, but it is always in the background. In times of stress, thinking and deliberation become necessary. The people whom we call primitive did a great deal of thinking at times. A council of Indian chieftains in times of danger no doubt surpassed, both in thought and oratory, our own United States Senate. It is certain that we have vastly under-rated intelligence in so-called primitive society and over-rated intelligence in our own. Society still depends largely upon sentiment and custom. Primitive society shows evidence of thought and planning.

Various forces of social control have been enumerated: Praise and blame, public opinion, physical punishment, literature, religion, government—to mention a few. But the enumeration is of no significance unless we consider such forces as growing out of the life of a people—its will to live and to live prosperously—and within the matrix of ideas and practices which a people at a certain time believe will further their life. This will-to-live is the permanent energy of which folk-ways, opinions, governments, religions, literatures are the transient expressions.

In a rapidly changing society, such as ours, the growing pains are considerable. Our mores, ethical, political and economic, were crystallized in an agricultural society, with its comparatively simple conditions, and cannot meet the complexity of our contemporary life, with its concentration of population, its mass production, its new means of communication, its scientific criticism and inventions which have added both new perils and new opportunities to our life. We must create new mores, but these must grow out

of our own processes of living. We cannot just put a new patch on an old garment. In modern society, as well as in primitive, reciprocity is the secret of success. When class is pitted against class, business against government, crises result. There can be successful development only when the interest of the whole is made paramount over the interest of the parts. Freedom of the parts must be subordinated to a sense of responsibility for the whole. This is a lesson which democracy must learn or perish.

Status and Contract

An important factor in social control is that of status. The often quoted statement by Sir Henry Maine, that the evolution of society has been from status to contract, simplifies the problem too much. In the first place, we must not forget that there have always been contractual relations, in the sense of enforceable obligations, even in primitive society, however much the machinery of enforcement may vary. In the second place, status is as real as ever, though its character has changed. We cannot make Maine's statement apply to social evolution generally for in some primitive societies there is practically no difference in status. We may take Eskimo society as an illustration. There is by general assent a recognition of leadership, but this is based upon efficiency, not upon status. If, again, we consider such an ancient culture as the Chinese, Maine's formula does not seem relevant, for in the long period of Chinese history, Chinese society does not seem to have had a fixed stratification. The status in China has depended upon the family. But, while there has been considerable difference in the social dignity of families, there has been no stratification of classes. Since, furthermore, the Chinese conception of the family includes reciprocal responsibility for all family relations, however remote and however poor, the life within the kinship family is more or less democratic. And Chinese life has consisted and does consist of such kinship families.

A more correct way of interpreting the matter of status would be that the evolution of Western society has been from the comparative fixity of status to greater mobility or circulation of status. We may distinguish two types of circulation[8]—horizontal circulation and vertical circulation. Horizontal circulation, such as inter-marriage within the same social strata, economic exchange, interchange of ideas, does not affect social position. Vertical circulation, on the other hand, is movement from one stratum to another, either ascending or descending and affects the status of individuals or groups. Vertical circulation varies greatly in different types of societies and at different periods. Sorokin points out that in Western civilization the greatest vertical circulation has taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is probably no civilization where there has been either no vertical circulation or where there has been absolute vertical circulation. During the feudal period status was, in the main, stationary. Society was stratified into royalty, nobility, commoners and serfs. Yet within the church there was a ladder of ascent from the lowliest to the highest social position, that of pope. The army furnished another, though limited, ladder of ascent. Today the great ladders are education and economic success.

The concept of "culture distance," as developed by E. S. Bogardus, cuts across the distinction of horizontal circulation and vertical circulation. The culture distance may be due to social stratification when social stratification means, as it generally has meant in the feudal type, cultural stratification. But the two do not necessarily coincide. In Great Britain, for example, which retains the form of feudal social stratification, members of different social classes may be nearer in cultural sympathy than members of the same

8. For a brief outline of two types of social mobility, see Pitirim Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, 1928, pp. 748 ff. For a comprehensive analysis of vertical circulation, see the same author's *Social Mobility*, 1927.

social class. Education creates its own nearness and distance independent of social stratification, though in social etiquette there persist certain customs which emphasize classes. Otherwise, social classes would have no meaning. Different cultural types, such as those of "civilized" man and "savage," of Occident and Orient, of national cultures with different historical backgrounds, give rise to distances in understanding and sympathy in proportion to the differences in the systems. The tragedies resulting from such distances are all too evident. But the cultural distance may be a basis of conflict even in the same family. This occurs all about us but becomes especially evident when another cultural ideal intrudes, as in present day China when East and West meet in the same family through intermarriage.[9] Cultural distance may be associated with race but this association is adventitious. Race prejudice is itself a cultural product.

We are here concerned with social distance as based upon status. During the long period of slavery and during the long period of serfdom, the status of the slave and of the serf was fixed, except as a slave might be given freedom or a serf might be granted a freehold. In contemporary Western society we have no such fixity of status. We have at least potentially open classes instead of closed classes and castes. But it would be a mistake to suppose that status plays no role. The most conspicuous status is that determined by wealth. The cleavage between the rich and the poor has always been the most important cleavage. At least one-third of our population, even in normal times, is living close to the threshold of misery. And that means the lack of other opportunities besides those having to do with subsistence. There is a status which is based upon education, which some of us value more than that of wealth. The

9. See E. S. Bogardus. "Culture Distance in 'A House Divided'." *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. XX, pp. 473-477. "Social Distance and its Practical Implications," in the same journal, Vol. XXII, No. 5, gives a general statement of Bogardus' conception.

status of wealth manifests itself generally in excess of consumption. The status of education has to do with skill and culture and the advantages that go with them.

In both of these types of status there is considerable circulation. The wealthy may become poor, as was evident in the recent financial crisis. Again the poor may become wealthy. Some of our millionaires started as day laborers. Many of our educated people, who are prominent in cultural professions today, came from strata who had little education. Such circulation of classes has been especially evident in a comparatively new country like the U. S. A., where a man's energy and initiative have counted for a great deal. It was most striking under pioneer conditions. But, taking our society as a whole, we must admit that the opportunities and incentives are very unevenly distributed. And opportunity and incentive are the most important factors in cultural productiveness. The gifts of nature are, no doubt, unequally distributed, but no one can say that the present status is a fair measure of the distribution of natural capacity. The element of luck plays too large a part in the present status of the population, whether it be the luck of being born into a favorable status or the luck of finding opportunity to rise to a superior status.

The inequality of opportunity for education was strikingly shown by Dean J. B. Johnston of the University of Minnesota in his Cap and Gown Day address to the graduating class of 1937. He pointed out that the liberal arts college, on an average, received only one boy or girl from a laborer's family for every 1600 adult laborers in the state whereas it received one son or daughter for every 21 men engaged in banking, one to every 24 in general business and one to every 315 engaged in farming. Dean Johnston further pointed out that, during the period 1931-1935, of the children of the poor, including those who received federal aid, 58 per cent became successful students and 15 per cent secured honor standing, while of the children of the well-to-do 42 per cent became successful students and 6.5 per cent

secured honor standing. "Without federal aid," he said, about 1300 self-supporting students would have been denied higher education." Yet from these students came more than twice as many honor students as from the well-to-do. It will no doubt be remarked that the self-supporting students were more highly selected than the well-to-do. But the important fact is that the ability is present in the poor part of the population and only needs opportunity. There is evidence that the politicians will economize at the expense of the self-supporting students rather than apply an equitable system of taxation.

While there is considerable circulation between the strata of contemporary society and while the picture as a whole presents some advance over past ages, the general stratification presents a relative constancy. The greater part of the population are poor in economic and cultural advantages. In Great Britain, where the feudal stratification of society has persisted to a greater extent than anywhere else in the Western world, they speak of the upper class, the middle class and the laboring class. The upper class means the hereditary aristocracy, which the founders of our Republic had the great wisdom to abolish. The British divide the middle class into the upper and the lower middle class, where wealth plays an important part. The stratification through wealth is general in society (except in Russia where a stratification of skill is under way). Such stratification means a difference in opportunity. The circulation between strata in an established society affects a comparatively small part of the population.

In no country in the Western world is the social stratification so subtle and pervasive as in Great Britain. Here the anachronism of a hereditary House of Lords, though its powers have been curtailed, still persists in a political democracy. The aristocracy is being continually replenished by promotion from below. The promotion to the peerage is generally due to political or financial reasons, though sometimes distinction in cultural lines is so rewarded. Knight-

hood is more often bestowed for contribution to culture, and is a distinction much prized even by men of international fame. It is, of course, to the wife that the social distinction is especially significant. The fact that the finest lady in England, Mrs. Beatrice Webb, refused to be a "Lady" probably did not affect the system which is sure to be self-perpetuating, thanks to the political sagacity of the powers that be. The tendency to snobbishness pervades the whole of English life. Even a labor gathering feels that it should have a lord to preside, however stupid he may be. The social system probably accounts for the lack of success in building up a genuinely democratic party in Great Britain. The able men, who might be leaders, are caught in the mesh of the social hierarchy, as the fly in the spider's web. The title, Labor Party, is itself a damning distinction in the English social system. The old Liberal Party was a middle class party and played an important role for a time, but since Ireland is no longer an issue in British politics and the policy of free trade is a thing of the past, the Liberal Party has lost its historical rationale for existence. It must find a new rationale. The British system needs a middle of the road party to mediate between the Tory element and the proletariat. But it must be a party with a broad liberal program and not a mere negation. The ideal thing would be to have a genuinely progressive liberal party which would include the proletariat.

Royalty in Great Britain is the acmé and standard of the social hierarchy, and also the source, theoretically at least, of the caste distinctions. But the king is more than the head of the social hierarchy. He is the symbol of the unity not only of the British empire but also of the British commonwealth of nations. In fact he has become the only formal bond of the British nations. But he is more than a symbol. He is an integral part of the working of the British system of government. When the king is a person of wide experience and tact, such as George the Fifth, he can exercise great influence on political affairs. But he must not

forget (as the late Edward the Eighth did) that he is the head of the hierarchical social system. It would take a far stronger personality than Edward to break the new feudal oligarchy and to lead the movement for social democracy. In the other democracies of western Europe, where the hierarchical social system has lost its political significance, the king has become more obviously the symbol of democracy. The evolution of democratic kingship in the last generation is one of the most significant recent political developments. Since the government is carried on through representatives of the people, the king is removed from party struggles. He represents all the people. Hedged about by constitutional limitations, the king can do no wrong, but if he is a man of wisdom and insight he can do a great deal of good. He smoothes the political transitions in a democracy. The celebration by all the people of the eightieth anniversary of King Gustav the Fifth of Sweden in 1938 not only showed the affection of the Swedish people, but leaders of all parties testified sincerely to the value of his sage counsel during the peaceful political and social evolution through which Sweden has become a model of social democracy.

The weakness in the British social system is the lack of a strong agricultural class. The English countryside is lovely but it is out of all proportion to industrial England. The strength of the French republic lies in its farmers—mostly small farmers—who constitute the bulk of its population. From the independent and self-respecting agricultural population, with their small towns, have come the leadership and genius of the French people, not from Paris which is cosmopolitan. The Scandinavian countries have a strong liberal agricultural class, as well as a highly intelligent and cooperative labor class, and are not dominated by the industrial overlords as has been the United States. This fact no doubt accounts in part for the success of the cooperative movement in Sweden, though of course it required effective leadership. It is significant that Russia, which

has aimed to establish a classless society is now shifting its emphasis to the agricultural population in order to secure stability and permanency. The strength of a nation is its attachment to the soil.

The Tory government in Great Britain is the logical result of its hierarchical social system, of which the Established Church is a part. In spirit, Great Britain is still strongly feudal. It is significant that only in Great Britain of all the democracies do the politicians speak of themselves as belonging to "the ruling class." It is understandable that the Tory leaders should use such language, but the leaders of the Labor party use the same language. It becomes easier to understand why the politicians feel that way when one recalls that under the British party machinery a prominent politician is likely to stay in Parliament indefinitely, for if he is defeated in one district the party machine will find him a safe district. An obscure incumbent simply withdraws for the good of the party. No wonder that the political repeaters think of themselves as "the ruling class." And the mass of the people, though voters, take it as a matter of course. Since the ruling oligarchy does not choose to quit, a government by old men necessarily results, and they naturally are strong upholders of the class tradition and nervous about change. "I stand for my class," says Neville Chamberlain. This is the weakness of the British nation and explains its failure to stand up to the unified totalitarian states. Though the British nation occupies a dominating position in the group of democratic nations of Europe, its leadership has brought democracy to the brink of disaster. Its ambiguous policy (to use the mildest language) in international affairs is due no doubt in part to the anxiety of the governing oligarchy to save its social system, even at the risk of the British empire—not to mention the sacrifice of other nations. As the other democratic nations have been moving farther to the left, with the tendency to destroy class distinctions, the bond of sympathy between them and Great Britain has naturally

weakened. The apparent drift of the British government toward the Fascist group has been difficult to understand either from the point of view of its professed democracy or the safety of the British Empire. The deliberate sacrifice of Republican Spain to the Fascist is hard to explain. Back of the drift, though more or less unconscious, has been the feeling of danger that an aroused proletariat might come effectively into power. This is all the more serious for Great Britain because of the lack of a strong agricultural class to balance the proletariat. What I am concerned to emphasize is that the working of a political system is very closely dependent upon the social stratification of a nation. The civil service, for example, which plays so large a part in the British system of government, is recruited mostly from the aristocracy and the upper middle class, partly because of tradition, partly due to educational requirements. Even when men from the two lower classes qualify, they are likely to remain at the bottom of the service.[10]

Status has always been and still is one of the most basic agencies of social control. Under a fixed stratification control by status seems more obvious. In the upper classes there has been a good deal of talk of *Esprit de Corps*, and no doubt it has played a large role. But the control by status is just as real in a circulating society. We live mostly within our class and most people desire, and it is a very practical consideration, to have the good opinion of our class. We generally do the things that are expected of us from our class; and the indifference or ostracism of our class is a serious and inconvenient matter. For such writers on ethics as Bradley and Bosanquet, the substance of ethics seems to be to live fittingly and creditably to one's station. They do not seem to make much of the possibility of a change of station. But that was in the Victorian era. It is true, however, in every era that one's

10. The British social system has had one economic advantage in attracting silly American heiresses who find titles more appealing than the American tradition.

station carries with it a fairly definite set of expectations.

The idea that human relations in contemporary society are based upon contract is an exaggeration. A great part of human relations is evidently based upon status. The freedom of contract, it is true, is an important part of our constitution and has been evoked by our Federal Supreme Court when there have been attempts to regulate working hours and wages. It was evoked not long ago to declare attempts by states to establish a minimum wage for women and children unconstitutional. This interpretation has recently been reversed. Just what freedom women and children have in making contracts has not been made clear. As was pointed out by the late Justice Holmes, freedom of contract begins where equality of bargaining also begins. In effect the judicial interpretation of freedom of contract in the past has meant the maintenance of a certain status—the status of the economically privileged. It is only recently that laborers, because of their organization into unions, have been able to do any effective bargaining, and just now Congress and the Supreme Court have established that they shall have the right to bargain as unions, through their chosen representatives, with their employers. What they will get will of course depend upon a variety of factors. For organized labor at any rate, the freedom of contract promises to be more than an empty phrase.

The greater part of human relations is too subtle and complex to be reduced to a contractual basis. It is only where property or services are involved that the concept of contract can be applied and even then it can be practically significant only when both parties have the means of being effective bargainers. In modern life, as in primitive life, social expectations are on the whole fulfilled because otherwise life would be intolerable.

The reason that Sir Henry Maine fixed upon contract as the characteristic of modern society was that he was writing in the latter part of the nineteenth century when *laissez faire* was the accepted theory and practice. The state was

conceived as having a merely negative function, that of keeping peace and order. The positive relations were between individuals. The enforcement of contract between individuals was a conspicuous function of the state. But in the twentieth century the conception of the state has become more positive. The state is not conceived merely as a policeman and arbiter, but as having to do also with the general welfare. The general welfare clause has become the most important clause in our constitution. It opens the door for constructive planning in our government, though in the past restricted by conservative judicial opinion which would rule out everything which is not literally stated in the constitution. The change of attitude was well expressed by Chief Justice Hughes in the Minnesota Moratorium Case, 1934: "The question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends."

The Expression of the Social Will

We must now consider the mechanism of the social will. How does the social will become expressed in action? How does it operate in practice? We may say that a social will is a group of people thinking and talking together about a common theme and coming to a decision about that theme. That is the essence of the matter, but it is over-simplification. It neglects the fact that a political group has a history and that the deliberation moves within a system of accepted tradition, whether oral or written. This system or constitution indicates the type of control and the distribution of powers in the government which is the mechanism for the expression of the will of the group. Government is not the same thing as the will of the political group, as has sometimes been wrongly assumed. A state may change the form of its government—and some states like the United States of America have a constitutional provision for so doing—yet retain its continuity. As to the form of

organization, the power may be centralized in one individual who has been called king or tyrant according to his attitude to the people. The power, again, may be concentrated in a few people who have been called aristocrats or oligarchs, the former distinction having been generally based upon family, the latter upon property. Finally the power may be vested theoretically in all the citizens as constitutionally defined. Such a form is called democracy. Today in the Western world, we have two types of organization: theoretical democracy and fascism. In the latter, the power is concentrated in one individual, who is called Leader or Despot according to the point of view. He must of course be emotionally the leader of a nation in order to exercise dominant control. But politically his power is supreme.

We are concerned with the democratic type of organization. In modern democracies the functions of government are distributed in different bodies—the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. It was the intention of the framers of the constitution of the United States of America that these bodies should be independent and their functions were defined. It was thought that by such rigorous division of powers, the Republic would be safeguarded against revolution. The theory of the division of powers goes back to Polybius, the Greek historian of the second century B.C. He had noted the tendency to degeneration in simple constitutions, such as kingship or aristocracy or democracy, and thought that by a complex constitution combining the essential features of each, as in the historical evolution of the Roman State of his day, such degeneration might be prevented by mutual checks and balances. We are not concerned with the details, but with the principle. Polybius' conception was modernized by Montesquieu on the basis of the British system as he understood it (and he did not understand it) and was adapted to democracy by the framers of the American constitution.

In the historical evolution of our government the separation of powers as between the branches of government has

been modified. As early as 1803, Chief Justice Marshall (Marburg vs. Madison) assumed the principle of judicial power to declare laws, passed by Congress, unconstitutional; and this interpretation has since that time been part of our federal system. Whereas in Great Britain, and the democracies of western Europe, parliament is the supreme law maker, in the United States the written constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is the final authority. This situation has in the past greatly complicated the passing of necessary social legislation, but the Supreme Court now seems to have become socially minded. Another development which has become inevitable in the complexity of our government has been the delegation of powers to non-political administrative bodies, who exercise large quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions in their domains as established by law. (The word *quasi* softens the fact.) It is true that the Supreme Court in the N.I.R.A. case held that such blanket delegation by Congress had gone too far, but that did not affect the general situation. Of course, such delegation is always subject to the legislative body.

We are concerned with the effective expression of the group will more than with its machinery. In the deliberation of primitive groups, unanimity was required. If they didn't agree, they adjourned to resume deliberations later. That didn't mean that all participants weighed equally. There were, generally, recognized leaders—the old men, the chieftains—and the others followed the lead. But there might be a deadlock among leaders. Under the system of guild representation in the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, it was necessary for each guild as a guild to assent, and this fact often blocked action. The Greeks, who invented democracy, invented also the method of majority rule. This has been the method in modern representative government, whether in the stock corporation or in the political state. This method has the advantage of preventing deadlock, but it has difficulties of its own. The tyranny of the majority is sometimes a serious problem.

But still more serious is the manipulation of the majority by those in control.

In the huge stock corporation of our machine age there is only a semblance of democracy. The voting is by stock. What happens is that the officers and directors send out cards to the stockholders, notifying them of the business meeting and suggesting themselves as proxies, and then elect themselves to the respective offices. The vast number of stockholders, mostly small stockholders, are scattered over a wide area, not only national but in many cases international, and do not attend meetings. If they tried to do so, they would find it futile. They have of course the right to appear, but when occasionally they exercise that right they find themselves ridiculous. To organize an effective revolt means building up a counter-machine and generally fails. The officers and directors generally manage to control the stock. They may not own a large part of the stock, but they manipulate enough of it to exercise control. The scandals in the past of dishonest manipulation, in the interest of those on the inside, stink to heaven. The result has been that the national government has been obliged to step in to try to secure fairness of management. Owing to legal, as well as political difficulties, in the U.S.A., the powers of the national government have so far been inadequate, but some improvement has been attained over the wild and woolly days of speculation. The gamblers of Wall Street are using all their influence, including their control of the press, to get the restrictions, established by the Roosevelt administration, nullified. They try to foster the illusion that the Stock Exchange determines prosperity, but it takes time for the public to forget the crash of 1929. "What is needed," Wall Street says, "is confidence. The government should stop interfering with business."

The vast impersonal economic organizations furnish one of the great problems of the future. It is futile to try to reverse economic evolution and to attempt to force return to small-scale local business where the interest involved is

national. You cannot force associations, which recognize their likeness of interest, to fight one another. But the public must be protected. The problem is not merely to protect the stockholder but also to protect the consumer. We are obliged to return to the medieval concept of "a fair price." Such protection must, of course, apply not only as against the large capitalistic associations but also against other economic organizations such as labor unions and farmers' associations, if they should threaten the public welfare, but the latter associations have so far been the underdog. They have not been able to exercise the power that capitalistic associations have been able to exert.

In the national efforts at expression and control, there are still serious problems. The promoters of political democracy thought that, once individuals were granted the privilege of the ballot, utopia would come at once. That was Rousseau's romantic dream.[11] But now we have been disillusioned. One difficulty of present political democracy lies in the numbers of citizens who participate and the geographical size of the political units. Rousseau framed his political conception upon direct democracy, that is, the meeting of all the citizens as one assembly to legislate for the common welfare. He had in mind the Greek City State and the Swiss Canton. But obviously such a procedure is impossible in modern national states. In modern political development representative government has taken the place of direct government.

The question is what do the representatives represent? Rousseau thought that no man could represent another man. That may be true. But a man can represent interests. The problem is: what interests? It should be the common interests of the members of the group. Rousseau thought that if each citizen voted his own will freely, without compulsion or persuasion, the pluses and minuses would cancel in such a way that the majority vote would express the

11. *The Social Contract.*

general will which would always aim at the general welfare. For Rousseau the majority vote constituted, in some magic way, the real will of the people. And not only that, but the real will of the individual, including the individual who voted in the opposition. The latter must admit that he was mistaken, that the majority result was what he really willed, and that he was free in obeying it, even if he had to be compelled to be free. Of course, if a democracy is to maintain itself, it must accept the majority verdict for the time being. Unless the minority accepts, anarchy results. But that does not mean that the minority is convinced that it was wrong. While accepting the result, it can, in a democracy, work for victory in a new election.

There are practical difficulties in majority control. Individuals do not vote as individuals in political elections, but as members of parties. While parties are extra-constitutional, they constitute the important machinery of government in democracies and are so recognized by the state. Parties originate as expressions of types of ideals or interests, but they may survive as organizations long after they have forgotten why they originated. They may even come to change sides in the changing conditions of political life. Such a shift is conspicious in the U. S. A. at present. The Democrats, who traditionally have stood for individualism and *laissez faire*, have come, as a result of governmental responsibility, to emphasize an extension of federal control, while the Republicans, who traditionally have stood for centralization, have, because of their policy to protect vested interests, come to emphasize individualism and *laissez faire*.

In the tradition of America and Great Britain, there have been, as a rule two major parties contending for control. Under such circumstances there is a fairly close approximation to majority representation, though because of the unequal distribution of population in voting districts, sometimes brought about deliberately by the party in control, it often happens that the party which is victorious at the polls represents a minority of the total number of voters. When

a third party enters effectively into the contest, the winning party may fall far short of representing a majority of the electors. And yet it may have overwhelming control of the machinery of government during the prescribed period.

Proportional representation which is now tried in various municipalities and national states makes impossible the anomaly of a large part of the population being without representation or at any rate having a very inadequate representation. It is inherent in democracy that every citizen is entitled to representation, though he must conform to the decision of the majority. Proportional representation gives minorities a more effective voice in formulating policies. And since there is bound to be a considerable range of opinion within parties, the minority party or parties may play an effective part in decisions. This is true to a certain extent under present conditions within our two party system. The liberals of the Republican party sometimes join with the liberals of the Democratic party, and the conservatives of the Democratic party with the conservatives of the Republican party. In this way a minority may hold the balance of power. With proportional representation the minority certainly has a better chance of being adequately represented. But it would be a mistake to suppose that proportional representation or any other political machinery will automatically produce good government. It has been shown in some of our municipalities that the selfish interests can adapt themselves to proportional representation and run the government as corruptly as under the old system.

The opposition to proportional representation has naturally come from the conservative party which generally opposes any innovations. But when the conservatives become the underdog in politics, they may see the advantage of proportional representation. It would have made a great difference in the respective representation of the Democratic and Republican parties in our national Congress if

we had had proportional representation. And it would be better for the party in power if it had an effective opposition party. The same can be said of the present British parliament.

Where there are a large number of parties of varying ideals and no party has a majority of representatives, government can be carried on only by a coalition of parties, as has been the case on the continent of Europe. This is likely to give rise to instability of government and difficulty of carrying out a consistent policy, whether in national or international affairs. This condition has had a great deal to do with the breakdown of democratic procedure in some European countries whose people have become tired of the bickering and uncertainty of representative control and have welcomed, or at any rate been indifferent in preventing, a fascistic type of dominance. International relations have played a great part in such shifts of control. A magnetic and bold leader who has promised his people a place in the sun has been able to make an effective appeal to a nation suffering from an inferiority complex.

The advocates of fascistic control point to the effectiveness of such control in getting things done. Such effectiveness means the ruthless silencing of opposition. The only freedom under such a regime is the freedom to cooperate with those in control. Such control depends for its continuance on the stimulating of a strong sentiment of nationalism, and this in turn can be kept at white heat only by war propaganda and war regimentation, which is bound sooner or later to produce war. The outcome is necessarily tragic, whichever side wins a nominal victory. We must admit that fascistic control gets things done. But whether, on the whole, those things are likely to increase human welfare is another question. The loss of personal freedom, in the sense of independent thinking and expression, means the loss of true culture and such loss is a high price to pay for any temporary success.

In the end, the question is one of social philosophy. Are

bigness and power the most important values in human relations? Small countries, like the Scandinavian countries, which have given up the idea of power and have applied themselves to cultivating friendly relations with their neighbors, and, above all, to fostering the peaceful interests of their own people, economically and culturally, are at present the envy of the big nations of the world with their colossal budgets for military "defense."

But lest we be too hasty and intolerant in our judgments, it is well for us to remember that government is an instrument and not an end. It would be rash to assume that the same type of government can fit all conditions of men. We may think that free democracy is morally the highest type of human relations, political as well as personal. But humanity, in its social evolution, has experimented with various types of control and the experiment is still going on. If the best is not immediately practicable, a people may have to consider "a second best." Democracy is an ideal toward which we should strive, but we should not merely eulogize the external form and neglect the substance; and before we get too critical of other nations in the light of an ideal we pretend to hold, it is well for us to examine what type of control we really sanction.

Democracy is an ideal which has never been realized so far. Real democracy means a democracy of opportunity and not merely a democracy of suffrage. Democracy of opportunity does not mean the same opportunity for all. There are differences in the qualities of men and the opportunities of men must therefore differ. An ideal democracy would be a democracy in which every individual would have the opportunity, through education and encouragement, of developing his distinctive capacity to serve the life of the whole in the way for which he is most fitted and to find his maximum happiness in the furtherance of a common life.

Plato, in the *Republic*, had the vision of such a state. But he did not think it could be realized in a democracy.

Plato had too much contempt for the masses. Though there are great differences in ability, no stratum of society has a monopoly of good sense. Plato's theory of the state, it is true, provided for circulation by education, if by chance superior talent should emerge in the lower strata of citizenship. Plato does not show how this selection was to be brought about, but at any rate he recognized the possibility of lapse in the upper classes and rise from the lowest class of citizenship. The three-fourths of the population who were slaves did not count.

Even so anti-democratic a writer as Pareto recognizes the historic fact that the ruling class in a society is continually recruited from, and often supplanted by, the class below it. "History is a graveyard of aristocracies."[12] To be sure, for Pareto, both classes belong to the *élite* from which he distinguishes the *non-élite*, the large mass. But history shows that there is no such sharp distinction in nature. In a free democracy we have a continuous illustration of "circulation" from the lowest stratum of society to the highest. And we have not begun to tap the resources of the mass of humanity. Some psychologists rashly concluded a few years ago that their intelligence tests showed that the great mass of humanity is subnormal in intelligence. But since their criterion of normal was their tests and their tests were incapable of testing intelligence, we have a right to be sceptical. Moral traits are more important for society than traits which can be measured by intelligence tests. The tests, thus far, reflect more of the conventional background of the testers than the capacity of men.

The form of a government is no index of the real control within a society. We have seen what a mockery democracy is in our great industrial organizations. Democracy in a political state may be just a façade for fascism. If we take the history of our own country (the U.S.A.), we find that in fact the real control has been control by property.

12. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, Vol. III, p. 1430.

The founders of our democracy had no confidence in the masses. They lived close to the French Revolution. They, therefore, not only limited suffrage by a property qualification,[13] but took special precautions to protect property. In this respect the conservative justices of the Federal Supreme Court represent the prejudices of the eighteenth century; but it does not follow that they represent the intention of the founders to create a viable state; and a viable state has a different meaning in the twentieth century.

Government, based upon control by property, did not present a serious problem when there was unlimited land to conquer and when a man's or a family's thrift was the chief consideration. When, under the industrial revolution, capital became more and more concentrated in a small class, the problem became tragic. A large part of the population was reduced to economic slavery—in many ways more cruel than legal slavery—, and with the governmental machinery in the control of the big financial interests, fascism had arrived in fact, even though the form of democracy remained. Had the small group of financiers in the U. S. A. succeeded in keeping control of the government during the recent "depression," with callous disregard of the suffering masses, a fascism of blood would necessarily have resulted. There were in fact real beginnings of such a reign in the methods of violence which the industrial over-lords employed against the employees who tried to improve their situation by strikes. It is an evident survival of feudalism in our midst that petty industrial barons can carry on civil war and kill a large number of people without being tried for murder. The methods of the capitalists, however, have had the effect of bringing about the unionization of labor and making it a real political as well as industrial power.

In the meantime, suffrage has become personal and universal. Such extension of suffrage, without any qualifications for citizenship, except a certain age, is indeed fraught

13. In Virginia a man had a vote in every district in which he owned 100 acres.

with danger. In the pioneer period the possessing of a farm was a fair measure of intelligence and industry. This era is in the past. We have now a large proletarian class with no attachment to the soil and with little if any fixed property. There is not the sense of responsibility that there was when the large mass of citizens were small property holders. But it is not clear that the masses are less sound in their judgment in a crisis than the interested few who look upon society as an opportunity for exploitation. One effect of the greater influence of the masses is that the state has come to recognize that a large part of the population cannot be allowed to starve to death. It was probably this recognition that saved the state from revolution. Under wise leadership the mass is more suggestible to far-reaching reforms than the privileged classes. But one shudders to think what might have happened under demagogic leadership. We need not look far for lessons of what happens under such conditions.

The history of democracy in the past indicates that democracy requires a large middle class; that means that it requires a wide distribution of wealth, in order to function securely. In the history of Rome, when a large proportion of the population had become dependents upon the state, the Republic was doomed. The people had to be fed or there were riots. The historical conditions were, of course, different from ours, but hunger was the same. The significant fact is that when Rome contained a large body of independent prosperous citizens, it found its normal expression in a republic. When the balance was disturbed so as to produce a small exploiting class at one end of the scale and a large mass of paupers, at the other end, it drifted inevitably into dictatorship. It was fortunate to have an Augustus. An object lesson nearer home is that of Germany. The middle class in Germany was largely wiped out by the financial disaster (brought about in large measure by the stupidity of the allied European victors) when the value of money went down to nothing and there-

fore all investments, annuities, pensions, payable in currency, became worthless. The conditions were then ripe for dictatorship.

In our own United States of America, with the wealth of the country concentrated in a few families, with a large proportion of the agricultural population reduced to tenants, with the small producers and businesses leading a precarious existence, and with one-third of the population facing misery, the centralization of power in the national government is inevitable, in order to avert chaos and civil war. A benevolently minded government is obliged to try temporary expedients to meet the situation. The immediately pressing problem is to save a third of the population from starvation. Such a condition is a serious indictment of the richest country on the earth. It is estimated that the wealth of the U. S. A. greatly exceeds that of the other five great industrial nations—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan—combined, but our unemployment also greatly exceeds that of those nations combined.[14] The totalitarian governments, which look upon the state as a whole as their business, naturally laugh at us for poor management. They do not understand that we hug to our hearts something very precious which we call liberty or democracy; they would say our pocketbooks, I would say our antiquated social philosophy, though it may amount to the same thing. It is clear that the safety of our democracy requires a more equable distribution of wealth. We should take warning from history. We must recognize that the glaring inequality of opportunity in our midst is incompatible with democracy. "It means that the dice are loaded in favor of the rich and you cannot play the democratic game with loaded dice."[15]

It is clear from history that a people imbued with a

14. It is only fair to say that the standard of living of those employed is far higher in the U.S.A. than in the other great industrial nations, but that does not excuse the unemployment, when you consider our resources.
15. Geoffrey Crowther, *Manchester Guardian*, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 138.

democratic tradition shows greater patience under strain and a greater capacity to adjust itself than a people not so imbued. There is a common intuitive wisdom in such a people which is wanting in those who lack such a background. A democracy is like a living tree. It can bend a great deal in the storm and yet right itself. Where, on the other hand, the control is by an artificial crust, whether aristocracy or wealth or militarism, the crust breaks under unusual strain like the break of an earthquake, and chaos results. But democracy must be alive; it must grow; it must assimilate its environment, if it is to retain its elasticity. When it ceases to develop, it begins to decay, and then it falls of its own weight.

There are many problems which democracy must meet. One problem is that of more adequate representation of the interests of the people. The form of representation generally in force is that of geographical representation which on the whole has been dominated by property interest. We have touched upon some difficulties of majority expression under such a system. But the problem goes deeper. The present method of election has created a professional class of politicians. Owing to the expense of conducting a campaign and the uncertainty of politics, the tendency has been for politicians to be subservient to interests which will subsidize them, and that means the financial interests. Now and then politics may, for the time being, break away from subsidized control. It generally requires an epoch of misery when the vested interests cannot use the argument of the full dinner pail. Even then an exceptional leader is needed to unite the various discontented elements, who have nothing in common except discontent. With prosperity, or apparent prosperity, people forget. And the vested interests are always on the alert and, with their powerful means of propaganda and the disorganized character of the opposition, manage to get back into control and, by specious arguments and judicious compromise, to keep in control most of the time. Politics has

become so disreputable that the better and abler part of the population shy away from it and let the professional politicians run it in the interest of those who make it worth their while. The indifference to politics is especially serious in municipal elections where the underground interests with their immense slush funds manage to get out their vote, while the "good" (!) people, oblivious alike of morality and taxes, stay away. When shall we learn from the Greeks that to be a good man means to be a good citizen?

Various methods have been suggested for eliminating the professional politician or at any rate to minimize his role. The most outstanding suggestion is to change the basis of representation from geographical districts to interests or vocations. In Italy, Mussolini has abolished the old form of representation and substituted a vocational parliament. But under a dictatorship any representative assembly, however selected, is merely the tool of the dictator. Could democracy be organized on the basis of vocational representation? Some years ago, the Guild Socialists[16] agitated for such representation, based upon guilds or unions. All the productive population would be organized into guilds and only they would have a voice in government. In Great Britain, where this agitation was most active, industrial labor is quite thoroughly organized. The professions, including teaching, are also well organized. The foundations for such a scheme seemed to be provided.

But there are difficulties. In the guild system as proposed, every guild was to retain its autonomy, as in the guild system of the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance. But such autonomy of guilds, where the guilds would vote as guilds and unanimity of guilds would be required, would lead to procrastination and often to deadlock. Moreover, guild socialism ignored the fact that some problems are geographical and have to do with localities. Since the guild representation would come mostly from the popu-

16. The most sincere and devoted advocate of guild socialism has been G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*, 1920; *Guild Socialism*, 1921, etc.

lous areas it would be likely to neglect the needs of less populous areas.

In the constitution drawn up by Sydney Webb and Beatrice Webb,[17] a bicameral system was suggested, one house being based upon geographical representation, the other upon vocations. The latter would legislate upon economic problems, the former upon the more general problems of the nation, internal and external. We cannot go into details and, of course, a great deal in such a scheme must be left to adjustment. Such a scheme would minimize the role of the politician. The vocational representatives would be chosen directly by their unions. But the decisions of the vocational chamber would be based upon majority vote. Even under such a scheme election would involve politics, but it would be confined to the union and would not involve the financial expense and temptations of the geographical system. Proportional representation, with a greatly reduced number of representatives, could eliminate some of the problems of the latter system. Moreover, the opportunity for graft would be mostly eliminated.

A vocational chamber would have great advantages over the haphazard geographic representation in that it would bring together experts in the various fields of interest. This advantage is partly gained by the British system of non-political bureaus of experts whom the government can consult and to which they have recourse for formulation of policies. As a matter of fact the greater part of British government is done by such non-political bureaus. But though such bureaus are kept at a high standard by civil service examinations, it is not to be expected that such service, subordinate as it is to the politicians in power, would appeal to the highest type of creative minds. Such minds might be willing to give part of their time to political service if they did not have to spend a great deal of time and resources in getting elected. There are men and women

17. *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 1920.

of ability who would be willing to serve their country, if they could serve it in a creative way, untrammeled by the machinery of party politics. In the history of Great Britain, as in no other modern country, the continuity and success of national policy has been due to a great extent to certain families who have exercised leadership from generation to generation in devotion to national greatness. These families are in decay. It is incumbent upon democracy to develop its own leadership.

A mild compromise has been suggested in the way of an advisory body, based upon interests, while the power would remain in the geographical parliament. The advantage of such a system would be that lobbying would be obliged to come out in the open, instead of working underground as it does now. The various interests would confront one another in discussion and some measure of understanding would be attained in that way.

There does not seem, at present, to be any great interest, in Great Britain or the U. S. A., in changing the character of national representative government. On the other hand, there is evidence that some of our associations are becoming politically conscious. That has been true for some time of our capitalistic associations. It is only recently that the labor unions and farmers' associations in America have come to realize the importance of the political government for safeguarding and promoting their interests. This is of course due to the great crisis through which we are passing. The will to live is strong and when politics is seen to be linked with the standard of living, we may be sure of more interest in politics. One conspicuous result of this new interest in politics is that the capitalistic dominance of the great organs of publicity has been less effective recently. The labor unions and the farm organizations now have their own means for discussion and publicity. But the big capitalistic interests, like gravitation, work all the time. The other economic interests have worked only sporadically. They now have a motive. But they yet lack

effective integration and responsible leadership.

In the meantime, the interest of the consumer has been lagging behind in organization. It is possible that capital and labor may come to an understanding. If the capitalistic interests can shift the burden on the consumer, there is no reason except greed and stupidity why capital and labor should not work together. But what about the masses that have to pay the bill in increased cost of living? They have for the most part depended upon the political government, and this so far has been ineffective in protecting their interests. There is evidence of association among consumers, but in the U. S. A. they have been slow to get under way.

In order to get effective expression from the community there is great need of simplification of our political procedure. The number of political offices, state and national, should be greatly reduced. Such reduction would lighten the tax burden as well as simplify voting. Our representative bodies are too unwieldy and, because of that fact, tend to be mechanized to carry out the will of the political leaders. The real legislative work is done in committees and the large body is manipulated by the party control. The ballot in local and state elections is too complex and confusing. Very few can vote intelligently under present conditions. Responsibility for non-representative offices should be concentrated. The appointment of federal judges by the president with the confirmation of the senate has been much more satisfactory than popular election, with its political confusion and uncertainty. Legislation should be the work of deliberative assemblies rather than by popular vote. The mass of the electorate are better judges of principles and personalities than of specific measures. All along the line there should be such simplification as would enable the average citizen to vote intelligently.

But the simplification of political machinery is not enough. There must be hard thinking about our common problems. The organization of will means the organization of thought,

for thinking is willing or, to use the language of John Milton, "to think is to choose." A deed is an idea to which we attend. Confusion in our thinking results in confusion in our conduct. As we look about today at the governments of mankind, we may well repeat the words of the Swedish statesman, Oxenstiern, of the seventeenth century: "Know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed." The leaders of some of the great nations today are fanatics, bent upon producing passion rather than thought, in order the more effectively to hold their people in control. Even the great democratic nations are swept into the maelstrom of unrest and are centering their energies upon the struggle for power. Though this may be inevitable in the present chaotic international situation, the present situation need not have existed, if there had been leaders with foresight. The most tragic result is the diverting of the attention from the internal problems of organization. There is today a deplorable lack of thinking in the management of the affairs of nations. Genius has found its opportunity in non-political activity, especially in science and technology, and the great common concerns of nations have been left to mediocrity. And mediocrity, having no vision of the whole, present and future, is naturally opportunist. It loves authority and is afraid of discussion. It manipulates the machinery of government so as to remain in power, but it lacks the wisdom to use that power. Only in some of the small democratic nations has the thinking been concentrated effectively upon the common welfare; and the results, in a comparatively short time, have been marvelous. But now these nations are disturbed by fears of aggression from the fanatics of power. It is high time that we awoke to the fact that power without wisdom is headed for chaos and that the best minds of all the nations should give thought to the common welfare of men and of nations. If the blind lead the blind, as is so largely the case, the end must be the—ditch.

Public Opinion

The greatest problem of democracy is to promote intelligent interest in politics. Such interest can come only when the people of a community feel vitally concerned in their common problems. And they only feel vitally concerned when they feel that something must be done and can be done. There is great need of organizing thought with reference to the problems that concern our common welfare. At present, there is mostly confusion. How can we create an intelligent public opinion?

We talk a great deal about public opinion. But if by public opinion we mean that a community is of one opinion we are talking about a fiction, not about reality. No nation has dared to submit the proposition of going to war to a popular vote. Yet a war, more than any other activity, is supposed to be supported by public opinion. The reason that it appears to be so supported is that after a government gets a people into war, it means jail or prison to criticize it.

But even when there is opportunity for popular expression on a government or a policy, the vote is the result of a variety of opinions and motives. The vote may result in a "landslide" for a party and its leader, as in the presidential election of 1936 in the U. S. A. But if we analyzed the decision we would find that it was the result of a variety of opinions. Some voted on principle, thinking that the policies for which F. D. Roosevelt stands are for the public good. Some voted on the basis of party regularity and the spoils that come from party victory. The conservative South stood as a block for the election of Roosevelt, though many of its leaders were silent, if not openly antagonistic. A large part of the labor vote went democratic because labor felt that Roosevelt was friendly to labor organization. A large part of the farmer vote went for Roosevelt because he had tried to do something for the farmer who expected more. Most of those unemployed and on relief voted for Roosevelt because they felt that it meant their daily bread, however meagre. A considerable part of the voters in any

election are swayed by propaganda without having any definite opinion of their own. We cannot say then that the election was the result of one opinion of the twenty-six millions who voted for Roosevelt. I say for Roosevelt, because it was a personality rather than a party which was the real issue.

We have the maximum of agreement in opinion when tradition dominates an age or a people. The primitive group, after long ages of trial, proceeded in normal times according to established ways of thinking and acting, though even in the primitive group, as the Melanesians show, there were conflicts and even methods of evasion which were winked at. A crisis, such as war, would call forth deliberation both as to means and end. The Middle Ages resulted in a remarkable integration of opinion under the dominance of the church. There was an established body of doctrine. But within that body of doctrine there was a considerable range of interpretation and there was always a fringe bordering on heresy. Moreover, the recognized body of beliefs and practices covers only a part of life. In primitive culture and in medieval culture there was a secular domain of life, in peace and in war, where man felt free to experiment and where divergent methods of conduct were in evidence.

We can readily ascertain agreement in *behavior* but agreement in *meaning* is much more difficult to ascertain and is necessarily relative. Even when the same words are used the meaning may be different. "Meaning is the resultant of the interplay of a word with others; what a word means is the rest of its context, psychological, linguistic, and real to which it belongs and for which it is now delegate. . . . The unexpressed context is a vital element in the meaning of a word and it shifts from occasion to occasion, prohibiting an antecedent definition and description."[18] To understand the social context is all-important for under-

18. Paul Weiss' review of I. A. Richard's *The Philosophy of Rhetoric, The New Republic,* April 7, 1937, p. 276.

standing meaning. To know what a man means we should have to know his psychological history as interwoven with the historic context of a people and the relation of both of these contexts to the context of nature. The latter is often ignored. As Étienne Gilson says: "We do not shape our ideas after the pattern of things, but after the pattern of our own ideas. Is that freedom? No, rather slavery." But it is well to remember that our ideas have a history. The ghosts of the past sit at the table of all our deliberations. Unbeknown to us they influence all our decisions.

When you consider all our centrisms—the centrism of our personal history, of our immediate group, of our national group, etc., it is easy to see the difficulty of our arriving at common meanings. We see it illustrated every day in our contending interest groups such as labor and capital, in our religious groups, many of which seem to have no reasonable basis of differentiation in our present life—as illustrated by the variety of Protestant groups which maintain their distinctions because of prejudice and the inertia of the past. When we come to national groups, with their histories and ambitions, tragic misunderstandings still exist. And as between the great racial traditions of East and West, sympathetic comprehension is still remote. It is easy to dismiss such centrisms as irrational idols, but such dismissal does not solve the problem of human relations. The problem of human relations is a problem of the sharing of meanings. Psychology has recently stressed behavior, but behavior is important only as a symbol of meaning and as the realization of meaning. In the problem of meaning we are dealing with a different level from that of physiology—with the level of social relations, the relations of minds with their desires and histories. "Human beings live in the realm of *meanings*."[19] To produce meanings of social cooperation, of recognition of the common welfare, must be the object of education from the earliest days of the individual and throughout his career.

19. Alfred Adler, *What Life Should Mean to You*, 1931, p. 3.

It must be the chief aim of the statesman.

We hear a great deal today about controlling thought. In a broad sense, society has always been concerned with controlling thought. Every cultural group has brought pressure to inculcate upon its members its own standards and ideals. Only so could there be continuity and order in group life. On the other hand, unless there is discussion and criticism, a group becomes stagnant and decays. If a group is to progress, there must be the prophets of a new order, as well as the priests of the old order. The prophets of a new order must now, as always, meet the hostility of the old order. And they have generally led a precarious existence. In the natural sciences we are willing today to give the experimenters a free field and even applaud their discoveries. It has not always been so. The Copernican revolution and the Darwinian revolution were obliged to fight the tradition of the past for a considerable period, because theology had incorporated the old science into its structure and took time to readjust itself. Today the battle rages about social planning. We shall have real freedom of thought only when we can apply scientific criticism and discovery to the problems of our social life, with the common welfare as our only criterion. This criterion must control our thought in social theory and legislation.

Pareto distinguishes between logico-experimental actions and non-experimental actions. The former, according to Pareto, are based upon scientific method, the latter are based upon sentiment, and the beliefs and rationalizations which grow out of sentiment. We must remember, however, that scientific method is an instrument, not an end. Logic devours itself unless it feeds on experience. It must have motive as well as method. Logicians have come to the profound conclusion that all deduction, all pure logic, is tautology. The only logic that has meaning and relevance is that which grows out of man's historic experience and leads to results in terms of further successful experience. Such a logic must have a motive and a motive is

the expression of value, which has its basis in some sentiment.

According to Pareto "experimental actions are those we make when we have some end in view and are seeking an effective means of obtaining it." Under experimental actions Pareto includes what he calls Interests, "the things men do when they are trying to maintain life, to make it profitable and pleasant, and to acquire respect and honour."[20] Those are not the only interests men have. Pareto's criterion of rational action is utility. But in the Middle Ages men thought of salvation as the chief end and they sought for effective means of accomplishing this end. Pareto confuses the method of procedure and the basis of action. All human interest (beyond the infantile stage) has its basis in some sentiment—in an emotive meaning. Whether it is experimental or non-experimental depends upon the method for carrying it out. Any interest may be carried out in an experimental or a non-experimental manner. On the other hand, the pursuit of pure science cannot be resolved into mere method. It has a motive and the motive is rooted in a sentiment for truth. To get social action we first create sentiment. The sentiment *should be* the general welfare, but unfortunately there are many conflicting sentiments. Even when the sentiment is the general welfare, it may fail because of bungling in method. On the other hand, a selfish interest may be very skilful in method and therefore more pernicious.

When Pareto devoted one part of his work to scientific method and three parts to sentiment he failed to realize that all our conduct is motivated by sentiment, that there is a sentiment of rationality which furnishes the energy of our thinking, and that the content of this sentiment varies from age to age and from culture to culture, but shows considerable coherence within its own world. The very demand for consistency in our thinking is a sentiment, which we

20. *An Introduction to Pareto*, G. C. Homans and C. P. Curtis, Jr., 1934, pp. 77, 78.

sometimes have to put in abeyance in order to achieve action. What is Pareto's repeated violent denunciation of democracy, but the reflex of his sentiment for some sort of fascism which seems reasonable to him because of his own historic background?

Pareto's work is a scandalous illustration of how sociology should not be written, with his three volumes of miscellaneous gossip, torn out of any historical context which could make it meaningful, and then classified according to certain arbitrary rubrics of his own. The modern anthropologist has taught us that beliefs and practices must be studied in their own temporal context. Their rationality lies in their being capable of meeting in a fashion the problems which the group must meet at a specific cultural stage. Such beliefs and practices may seem ridiculous to a man like Pareto with his nineteenth century materialism. But by Pareto's own criterion that "experimental actions are those we make when we have an end in view and are seeking effective means of obtaining it" the practices of the primitive medicine man would have to be regarded as experimental, though he may have been mistaken, as we often are, in regard to the means. For Pareto the golden rule, the rule of reciprocity, is a matter of sentiment, though it may be a useful sentiment; but Malinowski's study of Melanesian society, as well as our own experience, shows that it is also strictly experimental.

For Pareto with his nineteenth century science, Keat's poetic statement that "truth is beauty" is mere sentiment incapable of being tested by scientific method. But for Sommerfeld, a great contemporary physicist, beauty must be put in the scales with experiment in framing scientific hypotheses, for the most successful hypotheses from an experimental point of view are also esthetically the most satisfying. Simplicity and harmony are categories of beauty, but they are also categories of science; and the great Henri Poincaré found through his own experience that the search for truth is a search for beauty. It is a

vicious bifurcation to separate feeling or sentiment from thought. It is the feeling for unity and harmony which furnishes the drive for thought. Thought brings into clearness what we feel.

There is no absolute yard-stick of rationality. What appears rational or irrational to us depends upon the context of beliefs in which we live. We have a feeling of rationality when the details blend with the main theme, without shock or tax on our credulity, within the intellectual universe in which we live. So long as there is no patent contrary evidence we proceed on the truth of our belief, whether it be primitive man or scientific man. Witness how long the old atomic hypothesis persisted in science. A great deal of the physics of which nineteenth century physicists were absolutely confident is now mythology. Yet it did fit in at the time. When we are faced by contrary evidence, we are obliged to make a change in the framework of our beliefs, but we try to get on with the least change. Primitive man, too, felt obliged to make a change in "medicines," when his beliefs failed in the struggle for existence, but the main framework remained. A Chinese proverb says: "A man is more like the age in which he lives than he is like his own father and mother." In order to understand why certain beliefs and actions commend themselves to a man or a people we must enter sympathetically into the history out of which such beliefs and actions grew, and not judge them as irrational because they differ from our own, which grow out of a different background.

It is evident, therefore, that rationality is a relative matter. This is strikingly illustrated by Edgar Allen Poe in *The Thousand and Second Tale of Scheherazade.* Scheherazade is now queen, thanks to her success in *The Thousand and One Nights,* but the king's appetite for stories remains the same. She now ventures to tell some of the later tales of Sinbad, the sailor, when in his old age he visited foreign countries. When she tells in Sinbad's quaint language, about such monsters as steamboats and railroad engines,

the king grunts his incredulity. But when she tells about a continent of immense extent being supported by the back of a sky-blue cow that had no fewer than four hundred horns, the king is responsive. "That now, I believe," said the king, "because I have read something of the kind before in a book." As she continues Sinbad's story, with his impressions of telegraphs and telephones, the king grows increasingly antagonistic, and when she comes to the part of the story where he tells about the dear women putting on a big hump, just below the small of their back, so as to look like dromedaries, the king stops her and charges her with making a fool of him. (Can you blame him? I should regard it incredible if I had not seen it with my own eyes.) "On the whole," he says, "you might as well get up and be throttled." But she had her satisfaction in thinking, while the bow string was tightened about her neck, that her husband would receive his righteous punishment in being deprived from hearing the rest of her stories.

In art, including the drama and the novel, the artist must draw on a background which is familiar and therefore reasonable, to win the sympathy of his audience, however much he may add in the way of creative interpretation. Otherwise he has no audience, until the world gets accustomed to his invention. Bach had to wait a hundred years. The Greek dramatists dealt with a world which carried conviction and reality to their time, though they infused new meaning into that world. So did Shakespeare, so have done all great artists who have shaped human destiny. In this respect the artists do not differ essentially from the philosophers, scientists and creative statesmen. They all owe their convincingness to the background of beliefs which dominates at the time. What seems reasonable in medieval civilization may seem superstition in Soviet Russia, but those brought up in the medieval tradition find Soviet Russia no less unreasonable. When a statesman wants to lead a people, he tries to show that he is working out the true intention of the fathers.

What we need in a confused world is to try to comprehend the meanings of the groups and civilizations with which we must live. All the while, we must remember that our comprehension is conditioned by our own background and therefore cultivate tolerance. "When you are aware," says Harold J. Laski, "of the limitations of your knowledge, you cannot dare to crucify in its name. You shrink from the affirmation of dogma. You refuse to identify your candle's little fitful gleam with the light of the sun. . . . You are concerned above all with the simple dignity of individual human personality."[21] In this attitude we can find common ground, in spite of the difference in our over-beliefs. We must be on our guard, as Laski warns us, "against the one-idea fanatics, the men who serve power rather than truth, the professional zealots of persecution, the servants of grasping privilege." There is no dogmatic way of determining which attitudes are rational and which can be lumped as sentimental prejudice. Such distinctions grow out of the critic's personal background and are relative to his own system of beliefs. Democracy is a sentimental prejudice for Pareto, but it is an empirical and worth-while system of beliefs for those of us who have a democratic background. Rationality means a due regard for the complexity of life, with its temporal cadences and its variety of claims; and it means an effort to establish harmony by subordinating all claims to the good life for all.

It is time that we get rid of the illusion that scientific method of itself will make a better world. It may make a hell, as it is in fact doing in Spain and China right now. The fundamental thing is the values for which men strive. We do not act as we do because of scientific method. Action is determined by value and value by sentiment. We may work for self-preservation, for power, for democracy. We may use scientific method in working for any interest. But that does not make the interest rational. We may

21. *The New Republic*, Sept. 16, 1936, p. 162.

with Kant regard the will to action rational in so far as it is capable of being universalized. But what conduct we are willing to have universalized depends upon our historic setting. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth was once a recognized universal maxim. We do not live by verbal abstractions. We live by sentiments. The important thing is to cultivate a sentiment of thoughtfulness and not follow blindly either tradition or high-powered propaganda. We must combat the illusion that unlimited power confers also unlimited wisdom.

The great importance of sentiment is evidenced by the propaganda to produce certain sentiments. I agree with R.F.A. Hoernlé that we should not use propaganda in a merely opprobrious sense. Good causes require propaganda as well as bad causes. It is time that we awoke to that fact. By propaganda, I understand the effort to produce a sentiment which will lead to a type of conduct, as contrasted with discussion. Those who are interested in improving the human lot, by producing juster and more equitable conditions, must work to produce a sentiment for humanity. An imaginative novel may be far more successful in producing sentiment than prosaic argument. Witness *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* Drama has great possibilities in forming public opinion, as the great Greek dramatists so well understood. They were creating a world for their people, while they were also entertaining them, and doing it more effectively for that reason. Few appreciate the momentous service of our federal government in its "production for use" in the field of drama and music. A great deal of talent which had been shoved aside or had been dormant is being brought into play for a living wage (and happiness) and thousands who had never been able to see a great drama on the stage or hear a great symphony are now able to do so.[22] While the progressive forces cannot command the

22. Our stupid Congress has just eliminated the small appropriation for the federal art movement, while they increased the subsidies for agriculture and cotton. The artists do not have many votes.

financial resources which the vested interests can command, they can and do command most of the genius of mankind. The great creators in art and literature have been the great critics and interpreters of their time. They have stood for a greater sanity in human values.

It cannot be denied that the vested interests, economically and socially, have an enormous advantage in controlling to a large extent the means of publicity. They can and do corrupt a great deal of talent by the inducements which they offer. When we contemplate the venal press and the power of the forces that work for selfish ends, we may well pray in the words of the Common Prayer Book:

> God save the state
> And mercifully hear us when we call upon Thee.

But we must remember that God does not hear hypocrites. If we were sincere we would work to realize that for which we pray. Since most of our organs of publicity are venal we could defeat them by not making them pay, and they would not pay if we did not buy them. If instead we encouraged the organs that stand for society and public welfare, we could do a great deal to change the press of which we complain so much.

The drawback to propaganda as a general method of education is that, as it is usually practiced, it does not stimulate thought but passion. Napoleon said that there are only two figures of speech, affirmation and repetition. These are usually the method of propaganda. Herr Joseph Goebbels, Nazi minister of propaganda in Germany, is quoted as having said that "a lie oft repeated is mysteriously transformed into truth." He ought to know. In democratic countries the press, to a large extent, is controlled by the big financial interests. In fascist countries the press is controlled by the government. The latter is the more dangerous, since all contrary opinion is suppressed. In democratic countries, the liberal elements when they are aroused, do manage to find organs of expression, through

a few progressive journals, through their group organizations and through the radio (though *this* is in danger of being bought up) when they have effective leadership. There is evidence that the subsidized press has, for the time being, lost the confidence of a considerable part of the public. But in fascist countries people get only the affirmation and repetition of the forces in control. Of course, suppressing opinion does not necessarily destroy it. We do not know how much discontent is smouldering beneath the apparent uniformity. From the strong measures which are taken to suppress opposition we may suppose that those in control fear it.

The greatest danger of the official control of thought is that a considerable part of the population, especially the youth, will be enamoured with the propaganda and form a sentiment for that type of control and the promises it holds forth. Great numbers are in fact becoming intellectual robots. "If the mind is obliged to obey a word of command, it can at any rate feel that it is not free. But if it has been so manipulated beforehand that it obeys without even waiting for the word of command, it loses even the consciousness of enslavement."[23] People thus enslaved in mind would vehemently resent the suggestion that they are not free. "Slavery debases the souls of men until they love it," says Vauvenargues. But the spell of enthusiasm cannot feed indefinitely on merely dramatic performances. The danger is that the disillusionment may require a world tragedy.

"The public *has* a mind?
Yes.
And men can follow a method and a calculated procedure for drugging and debauching it?
Yes.
And the whirlwind comes later?
Yes . . . .

23. André Gide, *The New Republic*, March 31, 1937, p. 236.

Is there time to repeat,
'The living passions of millions can rise with a whirlwind: the storm once loose who can ride it?
You? or you? or you?
Only history, only tomorrow knows for every revolution breaks
As a child of its own convulsive hour
shooting patterns never told beforehand.' "[24]

Everywhere in this whirligig of a world would-be leaders are busy creating social minds. It isn't as individuals that we need fear the adherents of Naziism or Fascism or Bolshevism, but as group movements that are sweeping over the world. While the countries with a democratic tradition may withstand the technique of such movements, the danger is that in their fear they may work towards the same end of suppression. There is where the real evil lies, not in a particular form of political control. To control thought is to stifle thought, for thought must be free or it ceases to be thought. To kill free criticism—that is to kill democracy, in fact to kill true culture, whatever name the form of control may have.

There is grave danger of such hysteria in democratic countries. We used to say that our hope lies in education. That has been particularly true in our own country with its long faith in public education. But it must be a free intelligent education. There is abundant evidence that our public schools, whether from the hysteria of fear or through the dominance by selfish interests are being controlled so as to prevent free discussion of the issues of the day. The first class colleges and universities have, to a considerable extent, been able to pursue knowledge in a scientific way, including the study of society—the best evidence for which is that they are termed "hotbeds of bolshevism" by the predatory interests. Bolshevism to them means anything in the way of free discussion. On the other hand, fascism

24. Carl Sandburg, *The People, Yes*, 1936.

strikes a sympathetic cord in those very interests. This sympathy is, of course, due to ignorance of what happens to property in a fascistic state.

How can we organize free discussion, not only in schools but by the public at large, in a democratic country? We have noted that there is now considerable discussion in organized interest groups, such as laborers and farmers. Such discussion is a wholesome sign, but is necessarily weighted by the special interest. How can we organize free discussion for the general welfare? Woodrow Wilson, who was a schoolmaster long before he became president, had a dream of making the schoolhouses of the country the centers of free discussion, but his attention was diverted to other problems by the World War. In the Scandinavian countries, especially in Sweden, study groups have grown up in connection with the economic cooperative societies. These study groups are self-controlled. The government furnishes the books which they require. It also offers to furnish leaders. But the latter offer is generally declined. No doubt, this general interest in their political and economic problems in the Scandinavian countries is the secret of their success, both politically and economically. If a free cooperative movement grows in our own country, we may expect that discussion of the political and economic processes will follow. That may be the fear of the intrenched interests, even more than the fear of competition. Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries have shown that cooperative business can work harmoniously with competitive business, much to the advantage of the general consumer. The problem is to promote greater alertness and cooperation on the part of all those who love freedom, instead of the inertia which has left the field to those interests who have a special axe to grind. There is a ray of hope in the new movement for adult education. Here is an opportunity for those interested in democracy to do something constructive.

The specialists in the social sciences should furnish lead-

ership in forming public opinion for a cooperative society. But so far they have been, with few courageous exceptions, indifferent. They seem for the most part more interested in their technical jargon than in the pressing practical problems. They do not seem to understand one another, let alone making themselves understood by the struggling masses. They fail to present a united front in outlining a program of social reform. Only a few of them show any sympathy with the efforts of labor to promote the economic and political education of their members, though such education is of momentous importance for the future of democracy. They prefer the safety of their ivory towers to leading the forward march. Youth looks in vain to them for guidance in a troubled world. I do not speak of academic philosophers. They are mostly playing a game of formal logic while civilization moves to the brink of destruction. Educators are asleep at the switch. Education *is* important. But traditional education is not going to save us. The markets are glutted with graduates from high schools and colleges. We must have education for working out a scheme of living.[25] And a workable scheme of living calls for invention. A new pattern of cooperation must be discovered. If democracy cannot realize such a pattern, it will inevitably give way to some other form of control. Wake up, educators! When education relates to the problem of cooperative living—economic, political, cultural—youth will become eager for education, whether in school or out of school. Witness the condition in Sweden and Denmark. The young people will not have to be stuffed. The only way to promote an intelligent public opinion is to provide a

25. When I consider how much my own great university, the University of California (which may be taken as representative of the great universities), is doing in material cooperation—for the improvement and safeguarding of crops, of livestock, of citrus fruits, not to speak of its contribution to the understanding and control of the physical forces of nature—it shames me to think how little it is doing for social organization, for experiments in cooperative living. It is dramatic to split the atom and here we do not encounter social prejudice. The atom has no friends.

motive. The ideal of cooperative living must become a religion and it will become a religion when it is grasped. The sum of the law and the prophets is the golden rule and the golden rule can be expressed in one word—reciprocity. The great objective of education and legislation must be the cooperative life. We must begin with the earliest childhood and carry the education all the way up. Alfred Adler [26] has shown that a great many of our ills, such as neuroses, insanity, criminality have their root in the failure to learn to cooperate in early childhood; and the defect in personal character is reflected on the larger scale of international relations, whose leaders have lacked education in the spirit of cooperation. In our education and in our policy we must become socially minded.

The Reality of Group Will

"Rugged individualism" is the slogan of the exploiters of society. It is false to say, as is often said, that such a philosophy "worked" in the nineteenth century. The ruthless industrialism of the nineteenth century brought the greatest misery to the masses that the Western world has known. It is certain that we cannot understand or guide human behavior by considering human beings merely as individuals. We must take account of their group context, with its history and ideals. Man doth not live unto himself or die unto himself. There can be no doubt of the reality of the group in primitive life. In primitive life the group stands out as the primary fact. The individual is secondary. Individual motives are brought into play, such as vanity and ambition, but they are regulated within the reciprocal relations of the life of the group and made to serve the group. But the group is responsible for its members. In the primitive group no one is allowed to starve to death so long as there are any provisions. In the modern industrial era, with its concentration of population, the old community bonds, with their sanctions, were broken. People were up-

26. *Op. cit.*

rooted from their historic soil and set adrift. The individual was put in the foreground—the ruthless individuals who exploited and the helpless individuals who were exploited. It was competition, "red in tooth and claw," except as the exploiters found it advantageous to combine against the public. A great deal of our social theory and jurisprudence is reminiscent of this individualistic era. Social theorists are still treating society as though it were a collection of individuals. Jurisprudence, until recently, has insisted upon the right of individual bargaining, however farcical it may have been in the great industries. And the government has passed laws to compel capitalistic cartels which are bound together by common interests to compete; but it is merely changing the machinery, not the basic facts. The political state has remained in the background, but it has in fact been controlled by the organized capitalistic interests.

Recently the pendulum has been swinging the other way. Group consciousness is again coming into the foreground. The capitalistic interests were the first to see the advantage of union and are now thoroughly organized to fix prices and to fight any attack upon them. Meanwhile, labor, because of the hopelessness of individual bargaining and the dismal failure of sporadic strikes, with the arsenals stacked against them, is becoming more and more organized. The agricultural interests have also discovered the political advantage of association. The professions have become organized to exercise discipline over their members and to raise their standards, though mostly in what they conceive as their own interest, rather than in the public interest. There are, however, promising movements toward socialized service both in medicine and in law. The consumers have been slow in exercising influence because of lack of organization. But voluntary cooperative organizations, mostly for consumption, but if need be for production, are growing up in various countries, notably Great Britain and

the Scandinavian countries, including Finland, and in the latter countries have gone a long way toward revolutionizing their economic life.

In this growth of associations the importance of the political state is rapidly increasing and, instead of being looked upon as a negative factor, has become a significant positive factor. The political conception of the state, and more slowly the juristic conception, is changing toward the greater responsibility of the state for the general welfare. In democratic countries, the revolution has been gradual and respect for individual rights of association, free criticism and expression have been maintained on the whole, though not without continuous watchfulness. But in countries with the fascistic type of control, the political state has abolished the right of the individual to free expression and association and subordinated all other interests to the power and supposed welfare of the state. Thus in a very short generation the pendulum has swung from individualism and *laissez faire* to group consciousness and group dominance, with increasing emphasis upon the political state as of supreme importance. The drift of events is to make the group primary and the individual secondary, though the democratic states are still endeavoring to find a compromise between individual freedom and group dominance. What they must learn to recognize is that there can be no freedom without restraint within a common purpose. Freedom means cooperation.

It is high time for us to recognize the reality of group will and to try to understand it. It is not a question of eulogy or condemnation. Some groups are moral, some are immoral, just as some individuals are moral, some are immoral. It is not a question whether the group is more real than the individual or *vice versa*. There can be no group except as an organization of individuals. And yet the group will is not a mere collection of particular individual wills. It has a distinct individuality of its own. Our relation to a group will, whether internal or external, is not a relation

to individuals as individuals. In legal language it means that we impute a responsibility to the group organization as such which is distinct from the responsibility which we impute to individuals in the group. A group will is the result of a common interest and common sentiment, having reference to a common objective. In times of crisis the sentiment flares up into emotion and becomes energy for action. Group deliberation and action differ widely in character, depending upon the tradition of the group, the organization of its thought, the problems which must be met, the numbers involved, their geographical distribution, and many other factors. But when a group is real, the will to live is the will to further the interests of the group as such, not merely the interests of individual members. It may be that the interests of the members as individuals may have to be sacrificed in order to maintain the welfare of the group. Again a particular group-will may have to be curbed for the larger welfare. The group commands a loyalty to itself as a group. It has a character of its own as truly as an individual has a character of his own. And we may admire the individuals of a group in their personal capacity while we despise the group. If human relations were merely relations of individuals, we should have a very different political world from that which we have. The will to power, which eventually means the will to war, does not seem to characterize the individual people of the aggressive nations when we sit down with them at table over a cup of tea or a glass of beer. It is the product of leadership, propaganda, patriotism, fear and other factors. But the group will-to-power is nevertheless a reality for good or ill.

We must, in short, learn to recognize group wills as something different from individual wills and act accordingly. A political party, a labor union, a business corporation or a national state, is not a mere collection of individual wills. There is the common tradition, the common interest, the common bond of the group of interacting individuals as a

group, whatever may be the form of dominance. It is useless to deny this obvious fact. It is true that such collective willing does not have one physical body as is the case in individual willing. Nor is collective willing something existing apart from individuals. The organization of individuals within a common interest and tradition gives rise to a new individual, a new emergent fact, which has its own reality, as the history of civilization from primitive times conclusively shows. It is not resolvable into individual intentions and interests. It is something more—the interest, pressure and tradition, incarnate in the organization of many individuals. More than ten million British citizens voted individually for the support of the League of Nations and for effective sanctions in Italy's attack upon Ethiopia, but they were won over to the policy of non-intervention and fascist dominance by the government's propaganda. They came to think as members of a crowd rather than as individuals.

To understand a group we must take account of the whole social matrix of which it is the expression. In the past we have been too prone to conceive this matrix in spatial terms, as simultaneous factors and conditions. We must learn to conceive it in temporal as well as in spatial terms. Life is time, rhythm—organic rhythm, psychological rhythm, social rhythm, cosmic rhythm.[27] We must recognize that a group has its own temporal rhythm, its own time value, its own history with its life urge and its temporal structure, if we are to deal successfully with a group and effect wholesome changes within the group.

Just as in dealing with the individual organism—to guide, to correct and to heal—we must respect its inner rhythm, so we must respect the rhythm of the life of a group, such as a nation. We cannot bring real unity into disrupted or sick group relations by arbitrary force, however good our intentions may be. Nor can we arbitrarily

27. The rhythm of life has been well brought out in *Man the Unknown*, 1935, by Alexis Carell.

graft a new culture upon an old. We must have regard to the inner time value and help to further the rhythm of the inner forces, as the good physician does with a sick patient. This must be above all the attitude to our own group, if we wish to promote its health. If social surgery proves inevitable, we must respect the inner rhythm of the forces with which we deal. We must strive sympathetically to comprehend in order to act. We must cultivate the patience of nature. We must, as Shakespeare so wisely counsels, use "the advantage of the time." To produce unity, moreover, or to restore unity we must, like a good physician, try to understand the causes—the causes of unrest and discontent—and not merely palliate the immediate conditions by dealing with particular symptoms, such as handing out a dole, necessary though that may be for the time being.

In dealing with the social organism, moreover, we are obliged to *create* unities, more adequate social patterns, in order to produce harmony of humanity, the sweetest of all music. It is not enough to take over passively the patterns of the past. We are dealing with the future. No doubt, there exists in nature (as Plato would say), in the conditions of existence, a viable pattern of a more complex group life. But the social pattern is largely in the future, while the pattern of the biological organism is largely achieved and works for the most part by automatic adjustment. The circulation of the blood is normally taken care of automatically by the organism. Not so the circulation of commodities and opportunities in society. Here creative guidance is required.

A time-whole such as a life, a society, has a logic of its own. Just as the human embryo strives to be a man, so the life of a race or a nation strives toward its future fulfilment which is yet in the dark. There is a destiny of a nation which is the fulfilment of its past and which has a normal direction into the future, if we can discover it. We may fasten our attention upon the noise of the moment. We may feel that our ideas and decisions are the whole

thing. And they do matter, but they are the expressions of a deeper urge, a feeling of wholeness, a drive for completion which includes the past and stretches into the future and which establishes a sense of fitness and fulfilment. Society is like a flower, a plant, a child. It grows in the soil of humanity and comes to fruition, if we tend it. But society requires creative, wide-awake attention. It will not reach fruition, like the flower, while we sleep.

When we said that society is the work of creative intelligence we did not mean to imply that society always exists at the level of creative intelligence. On the contrary, this level is rare and is due to creative genius which sometimes succeeds, though usually in the course of time and bitter experience, in indicating a more viable way. Group will, like individual will, exists at many levels. For the most part the unity of the group is a unity of sentiment and tradition. When the group has a sound tradition, like Great Britain, it may blunder along more or less successfully without creative thought, but it would be better for Great Britain and for the world at large if Great Britain could command more creative statesmanship. Sometimes the group reverts to the primitive condition of the crowd, when the emotions dominate and thought is inhibited. The leaders of a national state sometimes deliberately arouse such a crowd emotion when they want to sweep a nation into war. It is only rarely that action is the result of rational deliberation.

The group, like the individual, is subject to pathological conduct. Hysteria, paranoia, mania, delusions of grandeur, depressions, fixed ideas and other symptoms of insanity have been transferred by the psychiatrists from individual pathology to the nation. And there can be no doubt that those symptoms are paralleled in national life. But it must be remembered that such symptoms in national life are artificially produced and may pass over. They are not due to physiological but to psychological causes. Some of us can remember with shame our hysteria in the late World War. But the fact that such symptoms of insanity are

psychological does not make them less serious for the time being. Unscrupulous interests are subtly at work even now, whether motivated by the delusion of national grandeur or by the sordid motive of the armament and munition makers who bloat themselves with profits at the cost of human misery. If society is to prevent future tragedies, greater than any in the past, it must show greater intelligence in meeting such conditions before the catastrophe is upon us.

The Will to Create

While we must recognize the reality of the group and of group conduct, we must not lose sight of the fact that the group is a creation by human beings. The conception of a general will, existing in some transcendental sense[28] and independent of the individuals which constitute the group, has been one of the dangerous dogmas of our political life. Philosophically expressed, the dogma means that the real will of a people is an entity which does or should exercise control independently of the people. It is supposed to be something sacrosanct. It is something which we may discover but which we do not create.

The sociological basis of this illusion is plain enough. Society, at any one time, is more than the present. It stretches into the past and into the future. Those who believe in a general will, as distinct from the members of society, emphasize the past—the accumulated tradition of a people into the pattern of which the individual is woven from the beginning of his conscious life. This tradition is more than the individual in his individual capacity. And it is therefore easy to assume that it has a binding force, independent of the living generation of individuals. Engrained by education into the very tissue of our experience and enforced by powerful sanctions, it comes to seem an authority over and above living society.

28. The transcendental conception of the general will has been most ably stated by Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, third ed., 1920. To admirers of Bosanquet this classification will seem a caricature and they may be right.

If it were only a doctrine of a few transcendental philosophers, it would not be worth discussing. What makes the dogma powerful enough to hold humanity in chains for ages is that it is the dogma of the vested interests which want to keep their control. In our democracy it is the dogma that property is the important thing, rather than human beings, and that the constitution of the state is an organ to perpetuate the dominance of property. That is supposed to be what the founders of our state really meant and it is unpatriotic to question this interpretation. The real will is the supposed will of the past.

There is a true sense in which the real will of a nation transcends the individual members. The historic life of a people is more than the aggregation of the wills of its members. It is a unity, a time-form of its own, which, while it includes the individuals, is more than the individuals. The individual is passing, finite. The historic life persists and cumulates. It stretches into the future as well as into the past. It is infinite with reference to the individual. But this historic life does not exist except as the living stream of individuals, carrying with it the past and striving to incorporate it, by creative insight, into the pattern of the future. The great difference between the static and dynamic view of society is that the former regards the general will as a fixed entity independent of individuals, while the latter regards the general will as something in process of creation, through the cooperative efforts of individuals who are trying to profit by the past in order to create a better future. Our theory must be a creative interpretation which above all subserves man's will to live and to live better.

Interpretation is always a function of the living present. We cannot interpret in the past. We may interpret interpretations that were made in the past. But those interpretations, when they were made, expressed the living present in that historic setting. We always interpret in the stream of custom, opinion, sentiment, thought, of which we are

part. That is true when we interpret interpretations in the past as well as in interpreting the present. It has been said by some justices of our federal Supreme Court, in defence of their decisions, that they are merely laying down what is in the constitution and that they have no choice. But they necessarily read the constitution in their own historic setting, particularly that setting in which their legal philosophy was formed. The framers of the constitution were governed by expediency. Their agreements were compromises in their own historic setting. The important thing was to agree on a temporary constitution to which the thirteen states soon found it necessary to add a number of amendments. It is impossible to say what the framers might have meant in our historic setting.

It was said by Chief Justice Hughes (before he was chief justice) that the constitution is what a majority of the judges say it is. This is inevitable, since to judge is to interpret. Interpretation is an infinite process. There is no going back. The angel of time bars the way. The validity of the interpretation lies in its relevance to history as a forward-looking creative process. That the interpretation of the constitution is not so inevitable as some of the justices maintain was recently (May, 1937) shown by one of the justices (Justice Roberts) changing sides on the constitutionality of important legislation and so reversing the interpretation of the constitution within a few months. In the case of a federal attempt to regulate child labor some years ago, one of the judges (who was ill and could not hear the arguments) changed his mind and made the law unconstitutional. The majority cannot be always infallible. If the judges make the constitution, society must exercise care in selecting the judges.

The world has been governed too long by men who belong to a past era of history and who look with misgiving, if not cynicism, on new ways of doing things. It is true that we must learn from the past but we must be willing to re-make the tradition to fit the new spirit. The old bottles

will not hold the new wine. What we must learn is that the past is not fixed and immutable. The meaning of the past depends upon the future. We are always living forward, though we generally look backward. If the future is created in living, so is the past. There is a whole-form of a national history, as of an individual history, which stretches forward as well as backward and is ever re-creating the past into the future.

We must use our genius to discover the pattern of the good life—a life of cooperation of man with man and of group with group. Have we the wisdom and courage to create a new social order, with justice for all? The greatest problem today is to unify mankind into a common purpose of good will and cooperation. Unless we can find a solution of that problem, our civilization is doomed. The cynics point the finger of scorn at the League of Nations and its failures. But why did it fail? We should examine the causes of its failure and set to work to find a workable plan. The great trouble with the League of Nations at its inception was that its main purpose was to make the world safe for the victors, instead of making it safe for democracy, and thereby making democracy impossible in the vanquished nations. Even so, the League of Nations has not been altogether a failure. It has made possible the discussion of international problems and averted some catastrophes. We must not forget to give it credit for the many non-political types of international cooperation in problems of health, communication, education and many others which not long ago were regarded as impracticable. If we cultivate the will to peace, the sentiment of mankind will eventually rally to the task. Psychologists sneer at "wish psychology." But it is the only psychology which produces results. What we earnestly wish, we work for, and it may eventually come to pass. We must not, however, substitute the wish for the facts but work to change the facts of social maladjustment.

The policy of national egoism must in the end be self-

defeating. National boundaries do not isolate human interest and human need. Some nations might be economically self-sufficient. But no nation today can isolate itself politically and morally. In a great conflagration, such as the recent World War, the fire spread to all nations. And the same thing is only too likely to happen again. Would it not be better to help prevent the conflagration, instead of helping to put it out? Culturally there can be no national boundaries; and a nation must be judged, in the last analysis, by the culture it creates. If we look with indifference upon misery and disease produced by war in other parts of the world, we do not thereby escape the germs. And the most horrible result would be moral indifference to the universal human problems. That would spell the end of human civilization.

What is needed is the creation of a new social conscience. We have enough abstract ideals to which we pay lip service. But we lack the organized will to righteousness. Not merely the will to power, but the will to the common good, must become the drive to our conduct within nations and between nations. Agreements produced by force and fear or even by convenience are not going to insure peaceful cooperation for any length of time. They must be founded upon the recognition of mutual moral claims. And we must be willing to take the steps and make the adjustments necessary for such understanding. The greatest sacrifice is to let the world go to pieces because of our blindness and selfishness. And selfishness is blindness. Socrates and Shakespeare agree that "the only sin is ignorance": and they mean moral ignorance—the failure to see the meaning of other lives and therefore of our own lives. The trouble with our moral knowledge is that it is verbal. It has not been a living reality. It has not been part of our will and therefore it has not been knowledge in the true sense. We know only by doing. I agree with Rabelais that "that study is vain and counsel unprofitable which in due and convenient time is not by virtue executed and put into effect." The

world is not going to be saved by fine phrases.

There has been a tendency in the twentieth century to decry reason and to emphasize feeling and intuition. In philosophy, the movement was called anti-intellectualism. It was a reaction against abstract systems of thought which ignored other aspects of human nature. But, nevertheless, it was a dangerous emphasis. It was a symptom of social insanity. If we had sent those who would dethrone reason to the psychiatric clinic, instead of flattering them as prophets, we should have less chaos in the world than we have now. The higher insects, in their static society, may get along with intuition, but in order to create a livable human society we must use creative reason. Today the appeal to passion and emotion has become the great menace to the peace of the world.

I do not mean to minimize feeling and emotional loyalty. Thought without feeling is barren, as feeling without thought is blind. But we need today to organize our feelings into patterns of thought. As J. H. Tufts wisely says: "It is late in the day to ignore or belittle the power of ideas." We need a new philosophy of life; and a true philosophy is a philosophy of wholeness, a wholeness of human living. We need to stir up more thought rather than more emotion. All the exploiters of mankind are working to stir up prejudice favorable to them—and seem to succeed.

It is easy to blame human nature for our failure, but human nature is pretty much what we make it. Primitive man knew how to make use of man's egoism—his vanity and ambition—to further social reciprocity. If we emphasized the values of social cooperation and service for the common good, and bestowed our praise and honors for such activity, if we frowned upon social neglect and indifference and made those guilty of such remissness social outlaws, we should soon have a different line-up in society. Man wants the approval of his fellow-man. This may not be the highest motive. The inspiration of the good life itself is the highest motive, but human nature being what

it is we must try to make its egoism serve a social end. If, like primitive peoples, we ridiculed and laughed at the bad human actors, we could make them very uncomfortable. After all, most human beings work for the values which society emphasizes.

In working for larger and more comprehensive unities, we should not forget that man, for his intimate life, also requires small unities. The band is rooted in human nature and when we organize for comprehensiveness, we must not neglect to organize also for intimate converse. Plato's Academy was an intimate group of choice souls devoted as much to human planning as to mathematical science. And all Western culture is its debtor.

Finally, in our effort to integrate the world into unities and in our emphasis upon the group, especially the national group, we must not forget the supreme importance of the individual. Philosophers like Hegel and Bosanquet exalted the Absolute at the expense of the individual. The fascistic totalitarian state today makes the individual a mere instrument of the state. The latter tendency is by far the more dangerous, for the former philosophy was abstract theory and after all the Absolute is supposed to express itself through the individual consciousness and therefore the individual consciousness is the Absolute. Fascistic totalitarianism denies individual freedom. It makes the individual a mere means to an end—the power of the state. At our stage of social evolution, it is fundamentally immoral.

It is well to emphasize again the Greek idea that the state exists to educate the individual in virtue, not as an end in itself. All creation must come through individuals, and only free individuals can create. Society should be so organized as to produce the maximum opportunity for the individual to realize his capacities in fellowship with his kind. If the individual is sacrificed, all is sacrificed. "The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath." We must recognize that life is the ultimate consideration and that institutions and forms are merely instruments to pro-

mote the happy life which is the harmonious life. In the words of Ruskin: "There is no wealth but Life—Life including all of its powers of love, of joy and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings."

CHAPTER X

THE CRISIS

It is high time that we should organize our thought around the problem of human living. "We need social inventions," as Justice Brandeis says, "each of many able men adding his work until the invention is perfect." It is so that we have worked in physical inventions. How much more important is it to do so in social inventions. In a changing world, where we are obliged to face new facts, we cannot live merely in a static system of ideas. We must create new systems of ideas in the social field as well as in the physical sciences. If we fail to discover a pattern in which we can work together, between nations as well as within nations, our physical inventions will prove our destruction. As in physical inventions, so in social, we must have the willingness and the courage to experiment, and there must be the freedom to experiment. Social relations are far more complex than physical relations and, therefore, we must be still more patient in experimenting and not give up hope when we fail. "It is better to hope too much than to despair too soon," as C. Delisle Burns has well said. We must remember that the great processes of nature and life require time. When we are too eager to arrive at the goal at once, it is well to remember the words of the wise Shakespeare: "Too fast arrives as tardy as too slow." But we must work earnestly for a new order or it will not come.

In our social relations, we have, for the most part, been guided by habit without philosophy. We must cultivate philosophic insight if we are to meet the problems of the future. It must be a philosophy which grows out of experience and, therefore, clarifies experience. Philosophy which is unconnected with action is sterile; action without philosophy becomes routine. This truth has been well expressed in

Bergson's aphorism: "Act as a man of thought, think as a man of action." There is a crying need for social planning. Both our natural resources and our human resources are being wasted at an ominous rate. We need to check the wanton waste of the former—the indiscriminate destruction of our forests, the reckless spending of our mineral resources without regard for the future, the depletion of the soil at a rate which will soon make large parts of our country resemble the Mongolian deserts, once productive areas. But equally urgent and even more momentous is the waste of our human resources. The conservation of humanity is the first consideration. We must face the tragic result of millions of able-bodied people being kept in enforced idleness. We must have the wisdom and the courage to use the vast resources of our national state to establish suitable opportunities for everyone. That we, as a country, possess sufficient resources, no one can question. We must create the will for social justice. Will the privileged grasp the handwriting on the wall of destiny before it is too late? History shows that they have generally, in their selfish blindness, resisted reform until it has been too late—and then has come revolution.

It must be clear to any thinking person that our capitalistic economy is facing a crisis. We cannot indefinitely support one-third of the population by means of taxes. The novel thing is not that a large part of the population is on the verge of starvation. That was true even in the halcyon days of inflated prosperity. The novel thing is that we are trying to do something about it. But our efforts lack systematic planning. "Priming the pump" may be necessary in an emergency but the emergency threatens to be recurrent, unless the conditions are radically changed. Taking care of people by work is infinitely better for the morale of our nation than handing out a dole. But there is a limit to the financing of public works. We could supplement our capitalistic economy with a cooperative economy —not only cooperative in consumption and distribution but

also in production—as some nations, notably the Scandinavian nations, have done, with marked success. If the vast sums of money which have been spent for emergency relief had been invested in cooperative enterprises for self-help, we should be farther along toward coping with unemployment.[29] Unless a better way is found for taking care of the masses who are thrown out of employment by our capitalistic economy, the capitalistic system itself will necessarily break down under the weight it must carry.

To produce employment by war preparations, as the large nations in Europe are doing, may give an appearance of prosperity, but it obviously is no solution. It mortgages the future in unproductive capital. Such investment cannot pay in any case. In times of peace it is a dead weight. If war comes, with its wholesale destruction of property, all concerned will be poorer. The victors cannot collect from the vanquished, as should have been learned from the recent World War. All will have heavier burdens to bear, including not only the loss of capital but the tragic human liability of war.

One thing is certain: unless we have the humanity, the genius, and the courage to evolve and carry through a comprehensive program of economic reform, the end of our political democracy is near. The end may be fascism or communism, but it is more likely to be fascism. The vested interests are only too ready to employ violence when their power is threatened. And they are not intelligent enough to learn from the experiments in Europe. The vital issue is the ability of a nation to meet its problems. Hunger has been throughout history the most powerful drive in

29. It is only fair to say that, in the early part of the Roosevelt administration, Harry L. Hopkins and his associates, in charge of relief administration, started to encourage just such cooperation and with marked success, but the business interests preferred to have the money poured out for immediate spending and were able to bring sufficient political pressure to stop the experiment. Then they kick like wild steers about the taxes which they make inevitable. Thus the business world, in its blindness, is working for the destruction of the profit system which it cherishes.

political and social revolutions. It was hunger that produced the movements of peoples that overwhelmed the Roman empire. It was hunger that produced the French Revolution. People will not starve indefinitely for the sake of preserving an economic or a political tradition. Some of the nations who are disturbing the peace of the world today are doing it with the excuse of lack of internal resources to meet the wants of their people. We have abundant resources to enable all our people to live in comfort. With us the distress arises from lack of intelligent social planning.

The financial crash of 1929 was the crash of an era, the era of an expanding economy with its ruthless individualism. The disorganization of the following years up to 1933 was the logical aftermath. The period since 1933 is the beginning of a new era, of attempted national planning for which we had no preparation. Some European democracies, notably Great Britain and the Scandinavian nations, had been moving for some time in the direction of greater responsibility by the national government in the economic life of the nation. Their problem is simpler in many ways than ours. They are smaller and more homogeneous. They have an integrated government as contrasted with our separation of powers within the government (with the supremacy of the Supreme Court) and as between the national government and the local state governments. They also have developed an adequate civil service for coping with the problems of government. But most important of all, they had been obliged to face the serious problems of their internal economy. They had no vast frontier with immense natural resources to be exploited. Unemployment and hunger were no new problems to them. They too had universal suffrage; and political parties, in order to stay in power, were obliged to meet the economic problems. In the Scandinavian countries the movement was called socialist, but the name is now seldom used. It has been a reform movement to make the necessary adjustment and it has

sprung, primarily, from the labor and the farmer classes. Its sanity has been proved by the results. In England, in recent years, the Tory party, following the shrewdness of Bismarck, has stolen the thunder of the Labor party in order to maintain itself in power.

Our government, when it was obliged to face a new situation, started with a serious handicap. During the presidency of F. D. Roosevelt it has made greater progress than any previous government in our country toward social planning: in its policy of conservation and development of natural resources, in its legislation for social security, in organizing a national relief administration in the depression which it inherited and which is still largely with us. But it has necessarily been groping its way. It had no organized service of experts to do its planning or to carry out its plans; and you cannot build up such a service in an instant. It was obliged to improvise and to learn by costly experience. So far our government has not been able to formulate, much less to carry out a comprehensive program of economic reconstruction. Such a program will require time and suffering, as well as vision and moral leadership. And there is always danger of reaction. The conservative forces are waging a bitter fight to maintain their power. And the rank and file who are suffering most from the present maladjustment are fighting amongst themselves in their blindness. The two leading labor unions are busy cutting each other's throats.

The bigness of the problem staggers the imagination and our attack has naturally been piecemeal and opportunist. In a small intelligent homogeneous nation, like Sweden, educated for a generation toward social democracy—thanks to such statesmen as Hjalmar Branting, who took a historical view of socialism—the cooperative movement may solve the problem of capitalism. But in a large, complex and heterogeneous nation like ours, which has been for a generation under the domination of a financial oligarchy, the problem is vastly more difficult. No doubt we must aim at

a cooperative economy, but voluntary cooperation cannot go far toward solving our problems. Cooperation on a national scale must be guided by the national government; and the national government has not so far been able to master the opposing forces. To meet the crisis will require a stronger and more effective mandate from public opinion than has so far been received. It will also take more constructive statesmanship than has so far been manifest. If the capitalistic interests were intelligent they would see that the adaptation to the future is necessary. They doubtless see that the present policy is self-defeating. We cannot keep throwing the burden on the future. They clamor for the balancing of the budget without being willing to pay the cost. We must pay our way by equitable taxation or the debt burden will break our financial structure. The cowardice of the politicians in failing to meet the problem of taxation spells the doom of our form of democracy. The politicians are interested chiefly in the next election. They pay lip-service to economy while they increase their subsidies to powerful pressure groups with votes. They appease the great corporations by lightening their taxes. Their only economy is at the cost of human misery. The recent attempt (1937) to balance the budget by reducing relief for the unemployed merely brought on a new depression. Neither political party is willing to face the facts. It is only anxious to get back into the trough. Any political party which tries to meet the situation must resort either to national fascism (which means the end of capitalism and of democracy) or make the necessary reconstruction within democracy. I must confess that I am not hopeful that our capitalistic democracy can meet the test. Most of the politicians are now dancing to the tune of the capitalistic press. In Washington, they forget the people whom they are supposed to represent, millions of whom are in dire need. Though the richest country in the world, we are a scandal among nations. More important than the saving of capitalism is the saving of humanity. We must

aim not merely at mass production, but at the production of sound personality.

A dilemma confronts us: Can we have large-scale planning for the welfare of the whole in a capitalistic democracy such as ours? The two large democracies of Europe—Great Britain and France—have gone semi-fascist in trying to meet their problems. Great Britain still retains the form of democracy, but France cannot be said to have saved even the form. The excuse in either case was the international emergency with which the nation was faced. The ominous fact is the abdication of democracy. The United States of America does not feel the international pressure as do Great Britain and France; and the politicians, heedless of the great human crisis which we are facing, feel free to play politics with the life of a nation. They allow themselves to be the pawns of powerful interests. Even such inadequate planning as our government has attempted is jeopardized for the time being. The momentous question is: Can we have national planning *and* capitalistic democracy? In Germany, Hitler solved the problem by abolishing democracy, with its contending parties, and making himself the supreme leader. If we want democracy, we must awaken to the fact that democracy must work for the whole. It cannot be a game of selfish interests. We are not making our democracy work, nor shall we do so unless we learn to work together for the common good.

We are only beginning to face the major problems that confront our civilization. The most momentous problem is to adjust our civilization to the changes which the inventions of science have wrought—the greatest revolution in the history of civilization. We have reduced the working hours, but to keep pace with the machine we shall, before long, have to cut the present working time in half. Other nations are rapidly becoming mechanized, thanks to our high-pressure salesmanship in providing them with the equipment. We can no longer, therefore, rely upon exports to take care of our surplus production. The period of ex-

pansion in our home industry has passed its peak. The machine age has reached saturation. New styles and gadgets will produce temporary flurries in industry, but will not materially affect the situation. The public is becoming immune to high-power salesmanship, partly for economic reasons, partly because of scepticism concerning the future. Before 1929 people had been indoctrinated with the belief that expansion in industry was infinite and they gambled away their savings on that belief. Since then they have found that what was called prosperity was mostly hot air. For a while we are sober.

We must face the situation that to reduce the hours of work so as to furnish employment to our industrial population, and at the same time to provide them with sufficient wages to maintain a decent standard of living, means that our large industrial corporations, with their inflated capitalization and their enormous overhead charge, will go the way of the railroads, in other words, bankruptcy. The railroads point the moral of the old capitalism. The machine, which produced our large-scale capitalism, will also be its undoing. If the capitalistic interests succeed for the time being in continuing the *status quo*, the load which they must carry from increased unemployment will certainly mean bankruptcy. Cooperative industry will eventually supplant the big capitalistic corporations. But such a condition will require assistance and coordination by the national government. The reconstruction will necessarily mean a further drift toward national control. Some would call it socialism. But we should not be scared by words. We should try to meet the situation, lest we perish. There is a considerable opinion now that the nation should take over such large-scale enterprises as the means of transportation and communication. Consolidation of the railroads under national control, as in Great Britain, would be an improvement, if they can be emancipated from the Wall Street interests which wrecked them and which are holding them in bondage. The railroads can never pay until the speculative

water is squeezed out of their stock, and the public "suckers" (of whom I am one) will have to pay the bill. The whole system of transportation and communication must be coordinated in the public interest. This should be the first step in democratic collectivism. So far as possible, the relation of the national government to our economic life should be cooperative and regulative. But the public welfare is the first consideration.

A major problem which demands immediate attention is the conservation and control of the resources of power. Another generation will see the oil reservoirs largely depleted; and before that time arrives the govenment will be obliged to reserve a considerable part for military purposes. Think of it! One crazy generation has run through the vast resources of power which it took nature millions of years to produce. The coal supply is also being rapidly reduced and future generations shall have to rely more and more upon "white coal" or water power. The control of water power for the public good is one of the pressing problems. We are only beginning to see the possibilities for human homes in irrigation and in cheap electric power. It will be necessary to regiment the sources of power more and more for common use. We shall try to find substitutes for oil and coal but the cost in any case will be greatly increased. The use of power for private pleasure and convenience will necessarily be greatly curtailed. We shall come back again for many purposes to animal power—to the horse and the bicycle of a generation ago. In Europe the bicycle is today the most popular means of personal transportation. One reason that the automobile is not used more than it is for private transportation is the cost of gasoline in Europe and the same situation will soon arise in America. By reducing the speed mania, we may also reduce the insanity which is growing with alarming strides; and we shall have more leisure for culture.

Another major problem which we must meet is the use of the soil. We must not only try to conserve what is left

of the agricultural soil and build it up again, but we must distribute it for human use. We must limit the amount of agricultural land that one person can control. We must abolish speculative and absentee landlordism. That can be accomplished by taxation. We must come back to subsistence farming. We must help industrious families to acquire farms. If any subsidies are to be granted, they should go to the small independent farmer. A generation ago a family on a farm was nearly self-sustaining. We do not want to go back to the drudgery of those days. The machine has come and we shall not abandon it. By cooperative farming, we can use the machine for a large part of the work. We must also reclaim for the public domain the vast areas of forest land which the lumber barons by unscrupulous means succeeded in appropriating from the state and which they devastated to satisfy their rapacity. And we must follow the example of the Scandinavian countries in instituting proper supervision of private as well as public forests, so that the harvest may be continuous. No people can be called civilized which has no respect for nature. But what should appeal even to a materialistic age, such respect is good economy. It would also be a protection against floods and erosion.

Decentralizing of industry, as Henry Ford proposes and has to some extent tried, by bringing industrial plants into the country, with the possibility of employees acquiring a home with a sufficient plot of ground for gardening, and even for truck farming, would not only benefit the health of the workers but would furnish profitable employment for leisure time which will be greatly increased. But such an arrangement cannot be left to the caprice of such men as Ford, with the risk that the employees may lose all by being laid off, as has happened in the past. The workers must have security and this, again, will mean increased supervision by the national government. Some call such increase of control regimentation. But we must not be intimidated by words. We must face the facts. One fact

which we must face is that the old order has passed. Increased centralization of control in our national economy is as inevitable in our complex civilization as are stop-and-go signs in our city traffic. While many resent these as a limitation of their liberties, sane people realize that such control means human safety. Our present civilization calls for team-work. And it is clear that the large-scale team-work which is required must have political power in order to succeed. If the power comes from the organized will of a people, freely expressed, it is still democracy.

In some nations the disorganization has been so great that the people have been willing to submit to autocratic control rather than go to ruin. And it should be noted that this autocratic control, whether in Italy or Germany or in Russia, justifies itself to the people on the basis of working for the national welfare. In all three instances, the change came by revolution rather than by evolution, and there has been much suppression and suffering. But it is well to remember that the traditional system, in each case, had broken down. The Great War in each case was the immediate cause of the breakdown and the revolutionary character of the change. I offer no apology for the course of events, but I think it is well for us, who pride ourselves on living in a democracy, to learn from the history of those nations and from the experiments that they are trying to carry out, as well as from the nations who, owing to a different historical background and more favorable conditions have been able to steer a middle course and to preserve their democracy. It is useless for us to indulge in denunciations of other national experiments. Every national state must meet its own problems as they grow out of its own background and conditions. We have no desire to force our own type of government upon other nations, but we have a right to demand that they shall respect universal moral standards; and we must restrain them, so far as we are able, from endangering the peace of the world. Our own problem is to order our economy so as to secure cooperation without the

sacrifice of political freedom.

The fascistic and the Russian experiments[30] started at opposite ends of the economic scale and have been traveling in opposite directions. The dictators of Russia, Lenin and Stalin, started with the proletariat and a general leveling process. The state was the only capitalist and the people had to be satisfied with a bare subsistence. But in working out the experiment it has been necessary to recognize a differential of skill and thrift, in the apportioning of rewards, so as to encourage initiative and enterprise within the socialistic regime. The result is that the bottom class of unskilled workers have a bare subsistence, while those having skill and managerial ability get greater compensation and are able to maintain a higher standard of living. They can invest their savings in government securities and can own their homes with other comforts. Thus there has evolved a modified capitalism within state socialism. We can, therefore, no longer call the Russian system communism. That is one reason why extremists like Trotsky accuse the Russian government of having sold out the Revolution.

The dictators of Italy and Germany started with the backing of the large capitalistic interests. But, in the course of time, owing to the necessity of some one paying the bill, capital has been conscripted in the service of the state, though with nominal private ownership, while the emphasis is placed upon the lower middle class, who are nearly propertyless, and upon the proletariat. Of course the loyalty of the mass is essential to warlike nations. The European fascistic nations are moving rapidly toward state socialism. One thing must be said for them: they are furnishing employment and security of subsistence, however modest, to their people (and that is more than we are doing). But for how long, and at what price?

I have not referred to Japan. It has a different tradition and a different problem. Japan has a hierarchical

30. For an able analysis of the present political situation, see J. A. Leighton's *Social Philosophies in Conflict*, 1937.

system of government, with the emperor at the head who has powers peculiar to the Japanese tradition. There are also a house of lords and a house of commons. Japan was moving toward parliamentary government, but now the militarists are in the saddle and carrying on a ruthless, inhuman war against its peaceful neighbor, China. The spirit and the aims of Japan are identical with European fascism, as they both recognize.

The course of events is obliging us to move toward democratic collectivism. The evolution of a democratic collectivism is a far more difficult process than the establishing of a fascistic totalitarianism. But the time has come when we must plan in terms of the whole. Our failure to do so is at the root of our whole problem, though we are making some progress. We can illustrate the difficulty by our experience in the early days of F. D. Roosevelt's administration. The democratic administration, after coming into power in 1933, found the farmers in dire distress. Prices were too low to pay even for harvesting the grain or for feeding the livestock. The difficulty appeared to be that there had been over-production of agricultural commodities. The government decided upon the policy of producing scarcity. The farmers were paid for destroying an enormous amount of agricultural commodities and for restricting the planted acreage. At the same time more than a third of the nation were starving and needed relief. The most economical way obviously would have been for the government to take the surplus of the farms and to use it to feed the hungry. The unemployed, who represented all grades of intelligence and managerial ability, could have been organized to take charge of the distribution and the use of the grain, livestock, hogs, cotton, etc. and thereby set the idle to work—and to eat. The government, of course, considered the matter. But it was up against our whole business system—grain exchanges, stockyards, jobbers, wholesalers, retailers, not to speak of the politicians who represented the business system. Since the starving millions had lost their buying capacity, feeding

them could not have reduced the business for the system. But what the system wanted was for the government to spend billions of dollars which it must borrow and which therefore became a burden on the future. No doubt our business system felt, more or less instinctively, that such planning on a national scale would have been a revolution of our economy. It would have been a step toward collectivism. But the business system was so stunned by the disaster which had overtaken it and so discredited in the eyes of the public that the government at that time could have done the sensible thing, if it had had the courage and the wisdom. We lost our first great opportunity for national cooperative planning.

This is merely one illustration of our piecemeal way of dealing with our problems. The farmers constitute a serious problem. But we cannot solve that problem permanently by subsidizing the farmer[31] at the expense of the rest of the country. Labor constitutes a great human and economic problem. The establishing of the principle of collective bargaining and of a bottom to wages are momentous steps in the history of our civilization. But unless we can organize industry and business in such a way as to give adequate employment to our labor population, the victories gained are empty. A national policy of providing security for the older generation of workers, so that they may look forward to a livelihood upon retirement, is a great step in advance. Such a policy will furnish more opportunity for the younger generation who are suffering most from the present condition. The legislation is still in the experimental stage and many adjustments will have to be made. It is evident that the state as a whole will have to carry part of the burden. In some European countries the federal state,

31. The farmer is apparently shifting to the right politically. He wants a balanced budget, drastic reduction of the relief for the unemployed and increased subsidies for himself. Poor small farmer! The present government has done something for him by reducing interest on his mortgage, for which it is cursed by the financial interests. The subsidies go largely to the big landholders, many of whom are absentees.

capital and labor each carry a third of the responsibility. The plan must be carried out in the public interest and not be made a political football. To finance old age pensions by a general sales tax, as some politicians propose, is to put the main burden upon those least able to bear it. The consumer, who includes all of us, is the forgotten man in the clamor of contending interests. We shall not solve our national problem by yielding to political pressure, now in one direction, now in another direction. We must face the situation as a whole. To this principle our national administration would doubtless agree, but it would point to the difficulties of realizing such a principle in a democracy such as ours with its contending interests, and justify its zigzag course, pointing to advance on the whole. It is easier to see the mistakes from the sidelines than in the confusion of the battle. But we shall not make permanent progress unless we evolve a philosophy of the whole.

What is wrong with fascistic totalitarianism is not that it attempts to plan in terms of the whole, but its conception of the whole. At present the fascistic nations are organizing their energies with reference to a military objective. Such an objective distorts their emphasis within the national life and it endangers the peace of the world. Nationalism is not a sufficient ideal. We must respect humanity within the nation and outside the nation. Our conception of a viable whole must include moral freedom within the nation and cooperation among nations. No nation can stand by itself.

In the meantime we must plan more adequately for the welfare of our own nation, and of our nation as a whole, if we are to meet the future. If we insist upon the old individualism, democracy will go under from its inability to maintain itself. We must try to save the maximum of individual freedom and initiative, consistent with a democratic system of national cooperation. The change which shall make possible such large-scale cooperation, within a democratic form, must be more than an economic change.

It means a spiritual change. It means a new recognition of the moral significance of man. Can the capitalistic democracies become imbued with this spirit in time to save them? I believe that eventually democracy will triumph, because I believe in the moral evolution of man. The will to live is strong in humanity and eventually, after many trials, it will find a harmonious pattern of living. It will discover its future.

There is a destiny of the United States of America. It is a land of great variety of climate and resources of nature. It is a nation which was founded by peoples who sought freedom, who had suffered for freedom and were willing to fight for freedom. It is a people into whose history has entered great genius and sacrifice. It is a people of many peoples. Yet it is one people, forged through stress and strain into one nation. It is a people which has sinned much—sinned against the Indian, sinned against the Negro, sinned against itself—in its ruthless march and yet with a strain of idealism running through its history. It has danced around the golden calf, yet it has never quite forgotten its God. It is a people that has suffered for its sins and must suffer that it may find its soul. It is for us, the living, to enter into the genius of our nation and to create out of its tradition, its resources and problems, a new future, expressive of our noblest humanity.

CHAPTER XI

THE UNIT OF CIVILIZATION

The last century has been notable for its tendency to human integration. This is illustrated in the political realm. Not only has nationalism asserted itself in the unification of peoples of kindred race, language, and aspirations, but vast empires have been organized, subordinating the lesser units to themselves and sweeping within their domain the outlying, less military portions of humanity. Again empires have ranged themselves into alliances of empires, at last coming to deadly grip for the dominance of the earth. The final act of the drama, which now seems far off, would be the organization of the civilized peoples into an effective league of nations. With the integration there has been a corresponding tendency toward centralization and an exploitation of the masses for the furtherance of the idea of power. The larger more inclusive units show an inherent hostility to the small component units—the hostility of self-preservation. Even as in Palestine of old, so the modern prophets of nationalism and empire have inveighed against provincialism and localism until the smaller units have often been emaciated into mere geographical names. And so we laugh at the petty conflicts among the small nations of old—Athens, Thebes, and Sparta, and bully the small nations of today.

The same tendency that has operated in the sphere of political control has operated in the economic sphere. Imperialism and capitalism are at least Siamese twins. The root of both at any rate is the lust for power. Both have been characterized by ruthlessness in absorbing smaller units unto themselves. Both aim at universal dominion. The logic of both tendencies found its consistent and tragic expression in the power struggle of the late world war. The growth of fascism which has followed the disintegra-

tion of the late war emphasizes power, with ruthless suppression of human liberties. But the democratic empires, while preserving the theory of freedom, still emphasize power. The crust of custom upon which they build is essentially the same.

There are signs, however, that the organization of humanity on the basis of power is failing. At the very moment when the climax of integration seemed to be in sight, the tendency to disintegration set in at an alarming rate. The imperialistic dream has become a nightmare as humanity has been confronted with the cost. Latent national ambitions and national jealousies have been set loose and threaten to upset the equilibrium. But what is even more portentous: internal diversity in the form of class strife has broken out, upsetting the calculations of the power regime. Somehow power-integration has failed to satisfy human nature; and there is a growing murmur that humanity when it cried for bread was given a stone.

The process of integration has not been accompanied with the corresponding process of differentiation. Whether in the political or in the economic sphere, the tendency has been to efface localism and to ignore the personal human equation. The larger the integration, the more impersonal has become the relation between management and the human units involved. From the point of view of imperialism, the individuals have become so much potential cannon fodder in the realization of imperial ambition; from the point of view of capitalism, man has counted only as part of the wealth-producing machine. The tendency has been to delocalize and to depersonalize human enterprise. For the exponents of this tendency there seemed to be no end to this process. But now we are facing the law of diminishing returns. Is imperialism, political and economic, worth the increasing overhead cost, financial and human? Is not human nature, instead of being realized, balked and cramped in the process? Human nature has not fundamentally changed. It is constituted for a life of personal

relations and hence is not satisfied to be a cog in an impersonal machine. By instinct, imagination, and sympathy, human nature is made for small groups, for face-to-face relations and hence is not at home in the artificial, de-humanized leviathan which, like Moloch of old, has only an instrumental interest in the human individual. It may fatten the sheep, but it is only in order to devour them. The old inhumanity of man to man has come to seem only more brutal when robbed of the old personal sanctions. And man, when delocalized and depersonalized, reverts easily to the anonymous mob.

The argument for integration has always been economy, efficiency. Yet through the irony of events, the old system has failed at this very point. In the economic realm it has been shown conclusively that impersonal management has been wasteful and anything but economic in its results. It has become trammeled by a network of red tape. It has produced antagonism by its ruthlessness; and it has failed to stimulate initiative and thrift. The more personal form of management, where the individuals are respected and given an opportunity to participate, has shown itself vastly more efficient for operator and laborer alike than the impersonal system. Whatever may be the course of the present unrest, it is certain that personal participation and local interest must be part of the future system of industry. In the political realm we have the anomaly that the loosest of the imperialistic systems, that of Britain, where the parts are held together merely by sentiment, where non-conformism has asserted itself in its boldest form and where no government, at any rate in times of peace, has dared to limit the personal right to criticize it, has shown the most coherency, while the abstract power-unities went to pieces during the late war.

One thing seems to be clear—the one-sided tendency to integration has failed in both the political and the industrial realm. A tendency to decentralize must sooner or later set in. The pendulum may vibrate back and forth between

the extremes for some time before a golden mean is reached. But whatever form the eventual organization of humanity may assume, it must rest on two fundamental facts: on the one hand, the reality of personal relations, and on the other hand, the vital importance of those face-to-face groups which furnish the sphere, as they indicate the limitation, for the realization of human nature. All else is scaffolding, means to an end, which will last only while it fills its instrumental purpose. We may well take to heart the lesson of Aristotle and Rousseau who both emphasized the face-to-face unity as fundamental—the Greek city, the Swiss canton, where men could get together to discuss the common weal, or at least hear and see their leaders and react upon the discussion. As we come to realize the moral significance of personal relations and of our own intimate groups, it is also to be hoped that we may realize the moral significance of other groups and learn to cooperate with them in those instrumental relations which tend to the common weal. Thus we shall have a moral basis for the executive organization of humanity—an ideal of democracy. Not pangermany, nor panslavism, nor pancapitalism, but panhumanity. Toward such a democracy we have at best made only a start, and the travail and pain in its begetting is likely to exceed anything in the past, unless we see the signs of the times.

One thing is certain: political democracy, the democracy of votes, is only part of the problem. We must have ethical democracy, the democracy of the spirit, the joy in common creativeness before we can satisfy the deepest human demands. For "man doth not live by bread alone," though of course he must have bread, and the economic problem seems now to be the crying problem. But even if we get the economic problem adjusted, we shall only be ready to begin to live; and the chances are that we shall not get it adjusted unless we realize that the essence of life is creative goodwill. I would rewrite Kant's famous maxim to read: *The only thing good in the world is goodwill,* helpful and

wholesome human relations. We must have a deeper appreciation of humanity everywhere, before the greater day can come. The old civilization was concerned with an aristocratic plane and its interests were correspondingly limited. The new civilization must express the fundamental human plane, not as an abstract universal merely, but in all its complexities, starting from the concrete associations with their color of tradition, climate and race, and working out towards the infinite. It must, as Nietzsche insisted, develop strong, resourceful, courageous individuals, not slaves of tradition nor of the herd instinct, but it must develop individuals with community consciousness, joyfully giving of their best to enrich all.

If integration, with its centralization and impersonalism, has failed in the political and economic realms, what about the realm of spiritual values? In the field of religion, it would seem that the ethical effectiveness of a religion varies inversely to its centralization and mechanism. In ecclesiasticism, the institution becomes the end and the individual soul a mere means. The motive of salvation is swallowed up in the insatiable passion for power. The best moral results seem to be attained where the local congregation is the unit, with the minimum of machinery for cooperation with other units and the maximum of tolerance. In education, while centralization tends toward uniformity of standards, the danger is that the process loses vital relation to the community. In a large country like ours, the nationalizing of education is in danger of producing a dead level—the sacrificing of variety of experimentation and of rivalry in attainment, for bureaucracy and red tape. This is what the large European nations have suffered from in the past. Religion and education, instead of following the flag of empire, should first of all minister to the community and make real the life of personal relations.

That power-integration is unfavorable to happiness values there can, I think, be no doubt. We have paid little attention as yet to the organization of happiness. But it

is clear that personal association is a fundamental condition. The number with which we can associate in a friendly way at any one time is limited by human nature. Graham Wallas was led to believe from his observations that twenty-five or thirty is as large a number as we can meet on an intimate basis. That is the number in the English "house" system, so successful in English higher education, and in our American college fraternities. A great deal can be done in the direction of proper organization of neighborhoods whether at work or at play on a basis suited to the limitations of human nature. Of course the external conditions, material and social, must also be healthful and favorable, but those are more easily appreciated than the need for personal association. One of the great problems of the future is that of promoting the organization of happiness and its favorable conditions, in order to redeem the artificiality of our modern life. And this need is felt not merely in the crowded industrial centers, but in the rural communities as well, since the new methods of transportation have broken up the old rural centers. We must learn to respect and further real human values, if civilization is to be endurable and to endure.

If again we look at the problem from the point of view of the production of the highest culture, we may well doubt whether the scramble for power has been favorable in this direction. Large units tend to bring out new qualities, hostile to the creation of spiritual values. The lust for power and the quest for the good do not make congenial companions. The higher human relations are essentially personal in their nature—religion, art, friendship. Truth, too, is personal in its incentive and goal, however impersonal its method. It works for social understanding and communion. Hence it is not to be wondered at that impersonalism and mechanism are hostile to culture. The fascistic type of control which dominates several nations today means the suppression of free discussion and that means necessarily the decay of genuine culture. There can

be no true culture without freedom of thought and expression. The tendency to impersonalism and centralization have had a deleterious effect upon our own culture. We can note the decay in the culture in our own country as between the days of the Revolution and the days of empire. The relations in the colonial days were strongly personal. Men were the masters of the institution, while later the institution became their master. Our politicians today make a sorry contrast to the statesmen who founded our republic.

In general we may say that spiritual values vary in inverse ratio to impersonalism and centralization. The greatest cultural productiveness has been attained when the culture group has conformed most nearly to the personal group which Artistotle had in mind. Athens in the days of Pericles, with a population of perhaps 50,000 freemen, Florence in the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, stand out as illustrious examples. But there were other Italian city-republics, contemporary with Florentine greatness and scarcely less distinguished. Paris in the days of Abelard, London in the Elizabethan age, Jena at the end of the eighteenth century are illustrious in the history of the human spirit and show the stimulus of association and personal reaction. The small nations of western Europe in the last generation have contributed to human culture out of all proportion to their size as compared to the power nations. I quote from Graham Wallas (writing in 1914): "The United Kingdom has a population of forty-five millions and the United States one of a hundred millions. The Norway of Björnson and Ibsen and Grieg had a population of two millions, and the Italy of Dante and Petrarch one of perhaps four millions. No one even dreams that the first rate intellectual output of the English speaking world of the twentieth century will be twenty-five times that of nineteenth century Norway together with fourteenth century Italy. But our wealth and knowledge and organizing power may perhaps make us together equal to one of them."

Today we would think first of Sweden, but Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland or Czecho-Slovakia[1] might also be used as illustrations. Spain, after she was rid of the incubus of imperialism, had for a time a wonderful era in the realm of culture which today is being destroyed by fascism. The awarding of the Nobel prizes is at best an approximate way of estimating contributions to culture, though in the course of years it cannot help coming nearer the mark. There has been a great deal of criticism within the big nations of supposed favoritism to the small nations. Perhaps the shock of this may lead others as it led Wallas to closer observation of the actual facts, and, if the facts should seem to be as indicated, into a closer scrutiny and criticism of the present organization of culture. If the boasted power-organizations fail in the spiritual fruits of civilization, what have they to commend them?

The reasons for the better showing of the small European nations are not far to seek. They have given up the race for power and have turned their resources in other directions. We have seen that the atmosphere of power is not favorable to spiritual results. It is fundamentally ruthless in its treatment of the human individual and the personal community. It tends toward centralization and impersonalism. It substitutes machinery for human values. Size tends to stimulate the instinct for power which grows with what it feeds on in geometrical progression; that means that the more the instinct for power is realized the more it takes to satisfy it. Where power becomes the dominant passion, the genius and energies of men are drained in that direction. They are needed for management, military and economic. When the passion for power dominates a people, the power-values are the ones that come to seem worth-while and therefore fascinate men; spiritual values come to seem incidental or instrumental. In other words, the passion for power inverts the true human perspective.

1. Since this was written the progressive Czecho-Slovak nation has been destroyed by Germany.

So far as we can learn anything from the past, genuine culture flourishes in proportion as social organization approximates moral organization, which means the respect for personality and personal values. Hence it is that progress in culture is in inverse ratio to the passion which makes power the end and human beings the means.

If we are made for personal relations, and if impersonal relations are artificial and instrumental, then we must readjust our notions of control. We must encourage instead of suppress the individuality of the smaller units. Nationality, provincialism, localism, clan loyalty, personal freedom—these are great motive forces which we cannot afford to lose, though in stressing the smaller units I do not mean to deny the importance of the large human contacts. Truth has no local boundaries. "Magnificent isolation" leads to stagnation. But we shall contribute more to the larger human relations if we cultivate more intensively our home soil. In our large political organizations, we must try to make the smaller unit vital, especially in a cultural way, reserving for the larger unit only those things which must necessarily be done by cooperation of the smaller units. But it should be cooperation and not suppression. It is especially in the realm of spiritual realization that the rivalry and interaction of small units becomes of the greatest importance—a rivalry like that of the city republics in Italy at the end of the Middle Ages. For mutual protection they must indeed cooperate to safeguard their spiritual life, but this must not mean bullying by larger units but a free cooperation based upon goodwill and mutual interest. There may be local rumblings now and then, but that is preferable to a universal earthquake such as that brought about by the power regime. When political control becomes, as it is now tending to become, positive instead of merely negative, it will be found that the unit which conforms most nearly to the moral unit will have immeasurable advantages in stability and effectiveness over the impersonal units. In the smaller units, experiments can be

tried and corrected, and local needs and peculiarities respected. If socialism is not to be a dead weight of tyranny, it must be tried in the small unit. It was in the small Greek states that self-government first developed, and it is in the smaller states today—especially the Scandinavian countries—that we see new experiments most successfully tried.

While we have emphasized the small unit, it must be obvious that smallness alone does not produce culture. The small unit must have sufficient material resources to encourage the best in education, science, and art. The unit must be sufficiently large and varied to furnish adequate complexity and sufficient interplay of forces. Nothing could be deader than some of the small rural towns or some of the small nations of the past. With the means of communication today, the geographical size may be greater than that of medieval times, but it must not be too great to make impossible personal contact and interchange. Impersonal associations, scattered over large areas and getting together at long intervals, have little effect on culture. The unit must have not only spiritual complexity, but friendly conflict of ideals in the way of discussion in order to bring out the resources of the spirit, whether this conflict be stimulated from within or from without. It must cultivate the maximum of cultural contacts with other groups, thus enriching its own life, but it must assimilate these contributions into its own genius. It must encourage spiritual production by the high social esteem it bestows and by furnishing such material means as will make it possible for genius to do its work without succumbing to poverty. Obviously the encouragement should be such as to preserve the spiritual integrity of genius and not prostitute it to material gain. Above all, the group must be inspired by a high bond of unity. It must be rooted in the noblest traditions of the past, but venturesome for the best attainments of the future. It must be intersected by a spiritual plane worth while. If there is no corrupter

like the public Sophist, as Plato shows, there is no inspiration like a noble public sentiment. The love of poetry among the Scandinavian nations, the passion for music among the small nations of Southern Germany (previous to the days of empire), the love for clarity on the part of the French, of common sense by the British, of beauty among the Italians, of freedom among the Swiss have produced their immortal results. All other disadvantages might be surmounted if we were animated by the passion for spiritual values, or rather the passion would produce the proper organization. We must put the instrumental values in their proper place, whether it be the organization of power, or more hogs, more corn and more corn, more hogs, and learn to emphasize the intrinsic, the personal values.

While it is true that some of the small city states like Athens and Florence and some small modern nations have offered exceptional instances of cultural development, it does not follow that such development is necessarily bound up with political independence, and some modern nations which have contributed in a marked way have not preserved their political independence. Instance Scotland in a happier way and Finland[2] in a more tragic way. No doubt oppression and uncongenial association among nations as among individuals tend to produce balked tendencies and to block cultural expression. Some nations with a brilliant past, like Poland and Bohemia, had for generations been preoccupied with their national grievances and felt impotent in the realization of their national aspirations. Poland and Bohemia, under the name of Czecho-Slovakia, regained their status as nations after the World War; but now, after twenty years of brilliant achievement as a democracy, Czecho-Slovakia has been murdered by Nazi Germany. It will take another European war to resurrect Czecho-Slovakia. Nationality, with a noble tradition and a high level of life, does offer a wonderful incentive. But such units

2. Since this was written Finland has been set free through the World War.

cannot be artificially made, and in some way our large units must be reorganized for spiritual purposes. It is not likely that the small units have had more genius in proportion to their population than the others, or that Athens for example had more genius in the time of Pericles than before and after. The development of culture is in large part a matter of spiritual incentive. Pericles set about with his usual energy to make Athens a great cultural center (which it had not been before) by inducing great men to come there and by offering incentives for genius. Our municipal and provincial units might follow his example.

Perhaps we have over-emphasized nationalism as a medium of culture. Nationalism has too often been blind, narrow and intolerant, a mere manifestation of the herd instinct. To be worth while, it must be enriched by cultural contacts without and still more by spiritual organization within. A one-sided patriotism offers at best a narrow incentive for spiritual production. We must grasp the universal in humanity and the universe in order to create; and this is not a matter of national boundaries, though a true national spirit is a potent factor. Some of the geniuses of small nations, like Ibsen and Strindberg, have reacted against their nations rather than with them, though no doubt inspired by the heroic background of their native tradition, while a poet like Maeterlinck may be said to be part of French civilization as much as of Belgium. Goethe was accused of lack of patriotism in his day and defended himself by saying that he found it impossible to hate the French since he had received his chief inspiration from them. It is not the sentiment of nationalism, so much as the fact that the nation has been the unit of spiritual organization that has made the nation so important culturally in the past. But in the future we may look for an extension of international incentives to spiritual cultivation and production not only in specific ways, such as the Rhodes Scholarships, the Nobel prizes, etc., but in the way of furnishing international communities of cooperation and ap-

preciation. We may also hope for a more intensive organization of humanity within the nation in the way of encouraging provincialism and localism. Who can tell how much provincial loyalty and rivalry have done to make the French civilization great in times past? And before the great war there were striking evidences of the intensification of such provincialism. In our country, Boston, whose provincialism we have laughed at, has had an enviable cultural record; and New York as the melting pot of the races is becoming more and more a great cultural center. Suppose it were dominated as a city by a high idealistic purpose, instead of by Tammany,[3] what might it not accomplish in the way of attracting and developing genius.

In our passion for larger units of human association we have been too prone to neglect the significance of the local. Yet it is a homely and truthful proverb that charity begins at home. The roots of the human spirit are in the soil. The appreciation of human nature and nature alike must start with the neighborhood of which we are a part. Certainly some of the finest of human inspirations have come from local associations. However cosmopolitan genius may become, it is apt to draw fire from some local altar, for the love of locality in most human beings is strong and ineradicable. How can we separate the genius of Thoreau from Walden Pond, Emerson from Concord, Whittier from his snow-bound New Hampshire, Wordsworth from the English lake region? There is the inspiration of the homely life of the Highlands in Robert Burns and there is the flavor of Scottish accent and of Scottish heather in Carlyle. Who could understand Mark Twain without his early life on the Mississippi or the rugged idealism of Lincoln except as the fruitage of the pioneer spirit of the West?

We may expect great gain in the future from the development of a new community consciousness. Once we realize the reality of the community, the cooperative rela-

3. New York has now (1938), under the redoubtable Mayor La Guardia, broken the old political regime. For how long?

tionship of human beings with their clashing, overlapping interests, and live ourselves into the tissue of life of our neighborhood as a moral and not merely an external relationship, then culture shall come to have new reality and meaning. The literary man will not simply nose about his neighborhood to find quaint types, but will aim to interpret the real life, the real aspirations and struggles of real people, working together to produce a community. Then law will become the registration of conscious human individuals in cooperation, instead of class interests as it is now. What an infinite fountain of culture—the beautiful community! But first we must create the community, for in the present newspaper age we seem to live least at home and mostly at a distance.

Perhaps, if in a vast country like the United States of America, we could once develop sectional and municipal rivalries in spiritual things, we might have a renaissance as great as any in the past. This seems all the more promising because of the variety of human material and the wealth of traditional background. If there are race qualities, conditioning the overtones of spiritual production, we should have them here. Nor does it seem wise to conventionalize our country by a bigoted eradication of the cultural heritage that some of the nations are bringing us. What is certain is that we have been leaving our spiritual tendencies largely undeveloped and balked in our mad chase for wealth and power. It is the irony of history that now the power-and-wealth-crust on which we have largely reared our social structure is breaking, and the false prophets are thus becoming exposed by the drift of events. If some of the nations had served the intrinsic values more and the instrumental less, they would not now be a menace to the peace of humanity. Even from the point of view of stability and prosperity, a saner respect for the demands of human nature may seem to be the best policy; but what is more important is that it is the only policy which makes life worth while.

The unit of personal relations and the unit of political control never have coincided nor can they at best wholly coincide. A unit which is large and complex enough to furnish a substantial basis for independent political organization must necessarily be too large for intimate personal association. Our memory and imagination, as well as our moral capacity for helpfulness, are limited. A political unit, moreover, must include all varieties and conditions of men with their division of labor and variety of interest. It must have its crust of custom as well as its pioneers for truth. The cultural unit of ancient Athens not only excluded the slaves who were probably three fourths of the population, but those who shared in active sympathy and cooperation for higher ideals included only a fraction of the freemen. The fate of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Protagoras in Pericles' own reign, and of Socrates a generation later, shows how far Athens was from being a moral unit for progress. The cultural epoch of Florence was after all carried by a small aristocracy. While in our modern democracies we may look for a more wide-spread interest in culture, the actual cooperation in cultural production must naturally be limited to small groups. What we can hope is that the unit of political control shall further the means of cultural cooperation and, by the atmosphere which it can create, stimulate instead of thwart the creative spirit. The creative cultural group is necessarily selective and should include those gifted by nature, training and nobility of aim to cooperate in a creative purpose. The best results for culture seem to be produced in friendship groups such as the Pythagorean fraternity, the Socratic group and Plato's Academy in ancient times, and the masonic guilds that built the Gothic cathedrals toward the end of the Middle Ages. There should be the widest tolerance of differences in viewpoint and the greatest desire on the part of each participant to furnish his creative increment in the erection of the temple of truth and beauty. Such masonry of the spirit has always been rare.

The leadership in creating personal groups for mutual stimulation and discipline should come from our educational system. There have been interesting and profitable experiments at the kindergarten stage and in some private schools for progressive education, but our mass-education in our public schools has necessarily mechanized our educational system. The over-burdened teachers are too much occupied with the routine to give attention to the organization of the life of the students. The machine must grind out its results of grades and promotions of students *en masse.* What organization there is among the students in the later stages has sprung from the interest of the students themselves, such as athletics and dramatic activities, and more recently fraternities and sororities. Such organizations touch only a small part of the student body and that mostly at the high school and college stage, though the junior high school has done a great deal to rescue the two grades below the high school from the deadly routine. The organization of the teaching in our public schools is of the power type, the superintendent being a despot without responsibility to his staff, though in turn dominated by political boards. There is little prospect of carrying the hopeful experiments of group association at the kindergarten stage into the grades of the public schools. Politicians find economizing at the expense of education altogether too tempting and the load of teachers is being increased instead of decreased. And the ideal itself, I fear, is largely lacking in those who manage our educational machine. At any rate, they are too harassed by the problem of making the machine function to attempt new inventions in organization.

One would naturally look to the universities and colleges for the spiritual organization of personal relations. The situation, however, is disappointing. This is due in part to the autocratic organization of most of our higher institutions of learning, and this in turn is due in part to the great size of our institutions. They have so far been, for

the most part, power-organizations instead of leaders in the democratic movement. This condition has created an atmosphere of suspicion between the administration and the faculty. In a large proportion of institutions, there is a chronic state of irritation and unrest which cannot help being unfavorable to cultural production. But it is especially in the departmental organization[4] that misunderstandings and conflicts arise. The department should furnish a natural unit for first-hand discussion and interstimulation, but too often the power motif is dominant. This condition has tended to have a depressing effect and to militate against such comradeship as is necessary for spiritual cooperation. The artificial character of departmental divisions has likewise been instrumental in producing undue rivalry and segregation and thus been unfavorable to like-mindedness of purpose. But the power-system, with its disadvantages, is itself the outgrowth of the chronic individualism and *laissez faire* attitude of the American scholar. He has not been prone to team-work. He has been apt to look upon the pursuit of truth as an individual affair—too eager for individual credit, and, one might add, for individual advancement. When there has been cultural cooperation, as there has been in philosophy in recent instances, there has been so strong a sectarian emphasis as to create a suspicion that the interest was more in propaganda of a particular doctrine or school than in advancing the truth. But that, no doubt, is due to the rawness of our culture and, we hope, presages a more liberal and disinterested cooperation in the future. Contrast with this the wide diversity which characterized the Pythagorean fraternity where Zeno and Empedocles could sojourn under the same roof with the mathematical realists, with their "units" or "simples" (which were not "new" in the fifth

4. In three of the four institutions with which I have been connected—Grinnell College, Carleton College and the University of California—the presidents have been democratic and fair-minded. The difficulties have come from departments.

century B. C.) or the even greater richness of the Socratic group where such different temperaments as Plato and Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aristippus could unite in the common purpose of following the argument whithersoever it leadeth. Evidently we are far from such red-blooded masculinity of comradeship.

One thing is certain: we need to reorganize our educational life, not only in higher institutions but generally, not only faculty life but student life, into moral groups, if we are to get the best results. Our fraternities, while filling a social need, lack, it is to be feared, a serious cultural purpose. They are primarily hedonic organizations, with dancing often the chief interest—a rather inverted emphasis one must admit. They are not from a cultural point of view to be compared with the old-fashioned literary and debating societies. There can be no doubt that the fraternity unit not only expresses a psychological need, but has great possibilities in true moral stimulation; and by moral stimulation I mean the stimulation of all those tendencies which should characterize a full-grown man or woman in our modern life. The possibilities are best illustrated in those instances where group rivalry has been turned into account not only in technically social, but in literary, physical, and practical development as well—an ideal which has been realized in the English "houses" and "colleges." Universities like Oxford and Cambridge show that there is no necessary disadvantage in a university's being large. Rather it is an advantage in the richness of stimulus, provided the institution is subdivided into small units. There has been an experiment of late, notably at Harvard and Yale, to introduce the "house" system into American universities and the experiment, so far as it has gone, has been a notable success, but it affects only a small part of the student body and it was possible by the generosity of an enlightened donor who had the ideal at heart, though it had long been a dream of the former president of Harvard, A. Lawrence Lowell. It is to be hoped that there will be other donors

and other administrations which will follow up the lead. With the economic pressure of maintenance and growth, it is not likely at present that such experiments will be tried in the large universities without special benefactors. There can be no doubt, however, that there is a crying need of a new spiritual organization among both students and faculty for closer personal converse.[5]

While I have emphasized in this essay the vital importance of the personal unit of civilization, it is only fair to recognize that the impersonal organization of our industrial era has had far-reaching indirect effects upon human culture, and that not all of those effects have been bad. It is a historical fact that the growth of popular democracy has coincided with the growth of mass production and mass circulation which are the results of the machine age. In the small permanent communities which preceded the industrial era the tendency was for human relations to be relatively stable. The folkways changed but slowly. The institution of slavery persisted for ages and then was followed by a long period of feudal relations. Status was comparatively fixed during long epochs of history. The industrial era, with the dislocating of human beings from their historic environment and with the facilities of movement over wide areas, immensely accelerated social change. While the immediate results of the new era were increased misery and confusion, it disintegrated the old economic folkways and to a large extent the moral folkways which were bound up with them. It set human beings loose from age-old bonds and necessitated the creating of new unities. The laborer was no longer bound to the soil and was obliged to find a new bond in common interest. The process of reconstruction is still going on, but the individual is emerging with a new dignity and a new scale of values, if still

5. During recent years the students in the large universities have shown a great deal of initiative in promoting associations not only for discussion of vital social and economic problems but for promoting more economic and healthful living conditions. I am particularly proud of the initiative which the students of my own university have shown.

confused. The industrial era, like an earthquake, has loosened the old crust. It has set a problem of reorganization and furnished an opportunity for greater economic and moral freedom. The new moral organization is still largely in the future and there will be many growing pains before humanity attains to a new and more adequate unification, which shall realize the need for small personal unities within the large scale impersonal organization, required by the new era.

In fact, the real work of organizing humanity into moral unities has scarcely begun. Our political democracy, so far achieved, is only a shell or framework for such spiritual organization into moral neighborhoods. From every point of view—political, economic, religious, cultural—the greatest problem in human organization for the future is not, to borrow the terminology of physics, the creative discovery of mass units, though this appeals to our imagination and is pressing, but the more subtle and basic problem of the creative discovery of the molecule of civilization. Only by this intensive creativeness can our larger social compounds become stable. We must create such moral unities of personal association as shall realize, to the greatest extent, the capacities of human nature, if our larger impersonal unities are to be worth while. In fact the objection to large human units will largely disappear, once we have created the real moral unit within the larger instrumental unit. Under comparatively homogeneous conditions, such as presented by rural life, the creating of a natural neighborhood community may largely answer the purpose now as under earlier conditions of civilization; but in our vastly complexer urban life, produced by the Great Industry and the modern division of labor, the neighborhood community, while it is imperative and must be created, must be supplemented by communities of interest. This becomes especially true in the highest creative realms of culture, where the participants are few and in danger of being submerged in the mass, unless brought together by

a spiritual bond for natural reinforcement. This is peculiarly the task of the educational profession.

In the meantime, while we are waiting and working for a saner social organization, we must do what we can to get together and warm each others' spirits at the fire of mutual interest and fellowship. That something can be done in this way to increase the spiritual output, we all know. And we shall thus save our souls.

CHAPTER XII

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY

Education in the past has been vitiated by two types of tendencies. One has been the tendency to regard education as a merely passive process, a process of imitation —the taking on of the knowledge of the past as a suit of ready-made clothes, irrespective of whether it fit the wearer. We are trying at present to emphasize the active, constructive nature of education. However chaotic our efforts may be so far, we are at least conscious of the fact that education should express the needs and tendencies of the developing mind and that knowledge is an instrument in the creative realization of personality.

Another tendency which we are trying to work away from is the individualistic conception of education. We are becoming aware at least that education is a social process and must fit the individual for the team work of a common life. The abstract individual has gone into the limbo of the economic man and of so many other abstract entities. It is through social education that the individual must discover himself and his vocation.

Education as Preparation

Upon one thing we are fairly agreed, that is that education should be a preparation for the later stages of life. Too often, however, this preparation is conceived in an abstract and piecemeal fashion. It is assumed that the mere acquiring of a certain stock of knowledge or of a certain technical skill, irrespective of any guiding principle, will bring out the right sort of individual. The conception of what this knowledge should be varies indeed at different times and with different ideals. In the fairly recent past it was supposed that classical subjects furnished the best preparation, a certain amount of Latin and Greek being

regarded as essential. At present, however, the tendency is to emphasize more modern subjects and the study of the ancient languages is on the decline. But in either case the main issue has been lost sight of, namely, that knowledge is instrumental to a life process and that the selection of content must be based, not on some supposed intrinsic merit of the knowledge itself, but on its value for the life process.

The whole idea that certain types of knowledge are intrinsically liberalizing and that other types are purely vocational seems be without foundation. It is the spirit in which the knowledge is communicated and the end for which it is sought which make the difference between the liberal and the narrowly technical character of the process. Thus Latin and Greek, which have been supposed to be so highly liberalizing, if they are studied with the aim of scholarly proficiency or perhaps the mere aim of making a living, would seem to be merely technical disciplines, while the sciences, if pursued in the disinterested spirit of love of truth and with the view of human betterment through progressive understanding of our world, become highly liberalizing subjects. It is evident that, in so far as we look upon education as preparation for life, the aim should be the mastery of the material from the point of view of participating more effectively and more appreciatively in our epoch of culture. To this end we must master the tools of civilization. This has indeed become a complex and seemingly hopeless task in our modern life. The primitive man could master all of life. And even the Greek in the days of Pericles could have a thorough understanding of the brilliant civilization of his day. So rapid, however, has been the increase of knowledge through specialization and increased means of communication that it has become impossible in one brief life time and with our circumscribed minds to master the spiritual resources of the race. Education today is obliged to deal with certain types of interest and methods. In this way we hope to enable the individual

to discover his tastes and capacities. While he must specialize in order to prepare for his vocation, it would seem that he ought also to acquire some perspective of life as a whole. Else he becomes a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water, a cog in our complex social machinery.

There are some types of interests that stand out in such a preparation for a fuller life. We must learn to appreciate the past of our civilization if we are to understand and guide the present. And here Greco-Roman culture has a permanent claim upon us as our spiritual background, and now excellent translations of the immortal classics are available. But even more important is an intelligent understanding and appreciation of the history of our own culture. We should also have some familiarity with the methods of the physical sciences and the control which they have made possible over the processes of nature. But at least equally important is an acquaintance with the life sciences. We must attain that knowledge and direction of our bodies and minds which will enable us to yield a maximum of energy for the common service. Hand and brain must be trained together in such a manner as to make us doers and not merely hearers of the word. Nor is there anything mean or sordid about this practical preparation for life provided that the process is animated with the motive of common service and individual excellence. It is only by striving for excellence that we can hope to contribute the maximum to the common fund of life.

Beside the mastery of such knowledge as relates to the control of nature and of our organisms, we must attain an understanding of our social life and its laws. Unless we are prepared to work with our fellows for our common good, our technical efficiency may be a matter of mischief rather than of advantage. We must therefore give due place to those sciences which, by preparing us for citizenship, will enable us to play our part in our institutional life. Nor is this social education complete without a proper moral preparation for the common life and a true philosophic

perspective of our place in the universe. Our motives as groups may be as selfish and mischievous as our motives in our individual capacity often are. Education, therefore, must involve more than intellectual or technical training. It must, in its whole process, be a training of character. It must inculcate such habits of self-control, thoughtfulness, conscientiousness, dependability, fairness, openmindedness and kindness as shall prepare us for our great human vocation. The yellow streak in human beings fortunately is rarely a biological taint, whether in individuals or races. It is for the most part, if not altogether, a social taint, due to diseased social conditions, to false social habits and ideals. Hence it can be corrected by the right kind of social atmosphere and by true social training. Nor must such training be a mere matter of unreflective acceptance of categorical precepts. Such training ill fits the individual to meet the complexity of a changing social order. True moral training must make the individual conscious of the meaning of the life in which he must play his part. It should enable him to examine not only his individual habits but his social habits in the light of a conscious ideal and should ever emphasize and furnish the opportunity for acting upon such insight. The old training was too abstract. It is a mistake to suppose that the three R's would necessarily produce good citizenship. We must have not mere abstract intellectual training, but that training of intelligence which shall enable us to understand and participate in a common life. To this end there must be a training of the emotions to loyalty and appreciation of what is best, the training of reason for the critical examination of what is best, and the training of a character which will act upon the insight into the best. No training which neglects any aspect of personality can be adequate to meet our common responsibilities. Mere emotional loyalty without critical insight degenerates into prejudice and fanaticism. Mere criticism without the deeper loyalty to a common life eats itself out in skepticism; and both our sentiments and our

reason must be organized through proper training into an open-minded and well-coordinated will Only thus can we create an adequate social personality.

Education as Initiation

It has been too often forgotten in our age that education is not merely preparation for life, but is initiation into life. It is through the educative process that the individual must be initiated into the solemn obligations of the group and be stimulated to loyalty to the common life. To this end there should be solemn moments in the process of education, with emphasis of the new and peculiar obligations at each stage in the life process. It has been the custom among primitive peoples indefinitely far back to differentiate the development of man into periods, with appropriate ceremonies and organization for each period. Especially has the transition to manhood and womanhood been emphasized with solemn rites and ceremonies. The youth has been taken aside for some time and instructed by his elders in the tradition of the group and been subjected to such tests and solemn functions as would impress upon him the obligations of the larger life upon which he is about to enter as a responsible participant. The ceremonies have indeed varied and the mystery surrounding them has been more or less emphasized, but the common elements stand out in the history of human civilization, and there can be no doubt about the instinctive soundness of the process. Similar rites and ceremonies have been emphasized for a similar reason in the more advanced stages of civilization; and the religious ceremony of confirmation which gained prominence in medieval Christianity is still retained in some form, in most religious bodies, but the emphasis today is upon participation in a particular religious community rather than the fuller obligations of citizenship.

Among some primitive peoples there were earlier initiations corresponding to the developing consciousness of boy-

hood and girlhood. There can be no doubt that the initiation into social participation should begin earlier than adolescence. It is a mistaken idea that the social instinct first makes itself felt with the changes of puberty. On the contrary, the gang spirit, the spirit of the clan, seems to develop its greatest strength in the period preceding adolescence; and it is especially here where our educational process has been so markedly and often disastrously inadequate. It has been shown that delinquent gangs are attempts at compensation for lack of normal opportunity for group expression; and mischievous though the operation of such gangs may be to society at large, they do provide within themselves training in group loyalty and group restraint. That there are experiments at present to use the gang instinct of boyhood for initiation into normal group life is a hopeful sign, however inadequate have been the efforts up to date. Society is paying a high price for its failure to provide proper opportunity for the expression of the gang instinct in the boyhood period. With boyhood, I, of course, include the corresponding girlhood period, but in separate groups. The separation of the sexes is spontaneous in this period.

It is to be profoundly regretted that modern education has neglected the sacramental function of the educative process. Mystery is a permanent element in human nature. Men are swayed more by sacraments and symbols than by intellectual content. In this there is a perpetual danger unless there is a continuous education in thoughtfulness. Sane living requires reason as well as sentiment. Creeds and ideals are symbols which call out certain emotional and volitional responses in the way of loyalty and sacrifice. We must use the emotional appeal for the most part in the earlier years before the meaning of institutions can be significant to thought. Primitive education, we have seen, gave a large place to the sacramental aspect. Nor did Greek and Roman education neglect the significance of the mysteries in impressing the most solemn lessons on youth.

Early Christian education and its medieval successor realized the importance of the emotional aspect, and education was still a religious sacrament. In some way our modern secular education must retain this appeal to the emotions, if it is to inspire that loyalty which is essential to make human institutions meaningful and permanent. Somehow there must be inspired the unselfish devotion to a cause if youth is to develop its inherent resources; and the oldest instrument is the priesthood of education. Other priesthoods come and go, but the priesthood of education is eternal. In some way education must take advantage of the tides in the development of life and consecrate them to the great social cause. In some way the expansive life of the individual, with its inevitable sense of mystery, must be given objective symbolism and content. To this end it is not sufficient to have some formal exercises for the outgoing class, however appropriate those may be; but commencement should be a solemn initiation into a new stage of development, a new epoch in the unfolding life of the individual; and our educational system should be so articulated as to make such initiations effective. There ought to be some such initiation for the gang period of boyhood with appropriate organization of the boys' life to make it significant, there should also be initiation into the expanding life of adolescence, and finally a solemn initiation into participation in the active duties of adult life. What strikes one, on the whole, about modern education, is its routine character, its lack of poetry and emotional appeal. Some of the European countries have seized upon the educative process to impress nationalism as a religion and a sacred cause and have organized children and youth into age groups for military discipline. But if the world is to be made safe for democracy the initiation into life must have a larger social and religious significance.

That there exists, in the stages of development of human beings, the basis for natural age groups has been felt instinctively by humanity since the most primitive times. Many

primitive peoples have consciously organized these epochs into societies—each with its unique activities and standards of control—and have thus succeeded in making their life altogether more effective. With the break up of the clan system, on the one hand, and the establishing of the patriarchal family, on the other, the social system of age groups disappeared in the more advanced cultures. But human nature has not fundamentally changed; and the needs and affinities which characterize epochs of development remain the same. With the disintegration of the home as an efficient center of nurture and control, under modern conditions, a new crisis confronts society. It is clear that the community must supply, for its own safety and good, the lack of the home. This must be done largely through the organized educational system, but it certainly can not be done by the present artificial institution. Society now, as in primitive times, must take into account the whole development of the life of the child and under vastly more complex conditions. In doing so, we can learn from the primitive collectivistic experiments of humanity, however much the symbolism and content of education and the nature of control must change. But if a nation like ours can change its habits so as to provide for the effective training of armies of millions in wartime, it should also be able to handle effectively the problem of the peaceful training of its millions of children and youth and thus be ready for peace as well as war.

The determining of the proper age periods and the proper cult for such periods will require long investigation and social experimentation. Interesting experiments are being carried out in furnishing suitable imaginative content as well as providing proper cooperative activity in dances and pantomimes for early childhood. In fact, this may be regarded as our most successful age experiment. What a rich heritage is available here from the ages. Indian life with its customs and folk-lore has an appeal to American boyhood and girlhood. What an opportunity is here, if intelligently

used, to impress a stage of civilization, with the romance of our own local background. The sturdy life of our northern ancestors, as expressed in the Icelandic Sagas, would at a later stage furnish a valuable introduction to our own spiritual history, the heritage of our ancient blood. The period of chivalry, with the song of Roland and the legends of King Arthur's court, is as germane to a certain stage in the human spirit as it is a valuable preparation for the true knighthood of today. And may we not hope to develop geniuses who will translate the history and ideals of American life into epic and drama, as the great Greek poets gave immortal expression to Greek history and ideals for the education as well as entertainment of their people? The life of the early American pioneers with their heroes would furnish a dramatic setting as valuable as history, as it would be a fitting introduction to the civic life and spirit of America. The life of the revolutionary times with George Washington as the matchless hero would be as picturesque as it would be instructive for learning the sacrifices which were the price of our democracy, and for inspiring devotion to its principles. The tragic setting of Abraham Lincoln and the inspiration of his already apotheosized life would furnish a deeper insight into the meaning of American unity and American ideals. And the ideal of an international organization with its ethics and literary expression would furnish an appropriate climax for an education which should fit us for a brotherhood of nations. This series of spiritual stages should be selective in such a way as to inspire first unconsciously and gradually more consciously the ideals of the highest life in society, with the control and thoughtfulness necessary for our complex age. But throughout there must be provided not merely intellectual content, but appropriate organization and appropriate activities of the various age groups with such initiatory sacraments as would make each special stage of development with its ideals impressive.

I can hear murmurings even now against taking any

time or effort for such organization and initiation as is suggested here. It will be objected that the schedule is already overcrowded. No doubt it seems so. But perhaps there is useless material that could be eliminated with profit—material taught out of season and material that holds its place from mere tradition. Then there are common assemblies that could be made significant instead of perfunctory, if there were in the minds of the leaders some conscious group ideal. There are holidays which are now given over to aimless and often mischievous idleness, but which might be used in wholesome and enjoyable, as well as informing, group activities. And what about the long vacations when the youthful mind is allowed to run to weeds?

Interesting, though casual, experiments are now being carried out to utilize the long summer vacation, not in stuffy rooms but in God's out-of-doors, in well-organized camps where community life and group responsibility can be emphasized in a more normal habitat, apart from the artificiality of the city. Here appropriate conditions can be provided for the distinctive needs of the sexes and of the age preiods of life with proper initiation into life's obligations. Here activities can be carried on which recapitulate the past,—its occupations, its significant festivals of Demeter, of Bacchus, of Aphrodite without the vices of the past but with the mysterious significance which they inspired. Here can be learned the mastery of life—gardening, boating, swimming, games of skill, the care of the body, moral control and chivalry. Here nature study can be taught in the concrete;[1] and orderly collections of plants, insects, minerals be encouraged. Here loyalty and reverence can be impressed through appropriate ceremonies and symbols, with the pupils as real participants. What a glorious means of preparation and initiation for peace and war the three

1. No one has set forth the possibilities of education in direct relation to nature more beautifully than Rabelais in his account of the education of Gargantua.

summer months can be, all with the enjoyment and enthusiasm of an outing, under teachers themselves trained for a life of all around living and companionship. Why should an educational system leave such opportunities to sporadic efforts, however noble they may be? Why not incorporate such an ideal into the organized system of national life? Such experiments as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts have attempted to unite spontaneity with discipline and have thereby ministered to the dawning instincts of youth in a way that has been, on the whole, as profitable as it has been enjoyable.

I realize the danger in trying to recapitulate the mystical element in the education of the race. For primitive man initiation was initiation into reality. It was an initiation into the whole culture of primitive man and the drama was its culmination. What we call mythology was at one time man's philosophy of nature and was bound up with the stern secular pursuits to live, and was checked by these. It is dangerous to bring up a child merely on myths without the background of reality in which these grew up; we must provide the setting which is appropriate to our epoch of life. If we imitate the external life of the Indian and something of his ritual, we must remember that the culture of the Indian was reality for him. It was not a sentimental experiment in out-of-door life. We must endeavor to grasp the significance of our own life and make it part of the life of childhood and youth. We have been too superficial in imitating other cultures and therefore failed in making the transition to mature responsibility which the Indian learned. Nevertheless, we should learn from the long ages of experience which have been embodied in what we call primitive culture, but which is really the foundation of our own culture. Biologically, man changes slowly and the epochs of development which primitive man discovered and tried to make impressive and effective in his education are still part of life and require proper adjustment, though in our abstract education we have ignored them. We should re-

member that our civilization is only of yesterday in the history of the race and it is a conspicuous failure in human adjustment. We should take advantage of the plastic period of life to develop not only the proper moral sentiments but also to develop the proper tastes, not only in personal habits, but in literature, art and music. This should be done first of all in the family, as it was and still is done in the fine old families of England. But with us this development is becoming more and more dependent upon the school. We must try to make our educational system adequate.

Education as Creative Participation

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the educative process is a life, covering the most significant years of human development and to miss the meaning and joy of these years is to miss irreparably a great part of life. No stage of life should be treated as a mere means of a later stage, any more than any individual should be treated as a mere means of life of another individual. If the latter conduct is immoral, so is the former. Each stage has its own claims, is entitled to its own joy of living in realizing its own unique capacities. To many human beings there is no later stage, and they would be cheated out of all. Those who live are better prepared for a later stage for having lived normally the preceding stage. The old theory of discipline seemed to imply that the more disagreeable an education, the more a misfit to human nature, the better preparation it was for the future,—on the same ground that it was believed that the more miserable a man is in this world the happier he will be in the next. It is true, of course, that education must mean discipline; and it must be owned that education today is lamentably weak on that side. It must mean control of the impulsive and immediate for the remote. It has its tough side. But this need not prevent it from having a sense of reality and significance for the present. It is wonderful how hard pupils will work and how much

discipline they will submit to when they do something that appeals to them, and has reality for them. Witness the voluntary discipline of the football field and how much time and labor youth devotes voluntarily to dramatics. Education is not merely preparation for participation in a common life, it *is* the participation in a common life; and while this life in institutional relations is necessarily more artificial and apart, it should be a sort of miniature of the larger life, a microcosm furnishing such training in the typical human relations as to teach men to live together and cooperate for common ends. Education, in other words, is more than a discipline; it is or should be a community, with community responsibility and community joy.

We are getting away from the patriarchal idea of education and are at least becoming conscious of the community ideal. Experiments of organizing young children into groups, with suitable activities, have borne marvelous fruits, intellectually and morally. It is in fact in the nursery schools[2] and in the kindergartens that the most successful experiments are carried on in education as group participation. Here children learn the importance of cooperation in playing the game and the punishment, which no child can long endure, is exclusion from the game. At every stage, the ideal of the educational community should be the ideal of friendship. This was the ideal which was emphasized by Socrates in his relations to the Greek youth and which gave his life such momentous significance for them. And the great teacher of Galilee found the fulfilment of his life in being able to say to his disciples: "I call you no longer servants but friends." It is in such relations that a true preparation for democracy must lie. The old saying that the ideal college would be Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other is true in so far as it emphasizes personal relations as the reality of college life. But a college is not a college without the

2. *Nursery Education*, W. E. Blatz, D. Millichamp, M. Fletcher, 1935, pp. 239-248.

community life of the students. It is indeed by participating in such a life that the real discipline is gained for the larger life of democracy. The discipline for life can only be gained by living; and institutions must be so organized that their opportunities are adequate to meet the full demands of life. Our past education has been entirely too abstract. It has emphasized knowledge, but forgotten that man is more than a memory reel or a logic machine and that education must make real and form the whole life of personal relations. When we grasp the full significance of the truth that the school is a miniature life and that only as this life is sound and adequate can the new generation enter into the responsibility of maturity, it will mean a more radical revolution in our educational system than has yet taken place. So far our development has been mostly haphazard, the students through their instinctive demands leading the way towards larger collective expression while faculties have reluctantly followed, as in athletics for example, and eventually given their official stamp of approval. What is needed is conscious, systematic effort to minister to the whole life of the individual during his impressionable years and to prepare him for later life by enabling him to live fully and joyfully the life that is properly his. This does not mean a mere yielding to the chance whims of the student, but such organization of the school as will rouse the deepest instincts of youth for active, loyal and conscious participation in the life of society.

Judged by the test of a miniature life, as furnishing proper stimuli to development and preparing for the typical activities of the future, our present school system is on the whole mechanical, wooden and inadequate. On the whole, little attention is paid to the concrete life of the pupils. In this they must minister to themselves; and what strikes one in surveying the present school life is its triviality and aimless restlessness. It fails lamentably in developing those standards of honor and team-work which are so indispensable to democracy. The teacher follows the intellectualistic

routine and has little time (even if he is sympathetic) for the pupils' efforts at group expression. The activities which are undertaken by the pupils are onesided and in no way adequate to the sympathetic understanding of the life process of the past or to meet the complex relations of our modern life. In the case of such vital instincts as those which concern race continuity there is prurient modesty and false mystery which produce balked tendencies and threaten our morality at a most serious point. So far as the activities of citizenship are concerned, in which the youth is supposed to be ready to participate on leaving school, but little if any training is provided by the school through its community life. The general tendency of the school, with its overhead control and its lack of opportunity for responsible participation, would seem to be a preparation for despotism rather than democracy. Yet the youth is admonished that democracy is worth dying for.

The true teacher is the mediator between the living present with its problems and the great contributions of the past. The torch of truth can only be effectively handed on when one soul is lighted by the passion for truth in another soul throughout the procession of the centuries. Loyalty to the past and its traditions has always been an important aspect of education. The ten commandments of the Hebrews, the twelve tables of the Romans, were stamped upon the mind of each generation. But this loyalty to the past through the mediation of the true teacher never becomes mere slavish loyalty, mere bondage to a fixed tradition or to the culture of any one age. True transmission must be interpretation—an interpretation which makes it possible for the present generation to live itself into the past and to appreciate its mind, at the same time that it discriminates those tendencies which indicate the drift of history. It must separate the wheat from the chaff, the illusions from the reality, so far as our moment of interpretation makes such separation possible. While we must endeavor to appreciate the past in its own setting, we can rarely if

ever use it wholesale. We must reconstruct it in terms of our needs as a stage in our own historic development. It is the irony of history that the great creators of the past, the great prophets and seers, who in their own times reinterpreted the past in terms of the living present in so daring a way as to bring them under the charge and penalty of impiety, should be used by their successors as mechanical models, as authority for slavish routine. True loyalty, on the contrary, enjoins us to take up the task of the great pioneers, not as sectarians and slavish imitators, but in their spirit, with their zeal for the truth and for human improvement, and thus to carry on the work of creative interpretation. Thus shall we prove ourselves the true seed and the worthy heirs of the spiritual aristocracy of the past.

Such a creative participation in the spiritual heritage of the ages makes education indeed a voyage of discovery, a means of understanding present problems and a basis for new creativeness. The process of education must be fundamentally a creative process. The motto of life should be: Be ye creative as your Father in heaven is creative. The high priest of education must not be a mere slave of routine, a mere taskmaster to overburdened pupils, a mere wage earner looking forward to the next vacation. No person can be a true teacher who does not experience the joy of creation in his work, who is not continuously aiming at improvement, looking for better methods, fresher interpretations, and anxious for deeper creative relations with his youthful community. Every teacher therefore should be bent upon research, should be awake to new demands and new problems. His contributions to the world's stock of learning through such research may be insignificant, but his contribution to his own work, to his creativeness in his educational relations, is immeasurable. Only thus can he keep his youth and prevent himself from growing old and stereotyped. Only thus can he teach as one having authority, not as the Scribes and Pharisees.

But this spirit of creativeness must be communicated to the students as well. They must catch the inspiration of the creative life. They must be impressed with the truth that every individual must be productive, that there is no place in this world for the mere parasite and slacker. In some way every one must aim at improvement, whether it be to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before, or to discover new scientific principles or to create new beauty or to reconstruct institutions. All must strive to intensify and illumine human relations in some way, however humble; and we must all be humble in the presence of the infinity of the ideal. Each human individual should be inspired to strive for distinctiveness in his work, not for his own sake but that thus he may enrich the common human stock. Always there must be the inspiration to openmindedness and to tolerance of fresh interpretation. The heritage of the ages must run through individual human nature and be colored by it. The light of eternity must break against the prism of the character and genius of the individual in his epoch of history. Only so can life be enriched and progress. But this furnishes no serious antinomy between society and the individual so long as society takes the experimental attitude to its task, and so long as the individual realizes that his inventiveness must be of, through, and for the community.

Education for Democracy

It is a splendid thing to be willing in the hour of trial to die for democracy. But it is even more difficult in the common test of everyday life to live for democracy. And yet unless we learn the art of living for democracy, all the sacrifices of the men at the front will be in vain. Our armies and navies may make the world technically safe for democracy, but they can not create the spirit of democracy. And after all, what shall it profit us to conquer the enemies of democracy abroad, if we ourselves, have no change of heart, if the struggle for democracy at home still remains

to be fought out?

There is no royal road to democracy. It is customary in the time of crisis to have the country canvassed by spell-binders who can make the American Eagle scream. But democracy is not a matter of phrases. You can no more learn democracy than you can learn to play the piano by talk. Democracy must become a habit. It is an art as long as life. The excitement of the hour may make us soldiers in spirit. But only a long process of education can give us the sanity of citizenship. There is according to Plato a pattern laid up in heaven of the true state and true citizenship. But Plato also points out that it is only through long training that we become conscious of this pattern, and learn to approximate it. A revolution may produce a dictatorship, but it cannot in a day produce the spirit of free cooperation and loyalty to a common good which are the essence of democracy. A great war, we have found, is a test of the spirit of peoples, their coherency in a common purpose, even more than a test of military organization and equipment. If we are to stand the test of democracy of each for all and all for each, we must make sure that we possess the spirit of democracy, the devotion to a common good which is also the good of humanity.

The difficulty that meets us at the outset when we stop to examine the educational machinery which is to grind out democracy is that those who manipulate this machinery are themselves the products of the old individualistic system. If democracy can come only by example and practice, how can you expect an autocratic system to turn out products of democracy? Nowhere in our social organization is autocracy more firmly intrenched than in the process which has for its aim the training of democratic citizens.

It is a sociological law that the existence mores, that is, the customs which have to do directly with group maintenance are the ones first to change in the stress of readjustment. Hence the rapid changes in our economic and military customs. But since our educational and religious

customs are for the moment only indirectly involved, even though more important for a normal national ideal, they are less likely to be affected. Now it is certain that if the aristocratic view of life remains as the relatively permanent tissue of our social organism, any temporary flaming up of the passion for democracy in the stress of national peril will spend itself when the peril is over. That is what makes the great wars of liberation such disappointing affairs in human history. After the struggle, the reaction has set in, which is only another way of saying that the great permanent agencies of education and religion have been fundamentally unchanged and have continued to grind in the old way. The revolutionary excitement for freedom has died down to a mere ripple on the comparatively calm background of the intact mores. The men who fought to dethrone Napoleon were inspired as we are today with the idea of freedom. But after Waterloo came the reactionary Congress of Vienna; and reactionary institutions, presided over by old men who had been untouched by the spirit of the French Revolution, continued to grind in the old way. Well might an impartial observer like Goethe ask: "And what has then been attained or won?"

If we really love and believe in democracy, we must be willing to reorganize our life and institutions on a democratic basis, inconvenient though it may perhaps be to ourselves for the time being. Else our professions are mere hypocrisy. It is very fine for the older generation to be willing to "give" the younger generation as a vicarious sacrifice for freedom, but ought we not to do something to consolidate our devotion to democracy into our institutions at home so that the noble dead shall not have died in vain, but that future generations may realize the fruits of their victory? And where should we begin if not with the institution of education upon which all other institutions rest? Since there is no strongly organized union to contest power with those in charge, we must with Plato appeal to the benevolent despots and their sense of fair

play to reorganize educational administration on a cooperative basis. I know objections will be raised at once. Yes, you have tried it perhaps and it failed; or the teachers didn't want it; or you are sure it would fail if you did try it. The chances are that if you have tried cooperative administration at all, it has been of the duma type which the Czar of all the Russias granted to his subjects—an opportunity for a debating society without any real authority, the debating of course to be agreeable to the powers that be. I realize that you haven't the best material to start with. They have not had training in cooperation. But a start must be made sometime. If they are nondescript and lack initiative, the chances are that the system selected them for that reason, and has kept them in subjection accordingly. It is time that the type were changed, and that initiative and cooperation not only be encouraged but made a test for fitness. If you say that democracy is very well in other fields, but that it does not belong in education, I ask whether it is reasonable to suppose that a group of highly intelligent people dealing with a limited number of problems to which they devote their life should be incapable of deliberative government while a country of a hundred and thirty millions, comprising all kinds and conditions of men, should be capable of dealing with the vastly more complicated problems of our common political life. Would you like to live in a country governed as you govern your school? Are you sure that unlimited power has in your case conferred unlimited wisdom and that combined thought and deliberation might not give saner results? Let us be frank at any rate. If we are convinced that democracy is a failure and must be a failure, then let us welcome Hitler. He has made the most successful experiment in autocracy that the world has ever known. If you feel that the above criticism is too sweeping, and does not apply to you, then I say in the words of Hamlet:

> We that have free souls, it touches us not;
> Let the galled jade wince, our withers are unwrung.

But be sure that you are not mistaking mere acquiescence and time-serving for democracy. Of one thing I am certain, that until we have teachers who have in their own life the spirit of democracy, and are capable of cooperating in the performance of common tasks, we shall have only a continuation of the process of the blind leading the blind. We shall have no thorough-going democracy.

It has often been said that a war is a conflict of ideals rather than of peoples or races. But it is education that weaves ideals into the warp and woof of a people's life. We may say then that a war is a battle of systems of education, and it is our conduct of education which must decide whether there shall be future wars. The old English ideal of education was that of the cultured gentleman, the German ideal was that of efficiency. The English must learn that a gentleman must also be efficient. The Germans must learn that the efficient man must also be a gentleman. All of us must learn our true place in the economy of humanity, if the world is to be a real democracy. How can this be done? If false ideals can be stamped upon a people by education, so that they are willing to live by them and die for them, so can true ideals. How thoroughly the German autocracy has stamped its ideals upon the German people! If the German system of education in one short generation could create in them a willingness to sacrifice everything for the empty illusion of power, then with a similar thoroughness in the inculcation of true ideals it ought to be possible in one generation to prepare men for democratic citizenship. If the German system has domesticated men into slaves, we must devise a system of education that will produce freemen. The psychology of the German system has been sound; and we must profit by it, as we must fight its results to the end.

In the first place, we must not underestimate the emotional aspect of education. Germany has started with the school children. It has taught them to sing with the whole abandon of their young hearts such songs as "Deutschland

ueber Alles". It has utilized holidays and parades to impress upon the children the militaristic ideal. Thus the Germans, before they could think, have sung themselves into the illusions which enslave them. Even though they flee from their country and come over here for refuge, some still remain sentimentally loyal to "Deutschland ueber Alles," even if not to the extent of enlisting for Deutschland.

But by the same method which Germany has used to instil loyalty to autocracy can a people also instil loyalty to democracy. I seem to have a recollection of some one having said: "Let me write a people's songs, and whosoever will may write its laws." A splendid instance of the power of poetry is that of Norway. Under their great interpreter, Björnstjerne Björnson, the Norwegian people literally sang themselves into democracy. He became the embodiment of the very spirit of Norway. Many an illustration could be given of a people winning its battle for freedom through the power of poetry. Even in cases when they have succumbed to the unscrupulous strength of their rivals, they have still been able by their heritage of song to save their national soul (witness Finland and Poland).

We have as a nation thought too little of the power of song. That accounts, I suppose, for the dearth of available material. And what we have is of an inferior quality. "The Star-Spangled Banner," while it serves very well for a military band, is unsingable, and its content is local and accidental. It is in no sense an interpretation of the spirit of a great people. "My Country 'tis of Thee" has the merit of being singable, thanks to borrowing the magnificent tune of "God Save the King." But the poetry, while wholesome in sentiment, is commonplace, and lacks depth of interpretation. We need very much a national poet, who shall fire our imagination with the vision of real democracy. Who can say how much our national development has been retarded for the lack of such a poet. And what will our boys in the trenches sing? The Tommies (when they didn't sing Tip-

perary) tried to find comfort and strength in some eighteenth century hymns of Watts, such as "O God, Our Help in Ages Past," and "In the Cross of Christ I Glory," which have indeed a noble ring. But where are the hymns of the new democracy? Where is the Burns to sing the glory of the democratic virtues? Does not the lack make one suspicious that the substance is as foreign to us as the expression? Even the songs we do possess (and there are a great many more than we use) are not known by us. How many can sing even "America" or "The Star-Spangled Banner" from beginning to end? How many of us have not been humiliated when in some foreign country we have been asked to reproduce *our* national airs and have been able to recall only a few snatches? Why could we not use our public holidays for demonstrations of the spirit of democracy as Germany uses them for the spirit of militarism? Why not sing for democracy and march for democracy? Modern psychology has taught us that the emotion is the reflex effect of the expression. If we fail to provide opportunities for the expression of loyalty, do we not fail to cultivate the emotions? It is poor preparedness even for war to wait until the danger is upon us before we begin to rouse loyalty to democracy. When we are supposed to celebrate great holidays such as Thanksgiving, Washington's Birthday, Lincoln's Birthday, Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, we adjourn school for a vacation, and let it go at that. We don't use such days for cultivating the spirit and meaning of democracy. And what splendid occasions they might be made! Does any people have greater examples for the dramatic expression of a true national spirit than we have? Our students, in spite of the authorities, invented athletics with the opportunities for emotional expression which they furnish. They have thus satisfied their instinctive craving for the expression of school loyalty and solidarity. What are we going to do to furnish these larger occasions of loyalty? There can be no doubt that our general lack of preparedness, materially and spiritually, for the present world crisis

goes back largely to the public school.

But emotional expression is not sufficient. Germany has recognized this by following up emotional enthusiasm with strenuous military drill. In like manner the spirit of democracy must not merely get into our blood through our emotions, it must be engrained into our nervous systems as habit. Now what opportunity does our autocratic school system furnish our youth for the practice of democracy? If the Germans have excelled in organization, it is because they have begun the practise early. They have not waited until the nervous system is crystallized. It is far more difficult to stimulate the initiative and thoughtfulness of democratic life than it is to produce respect and subservience to an autocratic system. But it must be done if we are to have genuine democracy. When shall we begin to train our citizens to self-government, the discipline for which is so woefully lacking now?

It is too late to begin after our young people reach the college age, if we are to get effective results. If they have grown accustomed to having everything settled for them by external authority, if they have had no opportunity to cultivate the sense of collective responsibility up till then, they will never do so very thoroughly after that. We must meet nature half way. There is a tide in the instinctive development of a human being which if taken at its height leads on to democratic cooperation, but if neglected, it can not be brought back. That is the period of the gang spirit in the child's history. This gang spirit, the outcropping of the tribal instinct of man, has been the cause of enormous annoyance to a stupid society which has forced the boys to satisfy the instinct in surreptitious ways. But Jane Addams and others have shown that this same gang spirit, which so often has led to mischievous social results in the street gang, can be harnessed to the best ideals of society and become loyalty of the finest kind when properly guided. In the Henry George Jr. Republic, we have an isolated case of what can be accomplished by the principles of democracy

when applied to neglected boys. Why should we not embody such training in democracy into our public-school system and thus systematically harness the gang spirit to democratic ideals? I feel certain that only thus can we lay the foundations of real democracy. You say: "Oh, it is too much bother." Yes, autocracy is a simpler system than democracy. But if we want to have democracy, we shall have to pay the price. What we need is to try the experiment of democracy generally and seriously in our national life. Like Christianity, of which it is the practical outcome and essence, we can not say whether democracy is really going to work until we have tried it. And then we shall indeed have the inspiration of fighting for democracy when needs be. If democracy means team-work, then it seems reasonable that the educative process should prepare for such team-work.

In addition to remodeling our system of control, it is necessary also to change our methods of teaching so as to produce the moral qualities necessary for democratic citizenship. The routine of work should itself be such as to produce the qualities of honesty, dependability, initiative and loyalty to a task. Our present system is ill adapted to produce such results. Our elective system with its term courses makes it possible to shift from one subject to another along the line of least resistance. It may not be desirable to go back to the old system of final examinations, covering the entire course of study, a system which is still in force in the European Gymnasium, but at any rate some definite group system should be enforced both in high school and college. A definite reckoning should then take place over the courses comprised in the major system of the selected group, insuring some degree of responsibility at least in that part of the work. Our present loose system fails to inculcate a consciousness of moral causality, such as that produced by the old classical course, or such as a technical course like engineering involves. We should be careful also not to make the work merely imitative, but to culti-

vate some initiative and individuality in the student. There can be no doubt that our present procedure is irresponsible and parrot like.[3]

Education must furnish not only the proper discipline for democracy, it must also furnish the right content for democracy. Here again we can learn from Germany. For a generation, German autocracy has used every content subject of the curriculum to impress upon the youth its ideals of power and expansion. The student has become imbued with the superiority of German culture and its right to dominate the world. Everything has been done to glorify the militaristic ideal as the noblest aim of a nation. Here again the psychology has been as sound as the results have been pernicious. If we believe in democracy and fair play as the true ideals for individuals and nations alike, we must teach the various subjects from that point of view. We must so teach history as to expose the false ideals of the past and to emphasize true ideals for the future. We are, indeed, a chosen people with unique opportunities, but our mission is the open door, frank and above-board diplomacy, the desire to settle disputes through impartial adjudication, and to abide by the result whether it seems to be for us or against us. Towards weaker nations, our attitude should be that of generosity and helpfulness, exercising patience under provocation, and lending a hand, as we may be able, to get them on their feet. As between all nations, our attitude should be that of maintaining sacred compacts and a square deal. In short, we should work towards those ideals as between nations which conscience and custom tell us are valid between individuals of the same nation. To this end, we should cooperate with other fair-minded nations towards establishing binding rules of international justice. For such ideals we should be prepared to fight to the very end. Such an attitude is not pacifism, but affirms that justice and fair play are the

3. See in this connection a paper by the author entitled, "American Education and Democracy," in the *Educational Review*, October, 1915.

only things worth fighting for, and that a nation which plays the bully is just as contemptible as an individual who attempts to do so. The boy's heroes should be such representatives of democracy as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln—men who devoted themselves heart and soul to the public good—not the free-booters of history, however brilliant they may have been. The biographies and great utterances of Washington and Lincoln should be engraved in the very hearts of our youth. The events emphasized should be those which have tended to the emancipation and uplift of human beings, and the worthiest motive of a human being should be shown to be the working for the common good. In general, history should be so taught as to give a true perspective of the past in order to prepare for sane conduct in the future. And those who believe that wealth or power or anything else short of the general welfare is the chief thing to work for should be treated as enemies of mankind and unfit to be the guardians of youth.

The same spirit should pervade other subjects. Literature should be so taught as to inspire true social ideals. Such literature or art as makes vice attractive or which emphasizes false distinctions among men should be barred from the curriculum. On the contrary, such literature should be selected as emphasizes social justice, honor and kindness. Economics should be so taught as to make it axiomatic that every man should be productive in some way, material or spiritual, and that the man who wilfully lives a life of idleness is a parasite on society, and has no right to be. Economics, too, should show men the possibilities and advantages of cooperation and the need of such social control as will ensure the highest welfare to all concerned. Civics should show the meaning of our common life and make the youth familiar with its machinery and possibilities. It should brand as the worst kind of a slacker the individual who neglects his obligations as a citizen. Geography should be so taught as to enable the youth

to appreciate the mosaic of nations and to understand their reciprocal needs and claims. Science should teach us that mastery of ourselves and the forces of nature which shall enable us, not to destroy our fellowmen, but to produce a more efficient, saner, and happier humanity. In short, the educative process should so exhibit its material as to show the moral baseness of exploitation and oppression, whether as between individuals or between nations, and the beauty of wholesome and creative cooperation. Ethics should not be postponed to the senior year in college, but every content subject, as well as the common life of the school, should be the means of inculcating sound ethical ideals—not the negative ethics which holds people to be good because of what they refrain from doing, but a positive ethics which emphasizes that goodness means wholesome and helpful living together.

A true education must be first and last the discovery of the true philosophy, the true meaning of life, personal and group life. It must inculcate, in the words of J. S. MacKenzie, "not the will to power, but the will to the good," the will to justice and usefulness and kindness. It must show that there can be no true loyalty to one's nation which is not also loyalty to humanity. It must impress upon us that the things most worth while are the common prosperity and the common happiness, and that the real hero, the one who deserves the eternal praise and gratitude of men, is he who devotes his creative genius and energies to the enriching of the common life. If the German youth have been willing and eager to undergo a life of discipline and sacrifice to promote the illusion of Pangermany, how much more should we be willing to bear and do for Panhumanity, for an ideal humanity—counting it riches to promote the general well-being, finding our soul in sacrificial cooperation with our fellows, realizing that the only thing that is eternal and worth striving for is the good life for all. Thus shall we make the pattern laid up in heaven incarnate upon earth. Thus shall we build the city of God.

Education as World Building

It will be seen now that the process of education in reconstructing the heritage of the past to meet the problems of the present means necessarily the creating of the future. Man builds wiser than he knows whenever he builds sincerely and honestly. Each generation that lives life loyally to its vocation projects its efficiency and appreciation into the larger life to come. Loyalty to humanity means loyalty to the future. It always involves a measure of vicarious sacrifice that the world-to-be may be a better world. This may call for the supreme sacrifice on the part of the individual in the clashing of world ideals. But there are always the insistent sacrifices of normal life—less dramatic and therefore more likely to be neglected. There is the elemental sacrifice involved in bringing into the world and nurturing the right kind of human stock, without which the promise of the future must fail. There is the self-discipline involved in meeting the increased demands for preparation for life's specialized vocations. There is the altruistic and often thankless public duty to the organized group life, for which all of us ought to feel responsible, if it is to be sound and effective. In short, youth must learn the sacrifice and patience which are the price of excellence whether in practical pursuits or in science and art. Whatever the call, the will to sacrifice for the right as God gives us to see the right must be inculcated into the very marrow of youth, if the integrity of the future as well as of our own life is to be preserved. It is because of such devotion on the part of the race in the ages past that society has developed to its present stage. The men of the stone age could little realize what their new inventions meant and what their sacrifices for the future implied, but their toil and faith during several hundred thousand years and the toil and faith of the generations which have followed—striving for improvement, living up to their best light, and meeting the future with fearless faith and ready

self-denial—have been the creators of the world as it is today. We are links in this long chain of history, living bricks in this unfinished temple of humanity, architects with them of an unknown future.

Are we doing our share in this creative process? Are we ourselves prepared for the great test that loyalty to our best sentiments may call for? Do we possess the willingness and the openmindedness to see new truth and the courage to help to make a new future? And are we inspiring the new generation with such ideals? There can be no doubt that before the recent world tragedy we had gotten into a state of moral flabbiness, that we were thinking too much of the dollar and too little of human life, that we were too smugly satisfied with our magnificent isolation, too prone to let the world run its own course if only we could live unmolested. Thank God that we are *beginning* to awake to our larger human responsibility as our brother's brother. We must learn to think in world terms instead of in merely local terms, in terms of humanity and not merely in terms of nationality, if we are going to meet the problem before us. This does not mean that the ancient and narrow loyalties are to be neglected, that we shall love our nook in the world less because we love the whole world more, that we shall be less loyal to our family and our country because of our newer and deeper sense of loyalty to humanity. On the contrary, the larger loyalty to humanity must be now as ever the building out of our more intensive loyalties—the extension of the family bond to the human family and of national loyalty to the brotherhood of nations. Only thus can the richness of life be preserved.

Are we preparing, through the educative process, for the greater unification of man, for a world of peace, a righteous peace and a tolerant peace "with malice toward none, with charity for all"? Our strength can not lie in mob hatred with its blind destructiveness. This can not prevail. It is next door to fear and panic. Rather must our strength lie in a sane and wholesome love of the right. Of this the

hatred of wrong is the other side of the shield. Are we molding our conduct and that of the new generation in such a way as to win the goodwill of the world by our helpfulness? Or shall we wave the red flag of selfish exploitation, forgetting that the spirit of democracy is the spirit of reciprocity? Our motto must be not merely "live and let live," but live and help live, whether as between individuals or nations. Are we imbuing the new generation with a sense of justice and kindness between man and man the world o'er? Upon the spirit of the educative process depend the outlook and conduct of the next generation which is trailing us so close. Are large ideals getting into its blood? To be wooden in a world of continuous readjustment is criminal. To miss the meaning of life is the supreme tragedy.

Always there is the new frontier of history, the new problems, the new ground to be won, the greater humanity to be created. Always there is the need of the pathfinder to blaze the way. Or to use another figure, so full of tragic memory for us today, there is always the need for brave, well-trained, forward-looking men to advance the front line trenches of progress into the no man's land of ignorance and chaos. They must battle with the selfishness and blindness of men as well as with the reluctant forces of their environment to shape a new and diviner destiny. Always there is the partly conscious, partly unconscious call of the future in the human heart, the call of the whole, the love of the good. The heroic souls, the prophets of the race, hear the call and advance, nothing fearing in their vicarious sacrifice for the cause. The rest, of less heroic mold or shorter vision, must follow and consolidate their gains into human institutions, the temporary habitat of the spirit. What humanity shall be five hundred thousand years from now we can not know; but if we work in creative faith, with loyalty to what is best, we have a right to believe that it will then be at least as far ahead of us as we are of the Java man.

CHAPTER XIII

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS[1]

A SURVEY

Sometimes it is well to pause for a moment to peer into "the abysm of time" in order to attain a perspective of life. Is there any plot in the manifold and shifting events of history? Or is it "the tale of an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." If there appears to be any plot in the past, can we make any prediction for the future and so regulate our lives?

It has been said that the idea of progress is a modern idea. But even if that is true, that fact is not necessarily against it, for many ideas are modern. The ancient Greeks were so busy making progress that they had little time to reflect upon it. It was not until Lucretius in the first century, B. C., that the word progress was used. But that does not mean that the great creative period was not conscious of progress. It is hardly fair to say, as Spengler does, that the Greeks had no feeling for time and history. He thinks of the plastic arts and geometry as typical of the Greeks. But the Egyptians, we know now, probably attained as great an excellence in the plastic arts as the Greeks. It is as creators of the drama that the Greeks stand out in artistic achievement, and the time plot is of the very essence of the drama. It is true that they created Euclidean geometry, but they also created the conception of world cycles. And it was the Greeks who created the art of writing history. The evolution of the writing of history is itself a fascinating story. It has as its background the great epics in which the struggle of civilization is depicted against a past where the supernatural and the

1. This essay, including chapters XIII and XIV, was read in part as the Sir John Adams Lecture at the University of California at Los Angeles, 1935.

human merge. It becomes gradually secularized in writers like Hecataeus and Herodotus, though with an aura of a supernatural past. It reaches its full consciousness in such masters as Thucydides and Polybius. The ancients did not conceive of infinite progress. They were realists, not romanticists. We may say that on the whole they conceived progress in reverse. They were interested mostly in decadence. We must remember too that the span of time which they could survey was very limited compared to ours. The horizon of history soon faded into the dim haze of myth. We may smile when Aristotle speaks of the early Greek Philosophers as the ancients, yet he certainly recognized history and development in thought.[2] The Greeks, moreover, were haunted by the legend of a great civilization which had preceded theirs—the great Cretan civilization of which modern archeology has revealed a wealth that was unknown to them. They looked with awe upon the monuments of the old civilization of Egypt and were impressed with a glory that had passed. This made them modest in their claims.

But the myth of Prometheus stealing fire from heaven and bringing the arts to man shows that they were conscious of man's having transformed his world. And Plato in the *Protagoras* points out that contemporary civilization at its worst was vastly superior to that of the cannibals, who had been on exhibition in Athens. Lucretius and Seneca, looking backwards at past achievements, could prophesy great extensions of knowledge in the future. But they had no idea of infinite progress. Science, except medicine, did little to alter the course of life in ancient times, though Empedocles in the fifth century B. C. foretells in a grandiose way how science will change the climate and even bring the dead back to life. In the third century B. C. Archimedes, one of the greatest scientific geniuses of all time, not only laid new and permanent found-

2. When Aristotle looked at civilization in the large he saw reason to believe that civilization had been built up and destroyed several times.

ations for experimental science, but also showed how it could be applied; and the modern era might have been anticipated by him and his academy, had they not been slaughtered by Roman barbarians. The Romans had no genius for science. We must not forget, however, that the Romans, when they discovered their own genius, had the magnificient dream, which they did in large part realize, of reducing the chaotic human world to one system of law and government, a universal state.

In St. Augustine we have an attempt at a universal philosophy of history. He thinks of the whole of history with its seven ages, in the sixth age of which we live, as a great poem, in which creation, the fall of man and his story of sin and redemption are finally to culminate in the complete victory of good over evil, the seventh age. In the *City of God*, St. Augustine interprets history as the perennial conflict between the Church (*Civitas Dei*) and the worldly state (*Civitas Diaboli*). But he wrote during the breakdown of the Roman Empire. As the Church gained ascendency in the Middle Ages, the state was incorporated in its conception of Providence, at any rate as instrumental. The idea of the early church and even of St. Augustine that the end of the world, with the final climax, was at hand, gave place to a longer view. St. Paul had said that Christianity brought hope into the world, and we may say that the Christian interpretation emphasized the future as giving meaning to the present and past. In the words of Bury: "The Christian construction marks an important stage: for the historical process was for the first time definitely conceived as including past and future in a totality which must have meaning."[3] But the Medieval Church was concerned with the salvation of the soul for another existence more than with progress upon the earth.

The revival of learning in the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance looked back to classical models rather than to progress in the future. While Machiavelli believes

3. J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, 1909, p. 240.

that it is essential for the state that a good constitution be created and enforced, he takes as his model Republican Rome. On the whole, he thought his own age fell short of the Greeks in science and philosophy and of Republican Rome in jurisprudence, and suspected that the human brain had deteriorated. Bodin took a distinct step forward in rejecting the medieval doctrine of the degeneration of human nature. He saw the importance of the human will in history; and since the human will is changing, laws, customs and institutions must change. Looking at the past, he thought that there had been oscillations but a gradual ascent. He is concerned primarily with knowledge and invention. In the sixteenth century he could point to the mariner's compass, printing and gunpowder as evidences of progress. In the spirit of the Roman Stoics and the Holy Roman Empire, he speaks of the world as a universal state, but does not indicate how it might evolve into such a state. He suggests a philosophy of history, looking backward. He divides history into three periods: "the first, of about two thousand years in which the Southeastern peoples were predominant; the second, of the same duration in which those peoples whom he calls the Middle (Mediterranean) peoples came to the front; the third, in which the Northern nations who overthrew Rome became the leaders in civilization. Each period is stamped by the psychological character of the three racial groups. The note of the first is religion, of the second practical sagacity, of the third warfare and inventive skill."[4] But Bodin ventures no forecast of the future.

Francis Bacon, like his medieval predecessor, Roger Bacon, shows great enthusiasm for the progress of scientific method, and pictures great applications which will redound to human welfare. But he did not think in terms of infinite progress. Cartesianism may be said to have prepared the ground for the idea of progress, though this was not Descartes' concern. It emphasized the supremacy

4. *The Idea of Progress*, J. B. Bury, p. 38.

of reason as opposed to authority, and immutable laws of nature as opposed to an active interfering Providence. As Bury remarks, "it was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of progress was to replace."[5] It is a notable fact that the materialists of the eighteenth century were just as enthusiastic for the idea of progress as the deists. Both were alike impressed with the universal benevolence of the order of nature.

The idea of indefinite progress, of infinite perfectibility, was born in the climate of the eighteenth century, with its supreme confidence in reason and its faith in the omnipotence of government to right all human wrongs. Leibniz has no doubt that this is the best of all possible worlds and will develop continuously toward perfection throughout infinite time. Fontenelle conceives progress as necessary and certain. Man passes through the ages of infancy, youth and maturity, but there is no old age. This, he thinks, would be contrary to the permanence of natural forces. While the emphasis in the eighteenth century is on the triumph of reason, the Abbé de Saint Pierre and his successors in the later eighteenth century enlarge the conception of intellectual progress to include general human progress. The Abbé suggests a scheme for abolishing war. He invents the idea of a "brain trust," a Political Academy, as adviser to the government on all questions of public welfare. He does not doubt that government is able to bestow happiness on human beings.

The thinkers of the period leading up to the French Revolution "were urged by the dream of a humanity regenerated by reason."[6] Rousseau was indeed sceptical of civilization as it existed and attributed to it the corruption of man, but it was under the romantic spell of reason that he proposed a utopia of a free democracy and became the greatest philosophic influence for the Revolution. The declaration of rights by the American colonies was based upon reason

5. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

and their success in establishing political democracy seemed to the leaders of the Revolution the beginning of a new order of liberty, fraternity and equality. It was the faith of the promoters, both of the American and of the French Revolution, that political democracy would bring utopia. It was an age of reason and natural rights, dictated by reason. Condorcet, under the shadow of the guillotine, insists on "the indissoluble union between intellectual progress and that of liberty, virtue and the respect for natural rights."[7] Let science destroy the prejudices of the past and man will become free. Equality of men, equality of the sexes and equality of nations will follow as a matter of course. The masses will no longer be exploited by the few.

The impetus of the idea of progress survived the Revolution and dominated the nineteenth century with no less faith if less enthusiasm. With the acceleration of science and invention, progress was also felt to be accelerated. Romanticists looked for the eternal idea, behind phenomena, which gives meaning to history. And soberer thinkers tried to discover a law of progress. Saint Simon conceived history as an alternation of epochs of organization or construction and epochs of criticism or revolution, tending on the whole toward a goal of social happiness. Comte thinks history can be explained in terms of three stages—the theological, the metaphysical and the positivistic (that is, his own philosophy) which is for him the climax of progress.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the theory of evolution seemed to establish the idea of universal progress as a scientific fact. At the end of his epoch-making work, *The Origin of Species*, Darwin says: "As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a

7. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection." Herbert Spencer, with his faith in the inheritance of acquired characters, looks forward with even greater enthusiasm. In his *Social Statics* we are told: "Always toward perfection is the mighty movement—toward a complete development and a more unmixed good, subordinating in its universality all petty irregularities and fallings back, as the curvature of the earth subordinates mountains and valleys. Even in evils the student learns to recognize only a struggling beneficence. But above all, he is struck with the inherent sufficingness of things." Such optimism palls on us in this age of disillusionment. Whether acquired characters are inherited is still a subject for debate. But *knowing human* generations as we do, we cannot see any ground for optimism in such a theory. We may well be thankful that nature has taken such great care in guarding the children from the sins of their fathers.

The feeling in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was in general that progress is rectilinear, that nature and humanity move toward one grand event, though of course the ideal was relative to the point of view of the interpreter. But others have interpreted history as a series of cycles. Some have considered these cycles as oscillations, others, like Campanella and Goethe, have thought of them as having cumulative significance, constituting a spiral ascent. Such distinguished writers as Inge and Bury assert that the Greeks thought of history as cycles. But this interpretation needs to be scrutinized. They quote the myth of creation in Plato's *Statesman* as evidence. Inge and Bury take the myth more seriously than Plato. Plato's Stranger introduces the "famous tale" as "a little amusement." It is "a tale which a child would love to hear." In this myth, Plato speaks of three epochs: first, the golden age of Cronos, when God, like a shepherd, exercised providential care over everything; then the age when God let go, with

the reversal of history and the consequent danger of return to chaos; and, finally, the age of Zeus when God had pity upon the world and restored order. God now "made the world imperishable and immortal." There can, therefore, be no "reflux." Plato's conception of the world is not cyclical. The third age is that in which we live and therefore the only age which has historical significance. In this age, man, having been properly endowed, is left to work out his own salvation. Plato does not suggest cycles in human history. Plato finds his "marvelous lump of fable" rather embarrassing since only the first part is relevant. He wanted an allegory of a divine king who should serve as a model to earthly rulers.

I do not deny that the Greeks evolved the conception of cycles. Empedocles pictures the world as a rhythm with the alternate dominance of love and hate—from harmony to dispersion and back again. The early Greek Stoics thought of the world as a series of cycles of expansion and contraction. In each cycle the universe repeats itself in detail, so that what we are doing now we have done innumerable times in previous cycles. We have no memory of such repetition. If we had memory, we should not have mere repetition. The later Greek Stoics seem to have abandoned the idea of cosmic cycles, but Roman Stoics, such as Seneca and Epictetus, revived the idea. Such speculations, however, had no marked influence on the writers of history. Polybius, the great Greek historian of the second century B.C. (c. 198-117 B.C.), has nothing to say of cosmic cycles, but he was interested in the cycles of political constitutions.[8] He accepted the tradition, which had been handed down by Plato and Aristotle, of great cataclysms which had destroyed civilization and which made it necessary to begin political life anew. Plato had given a logical analysis of the degeneration of constitutions. The ideal constitution for Plato is that of the philosopher king. This constitution might degenerate into aristocracy, the rule by

8. *The Histories of Polybius*, Bk. VI (Trans., E. S. Shuckburg, 1889).

the best families, this again into oligarchy, the rule by the wealthy families; this, by its oppressiveness, might result in the revolt of the masses and a democratic regime, and this by internal conflict might degenerate into the rule by the strong man, the tyrant. For Plato apparently this stage is the end.

Polybius tried to give an account of historical political evolution. He pictured human beings as living at first in herds like some animals, but with more intelligence. In the herd there would emerge the strong man, the despot, who by force would subjugate others. If by experience he learned to adjust himself to others and to take the side of justice, the people would voluntarily obey him as their king. He might even be elected. If, however, his descendants degenerated and became tyrants, using others at their pleasure, the aristocrats would arise and dethrone them. The aristocrats, in turn, would degenerate into an oligarchy and the oligarchy would become more self-seeking and corrupt until the people would rise and "take upon themselves the superintendence and charge of the state." They would at first "hold equality and freedom as of the utmost value." But the first integrity would weaken in the course of generations. Some would seek to become more powerful, especially the wealthy. These would corrupt the populace with bribes and benefactions, until they succeeded in undermining "the virtue of democracy." Constitutional democracy would gradually degenerate into mob rule and civil war would result, until civilization should be destroyed, and then the strong man would return and the cycle would begin again. Polybius had the advantage of the long perspective of Roman history, beside his intimate knowledge of Greek politics. He believed in the free agency of human beings and, therefore, did not think that political revolution is inevitable. He thought that by the combination of constitutions, such as kingship, aristocracy and democracy, with division and balance of powers, the tendency to degeneration might be averted and indefinite continuity of gov-

ernment might be possible. He used as illustration the government of Sparta and the government of Rome in the second century.[9] Men's efforts and failures are the efficient causes in history. While he admits that Fortuna plays a part he is careful to interpret crises in terms of human actions. Polybius calls his conception of history "pragmatic history." We can learn either from our own experience of trial and suffering or from the experience of other peoples. The latter method is more economical. If we were wise, we could learn from the errors of others and thus avert the disasters that have come to them. But the outbreak of civil conflict in Rome toward the end of his life convinced him that Rome too was doomed to decay, in spite of its almost miraculous success (which Polybius set himself to interpret) in establishing a world state in less than fifty-three years.

We have to come down to Machiavelli before we have the revival of the conception of cycles in human history. Human nature, according to Machiavelli, is always the same. But it goes through oscillations. Some societies advance toward prosperity while others decline. "Those which are on the upward grade will always reach a point beyond which they cannot rise further, but they will not remain permanently on this level, they will begin to decline; for human beings are always in motion and therefore must go up or down. Similarly, declining states will ultimately touch bottom and then begin to ascend. Thus a good constitution or social organization can last only for a short time."[10] We should study the past in order that we may be able to predict the future, for to the social events in our own period we can discover correspondence in ancient times. Human nature remains the same and therefore the effects must necessarily be the same. Louis Le Roy thinks that "things human pass through the same cycles—beginning, progress,

9. In the Roman government of Polybius' day the division of powers was amongst the Consuls, the Senate and the Tribunes.
10. J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

perfection, corruption, end."[11]

Vico, in the first half of the eighteenth century elaborates the first systematic theory of cycles in human history in his *Scienza Nuova* which does not seem to have exercised much influence until a century later, after it had been translated into French. It is only recently, however, that Vico's genius has been fully recognized. In order to get the full import of Vico's theory of "reflux," we must understand his doctrine of divine immanence. This is both a metaphysical doctrine and a theological doctrine with Vico. The metaphysical doctrine suggests some influence by his Neapolitan compatriot, Bruno, of the sixteenth century. Vico's metaphysical doctrine has been summed up by Croce: "Between God, who is rest, and matter which is motion, the intermediate place is taken by the metaphysical point, whose attribute is conation, the indefinite energy and attempt on the part of the universe to bring into being and sustain each particular thing. . . . Behind a grain of sand lies something which when this particle is divided gives to it and preserves in it an infinite extension and magnitude; so that the whole mass of the universe is included in the grain of sand, if not actually yet potentially and in capacity. This effort of the universe, underlying each smallest particle of matter, is neither the extension of the particle nor the extension of the universe; it is the thought of God, which, free from all materiality, gives motion and impulse to the whole. Every particular determination of reality agrees with this fundamental truth. Time is divisible, eternity indivisible, . . . body can be divided, mind cannot, possibility is at a single point, accidents are everywhere."[12]

The immanence of the divine thought in the universe becomes the immanence of Providence when we view it with reference to human history. The immanence of Providence is the rationale of order in nature and history. Providence works through history to realize the highest good.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
12. *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico,* Benedetto Croce, pp. 138, 139.

Man is free, but Providence can bring man's mistakes into line and so realize its eternal plan. But Providence realizes itself through human wills, according to Vico. Hence he can set himself to study the secondary causes. Having paid his respect to Providence, he can follow the methods of the historian. A great truth flashed on Vico as being proved by history: "That this world of nations is the work of man and its explanation therefore only to be found in the mind of man." He omits the cultures which claim supernatural revelations—the Hebrew and Christian—, and centers his attention on the Greek and Roman civilizations. He shows remarkable knowledge for his time of Roman history, especially of the development of Roman law. He shows, of course, the limitations of the knowledge of his age.

Since it is Vico's thesis that the explanation of history is to be found in the development of the mind of man, he defines the epochs or ages in this development in terms of the development of mind. He distinguishes three ages: the age of the gods when feeling dominates; the heroic age when imagination reaches its climax; and the age of men which is characterized by conceptual thought. He is aware of the fact that no sharp line can be drawn between these ages. That is especially true of the first age and the second. He holds that, from the beginning, historical development is determined "by certain principles, chief among which are the belief in Divine Providence, a sense of some tie between the sexes, and reverence for the dead springing from a hope of future life. They have given rise to the institutions of religion, to marriage rites and funeral ceremonies."[13] Vico made perhaps the first genuine effort to understand the primitive mind, though his resources were limited. He saw, or rather divined, the close relation between the development of mind and the development of language. The mind in the childhood of a culture does not deal in abstract ideas, for it does not have language for these. "Poetry is the primary form of the human mind,

13. *Vico*, Robert Flint, p. 217.

prior to intellect and free from reflection and reasoning."[14] He makes the pregnant suggestion that without poetry there can be no philosophy, though he seems to think that no philosopher can be a poet. Man in his childhood stage has a strong sense of the divine, though he conceives this only in visible things and forms, and mistakes his poetic conceptions for realities. The instinctive feeling of primitive man amounts to almost divine inspiration. Vico has great faith in the common sense of man. He believes that Providence instilled into the human mind from the beginning a sentiment of justice and goodness, of beauty and truth, which manifests itself differently at different times. But in this early stage man is rude, fierce and emotional. He is gifted with creative imagination, but it is as yet unregulated. For Vico, poetry and myth-making are the same thing at this stage. Language is concrete and metaphorical. And man's mental activity is characterized by sensation, instinct, imagination, not by reflection and inference.

What distinguishes this stage from the next—the heroic age—from a social point of view, is that men live in families. Vico has in mind the patriarchal family of the Greeks and Romans and this becomes for him the primary epoch in a people's life. The father is king and priest. Vico recognizes that this stage antedates authentic history in the Roman nation. When the Roman people are first known, they live in the second epoch, the heroic age. In this age, families have become consolidated into communities with their over-lords. A great part of the community has become reduced to slaves and dependents. The government is aristocratic. Sacerdotal justice takes the place of the feud. It is an age of formulae. There is a long series of struggles between the aristocratic over-lords and the governed, with increasing gains by the latter. Imagination, rather than thought, continues to be the characteristic mentality, but imagination becomes more controlled and expresses itself

14. Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

in great epics. Homer is the typical poet of this epoch. Heraldic emblems, which first were real language, like hieroglyphics, now become symbols. "Poetic wisdom" which is incipient in the first age continues to dominate but is more and more moulded by reflection and philosophy, until in the third stage, the age of men, it becomes "civic wisdom" or, as Vico also calls it, "occult wisdom," meaning a change from the sensory external view of things to an inner view of things.

In the third age, the mind has moulded language into instruments for concepts. Writing becomes alphabetical. Composition becomes natural and rational. "Manners are comparatively gentle and refined, civil and political equality are extended and natural right more honoured than mere legality. Justice is administered by tribunals. Governments are democracies or combinations of democracy and monarchy; myths fade away and are forgotten; religion is purified, and aims at diffusing morality, but tends also to extinction in scepticism, and to give place to philosophy."[15] There can be no doubt that Vico regards the age of men as the highest age and the culmination of the history of a nation.

The age of men develops within itself the seeds of decadence. Though there is civic equality, there is inequality of wealth with its consequent evils: luxury and corruption in the rich, envy and aggression in the poor. General discord and disorder are the outcome of this conflict. Having in mind the Roman empire, Vico thinks that Providence sometimes sends monarchy, some Caesar, to counteract these evils. But the beginning of the end is at hand and the disintegration leads to another barbarism, the Dark Ages. We have the beginning of a new cycle. Barbarism is followed by a new heroic age, the age of feudalism, of which Dante is the Homer. The feudal age in turn gives rise to the age of men, the civic age, the age of reason, in which Vico finds himself. He is rather pessimistic, how-

15. *Vico,* Robert Flint, p. 224.

ever, about his age. History tends to repeat itself.

This is Vico's famous doctrine of "reflux." Like Machiavelli, he regards human nature as constant and thinks that all nations pass through the same epochs or ages. He is too good a historian to believe that the history of one nation is a mere repetition of the history of another nation. The Dark Ages are not just a repetition of the barbaric epoch of the Greek and Romans. (Christianity is superior to all other religions and its presence must be recognized.) Every national history has its own individuality. Moreover, history is the result of free human wills and therefore decadence is not inevitable. Since history depends upon human wills, the knowledge of history can be turned to practical account. "This practical application can easily be found from the contemplation itself of the course of the history of nations: which the wise men (statesmen) and princes of states observing, could by means of good ordinances, laws and examples recall peoples to their acmé or state of perfection."[16] It cannot be said that Vico had much hope that this would happen.

As an empirical historian, Vico does not advance a general theory of progress in human history. The historian is obliged to study nations as the product of human wills. All that history indicates for Vico is the recurrence of cycles, which, if not inevitable, seem to have taken place with great regularity. Of course, his perspective was limited, since he started with the Greeks and the Romans. But the evidence seemed convincing to him. Bury thinks that Vico's "principle of reflux" could be significant only if the relation between cycles is conceived "as a spiral ascent." But Vico's attitude in this regard is uncertain. His faith in Providence as regulating human events for the best would seem to indicate advance, but it was this very theological faith which prevented his working out a secular theory of

16. Quoted by Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 110. This note was found among Vico's papers and was evidently intended for the *Scienza Nuova* but had not been incorporated.

progress.

Goethe seems to have believed in the spiral ascent of cycles. "Progress has not followed a straight ascending line, but a spiral with rhythms of progress and retrogression, of evolution and dissolution." In his *Conversations with Eckerman*, however, he seems to have been pessimistic about progress in our own epoch. "Let humanity last as long as it will, there will always be hindrances in its way, and all kinds of distress, to make it develop its powers. Men will become more clever and discerning, but not better nor happier nor more energetic, at least except for limited periods. I see the time coming when God will take no more pleasure in the race, and must again proceed to a rejuvenated creation. I am sure that this time will happen and that the time and hour in the distant future are already fixed for the beginning of this epoch of rejuvenation. But that time is certainly a long way off, and we can still for thousands and thousands of years enjoy ourselves on this old playing-ground, just as it is."

The most ambitious and the most dramatic statement of the conception of cycles has been advanced recently by Oswald Spengler in *The Decline of the West*. While Vico limits himself to southern and western Europe in his survey, Spengler takes humanity as his field. History for Spengler, as for Vico, is the history of culture. Spengler limits the term, civilization, to the last decadent stage in the cycle of culture—the dominance of the city, of science, of money and democracy. Spengler and Pareto have an obsession against democracy and thus may be regarded as the heralds of fascism in Europe, but neither had the background of a genuinely democratic tradition.

The birth of culture, according to Spengler, is an incident in the life of man and cannot be predicted or explained. We must accept it as a cosmic fact, as we accept a planetary system or a species. Furthermore, there is no order or organic relation among cultures. Every culture arises independently as a new phenomenon. He thinks there have

been eight great cultures. About 3000 B.C. arose (according to Spengler) the two oldest cultures, one on the lower Nile and the other on the lower Euphrates. About 1500 B.C. three new cultures began—first, the Indian in the upper Punjab; a hundred years later the Chinese on the middle Hwang-ho; and then about 1100 B. C. the Classical on the Aegean Sea. Later came Magian culture—the seed time of which might be called the Aramaic and the later period, Arabian. In the Magian culture, religious requirements—circumcision, baptism—count for more than the soil. Another culture, whose beginnings are also dark, arose in Mexico. Its springtime is that of the Maya states, 160-450 A. D. (Archeology has now pushed the beginning farther back.) It ended in a violent death at the hand of European adventurers, but Spengler thinks it was farther advanced in stages than that of Western Europe today. Finally, about 1000 A. D., was born the Faustian culture, the culture of the Germanic peoples. This culture differs from the others in its greater intensity and its irrepressible urge into distance in space and time.

It is futile, according to Spengler, to attempt to give a causal explanation of the origin and course of a culture in terms of climatic, geographical or economic conditions. "A culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality (*dem urseelenhaften Zustande*) of ever-childish humanity, and detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring. It blooms on the soil of an exactly definable landscape in which plant-wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and reverts into the proto-soul. But its living existence, that sequence of great epochs which define and display the stages of fulfilment, is an inner passionate struggle to maintain the Idea against the powers of Chaos without and the unconscious muttering deep-down within."[17]

17. *The Decline of the West,* Oswald Spengler, Trans., C. F. Atkinson.

A culture has a soul or gestalt of its own. This soul is the charter, the fate, the destiny of the culture. A culture is a living whole. "Every culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man. Each has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age." Like a man, a butterfly, an oak, a blade of grass, a culture has a "life duration," "a specific time value which is quite independent of all the accidents of the individual case."[18] A culture has a direction of its own. It moves by a logic of its own which is not the logic of reason. "There is an *organic logic*, an instinctive dream-sure logic of all existence as opposed to the *logic of the inorganic*, the logic of understanding and things understood—a logic of direction as against a logic of extension—and no systematist, no Aristotle or Kant, has known how to deal with it."[19] Causality has to do with the law-bound, the describable, with our waking existence. "But destiny is the word for an inner certainty that is *not* describable." Life as destiny is "directed, irrevocable in every line, fate-laden." Destiny is "creative through and through, and thus destiny is related to life and causality to death. . . . In the Destiny-idea the soul reveals its world longing, its desire to rise into the light, to accomplish and actualize its vocation."

The meaning of destiny can never be communicated by notions and proofs. Destiny "can only be made plain in the most subjective religious and artistic creation of those men who are *called* to divination."[20] Since, according to Spengler, every great culture must possess its own destiny idea and is "nothing but the actualization and form of a single, singularly constituted (*einzigartig*) soul," it follows that the comprehension of history is relative to the epoch of the culture of which we are part. "There are no eternal truths. Every philosophy is the expression of its own time, and—if by philosophy we mean effective philosophy and

1926, vol. I, 106 f.
18. *Ibid*, vol. I, p. 109.
19. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 117, 118.
20. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 139.

not academic triflings about judgment-forms, sense-categories and the like—no two ages possess the same philosophic intentions. The difference is not between perishable doctrines, but between doctrines which live their day and doctrines which never live at all."[21] Of his own theory, Spengler says: "I can then call the essence of what I have discovered 'true'—that is *true for me*, and as I believe true for the leading minds of the coming time; not true in itself as dissociated from the conditions imposed by blood and by history, for that is impossible."[22] The inner necessity of a culture can be grasped only by one who is part of it. "It is quite impossible for us to penetrate completely a historical world-aspect of 'becoming,' formed by a soul that is quite differently constituted from our own."[23] Sympathy, "physiognomic tact," may go a long way, but at best there must be "an intractable residue."

Spengler's conception of history, unlike that of Vico, is fatalistic.

> "On the world's loom
> Weave the norns doom
> Nor may they guide it nor change."[24]

Individual choices and ideals do not count. "It is not a matter of choice—it is not the conscious will of individuals or even of whole classes or peoples that decides."[25] It is a doom, something demonic and immense. History will accomplish its course with the individual or without him. It does not depend upon the choice of any individual. "It was not Napoleon who formed the idea, but the idea that formed Napoleon."[26] Napoleon was swept along by the destiny of his epoch. It he had not carried the role, someone else would have done so. If the revolution had not taken place

21. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 41.
22. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. XIII.
23. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 131.
24. *Siegfried*, Act III, Richard Wagner, quoted by Spengler, at the beginning of *The Hour of Decision*, Pt. I.
25. *The Decline of the West*, vol. I, p. 37.
26. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 149.

in France, it would have taken place somewhere else, for it was the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new epoch in Faustian culture.

It is true that a culture, which is itself the creature of incident, can be affected by incidents. "Fresh incidentals can affect the shape of its development, . . . can make this grandiose or puny, . . . but alter it they cannot,"[27] though evidently they can cut it short as shown in the old Mexican culture. Spengler recognizes that "within every epoch there is unlimited abundance of surprising and unforeseeable possibilities of self-actualizing in detail-facts, but the epoch itself is necessary, for the life unity is in it." The grand events of history are fated. They are "carried by beings of the cosmic order, by peoples, parties, armies and classes, while the history of the intellect runs its course in loose associations and circles, schools, levels of education, 'tendencies' and 'isms.'"[28] But these beings of a cosmic order are after all creatures of destiny. "It is a question of destiny whether such aggregates at the decisive moments of high effectiveness find a leader or are driven blindly on; whether the chance headmen are men of the first order or men of no real significance, tossed up, like Robespierre or Pompey, by the surge of events. It is the hall-mark of the statesman that he has a sure and penetrating eye for these mass-souls, that form and dissolve on the tide of the times, their strength and their duration, their direction and purpose. And even so, it is a question of Incident whether he is one who can master them or one who is swept away by them."[29] Chance seems to play a large part in this irreversible, unidirectional, preordained destiny.

Goethe's organicism pervades Spengler's conception of cycles. There is a morphology of cultures, as there is a morphology of plants and animals. It is possible to reconstruct, from a few fragments of a culture, "long-vanished

27. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 145.
28. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 19.
29. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 19.

and unknown epochs, even whole Cultures of the past, by means of morphological connections in much the same way as modern paleontology deduces far-reaching and trustworthy conclusions as to skeletal structure and species from a single unearthed skull-fragment."[30] By applying the conception of homologies, Spengler gives a new meaning to contemporary: "I hope to show that without exception all great creations and forms in religion, art, politics, social life, economy and science appear, fulfil themselves and die down *contemporaneously* in all the cultures, that the inner structure of one corresponds strictly with that of all the others; that there is not a single phenomenon of deep physiognomic importance in the record of one for which we could not find a counterpart in the record of every other; and that this counterpart is to be found under a characteristic form and in a perfectly definite chronological position."[31] Thus we can find the counterpart of Protestantism in the Dionysiac movement in Greece, of English Puritanism in Islam. He discovers homologous forms in classical sculpture and in West European orchestration, in the Rigveda, Plotinus and Dante. Every culture as a whole has a definite duration and so have the stages of a culture; and these durations, with the events within them, correspond in the various cultures. The life of a nation, which is the true carrier of culture, is a determinate period, "and so are the pace and rhythm in which its history moves to fulfilment."[32] The generations are more or less the same. The period from Solon to Alexander and the corresponding period from Luther to Napoleon "embraces no more than ten generations." The exhibiting of such correspondences taxes the ingenuity of even Spengler. You must select the epochs and events to make such correspondence plausible.

Like Vico, Spengler characterizes the epochs of a culture in terms of psychological development. The springtime of

30. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 113.
31. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 112.
32. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 171.

a culture is dominated by a mystic world consciousness, expressing itself in myth and legend. Childhood speaks to us out of the early Homeric Doric, out of early Christian. It "reveals itself in the morning of Romanesque and Gothic."[33] It is "dim, confused, tentative, filled with childish yearnings and fears." Culture reveals the vigor of youth in the heroic period. In this period history is dominated by the nobility, as it is also later, so long as culture retains its vigor. It is the period in which thinkers are priests, in spirit as well as status. "Such were the Schoolmen and the Mystics of the Gothic and the Vedic as of the Homeric and the Early-Arabian centuries."[34] The more a culture approaches its noon culmination, "the more visible, austere, controlled, intense the form language it has secured for itself, the more assured its sense of its own power, the clearer its lineaments."[33] Spengler finds the full consciousness of ripened creative power "in the time of the early Middle Kingdom of Egypt, in the Athens of the Pisistratidae (the tyrants), in the age of Justinian, in that of the Counter-Reformation." Here "we find every individual trait of expression, deliberate, strict, measured, marvelous in its ease and self-confidence."[33] Finally, in the grey twilight of civilization, which is the last decadent phase of culture, we find "classicism which is common to all dying cultures." In Romanticism the soul "looks back piteously to its childhood; then finally weary, reluctant, cold it loses its desire to be" and wishes itself back in the darkness of proto-mysticism. The spell of a "second religiousness," such as the cults of Mithra and Isis, is the last flare of the dying embers of a culture.

We are living, according to Spengler, in a time of decline. "But we have not *chosen* this time. We cannot help it if we are born as men of the early winter of full Civilization, instead of on the golden summit of a ripe Culture, in a Phidias or Mozart time. Everything depends on our seeing

33. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 107 f.
34. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 365.

our own position, our *destiny*, clearly; on our realizing that though we may lie to ourselves, we cannot evade it."[35] And what is it that heralds the *Goetterdaemmerung*? It is the dominance of reason. Reason analyzes, dissects. It is modeled upon the inorganic which is death. It is antagonistic to life, intuitions, creativeness, "the tyranny of the reason of which we are not conscious, for we are ourselves its apex—is in every Culture an epoch between man and old man, and no more. Its most distinct expression is the cult of the exact sciences, of dialectic, of demonstration, of causality."[36] And according to Spengler science itself is on the decline. "The great century of classical science was the third, after the death of Aristotle; when Archimedes died and the Romans came, it was already almost at its end. Our great century has been the nineteenth. Savants of the calibre of Gauss and Humboldt and Helmholtz were already no more by 1900." Art had already run a parallel course. "After Lycippus no great sculptor, no artist as man-of-destiny appears; and after the Impressionists no painter, and after Wagner no musician."[37] Philosophy faded out of the picture with the death of Kant. "Systematic philosophy closes with the end of the eighteenth century. Kant put its utmost possibilities in forms both grand in themselves and —as a rule—final for the Western soul. He is followed, as Plato and Aristotle were followed, by a specifically megalopolitan philosophy that was not speculative but practical, irreligious, social-ethical."[38] Democracy, social reform, cosmopolitanism, internationalism are for Spengler signs of extreme decadence. Democracy is nothing but the tool of the money power.

But the dictature of money is marching to its peak and its doom. The concluding form of civilization is "the conflict between money and blood."[39] The man on horseback

35. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 44.
36. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 424.
37. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 425.
38. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 45.
39. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 506.

approaches. "The coming of Caesarism breaks the dictature of money and its political weapon democracy." The money power can be overthrown only by race and blood. But the end is near and there is no turning back. To complete the measure of other completer cycles, scepticism still awaits us, though we shall meet it consciously and historically, instead of unknowingly as the ancients did. After that, there will come a second religiousness and then the end. "Our direction, willed and obligatory at once, is set for us within narrow limits, and on any other terms life is not worth the living. We have not the freedom to reach to this or that, but the freedom to do the necessary or to do nothing. And a task that historic necessity has set *will* be accomplished with the individual or against him."[40] Of what use, then, is the study of history? By taking account of cycles which have run their course, we can predetermine "the spiritual form, duration, rhythm, meaning and product of the still unaccomplished stages of our own western history," and foretell what awaits us in our decline. "It is the great task of the historical expert. . . to envisage, interpret, and delineate the future—which will come whether we will or no."[41] With Spengler's analysis before him, "henceforth it will be every man's business to inform himself of what *can* happen and therefore what with the unalterable necessity of destiny and irrespective of personal ideals, hopes or desires *will* happen."[42] Spengler does not seem to trouble himself about consistency. After all, that belongs to the logic of reason which Spengler despises as decadent. If everything happens irrespective of personal wills and desires, what use can there be in appealing to the "creative wills" of the German people, as he does in *The Hour of Decision?*

What next? Or is there any next? According to Spengler there is no possibility of the prediction of a new

40. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 507.
41. *The Hour of Decision*, Oswald Spengler, p. x.
42. *The Decline of the West*, vol. I, p. 39.

culture. It is an incident. There is no law or order of cultures, no spiral development. It is a mere incident that West European culture is superior to the rest. Spengler thinks that a new culture may arise between the Vistula and the Amur. But that would be an incident and Spengler evidently does not think that it would be of a high order. Spengler leaves us in no doubt that he rejects the idea of indefinite progress which has dominated western thought for two hundred years. "The future of the West is not a limitless tending upward and onward for all time toward our present ideals, but a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration."[42] Within the same cycle, we can speak of advance, but this is followed by decadence.

It should be noted that the conception of cycles can have no relevance unless there is repetition. Some thinkers have, indeed, conceived history as a succession of stages of development but these stages have been linear and have tended to one climax. Thus for Fichte history passes through various stages from instinctive to rational conduct in the process of realizing moral freedom. This is the end and goal of history, but can never be absolutely attained. Hence progress is necessarily infinite. But it is a one-way process, not one of cycles. Hegel, in a similar way, regards the realization of freedom as the goal and rationale of history. The life of humanity passes through childhood, youth, maturity and old age. Various past civilizations are not only different expressions of the spirit's striving for freedom: they are different stages. Oriental civilizations correspond to childhood, Greece to youth, Rome to manhood and the Germanic world, the final and the highest for Hegel, to old age but not feeble old age. Unlike Fichte, however, Hegel thinks that spirit comes to full consciousness and freedom in his own civilization and philosophy. But in both Fichte and Hegel the stages of history are the necessary forms of man's developing consciousness. They are a one-way process, proceeding to an ultimate goal.

It must be clear from our brief survey that a theory of progress amounts to nothing less than a philosophy of history. And a philosophy of history cannot ultimately be separated from a cosmic philosophy. If we limit ourselves to human history, our survey shows two types of philosophy: according to one type, history is a steady onward and upward march toward perfection; according to the other, history is a rhythm of cycles which repeat themselves in their essential features. History, according to the latter view, is like the tide which ebbs and flows in response to cosmic influence. If I have devoted more space to the cyclical conception, it is because its principal proponents, Polybius, Vico and Spengler, have attempted at least to found their theory on historical fact. The rectilinear conception has been, on the whole, more sentimental than philosophical. History does indicate that "there is a tide in the affairs of men." It seems clear that life, individual and racial, is rhythmic. The proponents of the cyclical theory have generally committed the mistake of transferring bodily the rhythm of individual life to racial life. That is over-simplification. The life of the race is always renewed in a new generation. If merciful death did not remove the generation which has become senile, there could be no progress. Death is one of the most important conditions of progress. The race has immortal youth. But while the analogy between individual history and racial history breaks down, the evidence of history indicates that there is a rhythm in the life of the race. This rhythm, as Vico saw, is psychological. But mind is part of life and is responsive, therefore, to the pulse of life. Life itself has certainly been undergoing change, in response to its environment to be sure, but it has also had a momentum of its own. We certainly cannot understand the history of life as merely repetition. Else there would have been no new species with new characters. But though there has been mutation, there has also been the stiffening into types. In human history, of which we know only a brief span, there have been periods of rapid change followed by periods

of stabilization, and then the crust breaks again. There is ebb and flow in the life of man. The question is: in this rhythmic ebb and flow in the life of humanity has the tide of life risen higher in response to cosmic influence? That would be spiral ascent rather than rectilinear advance.

It is certain that we should give much more careful study to the ebb and flow in human history than we have so far given. It is easy to point out flaws in such efforts as those of Vico and Spengler. Both treated cultures in isolation and neglected the interaction of cultures. Of the two, Vico is far superior to Spengler in his feeling for history. But though he had a remarkable grasp of Roman history, his basis for generalization was very slender. Both Vico and Spengler identified culture with national history. But this leads to a very loose use of the word nation. There is Greek culture, but there is no Greek nation. Many cities contributed to Greek culture: Miletus, Crotona, Elea, Athens, Syracuse, Alexandria—to mention only a few. There is a spirit of Greek culture, but certainly it is not the work of a nation in any proper sense. And so there is a spirit of medieval culture, but there is no medieval nation. Modern culture is the result of many interacting nations which have both contributed and received stimulus.

In distinguishing epochs within a culture, there is considerable room for interpretation. For Vico the Dark Ages are a reversion to the barbaric stage, the Middle Ages exemplify the heroic age, and the modern period, including Vico's own time, is the age of men. But Vico's psychology of history here breaks down hopelessly. The Middle Ages was no doubt a great imaginative period. But it was also an age of unusually rigorous thinking—the age of scholasticism. Dante, for Vico, is the Homer of the medieval heroic age, but Dante's poetry had as background the conceptual structure of scholasticism which furnished him with his theological frame-work. Vico is right that conceptual thought involves the development of abstract language, but the Middle Ages inherited an advanced language. The fact is, of course, that there never was in Europe a com-

plete reversion to barbarism. There were always centers of Greek and Latin culture from which learning eventually spread. We must, I think, recognize the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as the culminating epoch of a thousand years of Catholic culture, which knew no national boundaries. Dante's *Divine Comedy* is both the culmination of an epoch and the prophecy of a new epoch, with its emphasis upon individualism, national and personal.. The mould of medieval culture was already breaking. There is no reason, moreover, to suppose, as Vico and Spengler do, that the life of a people must pass through a fixed sequence of stages—and then revert to the primitive. How many epochs has China passed through during its six thousand years of history or even such modern nations as France and England? Anthropology has come to the conclusion that the theory that every culture passes through the same order of forms is without basis in fact.[43]

The evaluation of the epochs of a culture necessarily depends upon the interest of the critic. A period which may be considered as decadent from the point of view of one interest, plastic art, for example, may be a climax from another point of view—philosophy or science. We may grant that the fourth century Greece B.C. was decadent in art, but the century of Plato and Aristotle is for the philosopher a climax of a marvelous history, going back to Thales. The scientist will look to the third century B.C.—the century of Aristarchus, Euclid and Archimedes—as the climax of Greek civilization, while the jurist would perhaps find the climax of ancient jurisprudence in the reign of Justinian in the sixth century A.D. Whether art or philosophy or science or jurisprudence is absolutely higher depends upon the interest of the evaluer. But Vico and Spengler have done great service in calling attention to an important problem—the problem of rhythm in human history. Any intelligent theory of progress must certainly take account of rhythm. But we must also try to discover whether the tide of life, in its rhythms, is rising higher.

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43. *Primitive Society*, Robert H. Lowie, Chap. XV.

CHAPTER XIV

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

AN INTERPRETATION

Having taken a brief survey of the history of the idea of progress, we must now inquire into its meaning. But unless we can discover a frame of reference beyond the present we cannot be certain whether we are moving or in what direction we are moving. We are often obliged to sympathize with Alice in *Through the Looking Glass.* You will remember that the Red Queen took Alice by the hand and exhorted her to run faster and faster, but after she had appeared to herself to be "skimming through the air" she found on stopping that she was under the same tree as when she started: "Well in our own country," said Alice, still panting a little, "you'd get to somewhere else—if you ran fast for a long time as we've been doing." "A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now, here, you see, it takes all the running *you* can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that." Indeed, most of us find that with all our running, it is all we can do to keep our place in the procession. We may even become sceptical about the reality of progress at all. Inge and Pareto regard the idea of progress as a superstition. But how can we know it is a superstition unless we know whither we are moving? Spengler thinks we are moving toward decadence and nearing the end of our cycle. But his evaluation of history seems to be based largely upon personal prejudice. He likes a society which is dominated by nobility and royalty. He hates democracy, and therefore he thinks we are moving to ruin. He thinks life must be known through intuition, and interprets science as dealing only with the inorganic and dead. He does not realize that art and science may in reality be complementary instead of antagonistic. He

selects certain periods which he likes in art, poetry and music. The rest is decadence. He does not see that art, poetry and music must be viewed as interpretations of life and have value only as they express life. There are no abstract higher and lower.

To see the significance of culture we must indeed view it historically. The significance of the culture of today depends upon the past and the future. The future is more important than the past, for it gives significance to the present and past. The real frame of reference is the future for which the present exists. The ideal for which we strive gives meaning to the present. As a practical maxim, however, it is well to keep in mind that we plan best for the future when we meet most adequately our present problems. By creative imagination we can in a measure divine the direction of life. But our insights must always be tentative, for history is in the making. The future is a creative fact and will give new meaning to the present and past. The future involves venture and risk. History does not really repeat itself. We may, like Spengler, try to see parallelisms in cultures, but at best they are arbitrary selections and do not guide us very far, since no age has really had our meanings or our problems. We should indeed study the past and try to learn from the past. But we should regard other cultures as experiments from which we should try to extract the relevant features, not as *fates* that we must follow whether we will or no.

There are two ways in which we may regard the idea of progress: We may regard it as a fact or as an ideal. According to Bury the idea of "Progress of humanity belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is true or it is false, and like them it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith."[1] Oswald Spengler regards the movement of a culture from beginning to end as an inner doom, fate, necessity which individual wills and ideals cannot alter. We may,

1. J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 4.

on the other hand, regard the movement of history as due to human wills. The idea of progress then becomes an ideal toward which human wills, individually or collectively, strive. On that view, progress is not inevitable. It may come or not, and it may come in various degrees in accordance with the insight, devotion and earnestness of human beings. A true theory, I think, includes aspects of both of these views. We must recognize a cosmic movement of which life is a part. The origin of our solar system, with its pattern and conditions, the origin of life and its succession of types, the origin of human types and the pattern of some sort of social group are facts of a cosmic order. Just as other species move through biological childhood, adolescence and maturity, so there is a movement and rhythm in the life of humanity as a species, which are beyond human control and which we must accept as a fact. In view of the principle of indeterminacy, however, we cannot say that even the great cosmic movements are prescribed in detail and might not have been otherwise. At every stage the individual responsiveness may have counted. Certain patterns, such as atoms, seem, indeed, to be indicated in nature, since they are repeated everywhere. And why not life patterns? Yet nature may complete its patterns or fail, because of the responsiveness of the individual.

That there is more to history than our individual wills, we must, I think, grant. Beside the biological gestalt of the life of man, we must also recognize that a great cultural movement has a gestalt and momentum of its own. This historic gestalt shapes the individual's habits and point-of-view. Even genius is determined to a great extent by the cultural movement of which it is part. This is the soil in which it grows. Homer, Shakespeare, Newton must be understood as expressions of the age and culture in which they lived. But this fact does not mean that history moves by a necessity of its own, irrespective of individual wills. There is no life, history or culture apart from individuals. Individual genius, in assimilating the

cultural heritage, recreates it. The material of culture is fused into a new synthesis which in turn becomes part of the social heritage. By his insight into the future, individual genius may create a new epoch by giving a new direction to a culture. So have done the great geniuses in art, science, religion. This is true also in the creation of social unities. George Washington and his associates through their faith, courage and genius created a new political pattern which made a new epoch of history possible. They were indeed part of a larger rhythm, but this rhythm would not have been expressed in the same way without their wills. Destiny there is, but individuals are a creative part of this destiny and therefore a particular destiny is not inevitable.

We must take a long view of history, if we want to discover whether there has been progress and in what sense we can speak of progress. We must learn to look at life as part of cosmic evolution. The urge of life is a cosmic urge. Again, we must view human life as part of the whole march of life. Human life is but a short span of the history of life and its roots stretch into pre-human history and its creative adaptation to the cosmos. Of human history we have only a brief cultural record. We are apt to think of human history in terms of European history, and we divide this into ancient, medieval and modern. This division, as Spengler points out, is artificial, though his division of European history into classical culture and Faustian culture as distinct organic units, is even more artificial. We must consider European culture as a whole. Fontenelle thinks that later ages may classify us with the Greeks and Romans as contemporary. We are certainly part of Greek and Roman culture. There has indeed been metamorphosis; the motifs emphasized have varied, but there has been no break in the continuity. Greek culture was transformed into the Roman, the Roman into that of the Middle Ages and that in turn into what we call modern, but Greek culture lives in the present, and on the whole our

civilization is today more Greek than Christian. The spirit of science is the Greek spirit. The structure of Roman law and language has persisted and furnished the frame-work of our civilization. And we are becoming increasingly conscious that the roots of our institutions go back to the Middle Ages. It has been suggested by C. M. Case that we might call the Old Stone Age ancient civilization, the Neolithic Age medieval and the period of recorded history modern. This division is impressive and inclusive in its scope. But it too would be artificial since the divisions are more or less arbitrary.

There are three lines in which we can note continuous advance over a long period of time—the biological, the technological and the spiritual. When I say continuous, I do not mean that the rate of advance has been uniform. On the contrary, it has been rhythmic—periods of rapid change being followed by resting periods. This is true of the history of life generally. Why there should be such a rhythm we do not understand, but it is probably due to cosmic rhythm. That there has been advance in the history of life upon our earth there can be no doubt. But that does not mean that we can arrange the forms of life along one straight line. Life, like a tree, has radiated branches. But we can, on the whole, follow the trunk of the tree to the top. The life of man is the culmination of the urge of life to express itself in relation to its world. From the beginning of what we can call human history we can note advance. The paleontological record is the oldest. From the remains of human skeletons, we can reconstruct to some extent the evolution of man. The Java man had already assumed the upright position as a two-legged animal, though he had many traits in common with his simian ancestors. His brain capacity was only half that of European man today. For a million years nature has been experimenting in man-making—the Java man, the Heidelberger man, the Piltdown man, the Neanderthal man, the Cromagnon man. Some think that man has not advanced biolog-

ically since the Neanderthal man, because the latter had the same skull capacity as modern man. And the Cromagnon man may have been physically our superior. But the size of the skull is not the only thing to be considered, though we must credit both the Neanderthal man and the Cromagnon with traits which make them akin to us. They developed not only tools but religion, including some faith in immortality; and the Cromagnon was an artist of remarkable power. But human evolution has also involved developing those qualities which have made possible human cooperation on an ever larger scale; and here we may believe evolution is still going on. The Cromagnon man was still a beast of prey. He did not establish that companionship with animals which is involved in domestication. He hunted the horse and ate an enormous number of horses, until the supply gave out and then he disappeared. Judging from the exaggeration of sex in his art, he seems to have been very much in need of psycho-analysis.

Dean Inge thinks that the history of civilization has always tended "to an *Ausrottung der Besten*—a weeding out of the best."[2] That depends, of course, on what he regards as the best. Spengler thinks it is the highest compliment to call a man a beast of prey. "If I call a man a beast of prey, which do I insult: man or beast? For remember, the larger beasts of prey are *noble* creatures, perfect of their kind, and without the hypocrisy of human moral, due to weakness."[3] That we may admit. And yet for living together, physical strength, fierceness and cunning are not enough. It was necessary for man to develop also the gentler qualities of sympathy and cooperation. " 'Tis love which makes the world go round," says the Duchess to Alice.[4] The fiercer type which has been engaged in incessant fighting has tended to eliminate itself. It is true that men may be aroused to fierceness yet, when baited by other motives.

2. *Outspoken Essays*, Ralph Inge, p. 175.
3. *The Hour of Decision*, Oswald Spengler, p. 21.
4. *Alice in Wonderland*, Lewis Carroll.

The fact that the social qualities, such as loyalty to ideals, are used as baits to set people to fighting is a testimony to the strength of the social qualities. We may believe that the biological evolution of man is still going on and will go on until the human species reaches maturity. The human race is young. It may be that man of the far future will look back upon us as we look back upon Pithecanthropus. Perhaps some day man will reach permanent adaptation in a social pattern, such as that of the beehive, unless indeed reason can keep man plastic indefinitely.

Of the technological history of man we have a far more complete record than of his biological history. And here the advance is far easier to follow. The human hand has been called by Aristotle "the tool of tools"; and because of his hand man was not long in manipulating nature, first by using things at hand and then making them over. What distinguishes man most strikingly from other animals is his use of creative intelligence. Man not only accepted his world but started at an early date to transform his world. The conscious making of fire was regarded by the Greeks as a profane inroad into the secret of the gods. When man consciously started to experiment to use matter to transform matter into the service of his needs, he had set in motion the civilization which unites him with us in a common enterprise. We are too apt to associate invention with the industrial revolution of the last two hundred years. But the fundamental inventions were made before recorded history began. We can now follow the progressive invention of tools of great variety in the Old Stone Age. The invention of the bow and arrow in the Neolithic Age was a great revolution, but even more revolutionary was the discovery of the domestication of cattle and the use and planting of cereals. These discoveries were quite as revolutionary as any discoveries in modern times. The use of copper, bronze and iron antedate the historic period. These early pioneers were craftsmen and we can still admire the beauty of their work as well as its practical utility. The recent

period of consciously applied science has greatly extended and accelerated man's control over nature, but it ill behooves us to forget the long series of nameless inventors who laid the foundation of our civilization. In the course of the ages the inanimate forces have taken over more and more of the effort of the human body, until today we have complete mechanical processes which only require to be started in order to turn out the complete product.

We have reason to believe that there has been biological advance and technological advance in the history of man. Let us now consider spiritual advance. I do not mean that we can separate spiritual advance from biological history. Life is the ultimate consideration, and all advance is the expression of the urge for life. The construction of tools to extend the power of the hand is the contrivance by life to maintain itself. And spiritual invention is likewise the expression of the life urge that life may prosper. But what concerns us here is that man has striven to transform his environment not only materially but imaginatively. Man not only desired to make things but to express ideas, to dream dreams. Man's first expression is poetry. Science itself starts as a kind of day-dreaming, which is controlled by a certain method, but before we can speak of science, in a systematic sense, creative imagination was already at work in the making of tools and in the creation of art; and in turn the manipulation of nature has aided man in the divining of its secrets. At first, knowledge was primarily practical, but later man found enjoyment in knowledge itself; and then we have the beginning of pure science. And science in turn gave man greater power of control which has been greatly accelerated during the last three hundred years.

When we consider spiritual advance, our retrospect is not so long as when we deal with paleontology or technology. We learn something of man's religious attitude from the burial customs of the Neanderthal and the Cromagnon man. And in his cave paintings, Cromagnon man has left

us a wonderful record of his artistic imagination from which we can infer something of his spiritual attitude—his use of magic, for example. But it is little that we know of the spiritual life of man until the last few thousands of years, though archeology has greatly extended our perspective. Can we trace continuous advance in man's spiritual life? Art and religion present difficulties. Do we have superior art to that of the Greeks in the fifth century, B.C.? Is our religion superior to that of the first century, A.D.? In art and religion we appear to move in cycles—a great creative outburst of genius, then imitation and decadence. We have continuity and rhythm, but it is not so clear that there is advance in an absolute sense, though we must remember that art and religion are peculiarly sensitive to the rhythm of life and are expressions of that rhythm even when we consider them as decadent. We must remember, too, that the standards of art and religion are in evolution. When art and religion are sincere and experimental they may give rise to new forms which are more truly the expression of the human spirit, at the time, than past forms. "No musician since Wagner," says Spengler. But we have had Brahms and Sibelius and other masters; and we have interesting experimental developments at the present time which in turn may become classical. It took a hundred years for the world to appreciate Bach, though now he is a classic. So long as art takes the experimental attitude, there is no necessity for decadence, though there will always be periods of transition. Yet since different epochs in art are incommensurable, it is difficult to trace a continuous advance. Greek art and Gothic art are both marvelous creations of the human spirit, but we cannot say that one is superior to the other, except in its historic setting as an expression of the spirit of the age. Classical art was the expression of the aristocratic ideal of life. The new movement in art aims to express the collectivistic, the cooperative ideal of free men working for the common good. The advance in art, when we compare the great epochs, may be

in content rather than in form. But here art becomes part of moral advance. Religion, too, whatever our reverence may be for the great revelations of the past, must be part of the social and moral evolution of the race, if religion is to be vital.

When we speak of progress, we generally think of science and the changes which it has wrought. Science, in the strict sense of free inquiry into the nature of things, was born in Greece in the sixth century, B.C. It moved with great acceleration to its climax in Euclid, Aristarchus and Archimedes in the third century, B.C. Greek science might have gone on and anticipated the modern era, if the Roman barbarians had not slaughtered Archimedes and all his associates in the taking of Syracuse. Science was set back seventeen hundred years. In the last four hundred years science has had a continuous and accelerated development. Incidentally it has transformed our civilization in a practical as well as a theoretical way. Instead of going into decadence at the end of the nineteenth century, as Spengler thought, it has had its most radical development in the twentieth century. But considering the youth and intermittency of science, we cannot look to science as the measure of the continuous spiritual advance of the race, if there has been such advance.

It is in the moral field, I think, where we can trace the most continuous spiritual advance. By moral advance I mean the increasing recognition of the dignity and significance of the human individual. Hegel at the close of his *Philosophy of History* makes the pregnant statement: "The History of the World is nothing but the development of the Idea of Freedom." Without accepting Hegel's dialectical framework, we can, on empirical grounds, and in a general way, agree to this interpretation of history. But freedom is not an abstraction. It means the realization of personality. For us, as for Hegel, it must include social organization, since man can only realize freedom in society. Without society he is a mere animal, and not even that, since he can-

not survive without the nurture of society. We may say that *freedom is the root of creative culture.* This holds for all culture—for art, religion, science, as well as moral realization—for man cannot create under compulsion. He may claim freedom *against* authority—against custom and convention—and take the consequences, as all the great prophets of mankind, in various fields of creativeness, have done. But free in spirit he must be in order to create. "Love will not be constrained," replied Lancelot to Queen Guinevere (when she asked him to show just a little love to a love-sick maiden). And this is true of the love of beauty, of truth, of righteousness, as well as the love of woman. When we examine the great periods of creativeness, we find that they have been periods of great expansiveness of spirit, whether in fifth century Greece, in Ancient times, or in the modern Renaissance. Science is as much the expression of the freedom of spirit as is art or morality. This freedom may be felt *within* the life of an institution as in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or *in protest* against institutions as in the French Revolution. But without a sense of freedom there can be no creativeness.

In primitive civilization we can scarcely speak of an individual. Man exists for the group. It is the life of the group that matters. Just as their language is holophrastic, every situation being expressed in a unique combination of sounds which have meaning only as a combination, so the individual is significant only in group patterns. Life is regulated from beginning to end by group customs and taboos, though the desire to live does at times bring about a change of "medicines." We cannot speak of moral freedom unless there is the conscious realization of ideals. Man must develop analytical language and analytical concepts before the individual can have moral significance within the group. The penalty of such analytical thought is that the individual may become an abstraction and forget his group responsibility. Such individualism must be over-

come by the development of creative imagination and a sense of unity on a higher moral plane.

We may consider the *conscious* struggle for freedom, with all that it implies in creative thought, as beginning in Greece, at any rate so far as the Occident is concerned. In Athens in the fifth century, B. C., we have the first realization of a commonwealth of freemen controlling their own destiny in a direct democracy, and we have noted the impetus which this new freedom gave to cultural creativeness. But while Athens created the idea of free citizenship and democracy, we must not forget that three-fourths of the population of Athens were slaves. Not even such advanced thinkers as Plato and Aristotle suggest abolishing slavery. It was the human energy of the slaves which provided the leisure for people of culture. Slavery persisted in the Roman empire, but it was not congenial to the Roman spirit and manumission was common. During the empire freed slaves sometimes rose to high position in the state. The great Stoic jurist, Ulpian, gave expression to the doctrine that all men are by nature free and equal and that slavery is contrary to the laws of nature, but the concrete realization of this insight required time. The development of Roman law during a thousand years is an impressive story of the triumph of human rights for man, woman and child; and Roman law persisted through the vicissitudes of the Middle Ages and formed the framework of modern society.

Christianity was a great emotional force in the emancipation of man, though its political and economic effects were slow, and are slow, in making themselves felt. But the belief in the absolute value of every human individual before God and the equality of all men before God must make itself felt in human relations. The doctrine of the common fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man was a powerful leaven in the Middle Ages. In the Church at any rate there was democracy of opportunity through which a carpenter's son could rise to the papacy. Rome had tried to

achieve a universal empire of law; and the medieval church tried to bring mankind together into a spiritual unity, which at times was also conceived as a political unity. It is true that the lot of the tenant under the feudal system was miserable enough, but at any rate it was somewhat better than slavery. The development of the king's court and the common law in England gave impartial justice between lord and vassal.

In the modern period we have seen the abolition of black slavery and the realization of political democracy. At the end of the eighteenth century the revolutionary leaders thought that the realization of political democracy would mean Utopia. Such had been the dream of Rousseau, and America seemed its fulfilment. If men are free to determine their own destiny, will they not determine it for the welfare of all? But we have come to realize that political democracy is but an instrument, and mankind was poorly prepared to use the instrument. Democracy means little unless it is a democracy of opportunity, and that we are far from having reached. But we must recognize that the great social movements take time. It took several hundred years of bloody struggle before medieval feudalism was fused into the new national unities which arose at the end of the Middle Ages. The feudal lords survived only when they learned to subordinate themselves to national authority.

In the industrial era, a new feudalism has arisen. The old feudalism was based upon the soil. The new feudalism is based upon the control, direct or indirect, of the means of production and distribution. It will take time before the new feudalism is subordinated to a cooperative commonwealth. Whether this can be accomplished peacefully under democratic institutions depends largely upon the attitude of the new feudal lords. In northwestern Europe long strides have been taken in this direction in a peaceful democratic way. In other parts of Europe the changes have been revolutionary and have abrogated democratic principles.

We, in the United States, have an opportunity to work out our own experiment, undisturbed by tragic political complications from outside. If the capitalistic interests are wise, they will cooperate in making the transition toward a juster distribution of wealth and opportunity. Capitalism has had its strong points as well as its weak points. Individual enterprise and thrift should be encouraged. We want a maximum of individual freedom consistent with the general welfare. But this cannot be the freedom of the beast of prey. The wolves have set up such a howl that they have even gotten some of the lambs to bleat in sympathy. But to attempt to stop the evolution toward even the very minimum of social opportunity—the right to work and the right to eat—means revolution; whether the outcome is called fascism or communism will not matter much in its immediate effects, so far as the freedom of the individual is concerned. Man doth not live by bread alone, but he must have bread if he is going to live the good life.

There has been a tendency in some quarters to blame science and invention for all our troubles. But it must be obvious that our civilization cannot exist without the machine. For ages, war, pestilence and famine kept the population down to the available means of subsistence. But, thanks to science, we have enormously increased the population and yet could have abundance for all. The machine has multiplied man's power of production a thousand-fold. It has lifted the burden off man's back and will continue to do so. Through progressive processes of production, it will not be necessary for man to be a cog in the machine as was the case in the past. Man's work will be supervisory instead of mechanical. In ancient Athens three-fourths of the population had to be slaves to provide leisure and culture for one-fourth. Thanks to science and the machine, we could all have leisure and culture. There is no use inveighing against the machine. It is man's imperfect moral organization which must take the blame. The machine has liberated man from slavery to matter. It is for

man to see to it that it also liberates man from human slavery.

The trouble is not with the mechanical machine but with the social machine. Have we the intelligence and courage to make this over? If not, we deserve to go under as unfit. The root of our trouble is that while we have devoted great genius during the last three hundred years to the discovery of the laws of nature and to make nature responsive to our will, we have neglected to study the laws of human nature and to find how it can best realize itself. When we apply the same genius, earnestness and disinterestedness to the study of human affairs as we have applied to physics and chemistry we shall arrive at a solution. That means that we shall require experts to conduct our affairs, instead of politicians whose sole interest generally is in the next election.

Human organization means not merely national organization but international organization. Our modern era got rid of feudal anarchy only to substitute national anarchy. But it must be clear now that there can be no prosperity and happiness for one nation when the rest of the world is in chaos. Our problem today is world-wide. We crave not only justice within the nation but justice between nations. Unless nations can work out a program of cooperation, our civilization is doomed. I do not say that humanity is doomed. Humanity has survived a great many depressions and catastrophes, sometimes with irreparable loss, but it has survived nevertheless. Humanity may have to go through another period like the Dark Ages. Perhaps that is the price it will have to pay for its selfishness and stupidity. Yet it will surely emerge again and then perhaps have learned the lesson of unity. But it is in our power to prevent such a catastrophe. Woodrow Wilson's dream of a league of nations was a sound ideal. Unfortunately he helped to perpetuate the conditions which have made such a league precarious. It should be a body of impartial justice, instead of being loaded with past liabilities of national animosities.

Nevertheless, it is a beginning and we must give it time—and support. Bergson says of the founders of the League of Nations: "Like all great optimists they began by assuming as solved the problem to be solved." It is too much to hope that the problems of hundreds of years can be solved by one resolution. It took a long time to pass from feudalism to nationalism. It will take time to pass from nationalism to international cooperation. And it can only be accomplished when nations learn by bitter experience, not only to live and let live, but to live and help live. The principle of justice and fair play must be made the basis of unity, if the unity is to succeed.

In taking a long survey of human history we have found as the most significant result of human evolution the increased recognition of the dignity and value of the human individual. In our present mood of pessimism and disillusionment, it is well for us at times to look backward over the road we have travelled from the brute. If things seem worse now than they ever were before, it is because they are better than they have ever been before. There was no pessimism in regard to slavery in ancient Athens. The feudal tenant in the Middle Ages religiously accepted his lot. In the first generation of the industrial era, the workers resigned themselves to helpless misery. If we compare the general standard of living in our age with that of any previous ages, the advantage is certainly with our age. Since the late war there has developed a corporate recognition by states that man has the right to daily bread, however inadequate has been the provision. We are at least beginning to see the absurdity, if not the tragedy, in man starving because of too great plenty—all for lack of proper social organization. If man can produce so much more because of the machine, then he should have more leisure and the proper education to use his leisure. At least we are conscious of the problem and are trying, however stumblingly, to do something. At any rate, we lack the old bravado of Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?" It is

true that we have had recently one of the most senseless and destructive of wars in the world's history. But out of that tragedy an international conscience is being born, though the travail may be long and painful. There is at least evidence of a sense of sin and that is something new in international relations, though our consciousness, as usual, is mostly of the other party's sins. We may require still more suffering before we produce the fruits of repentance, but the developing of a conscience is a distinct gain.

From our survey of the past, we can now advance an answer to the question: Is progress a fact? In the large we can answer this question in the affirmative. But we cannot say that progress is a fact independent of human wills. There is indeed a movement of life, of the human species—a cosmic urge which is more than individual wills. In virtue of this we can say that we are more than we are and are wiser than we know. But this cosmic urge works through human individuals and because of this fact there has been a great deal of blindness and waste. If nature is prodigal in the evolution of species generally, it has also been so in the evolution of the human species. The advance of man has not been along a straight line with continuous cumulation of the past into the present. There have been tragic losses. Whole civilizations have been destroyed with little to show for them in the movement of history. The civilization of the Hittites is only one tragic example. A great deal of Greek civilization has been lost to us. We have only a few fragments of its incomparable art. A great deal of its literature is lost. We would give a great deal to possess Protagoras' work on *Truth* of which we have only two or three sentences. Roman civilization and medieval civilization made other contributions but those do not compensate for the loss. It is well to remember, however, that the living circulation of culture is not to be measured by the survival of the external embodiments of civilization. The influence of Hittite culture did go on in Egyptian and other cultures. Protagoras' influence is not to be measured by the

few sentences that have come down to us. He created an epoch in Greek thought and his influence still persists. We may say that there is "a destiny which shapes our ends." But this destiny works through human individuals. Life is more than individuals, but it can only exist and realize itself through generations of individuals. The only pervasive theme is the realization of human freedom, but this too might have been realized sooner and more effectively except for the blindness of human individuals.

What can we say of progress in the future in the light of the past? It is the tendency of our age to look forward rather than backward. The future looms bigger than the past. The ancients found the past more impressive than the future. The horizon of the future sat close on the present. But to what future can we look forward? We may believe that the human species is still evolving and that the biological nature of man is undergoing transformation. We do not know what we are to become because we do not know what we are in the stream of life. Judging from the past, we may believe that evolution will be in the direction of greater moral freedom. But we must make clearer what we mean by moral freedom. It is not freedom of the beast of prey, though the beasts of prey naturally lament the passing of this kind of freedom. It is *social* freedom—a freedom of cooperation and comradeship. It is a realization of life through mutuality, through sharing in one another's life. It is the freedom of friendship. It is freedom of life within a common bond. Moral freedom includes harmony. There can be no human realization without harmonious cooperation. A man must be a beast to regard only the satisfaction of his own appetites. All values worth striving for are social values. The reason that evolution works toward harmony is that there is strength in harmony. Individuals working together are better able to maintain themselves in the struggle for existence than unsocial individuals, however fierce and cunning. But harmony is not only strong in maintenance,

it is also strong for the future. Human beings who can work together in harmony in larger and larger unities will in the end possess the earth. This, I think, is the meaning of the saying: "The meek shall inherit the earth." Love is the strongest thing in the world, for men will give all for love, including their lives.

I know that there are those from Thrasymachus (in Plato's *Republic*) to Oswald Spengler who maintain that force determines human destiny. They tell us that "God is on the side of the strongest battalions"; that justice and love are mere lullabys to put man into pleasant dreams but have no effect on history. "World history," says Spengler, "is the world court, and it has ever decided in favor of the stronger, fuller and more self-assured life—decreed to it, namely, the right to exist, regardless of whether its right would hold before a tribunal of waking consciousness. Always it has sacrificed truth and justice to might and race, and passed doom of death upon men and peoples in whom truth was more than deeds and justice than power."[5] The same idea had been expressed long before Spengler and even more forcibly by Shakespeare's Richard the Third:

> "Let not our babbling dreams affright our souls:
> Conscience is but a word that cowards use,
> Devised at first to keep the strong in awe;
> Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law."

We may agree that history gives its award to the stronger. But the stronger in the end are those who are the more sympathetic and cooperative. Mere physical victors like Attila and Genghis Khan were soon effaced from the pages of history, and even they could not have existed except for a following which was loyal to them. The permanent results of victories depend upon the contending ideals, not just upon force, though it is true that in our blind world organized force has triumphed for the time being over superior cultures which lacked the spirit of military coopera-

5. *The Decline of the West*, Oswald Spengler, Vol. II, 507.

tion.

I do not deny that force plays a part in deciding human destiny. But we have learned only recently that mere military victory does not decide anything. Much, however, as I dislike to seem to give support to the stupidity of militarism, I dislike equally sentimental pacifism. Until we have a world of saints, we cannot always turn the other cheek. There are moments when righteousness and force must go together. The war on the gangsters in our midst has cost many splendid men. Yet who would say that the gangsters should have their way? And what about the international gangsters? There are great decisions in the life of humanity when men must fight for their ideals. I am grateful to the Greeks who fought at Marathon and at Salamis to save western civilization, to Aetius, the last of the Romans, for stopping the Huns, to Charles Martel for turning back the Moslems. There are crises when neutrality, however profitable, is treason to humanity. But we should use every means of persuasion before resorting to force; and if the offending party has a genuine grievance we should realize that the use of force alone will not bring peace. We should at all times, when fighting seems imminent, make sure that we are fighting for a principle and not for the munition makers. Since wars are due to economic causes, they can be averted by economic means. We could see to it that wars do not pay.[6]

One thing seems clear from past history: progress demands sacrifice. Humanity shall no doubt have to pay a high price for progress in the future, as it has done in the past. At best progress is tragic. Society will fight new ideals in the future as it has in the past, for society first of all fights to maintain itself. But the fight of argument

6. The irony is that the great capitalistic democracies, through their cowardice and egotism, have made wars profitable to the aggressors. They thus think to "appease" the aggressors, while making them only more rapacious. While weeping floods of sentiment for the victims of aggression, they find it too profitable to supply the aggressors with war material; at the same time that by a hypocritical theory of non-intervention they close the markets to the victims.

is more economical, and in the end more effective, than the breaking of heads. The best way to prevent revolution is to encourage free discussion. When dissatisfaction is boiling, it is safer to let the steam blow off in a normal way than to try to keep it down by sitting on the lid.

I can offer no Utopia. It is, has always been, and will always be a dangerous world in which man lives. No one would say it is the best possible world. But it cannot be the worst possible, if we can make it better. To accept the world as it is, is treason to the future. It is lying down on our job. But a world which gives the opportunity for creativeness—plastic to man's hope and faith and courage —may be the best sort of world for human beings after all. It is our destiny to be creators, and, by the grace of God, to help create the future. To fail to be creators is to make the universe fail. When we create greater harmony we are working with the universe.

No doubt one reason for our failure to make greater progress is due, as Dean Inge says, to the confusion and unworthiness of our ideals. "What we need," according to Inge, "is a fixed and absolute standard of values, that we may know what we want to get and whither we want to go. . . . Our ultimate aim is to live in the knowledge and enjoyment of the absolute values, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty."[7] Inge admits that "there must be advance in our apprehension of the ideal which can never be fully realized because it belongs to the eternal world." But in that case what becomes of *our* absolutes? Our human world is a world of relativity in which we must learn by trial and suffering to find the better way. There is, I think, a viable direction of history, but we must try to discover it.

A great deal has been said in the last generation about "historical relativity." It is true that we must understand ideas and institutions in their historic context. It is also true that this context gives the ideas and institutions convincingness to those who live in that context. But belief is

7. Ralph Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, pp. 181, 182.

not the only test of truth. In science we see another test: the conformity of ideas to the experience of the race and their success in guiding it toward further experience. Social ideals, too, are tested through their success as guides of life. They are not true merely because men believe in them at any one time. Historical relativity, in its true implication, means not merely relativity to a static context of historical conviction, but also relativity to the future—to new experience. There is progression, on the whole, toward greater adequacy. Of this the whole history of man's experimentation not only in material adaptation but also in social adaptation is evidence. While our experience gives us no absolutes, it does give us the distinction of truer and better. While we today are apt to stress *change* in social evolution, we should also note the *continuity* in that evolution. If we take the in-group—the group in which man lives—we find that the moral commandments are very much the same in substance in modern society as in primitive, however much the concrete details have changed. Thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not murder, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not bear false witness are universal commandments. When we come to the out-group, the other group, we still lack a moral code. But we all agree that there is great need of such a code.

One thing is certain; we shall not discover the better way by merely day-dreaming. We must do some hard thinking. Socrates' maxim: "virtue is knowledge," is part of the truth, if not the whole truth. We certainly shall not succeed by abandoning reason and leaving the verdict to force, as Spengler would have us do, or waiting for some supernatural inspiration, as Bergson would have us do. Force, we know to our sorrow, decides nothing. Inspiration is effective only when it is combined with careful thinking and experimentation. The great prophets of Israel were realists who tried to understand their times and counseled in the light of the facts. Mysticism, unenlightened by reason, becomes fanaticism. It breeds sects and persecu-

tion, instead of larger human unities. Even Bergson, when he is trying to find a way of making the League of Nations effective, suggests "an organizing intelligence," not a mystic, though in the great mystics feeling and intelligence have not been divorced. The higher standard of life comes at first as an inspiration to a few noble souls, but it comes as a profounder grasp of the meaning of life, and it proves itself in greater reasonableness, in showing the way to greater harmony of living. It is good sense, which in the long run commends itself to sensible people, because it is viable. It is true that our sentiments on the whole are better than our conduct, but it is only when our sentiments become thoughtfulness that they become effective.

For us the idea of progress as a working theory must be an ideal which our wills can effect and our striving in some measure make real. While we may hold with Plato that the Form of the Good has an objective reality and that it guides in some sense the cosmic process, in spite of the blindness and indeterminacy inherent in it, yet *we* at any rate must discover it and it will not be real in our world except as we earnestly and intelligently work for it. It is true, as Plato says, that everyone desires the good and not a make-believe substitute, yet *our* idea of the good, as Plato also pointed out, is confused and we pursue counterfeits a great deal of the time. Only experience of trial and suffering can show us the better way. The ideal of life is a time-form and not merely a space-form and must be progressively discovered by living.

The fault in our past theorizing about life is not that we have tried to analyze life. There can be no thinking without analysis, but our analysis has meaning only within a whole, and the whole of life is a dynamic whole. It includes the future. The fault in our philosophic thinking has been that it has stopped with analysis. It has erected its abstractions into timeless absolutes and forgotten their relativity. To try to substitute abstract categories for first-hand living is like substituting a menu for a real meal, to use an ex-

pression by William James. The categories and the menu are only significant as instruments in concrete realization.

But there are some general traits which it has proved helpful to consider as constants in our varying perspectives. There must be consistency in our efforts at the ideal. We cannot make progress by working at random without any constant aim, though the aim itself comes to have new meaning in the process. There must be freedom of thought and experimentation, if we are to advance. We must aim at economy. We must try to conserve and utilize the experience of the race; and we must aim at the least loss in realizing the unification of life, individual and social. We must try to be impartial in evaluating the values of life and not allow ourselves to be biased by personal and group centrism. We must be willing that the ideal for which we work shall be universal and not limited by our parochial interest, even though such conduct may involve sacrifice on our part. We must aim at such security of existence as will make progressive realization of life possible. Perhaps the trait of harmony may, as the Greeks thought, serve to unify all these demands. But in that case it must be dynamic harmony—harmony looking to the future as well as to the present and past—and not merely static harmony, for an ideal is always a program for the future. To organize the claims of life into an ideal of forward-looking wholeness, with fairness to all claims, with the least sacrifice of claims, and with the greatest possible security of realization, seems a satisfactory working conception of life.

But relativity haunts us. We must take account of *quality* and not merely quantity of life. What shall be the *criterion* on the basis of which we shall correlate and subordinate the various claims so as to produce a harmonious life? No doubt all men desire harmony. But what value shall be supreme? Here is the rub. We may strive for harmony at a higher level or at a lower level. But who shall be judge of higher and lower? When J. S. Mill introduced the criterion of quality he upset Bentham's neat quan-

titative calculus of values, for quality is an irrational. Bertrand Russell thinks that the greatest contribution which the Pythagoreans made to mathematics was the discovery of irrationals, though they are reported to have drowned the discoverer. The great problem of social evolution is precisely the problem of quality of life. Here lies the tragedy of progress, for the new insight into quality must come through individuals, and they must try to leaven the rest of the mass. And yet while a higher quality is an irrational, since it cannot be deduced from the past experience of the race, it is the basis of a higher rationality. It makes possible a higher harmony of life. After all, all quality is equally irrational, in that we must start with quality; and rationality shows itself in the correlation and integration of quality. The higher quality of life proves itself superior to the lower in that it makes life more meaningful to those who share the higher quality.

The only way we can comprehend quality is to live it. That is as true of spiritual quality as of sense quality. We must enjoy a certain quality of life in order to grasp its significance. We can only comprehend the lower or the higher quality of life by sharing it. In an eloquent passage in his *Utilitarianism*, J. S. Mill says: "It is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied; and if the pig and the fool are of a different opinion it is because they know only one side. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." But, in fact, Socrates can as little know the fool's universe of value as the fool can know that of Socrates. A man must be a fool to share a fool's quality of life and he must be a Socrates to comprehend Socrates' quality of life. In that fact lies the difficulty of persuasion. The higher quality of life is a cosmic gift in the evolution of life. It cannot be predicted. Like all gifts of genius it is a rare gift. But it is prophetic of a new society. It establishes a new sense of community. We that love music, poetry and righteousness can understand

one another and work together. And more will love the higher values as more have opportunity. We must begin with childhood if we are to form tastes. There is hope in the fact that not only evil spreads but good also spreads, and in the end good is more powerful for it is health, co-operation, well-being. Evil is self-defeating. The ideal of progress must be to realize the highest quality of value as well as the greatest quantity of value. In our maladjusted world, the two aims may not be consistent. But whatever our limitations in the sharing of values, we can work together to realize at least the minimum conditions of life.

The most vital question of all for us is: What steps can *we* take to promote the progress of the race? A generation ago great hopes were placed upon eugenics. Those hopes were premature. That is not saying that eugenics is not important. But first of all the eugenists should try to form a clear conception as to what we should breed for. Most of them seem to have prize-fighters in mind. It is clear now that we know too little as yet about human heredity to exercise any intelligent positive control. The emphasis, therefore, is upon negative eugenics. But we need to know more about the respective roles of heredity and environment. A hasty conclusion was drawn that all feeble-mindedness[8] is heritable and several states

8. "Mental deficiency or feeble-mindedness may also be a strongly inherited condition. But this is true only of 'primary amentia,' that is mental deficiency due to aplaria of the brain, a germ-plasm defect. These comprise less than one quarter of the feeble-minded; the other three quarters being due to inflammation or injury in infancy, before birth or during birth." Stanley Cobb, *A Preface to Nervous Disease*, 1936, pp. 155, 156. Cobb regards abnormality in endocrine secretions as concomitant rather than cause. Contrary to popular opinion, the size of the brain is not decisive evidence of comparative normality or abnormality. "Some of the largest and best developed brains are found in morons, so it appears that above the idiot level, mental development is not dependent on brain weight and convolutional development, but on some more subtle development that has so far eluded our laboratory methods. Possibly the theories of Bolton and the minute anatomical studies of Vogt on cortical architecture may lead us to a better understanding of these mental conditions." Cobb, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

based legislation on that assumption, but it is more probable, in the light of present evidence, that some feeble-mindedness, like dwarfishness and giantism, may be due to faulty secretion by the endocrine glands. Some of it is due to accidents in the embryological period or at birth. Such conditions may be controlled by science. Abnormalities which are due to the blood simulate heredity and may practically be as serious. We must be on the watch for diseases, such as syphilis and alcoholism, which poison the stream of life. We must begin the nurture of the child with the parents, if we are going to have normal offspring. In general, feeble-mindedness is more likely to occur when the parents are feeble-minded, but it does occur when both the parents are highly intelligent. In the meantime, feeble-mindedness is a serious social problem. Until we know more about the biological side of the problem and until we have better psychological tests, the best way is to segregate the feeble-minded in institutions where they cannot breed, where they are given proper medical as well as educational nurture, where they are given useful work to do and are made self-supporting. Frequent examinations should be given to determine their condition, physical and mental. Some states have tried this plan with satisfactory results. The feeble-minded are the most contented people in the world when they are well cared for, and their existence is comparatively brief. Unsexing the feeble-minded, and turning them loose does not solve the social problem as our juvenile and criminal courts conclusively show. Their greatest danger is in becoming the tools of the unscrupulous.

The feeble-minded constitute from one to two per cent of the population. They are harmless compared to the racketeers, legal and illegal. I would not say that racketeering is a Mendelian trait. Human nature is marvelously plastic and what it becomes is largely the result of environment. The eugenists must recognize that the social qualities are even more important than the physical

qualities. Plato thought that all philosophers and scientists must be athletes. But some geniuses have been physically unfit, yet have contributed significantly to human civilization. It is important that the race should be kept healthy and that it should breed in sufficient numbers to ensure its continuity. In regard to the latter problem, there is more need of intelligent restraint than wholesale encouragement, if the earth is not to be hopelessly overcrowded. Some lament that the children of the so-called upper classes are decreasing. But the upper classes have always been recruited from the lower classes, so there is no cause to worry. "History is the graveyard of aristocracies," says Pareto. So far as genius is concerned, it is certainly not heritable. It is a cosmic gift and may manifest itself in the humblest social strata as well as in the more favored, provided proper opportunity is given.

Since we cannot control the biological future of the race, except by keeping fit, the main problem becomes the control of the environment. Human nature has marvelous possibilities, when it is given proper incentive. Our immigrant population in the United States is striking proof of this fact. Many characteristics which we supposed to be race characters, have turned out to be due to undernourishment, as the statistics of Franz Boas strikingly show. There are, I think, three fundamental human rights: the right to be well-born, the right to be well-bred, and the right to work. As educators we are concerned with the proper culture of humanity and in the last analysis everything hinges upon proper education. We have become alert in regard to the physical side of education, but in regard to social education—the proper education for citizenship—we are largely confused and often insincere. Since educational institutions all depend in some way, directly or indirectly, upon public support, the tendency has been to educate people for things as they are. But if life is open to the future, education, to

be a guide of life, must also be open to the future. It must be based upon free research and free discussion, and above all upon an earnest desire to be creative—to make the world a little better than we found it. And the most urgent creativeness today is social creativeness—the making over of the social organization to express the evolution of man. Here we have the most tragic situation at the present time, and that means the greatest opportunity. The most critical need of social education lies in the realm of values. How shall we create an efficient motive for social progress? Spengler says: "Destiny is always young." But youth is not just a matter of years. It is a quality of open-mindedness, of venture. The difficulty with youth is getting the proper inspiration. It cannot get such inspiration from old age, meaning by old age not years, but social automatism. The guides must also have the spirit of youth, of adventure. But what shall the adventure be? Enthusiasm is not enough. It is not encouraging to watch the enthusiasm with which youth has embraced the fascist movement in various countries. The enthusiasm of youth needs to be wedded to a new ideal of humanity.

Plato, with his keen psychological insight, saw that the most dangerous sophist, the greatest corrupter, is not the ordinary demagogue, but the public sophist, by which he means the valuations which dominate society. If society regards the achieving of wealth as the most important value for which man can strive, you cannot wonder if youth turns its energy in that direction. In the Middle Ages the emphasis was upon salvation and the promoting of the Church which was the means of salvation. The Church in the Middle Ages furnished the only unlimited career for a man. Therefore the most energetic and brilliant youth of the Middle Ages took the vow of Chastity, Poverty and Obedience and created that marvelous civilization which culminated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—one of the high levels in Western culture. I

am mentioning this to show that youth is plastic and will follow the lead of social stimulus.

Our emphasis has been material and we have reaped the fruits in great cumulations of capital in the hands of the ambitious few. But the many have had the same scale of values. There is no particular virtue in failure. The irony is that the worshipers of the golden calf are likely to have to carry on their worship without the calf. But the deeper tragedy is that we have failed in the more fundamental values of human life. Creating of wealth is an important part of human civilization, but it is a means, not an end. The title to the wealth, which is becoming more and more empty, is of secondary importance. The important thing is whether wealth is used to promote spiritual realization and the higher man of the future. There are men who find absorbing satisfaction in research, in the creation of art, and in promoting human welfare, though the material reward may be a bare maintenance. Economic considerations *are* important: men should have sufficient security of material existence not to be distracted by worry. And such maintenance in comfort is possible for every man, if we exercise the intelligence and courage to make our social organization our servant, instead of our master.

But an adequate education must do more than enable us to meet our present problems, urgent though they be. It must be, in the words of Sir John Adams, a "cosmic education." It should be a consecration to the future of the race, to the larger destiny of which we are a part and of which we must be a creative part if that destiny is to be realized to the fullest extent. Our inspiration must become a religious inspiration. Every great movement takes on the character of a religion. The Medieval Church dreamed of the unification of mankind into a *civitas dei,* a city of God. Our modes of thinking have changed, but the need is the same: the unification of humanity into a moral unity in which mankind will sub-

ordinate its self-seeking, individual and national, to the common welfare of man. And as harmony is stronger than disharmony, and constitutes the line of survival, we can have the consciousness, and some have that consciousness, that in working for harmony, the universe—the cosmic spirit of creativeness—is not only on our side, but is working in us and through us for the realization of a higher humanity.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL IMMORTALITY

Man's conception of immortality varies with his social development. Primitive life is dominated by tradition. The group is all-important. There is little consciousness of individual creativeness. Customs and language grow for the most part unconsciously. No individual names are attached to early man's slow but epoch-making generalizations about life, nature, and the gods. Immortality becomes, therefore, primarily a continuity of breed. The individual can live only by proxy.

In the individualistic stage of man's development, when man's reason and conscience rise against antiquated traditions, or when he is called upon to choose between conflicting traditions; when, in any case, man must stand on his own feet and find the value of life in the deliverances of his inner experience, immortality comes to mean the conservation of the values of the newly discovered personal life. In early Christianity, the kingdoms of this world, its laws and institutions, even the family, are conceived as of the earth earthy. The individual must save his own soul. The end of the world is at hand.

In the third stage, the conception of immortality is socialized. Man finds his meaning and salvation in the social community with its continuity of life and ideals. The kingdom of heaven has now become a kingdom to be progressively realized in this world. Loyalty to the community and sacrifice for its progress now become dominant motives. The immortality of the individual and of the social group of which he is a part are now recognized to be reciprocal. Man must find his life and joy in creative service for the community. Unlike tribal man he is not a mere member of a community. But he recognizes in the community his own larger self. If he renounces himself, he

does so freely for the good of the group. His self-realization is also the realization of the community. His aim is not so much self-emphasis as the interpreting and improvement of the group life of which he is a part; not so much individual salvation as to lose himself in service and friendship. Social creativeness now becomes the end of life.

This consciousness of the solidarity of life seems at any rate to be gaining ground. With it there is less emphasis on individual immortality. We do not seem much concerned about it except at funerals. Just what individual continuity can mean is hazy to us. We have abandoned the ghost doubles of our savage ancestors. The supposed indivisibility of the soul, which gave such assurance of continuity to an earlier generation of thinkers, is small comfort to us with the psychology of multiple selves before us. What unity there is of life seems to be a unity of purpose; and this unity is achieved in working with our fellows for the realization of an ideal. The ongoing of individual life we conceive in terms of tendency and character, rather than in terms of memory as our ancestors did. In some way, it would seem, the net results of life must be handed on. But these results we must conceive again in social terms—the capacity for friendship, for enjoyment of beauty, for discovery of truth. If in some way our having lived makes us more attuned to the better part of the universe; if, under whatever circumstances we may reappear, we shall know our spiritual kin (even if we do not recognize all our former blood relations) and shall be better able to work with them for the realization of ideals, we feel that life has been worth while.

To us, at any rate, it seems that the chief end of life is to socialize mind, to give it a spiritualized body, be that body language, art or institutions. Whatever other form of immortality there may be, mind becomes immortal, in any case, when it thus succeeds in embodying its significant ideals. To a large extent at least this is the only

immortality which mind can have. For mind is not a static quantity. It continually radiates, it grows into new forms, and the old forms are lost as such, unless they are incarnated into bodies of their own.

We have exaggerated the continuity of individual history. Rather than call our life mind, we might call it a series of more or less over-lapping minds. It is not true that these minds interpenetrate absolutely. The old man does not own the mind of childhood and youth. Even though he may have some fragmentary memory of them, he looks back to them objectively. They are not he. The creations of these earlier minds lie outside his possibility and sympathy now. Sometimes he relies on objective records for even the existence of his earlier minds. And when he meets them, they seem strange to him, and often he even disowns them. Thus our souls, within our personal history, are ever passing into the past and ever being resurrected, sometimes against our wishes, and dragged into the light of day. Mind is not merely growth, but change and decay. The snowball may gather a great deal in the rolling, but it melts largely in the transit, if the day be long. If we continue to live forever, we may no more recognize our former selves than we recognize the amoeba as a former stage in our evolution or remember even the nearest pre-existence if there is any such.

We may for metaphysical reasons hope for personal immortality. We feel that a life of transcendent worth must, somehow, be conserved and continue into the beyond. We cannot, any more than Plato, reconcile ourselves to the thought that a personality like Socrates can disappear from the universe. Such a loss contradicts a deep-seated faith in the conservation of value. But if such a personality goes on it must be in the realm of spirit, not in the mortal world which we know. We may have a feeling that whatever has intrinsic worth must somehow be taken up into an enduring world of value, that a spirit of goodness in the universe must save that which has worth

from the vicissitudes of time. But this is an article of faith and beyond our grasp.

The only way that we can save our soul from moment to moment, irrespective of whether there is indefinite personal continuity, is by social creativeness. We must give the momentary soul an individual habitat. It is true that somehow our life history develops and runs its span in connection with this fleshly envelopment, but this is at best a sieve and does not hold mind. It is a fragile and transient instrument. Mind lives and expresses itself more truly in the body which it creates for itself in the social texture of human history. The physiological body conceals far more than it reveals. How thin and transparent, on the other hand, is the spiritualized body of mind in the form of language or art. Even as the gauzy drapery reveals the form of a beautiful woman, so this created embodiment of soul reveals soul. And as the universal body of language is our mutual creation, it reveals mind with an immediacy that the fleshly body cannot give.

In our understanding and appreciation of creative activity, soul truly shares soul. Mind overlaps as the common section of two circles. In the words of John the Scot: "Whoever rises to pure understanding becomes that which he understands. We, while we discuss together, become one another. For, if I understand what you understand, I become your understanding, and in a certain unspeakable way I am made into you." The same mind is ours as was Euclid's, when we understand his geometry, whatever other psychological fringes there may be. The symbols of Euclid are the eternal body of Euclid's mind. And so in sharing the hypothesis, the melody, the poem, we enter into real communion with the creator's soul. Could we have seen his fleshly body, could we have shaken his hand, we might not have gotten his mind so intimately as we do in his work. How often have we not found it a disappointment and hindrance to true spiritual appreciation to know the mortal man. And so we go back

to the symphony or book. Mind really lives in the systems of symbols with their relations of meaning. It continues as embodied will, pent up energy, ready to connect with other minds fitted to enter into converse with it. It may be but a brief moment of the life history, but it lives here, here is its habitat. It is not a photographic copy or model, but the genuine creative will itself. Here at any rate is real immortality.

Soul, then, does not require a physiological organism as its habitat and expression. It may have a block of marble or a book as its body. Some years ago I wandered through room after room of imitative and lifeless casts in the Boston Art Museum. But at length I came upon a battered Greek statue with only the folds of the garment left intact. Here there was a will, a mind that spoke from every fragment, as live and real as when it originated over two thousand years ago. The marble was but its transparent body, the real individual soul is still there. For soul, when it rises to a stage worth saving, is meaning, purpose; and who saves the meaning saves the soul and who shares the meaning shares the soul.

The spiritualized body of mind has one great advantage over the biological body. It helps us to dissociate mind—the real man—from its animal associations. How near is God to brute in our human organism. How much there is that jars upon us in the paltry routine of the mortal life of even the greatest personalities. How close to the animal the highest part of us lives in this physiological habitat. How unesthetic and even degrading are many of the functions of this biological existence and in many aspects below the wholesome innocence of the brutes. Let the mind make itself its own body where its own dignity and beauty can shine.

Often the soul has no other habitat for us than the marble, the symphony, the book, the remembrance in the hearts of others. If Homer, Phidias, Beethoven, have a continuous personal history in some unknown manner and

climate, they may be quite as incapable of reproducing or even appreciating the soul of their master works as was the later Tolstoy incapable of appreciating "War and Peace" or "Anna Karenina." How often an author outgrows a book from his own point of view, even disowns his spiritual child, while the generations after him still look upon it as the climax of his creative career.

Sometimes the imprisoned mind of the creator is lost for generations, even to the social consciousness, yet when we do come upon Taylor's Theorem or Mendel's Law or Praxiteles' Hermes, how significant and real they are! What a renaissance when Greek culture connects again with Europe! Even though the temporal parent has passed beyond human ken, the statue, the prophetic book, the nugget of wisdom still speak to us with an individual mind, independent of birth, time and circumstance. Just because it is a unique will, and not an abstraction, we dare not complete it when fragmentary. Schubert's "Unfinished Symphony" must remain unfinished.

How weird it is when at some moment you find your own past soul looking at you from a letter or poem or treatise and know it not. I look at my own mind of fourteen as a stranger. Kant and Plato enter more truly into my mind now than what I call myself at fourteen. Should I come upon some old letters or lost bits of verse, this mind would be resurrected, but the chances are it would at best be a matter of curiosity with me. My mother seems to own it more truly than I. She has treasured it in her love in my absence. In her loyalty it has indeed survived, but I can no longer own it as myself. In the words of Romain Rolland's Jean-Christophe: "For myself, I bid the soul that was mine farewell. I cast it from me like an empty shell. Life is a succession of deaths and resurrections. We must die, Christophe, to be born again." Yet while we thus slough off our past selves, we must not forget that they are important stages in the transformations of our spiritual life. Each stage, more-

over, in normal development has its own beauty, and it does not always follow that the last stage is the best. But since the stages cannot be preserved in the history of the individual, since youth and old age cannot coexist, we must save them in some other way.

Thus Shakespere hoped to save through his Sonnets what was most precious to him from the ravages of time. He wanted to rescue the beautiful youth, whom he loved, from "wasteful time," by engrafting him anew into his verse, by translating him into the context of social meaning.

"Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o'er-sways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?
O, how shall summer's honey breath hold out
Against the wreckful siege of battering days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?
O fearful meditation! Where, alack,
Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid?
O, none, unless this miracle have might,
That in black ink my love may still shine bright."

Shakespere would give the beautiful youth a spiritual body and preserve the transient charm of innocence and spontaneity. Even in such fragile beauty, love somehow can find the eternally significant, that which ever constitutes "the marriage of true minds." In discovering the meaning of loyalty to beautiful youth and in fixing this in poetry, love triumphs over change.

"Let me not to the marriage of true minds
Admit impediments. Love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove:

O, no! It is an ever-fixed mark,
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is the star to every wandering bark,
Whose worth's unknown, although his height be taken,
Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come;
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.
If this be error, and upon me proved,
I never writ, nor no man ever loved."

At least the eternity of love's loyalty to youth's spotless beauty can be put into verse. The youth may fall, time "delves parallels in beauty's brow," but the loyalty itself remains. And this loyalty Shakespere has indeed succeeded in making immortal. Shakespere has not been able, if indeed he so intended, to make the lovely youth as such triumph over time. The physical flesh-colored youth must go. Not even his mind could be made immortal by the poet's magic because there is nothing about the youth's mind that is truly individual—no great thought or aspirations that mark him from other beautiful youths. Love alone has individuated him to satisfy its eternal longing. To give him physical definiteness or even a name would but impede the imagination and defeat the aim of the poet which is to kindle in us his love—not of a great mind—but of innocent beauty. It is Hegel's paradox over again that pure immediacy is universal. In making immortal this type of loyalty, perchance Shakespere's own personal loyalty in spite of sordid change (for the youth seems to become a victim of a low woman), the poet has been incomparably successful. The loyalty of youth is a loyalty of emotion and can only be kept alive by the eternal feeding of the emotion; and this Shakespere has done in the sonnets where "in black ink my love may still shine bright." It is a subtle task where only the infallible in-

tuition of the great artist could have succeeded.

Can this transient beauty of innocent youth have any other immortality? If there is personal immortality, does it not mean change and growth and must not the beautiful boy pass into the deeper experiences of sin and triumph? We love the beautiful child as a beautiful child; and the mother may sometimes weep because she is going to lose her beautiful boy; but still we love the development of the boy, too. And normal personal life means just such promise of development where manhood supplants youth. Who would want the beautiful boy arrested and fixed? That would make him an immortal idiot. His only immortality as a beautiful boy, therefore, must be social, as love fixes him in memory or better still in art. But what it thus immortalizes is primarily the loyalty itself to such a type of beauty. We cannot stop the movement of life. This indeed would be violence to beauty itself. But we can seize the significance of each moment as a part of our social consciousness.

"Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do our minutes hasten to their end;
Each changing place with that which goes before,
In sequent toil, all forwards do contend.
Nativity, once in the main of light,
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crown'd,
Crooked eclipses 'gainst his glory fight,
And Time that gave doth now his gift confound.
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth,
And delves the parallels in beauty's brow,
Feeds on the rarities of nature's truth,
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow:
And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,
Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand."

His *own* mind Shakespere has succeeded in making immortal. Whatever immortality he may have now as a personal history, he has incarnated the series of beautiful

moments of a long creative career into the social tissue of humanity. His soul shines through "the black ink," it warms our love, we share the real mind of the sweet singer of Avon, and that is probably more than he can do if his personal history still goes on.

The old Norsemen were right that a living power dwells in the constellation of the runes—more magic than the artificial power which they had in mind. Whoever has become acquainted with Plato's dialogues knows what subtle power they have to transform one's thought. No one has come thoroughly under the spell of Plato without having become, perhaps unconsciously, his disciple. It is not a dead Plato, but a living soul with which he deals. The 'procession' from the mind of Plato is ever going on afresh, stimulating and subduing minds. Thus mind moves over periods of time as over distances of space. Plato's mind, the real Plato, is immortal. And Plato, in the variety and comprehensiveness of his contribution, seems to have sent forth his whole soul through the ages.

The Stoics distinguished between the Logos as unspoken thought, the inner psychical function, and as thought expressed in word and act.[1] This distinction caused much discussion when taken up into the theological thought of the Christian fathers and applied to the Father and the Christ. The distinction is an artificial one at best. They were inclined to make being and its manifestation separate entities by personifying them, thus hampering the human mind for ages by a fanciful theology. But their intuition was wiser than their abstractions: Thought and expression go together. The existence of mind is inseparable from its procession into its objective expression. The "Word" as the expression of thought carries the living soul with it. The fulness of the mind overflows in the expression; and the mind expressed is mind of the original mind, "light of light, very God of very God, of one substance with

1. See Ralph Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, 1907, p. 44.

the Father." In the golden sayings handed down, in the living tradition of the community, the early Christians, and the loyal followers in all ages, have recognized the soul of the Master, potent to comfort and to help, to give inspiration and energy for the triumph of the cause. All conditions of men, poor and rich, ignorant and learned, have thus come to recognize the mind that was in Christ Jesus, which the loyal have also recognized as the mind of God.

So it seems that he who would save his soul must create. Only thus can the moment live after the material substance, and memory with it, have vanished like a dream. When one gets old and the evil days draw nigh and one fears the decay of one's faculties, then one begins to realize with almost tragic seriousness the importance of saving something from the Destroyer. But then as a rule it is too late to save anything worth while. Youth is the summer of creative growth, and the autumn at best is good for garnering the harvest and setting one's house in order. Even though nature here too may have its Indian Summer, it does not come unless the real summer of creative ambition has somehow preceded.

What we must cultivate, therefore, is the spirit of creativeness. This is the most effective way of saving the soul, not only of the individual, but the soul of the group as well. For the greater an individual is the more fully is he the focus of the people and the age whose psychic currents meet in him. Not only has Plato given us his own mind but also the genius of the Greek mind which carried him on and to which he in turn helped to give immortal direction. This direction continues as a fundamental theme in human history.

In the end our progress must be measured by our contribution in the way of ideal creativeness. The passion for immortality measures the greatness alike of a people and an individual. Great material resources and their manipulation are but instruments to the spirit's emanci-

pation and expression. It is small credit to us that with our immense population and wealth we are lagging behind some of the smaller nations of Europe in genuine creative output. A thousand years from now the world will have far more interest in the fact that this nation produced Edgar Allen Poe's lyrics, Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Scarlet Letter" and Walt Whitman's "Leaves of Grass" than that it made possible the immense fortunes of Rockefeller and Carnegie. Let us not sacrifice soul to matter, the end to the means, the purpose to the instrument. Let us measure our resources in the results of truth, institutions, and beauty for the good and joy of all.

Ideal creativeness like love feeds on encouragement. Humanity probably never has lived up to its limit in this respect. The reason that creativeness has come in great pulses in human history, such as the great Greek period, the Augustan age, the Elizabethan age, is not due to greater capacity for creativeness in such periods, but to greater incentive—to an intense social consciousness for creativeness. Such epochs have been inspired by the consciousness that he that thinks a new thought, paints a new picture, creates a new melody, brings new mind into the world and that humanity is infinitely his debtor. The fact that some small countries today, such as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Finland are doing so much more than their proportionate share is due doubtless to the strength of social appreciation in those countries. With greater economic freedom, greater opportunities for education, greater sympathy of man with man, the joy of doing and sharing in ideal activity ought to increase at least tenfold.

Mere brute material competition will then be converted into the infinite and friendly possibilities of ideal rivalry. Genius will then spend its inventiveness in the service of the many instead of in irrational material accumulation and the consequent slavery to the instrument. Whether master or slave in this despotism, one is tyrannized over by the system. And as Hegel showed long ago, the master is more

damned by the relation than the slave, at least in so far as he fails to become conscious of real human claims through productive social work. It should be clear at any rate that society is not dependent merely upon a competition for property to furnish incentive to effort. This is a comparatively low kind of emulation at best. I have often watched a couple of dogs struggling for the possession of a stick. And one can imagine that if there were a dog's philosophy they might reason that life would become horribly inane if there were no sticks for which to compete. And perhaps it would for dogs.

Social creativeness takes different forms in different ages in accordance with the ruling passion of the age. Greek creativeness was a birth in beauty. The passion for beauty was a motive for them not only in artistic creativeness, but in their search for truth and in their striving for moral perfection. With the Romans the interest was in social organization—the legal and military unification of the world. With the Middle Ages religion became the dominant motive; and so we have theological architectonic and Gothic cathedrals—philosophy and art being alike handmaids of religion. Today the dominant motive is social justice, the harmonization of human claims, the liberty of man, woman and child. If he that is instrumental in saving an individual soul shall shine as a star in eternity's firmament, how much more he who is a creative factor in improving a community, a fundamental institution, a nation; who helps to bring about new unities of cooperation, whether local or international; who brings us to see that in spite of all disparities of race and condition "a man's a man for a' that."

I have emphasized so far the personal form of social immortality—the survival of a soul in the unique spiritual mansion which it has built for itself. But there are also the more impersonal forms of creativeness—the survival in the moral causality of history. And, sometimes, the will may the more completely fulfil its end for the alabaster box breaking and the ointment pervading the atmosphere of the race.

The great souls, the great leaders of men, have often been careless of personal survival. They have written their words in the sand of the fleeting memories of men. They have cast their golden grain in all kinds of soil—hopeful that some might reach a harvest. Thus worked Socrates, Confucius, the Buddha, the Christ. They are greater for their complete abandon to the eternal human cause, for losing themselves. Yet even here we are grateful for a few "words" recorded by their disciples against forgetfulness, for a few personal touches which those that loved them treasured in story. The great movements would seem less effective were their creators mere myths to us. The personal consciousness, however vague, helps to give their influence a focus; and fortunately the artist can here, almost unhampered, give their minds bodies which correspond to their spiritual stature.

But the large mass of human beings, what social consolation is there for them? The many, the forgotten ones, do they still count? They can hope for no personal immortality in the records of men. Yet by losing themselves in the great social mind of which they are part, they can help create the spiritual situations which make artists, scientists, and prophets. It is their combined willing which raises the few. The latter are the index of the spiritual sacrifice and appreciation of the many, and would be impossible otherwise. What ages of spiritual creativeness it took to make a Homer. The numerous unknown balladists gave Homer his material, his sense for song. And the appreciative listeners who gathered round the blind minstrel, lived, enjoyed and applauded his song—they counted too; they gave strength, inspiration and vital faith to his soul. Homer's genius (whatever that name may stand for) moulded into unity, not merely the mass of material before him, but what is more, the soul of a people of whose life his song became the chief index and expression. Lincoln's greatness lies in the fact that he is the creative and loyal interpreter in act and speech of the idealism of a great nation that "govern-

ment of the people, by the people and for the people," not only shall not perish from the earth but be progressively realized through the sacrifices of devoted individuals in war and peace. It is the faith of the loyal, unknown many that buoys up the leader, at the same time that he furnishes them a new consciousness of direction, interprets their deeper will. To live in this larger subconscious social mind, as a genuine, vital, inspiring part of its faith and movement and to be able to say in supreme renunciation, not I but the social mind which liveth in me, this is indeed to save one's soul, to count eternally. And in the infinite ages, God only knows which is the more significant in the developing spiritual community where to live is to lose oneself, to be master is to minister. After all what will a name mean in a hundred thousand years?

If individuals can thus achieve immortality through social creativeness, so can communities and nations. It has been the custom to speak of nations as having a growth and history like individuals—as having a childhood, youth, maturity, and old age. There is, of course, truth in this. Nations start from simple origins. In their struggle for survival and in their rivalry with other nations, they become conscious of their life. They develop institutions and traditions to meet their needs; and in so doing they draw upon the accumulated tradition of the race. They thus go through a learning process analogous to that of the individual. They are not, however, dependent upon a single physiological history as individuals are. They have the advantage of a stream of ever renewed biological life. They can live through cycles of rhythms. They become old, it is true—crystallized in traditions and customs; but the inner life may break through afresh, with new youth and creativeness, to live through the process of organization and formalism again. Thus new plateaus of culture are established. And thus it would seem the spiral of cycles might go on indefinitely.

It is true, as a matter of fact, that nations have had a

limited life in the past. This has been due in part to internal, in part to external causes. Wealth, with its consequent idleness, luxury and dissoluteness; class strife and local differences of interest—these and other causes have tended to sap the nation's strength from within, while international wars and degrading international contacts have endangered its existence from without. Perhaps the most potent cause of national degeneracy has been war—civil and external—both from the depleting of the stock of the nation and from its dissolving influence on morality. Athens never recovered from the Peloponnesian wars, nor Rome from the civil wars. While, however, nations have thus had a limited biological existence in the past, it does not follow that they have any natural span of life. In the case of the individual organism, science has just begun to investigate the chemical causes of death and to try to discover means for keeping at bay the last enemy. As the causes of national mortality are due to social maladjustments and are fundamentally moral, we may hope that an intenser consciousness of the obligation of man to man, past, present and future, reinforced by a more vital religion, may stave off the enemy of national death.

What is more important, however, than the biological and political continuity of a nation is the continuity of its mind—its ideal immortality. And here, as in the individual, the social immortality of the nation, as embodied in its institutions, its literature, its science, its art, is quite independent of its organic continuity. While the independent political existence of the Athenian nation came to an end and its illustrious history as a cultural centre also terminated, the reality and potency of the Athenian mind did not cease. Not only did this mind make Rome subject to itself, but in every domain of cultural activity we are still dominated by Greek influence. In like manner we recognize our dependence upon the organizing genius of the Romans. We have incorporated their laws and institutions into our growth. No less real is our in-

debtedness to the ancient Hebrews. We worship a Hebrew God; we have adopted their prophets as our own; and are held within the sway of their ideals. First hand contact with the civilization of these peoples means a first hand acquaintance with their mind. And when continuity with this mind is established, consequences flow from it as real as though the mind inhabited a biological body. Fresh contact with the Greek mind means a renaissance in science and art; first hand acquaintance with the ancient Hebrew prophets means moral and religious reformation. Practically considered such a mind must be as real as the consequences it produces. As human tissue can now be kept fresh under artificial conditions for a period after the death of the individual, and can function again as part of a living organism, so the mind of a people embodied in the vehicles of ideal creation is kept alive and ever ready to render fresh service and inspiration. The advantage that meaning has over body is that it can exist in an indefinite number of places at the same time, with the same reality. Its vehicles can be constantly renewed by the race and thus the life of the meaning kept intact.

Thus the past has its own reality, which we must respect even if we must ever translate its meaning into our own experience to make it significant for us. This social immortality of a people is far more real than its biological or political continuity. While the Greek nation of today is justly proud of its temporal continuity with the civilization of Pericles, it had for a long time less share in that civilization than other parts of Europe and can own it in no other way than can the other culture nations. It is possible for a people to lose its political existence and yet to continue its creative individuality, ever enhancing its national immortality and potency. Thus Scotland has continued its national creative tradition unhampered and with unabated glory as part of a larger empire; and Finland, against tremendous odds, has elicitated the admiration and sympathy of the world as a creative nation. If

a small nation is handicapped in the competition of armaments with the larger nations, it can, as the small nations of western Europe have shown, build an ideal empire and outstrip the large nations in that which really measures the greatness of a people—its contribution to the cumulative civilization of the world.

Social minds, then, like individual minds, may become immortal, not only as impersonal influences in the stream of history but as individual souls, when they embody permanent and universal purposes; when they express, clearly and distinctly, essential human types. Thus the Greek mind, the Hebrew mind, the Roman mind, the Medieval mind remain as living vitalizing unities in spite of the vicissitudes and changes of temporal events. In their spiritualized bodies of language, tradition, art, science, institutions, and religious symbols, they continue to live an individual existence. And in the enveloping historic process, with its growth and unification, they continue to contribute their vital energy long after the temporal individuals, who once were their bearers, have passed from the scene. Social minds, like individual minds, are subject to the law of survival. They persist by no external fiat, but by their capacity for leading and for furnishing permanent objects of appreciation. Whether they shall live forever in the changing cosmic weather depends upon whether they are unique embodiments of an eternally significant idea, the incarnation of a divine insight.

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